

## **Abstract**

### Designing Effective Negotiating Teams for Environmental Disputes: An Analysis of Three Wolf Management Plans

by

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Success of a negotiating team in an environmental dispute depends to a large extent on the how the team is designed. Who is chosen, how they are chosen, and what they are expected to do will have a profound effect on the negotiations.

Three team designs for negotiating disputes over wolf management in Alaska, British Columbia and the Yukon are examined. Faced with a complete impasse over the issue, each of the three areas decided to form citizen teams to try to reach a consensus on wolf management. Two of the teams (Alaska and British Columbia) were unable to develop lasting agreements, while the third (the Yukon) produced a plan which has broad support and has been endorsed by the government.

Teams are more likely to be effective when given greater authority, when their task is a complete and meaningful whole, and when the ultimate purpose is a meaningful one which all of the team members view as important. Teams are also more likely to work when the convening agency sees its role as steward—and the public's role as that of owner—of the resource. Agencies can provide technical support, but it is the team's responsibility, in representing the larger public, to determine the social and ethical priorities. The team then becomes much like a jury brought together to weigh the evidence and make the tough judgment calls. To have lasting impact, teams must also produce a written agreement which includes both a vision of where management should go and a clear road map for how to get there.

Finally, politicians and agency administrators must understand the fundamental difference between traditional advisory committees and consensus processes. A consensus agreement is not a smorgasbord an agency can pick and choose from. It is a house of cards that must either be taken as a package or rearranged with extreme care. Agencies must also be prepared to commit to the process, take an active role in it, and uphold their end of the agreement. If an agency is not prepared to accept this level of commitment, a traditional advisory group would be the process of choice.

If these caveats are adhered to, an EDS team can achieve significant results—even in cases where fundamental values are involved—and the agency, the public, and the resource itself can benefit greatly.

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An Analysis of Three  
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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(Natural Resources and Environment)  
in The University of Michigan  
1995

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To the  
Team Members,  
who taught me much  
about courage, perseverance  
and conviction

# Acknowledgments

I could not have completed this effort without considerable assistance from a terrific team of supporters. I would not have attempted the project without the faith and encouragement that my supervisor, Dr. Carol Lewis and many of the crew at the University of Alaska Department of Resources Management gave me. A very special thanks to all of you.

I am also indebted to Dr. Julia Wondolleck at the University of Michigan. I have gained so much under her guidance. She has a remarkable ability to see through the details and understand the big picture. A master at the art of constructive criticism, she encouraged me to compare these three cases and taught me how to probe more deeply. When I was struggling, she encouraged me. When I was overwhelmed, she gave me direction.

I would like to thank Dr. James Crowfoot for his insight, his instructive comments and for pushing me to dig deep and wide.

I enjoyed the friendship and benefitted from the considerable knowledge of Katharine Richardson who has been studying and collecting information on wolf management disputes for many years. She found many rare newsletters, memos and other documents I needed (and several others I didn't *realize* I needed). I also valued her counsel and comments.

I am grateful to Robert Schults, who reviewed drafts chapter by chapter, and told me not to be afraid to "tell the whole story"—that brevity has its virtues, but thoroughness also has its place.

Roger Kaye, a born writer and longtime friend, was gracious enough to pack along a hefty draft and do a thoughtful editing while conducting a caribou census in his beloved Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. I also benefitted from his considerable knowledge and enthusiasm for the great literature on wilderness.

Alan Jubenville read several chapters and said wonderful things like "It looks nearly finished to me." Don Pendergrast gave me thoughtful comments and often said, "You'll get there," which was music to my ears. I am grateful to John Bailey for imparting his wisdom on the art of facilitation, for his honest opinions on an early draft (and for his sense of humor in conveying them to me!)

I was extremely fortunate to have the opportunity to speak and correspond with all of the respondents who were so patient with my endless questions and so open with their concerns, opinions, and their feelings. They placed considerable trust in me and I have tried to treat their confidences with the sensitivity and respect they most certainly deserve. Their thoughts and insights enriched me.

Last but not least, to two people who gave so much of themselves for this project, my children Todd and Erica. We have spent too little time together the last three years. I recently told them that I would be finished very soon, and my five-year-old daughter said,

“When I’m 80, right Mom?” Well, kids, we best head for our favorite fishing hole before we’re too old to make it, don’t you think?

## Preface

This study is not about wolves. It is about people and their clash of values in a changing world. Listening to these people and reading the interview transcripts time and again was a rich and moving experience. The respondents had opened their hearts, for this had clearly been a major endeavor for them all. I gained an appreciation for the courage, hard work and perseverance these efforts required of them and became so enamored with many of the quotes that it was a painful process to decide which passages to keep and which to leave behind.

I realized that their story might best be told much as I had heard it—in their voice rather than my own. The quotations provide a more vivid, more complete, more accurate—and therefore more scientific—account of what happened because they capture more than just a sterile chronology of events.

They capture the often powerful physical, emotional, and cultural impact those events had on the people involved.



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## List of Abbreviations

ADFG	Alaska Department of Fish and Game
AOC	Alaska Outdoor Council, a pro-hunting organization
ANCSA	Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971
ANILCA	Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 1980
AWA	Alaska Wildlife Alliance, an organization opposed to wolf control
BATNA	Best alternative to a negotiated agreement
BC	British Columbia, Canada
BCME	British Columbia Ministry of Environment and Parks
the Board	The Alaska Board of Game
the Branch	The Wildlife Branch of the BCME or the Yukon Renewable Resources Dept.
CP	Hans Bleiker’s term for citizen participation
CYI	The Council of Yukon Indians
EDS	Environmental dispute settlement
EIS	Environmental impact statement
FLPMA	Federal Land Use Policy and Management Act
GMU	Game Management Unit (in Alaska)
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
NAEC	Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Fairbanks
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NWPS	Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society (British Columbia)

# Part One

## Introduction



# Chapter 1.

## Research Objectives and Methods

*Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful,  
committed citizens can change the world.  
Indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.*

*—Margaret Mead*

### I. Overview

During the past fifteen years, as public planning has become increasingly complex and controversial, consensus building approaches have met with considerable success in settling many types of disputes. One of the first environmental disputes to be resolved through a consensus building approach was the conflict over the proposed Snoqualmie Dam in Washington State (Cormick and McCarthy, 1974). Now consensus building approaches, and the more narrowly defined field of environmental dispute settlement (EDS), are being used with increasing frequency to help settle disputes.

The difference between EDS and traditional approaches is “the level of true collaboration and involvement of non-decision makers with the decision making authorities” (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 22). Susskind and Cruikshank indicate that a consensus process should be ad hoc, informal, supplementary to more conventional processes, restricted to distributional (rather than constitutional) issues, and, of course, decisions must be made by consensus. Consensus is often misunderstood as an agreement which does not require compromises and which delights all parties. But this is not the case. Consensus should be thought of as a *package agreement*—often a package of compromises—which each party can *live with* because it attends to their *most important* concerns. In most cases, it is difficult to achieve consensus, but it is a much stronger form of agreement than majority rule.

In general, consensus approaches recognize that it takes only one dissatisfied group to derail a plan and that planning involves many judgment calls. In addition, they emphasize involving representatives of all the potentially affected interests in each of the steps toward settling the dispute. It is widely agreed that consensus building approaches

have the following basic elements in common (Bingham 1986; Carpenter and Kennedy 1988; Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987):

- representatives of all the potentially affected interests are invited to participate
- at least some of the issues to be discussed must be negotiable (i.e. the representatives are willing to compromise on them)
- representatives are involved in more than a “reactive” capacity
- representatives engage in face to face dialogue
- the agenda and protocols are developed jointly
- data are acquired and analyzed with direct participation of the citizen group
- alternatives are developed and evaluated collaboratively
- decisions are made on the basis of a consensus of all those involved
- the stakeholders continue to be involved in monitoring implementation

Success in each of these elements—and in the negotiations as a whole—depends to a large extent on who is chosen, what they are expected to do, how they are expected to do it, the quality of any written agreement, and the extent of political support. I refer to these factors as the elements of team design and I define an EDS “team” as a group of individuals from a wide range of interests convened by a public agency, usually on a temporary basis, to deal with a specific environmental dispute.

While there is general agreement that these factors are important, there has been little empirical research focused explicitly on these critical components of the negotiation process. Those contemplating the question of whether to enter into an EDS process face many key decisions. Does it matter who chooses the participants? Should participants represent just themselves or organizations? When should the citizen team be disbanded? How much authority should the team have in setting policy? The EDS literature discusses many of the options available under each of these issues, and it points out some of the advantages and disadvantages of different choices, but there are no definitive answers to these fundamental questions.

An EDS process can take anywhere from a few months to several years to complete and can require considerable time, effort, and expense on the part of everyone involved. Therefore, it is vital to determine if some team design options are more likely to be successful than others. Agencies and potential negotiators are interested in establishing such teams, but too little data is available for them to make informed decisions. It is imperative that researchers make every effort to direct agencies toward the most effective team design so that the true promise of collaborative efforts can be realized. This study represents an early step in understanding what the key variables are in designing EDS



teams and what effect changes in these variables may have on the outcome of negotiations and the ultimate stability of the final agreement.

## II. Two Research Objectives

### ***To develop a model of effective team design***

The EDS literature discusses many of the options for establishing an EDS team. However, it does not examine the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches in any detail nor has it provided empirical research specifically targeted to determine what aspects of the design seem most effective. The organizational management literature is an extensive source of research and information on teams—i.e. what can we learn about teams from corporations such as Honda? While at first it may seem that a team on an assembly line and a wolf management team would have nothing in common, I believe this study will demonstrate that in fact much can be learned from this research. Merging these two diverse bodies of literature can provide new insights into what makes effective teams.

Based on these two bodies of literature as well as personal experience, this study compiles a list of criteria which form a preliminary hypothesis—or model—of what constitutes effective team design. These criteria will then be tested in three cases to see if they do appear vital to team success. Based on a comparison of the criteria developed in the literature review and the results of the three cases, this study will then refine the preliminary model of what factors, if any, are *essential* for the team to be effective and which appear to be highly recommended.

Because this is an exploratory study, it will not be possible to determine definitively what the best design is (indeed, because team design is at least partly an art, this may never be determined precisely). However, it should be possible to develop a theory of the best way to structure a negotiating team and what some of the pros and cons are of different options. This theory should then be tested in future research.

At a minimum, this research should contribute to the identification of major variables and relationships regarding team design, which is a preliminary step in understanding any complex system. Other desired outcomes include potential practice improvements and questions for further inquiry.

### ***To provide a detailed portrait of three EDS processes***

In addition to shedding light on effective team design, a primary objective of this study is to provide an intimate portrait of the intensely human struggle involved in

environmental dispute settlement. Some case studies, in their brevity, make it appear that reaching a solution was simply a matter of following a recipe. But in most cases, it is a tough, emotional, and very complex process.

I will attempt to give the reader a front row seat to three EDS processes by using my informants' own words—words rich in detail, brimming with color and spoken straight from the heart. Certainly their experience dispels any notion that there are simple answers to these questions.

### III. Defining Team Design

Team design is the set of characteristics which need to be considered when a team is established. This must not be construed as a process of establishing a committee of “yes people” to rubber stamp a predetermined decision. Fairness, honesty, openness, and *trust* are essential ingredients in establishing an EDS team.

The model proposed in Figure 1-1 indicates that there are likely to be two principal determinants of team effectiveness: team design and other factors. Other factors include such things as the demographics of the local population (age, income, education level, etc.), as well as the regional setting and cultural norms. These factors are not likely to be controlled by the designers of a team.


The model also postulates that there are five basic factors which those convening a team must consider. I refer to them as the “Five Ps” of team design:

- 1) Participants
- 2) Purpose
- 3) Process
- 4) Politics and
- 5) Product

Three of these—the “internal variables”—occur at the team level and include the participants, the purpose and the process, i.e. who will be on the team, what will they be asked to do and how will they do it? Political and agency support is external to the team but critical to the success of the effort; thus it must also be considered in designing the team. As shown in Figure 1-1, these four factors have both a direct and an indirect effect on team effectiveness. For reasons discussed below and in Chapter 2, they have a direct effect on team success. They also have an indirect effect through the quality of the fifth factor—the “product.” In EDS processes, this generally takes the form of a written agreement.

- 1) **What—The Purpose**—Team effectiveness is definitely influenced by the task the group must do—its complexity, uncertainty and the degree of collaboration required of team members to complete the task. Just what is the team expected to do? Is the task realistic? Is the dispute ripe for settlement? How compelling and inspiring is the task? Is there a sense of urgency? Will the team be making recommendations or actually setting policy?
- 2) **Who—The Participants**—Who should be included on the team? How should the members be chosen? Who will select them? What criteria should be used in selecting participants? Who should the participants represent? How many people should be on the team?
- 3) **How—The Process**—Is a capable facilitator present? How does the group approach discussion of the issues (group norms, use of subgroups, building on areas of agreement, frequent self-evaluation of the process, etc.)? Does the team have deadlines? How many meetings will they have and how frequent will they be? Should the team remain active after an agreement is reached?

**Figure 1-1**  
**The “Five Ps” of Team Design**



**4) Political and Agency Support**—How will the team make the essential political connections to ensure their agreement is implemented? Has the current government sanctioned this effort? Are those with authority involved? What is the prevailing public opinion on the issue? What is the relationship between the team and the agency? How extensive is the support within the agency? Does the agency feel threatened by the team?

**5) The Product**—If the team is expected to reach an agreement of any sort, it is preferable that the agreement be in writing. The quality of this product can affect the ultimate success of the team. Was it specific enough to avoid problems of misinterpretation later? Did it define clear goals and indicate steps to reach them? A good quality written product can have a lasting impact.

All five factors are important. An EDS team may have the right participants, an appropriate purpose and political support, but have a poorly-conceived process which ultimately makes the group ineffective. Likewise, if a team has the right participants, purpose, process and political support, yet they do not produce a clear and adequately-detailed written agreement, they are unlikely to have a long-term impact on the dispute.

## IV. Defining Team Effectiveness

The basic outcome variable is the “effectiveness” of the team. What do we mean when we say a team is effective or successful? There are ways to judge success. The following criteria will be examined in an effort to define the level of effectiveness of each case. I should point out that, while the words effective and success are used interchangeably in this study, I prefer “effective” because it implies something competent and sufficient, but “success” can imply something more dramatic or spectacular.

### ***Was it fair?***

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 21) identify four characteristics of a good negotiated settlement: fairness, efficiency, wisdom, and stability. The best way to determine fairness, in their approach, is to “evaluate the attitudes and perceptions of the parties most affected” (1987, 24). They suggest four tests: 1) Was the offer to participate genuine, and were all the stakeholders given a chance to be involved?; 2) Were opportunities provided for systematic review and improvement of the decision process in response to concerns of the stakeholders?; 3) Was the process perceived as legitimate after it ended, as well as when it began? and 4) In the eyes of the community, was a good precedent set? Would the participants use such a process again?

The importance of including the members' assessments has also been emphasized by anthropologist Helen Schwartzman (1986, 261) in her evaluation of research on team effectiveness:

Almost all researchers in this area seem to have imposed their own criteria of work group effectiveness onto the groups that they have studied (criteria such as task performance, task completion, goal attainment, productivity, and decision quality) without considering the fact that the members of a work group may have their own very different views of what constitutes “work” as well as “effectiveness.”

Another important indicator of fairness is the extent to which the effort advances social justice and empowers groups who currently lack social and political power.

Citizens who take advantage of public meetings and get appointed to citizen advisory councils tend to be of higher socioeconomic status than the community at large (Gittell, 1980; Kathlene and Martin 1991). According to these authors, inner-city neighborhoods, welfare recipients, and minority groups are often under-represented in such forums; these groups are also less likely to form independent advocacy groups, thus limiting their ability to influence public policy. But from an ethical standpoint, a process must involve these groups if they are potentially affected by the result.

### ***Was it efficient?***

Susskind and Cruikshank determine efficiency in terms of whether the process cost more, whether it took more time than traditional processes, and whether any joint gains were left on the table. In their study of “failed” mediations, Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986, 65) found “the most concrete benefit indicated by the participants as contributing to their perception that mediation had 'succeeded' was reduction in time spent, expenses paid, and delay encountered in mediation, when compared with adjudication or regulatory hearings.”

### ***Did the team meet its purpose?***

One criterion for the success of many endeavors is whether the effort met its original purpose. If the purpose was simply to discuss the issues, was that purpose met? If a team set out to reach agreement on broad policies, did they do so?

### ***Did the team reach consensus?***

If the goal of the group was to reach a consensus agreement, then the members and the conveners are likely to use this as a measure of their success (although, as discussed below, it should not be the only measure). The pinnacle of success is often perceived as a process in which the parties reached consensus on all of the key issues and were able to see their consensus agreement implemented. However, it is also quite respectable to reach agreement on many, but not all of the issues. The “worst case” scenario is one in which no agreements were reached.

### ***Was a written consensus agreement produced?***

The literature also emphasizes that a written agreement helps both to ensure that all parties are agreeing to the same thing and to eliminate some problems in recollection and

interpretation. Also, while team members themselves may move on, a document can have lasting impact. Therefore, if reaching agreement was part of the purpose of an EDS process, then it is reasonable to include this as a criterion of success.

If, however, the purpose of the process was simply to exchange information or discuss the parties' interests, then it would be inappropriate to use an agreement as a measure of success (in which case the next two major criteria—the wisdom and the stability of the agreement—would also be inappropriate measures).

### **Quality of the written agreement**

To have lasting impact, the quality of the document is also important. Certainly, group effectiveness is related to the quality of their decision: “if a group is established to make a decision, then effectiveness for that group would be gauged in terms of the merits of the decision produced” (Guzzo 1986, 50). Hackman (1990, 6-7) concurs and proposes the following criterion for team effectiveness:

the degree to which the group's productive product, service, or decision meets the standards of quantity, quality, and timeliness of the people who...use that output

This subject will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, but it is also related to the wisdom of the agreement.

### **Wisdom of the agreement**

If an agreement was reached, then—according to Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 30)—“a wise settlement is one that contains the most relevant information...Both sides must participate in an effort to minimize the risk of being wrong.” In other words, Is the agreement technically accurate? Is it based on adequate, reliable data? Are the resources involved conserved as a result of the decision? Is the approach sustainable over the long term? Have irreversible decisions been made and if so, are these acceptable in the long term? What are the possible negative environmental impacts (including cumulative impacts) and are they acceptable? What is the risk of being wrong?

Aldo Leopold (1949, 262) gave us this well-known yardstick for measuring the wisdom of a natural resource decision: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”

In the field of resource management, the term “resource” is generally taken to mean elements of the natural world *except* humans. But people are a resource, too. It is now

generally accepted that all species have an inherent right to exist. Does this dictum apply to different types of people as well? We now recognize that the genetic diversity of the earth's flora and fauna is vital to our long-term survival. Does this precept extend to *human* diversity?

If it doesn't, it should. A person's way of life can also be endangered and this should not be treated lightly, even if that way of life is not considered proper by those with other values. Is it possible for their way of life and sound conservation principles to coexist? Does their way of life impinge on the basic rights of others? If it is possible for their lifestyle to stay within sound conservation principles and if they are not harming other people, then we should apply the same respect for human diversity that we have learned the hard way with other resources. For a world without a rich diversity of people with differing values would be as lonely as a world without wolves.

One of the respondents in this study expressed concern that some Western conservationists are attempting what amounts to the "ethical occupation" of territories where the people have different values from their own. Conservationist Raymond Bonner (1993, 286), in his book on African wildlife issues, terms it "eco-colonialism." He extols the need for a conservation ethic which is also humanitarian: "All we have to do to preserve Africa's wildlife heritage is care about the people as much as we care about the wildlife. Both are in the hands of man."

A wise agreement should look for ways in which all of us—regardless of our different values—can coexist with the natural world that sustains us.

## ***Stability of the agreement***

Stability is also a key component of success. "An agreement that is perceived as fair, is reached efficiently, and seems technically wise is nevertheless unsatisfactory if it does not endure" (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 31). The authors indicate that the feasibility of the agreement is crucial here—is there broad support for the agreement? Is the agreement within the technical, financial, legal, and administrative constraints of the implementers? Has the agreement been implemented? A stable agreement will stand up to an appeal, or better yet, will not be appealed. Are provisions included for renegotiation if necessary?



### **Does the agreement have a broad base of support? Has the level of controversy diminished?**

These are really two sides of the same coin, one is a positive reaction, the other a negative one. If the agreement is supported by a wide range of interests and if that support is fairly solid, it is more likely to be stable and capable of withstanding attacks from extremes on both sides. Without broad support, an agreement signed by a few representatives will not have far-reaching impact.

The level of controversy is another indicator. While the underlying broad conflict (e.g. timber harvesting vs. preservation) is unlikely to decrease as a result of the process, it is hoped that the controversy over the specific dispute (harvesting timber in a small, specific area vs. preserving that area) can diminish, if not disappear, if the key issues have been settled.

And most important, the process should not create more problems than it solves. As Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 64) put it, a basic principle of EDS is to “do no harm”—i.e. do not exacerbate the controversy.

There are several indicators of the level of controversy which I propose. The first five can be quantified to at least some extent. The remaining four were asked in the interviews as they depend on the subjective evaluations of the stakeholders.

- 1) Extent of opposition actions (boycotts, litigation, legislative actions)
- 2) Public debate before and after the agreement (number of editorials, debate at public meetings, number of people attending meetings on the issue, stakeholder opinions of the atmosphere at meetings before and after the agreement)
- 3) The amount of time spent by an agency and interest groups on the issue
- 4) Articles and editorials in interest group newsletters
- 5) Letters and telephone calls received by the agency, Governor, and other officials
- 6) Extent to which representatives retrench to earlier or more extreme positions
- 7) Stakeholder opinions of the level of conflict before and after the agreement
- 8) Stakeholder opinions of their level of trust in the agency and in other interest groups before and after the agreement
- 9) Extent to which some participants feel betrayed

### **Have the key issues been settled?**

At times, the controversy may continue because the key issues have not been settled. The team may have made significant progress in promoting understanding, obtaining

information and settling some issues, but as long as key issues remain, the controversy will not diminish and the agreement is less likely to be stable.

### **Has the decision-making authority endorsed the agreement? Has the agreement been implemented?**

Perhaps the most commonly-used measure of success is whether the agreement has been endorsed and implemented. As discussed below, some believe there may be too much emphasis on implementation as a criterion. But as Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 149) point out, an “agreement reached but not carried out can create a feeling of betrayal among the parties and resentment about resources spent in negotiation that apparently have been wasted. If all the effort goes for naught, the parties may end up even angrier with each other than they were before...the key to carrying out agreements is to include a plan for implementation in the final agreement, not produce one as an afterthought.”

The blame for lack of implementation may not lie entirely with the agency: implementation is also a function of the quality of the plan. If an agreement is not within the technical, financial, legal, and administrative constraints of the implementing agency or agencies, it will not be possible to implement it.

### **Are provisions included for renegotiation?**

Because it is rarely possible to anticipate all the types of problems the settlement may face, it is also important for the disputants to have a good working relationship that will allow them to return to the bargaining table to work things out if the need arises. “If disputing parties build a good working relationship, the prospects for stability are greatly enhanced...The parties are likely to come back to fix the agreement and make it work if they feel positively about how they were treated” (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 33).

## ***Other measures of success***

In addition to the above criteria for success, the participants in a study conducted by Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986, 64) indicated—to the surprise of their mediators—that they viewed the process as successful even though no agreement had been reached. They identified several other significant ways in which mediation had contributed to the successful processing of their conflicts:

- an outcome that better fit their needs (when compared to traditional approaches)
- an increased personal ability to negotiate

- insight into the interests and positions of all the disputants
- better knowledge of options open to disputants
- additional 'staff' to help an agency work on an issue

The authors feel that too much emphasis on a signed agreement has devalued many other benefits of a consensus process. “We propose to adjust our notions of success in mediation and to account a mediator successful to the degree that he or she enables the parties to increase their affective and cognitive awareness about their relationship and the matter at dispute. In effect, we propose that we view mediators as teachers of negotiation” (Buckle and Thomas-Buckle 1986, 69).

Based on an analysis of several case studies, Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990, xv) noted the following additional potential benefits of EDS processes:

- citizen members felt they had used their organizational resources more efficiently than in traditional approaches
- their organizations were strengthened as a result
- outcomes were designed more creatively to respond to the specifics
- the processes had opened the doors for continuing dialogue
- the processes had increased the credibility, legitimacy, and trust between what had been traditional adversaries
- in at least two cases, citizens gained a role in implementing and monitoring the final decision

In his research on teams, Guzzo (1986, 50) has found that “effectiveness is indicated not only by the adequacy of group outputs but also by the extent to which members experience satisfying interpersonal relations.” He warns, however, that smooth group interaction often obscures other assessments of effectiveness: “groups effective in terms of task accomplishment are often groundlessly perceived as having desirable interaction process characteristics and groups with desirable interaction are often erroneously perceived to be effective in task accomplishment” (51).

Hackman (1990, 6-7) also notes that success cannot be judged by implementation alone. His research indicates that the criteria for team effectiveness should also include: 1) the degree to which the process of carrying out the work enhances the capability of members to work together interdependently in the future; and 2) the degree to which the group experience contributes to the growth and personal well-being of team members. Hackman (1990, 486) also emphasizes that in successful teams, individuals must feel

responsible for the team result. An EDS team walks a fine line on this point, because individuals cannot be expected to compromise their basic values, yet if they feel no responsibility for the team result, reaching an agreement will be very difficult.

Table 1-1 summarizes the indicators of success used in this study.

**Table 1-1**  
**Indicators of Team Effectiveness**

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Was the process fair?

Was the process efficient?

Did the team meet its purpose?

Did the team reach consensus on the key issues?

Was a written agreement produced (if part of the purpose)?

Does it define a desired future and set measurable targets?

\*Wisdom of the agreement

Is the agreement technically accurate?

Is it based on adequate, reliable data?

Are the resources involved conserved as a result of the decision?

Is the approach sustainable over the long term?

Have irreversible decisions been made?

What are the possible negative environmental impacts

(including cumulative impacts) and are they acceptable?

What are the social and economic impacts and are they acceptable?

Is it possible for a people's way of life and sound conservation principles  
to coexist?

What is the risk of being wrong?

Is there a mechanism for detecting and responding to unanticipated results?

\*Stability of the agreement

Does the agreement have a broad base of support?

Have the key issues been settled?

Has the level of controversy diminished?

Is the agreement within constraints?

Has the decision-making authority endorsed the agreement?

Has the decision been appealed? If so, did it withstand the appeal?

Has it been implemented?

Are provisions included for renegotiation?

Has it increased level of trust and understanding between all parties?

Did participants find it personally rewarding?

Did participants view it as a success?

Did other affected parties view it as a success?

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\* These presuppose that reaching an agreement was part of the task.

## V. Methods

The study examines three team designs for negotiating disputes over wolf management in Alaska, British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. (Perhaps it is more than just coincidence that this study of teams should also involve an animal known for its remarkable team work.) Wolf management has been a controversial subject in each of these areas for decades. Faced with a complete impasse over the issue, each of the three areas decided to form citizen teams to try to reach a consensus on wolf management. Each built on the lessons of the previous attempt and therefore took slightly different approaches to structuring their teams.

Two of the teams (Alaska and British Columbia) were unable to develop stable agreements, while the third (Yukon Territory), building on the experience of the other two, produced an agreement which has broad support and has been endorsed by the government. Because each of these cases faced the same basic issue and had many of the same interest groups involved and because one had greater success than the others, they offer a unique opportunity to isolate some of the variables to see if changes in team design may have an effect on the ultimate success of the negotiations.

As in all social experiments, it is almost impossible to isolate a given variable. Ideally, only one team design factor would be changed at a time and all other factors would be held at their optimal level. But each of the cases altered more than one internal variable and in all three cases, the political climate took a substantial shift which greatly influenced the effectiveness of the team efforts.

### ***Case Study Methodology***

A case study methodology was chosen for this study. Yin (1984, 23) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” In addition, he contends that, “case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed [and] when the investigator has little control over events” (1984, 13). This study meets these criteria because it is considering “how” team design affects the stability of the outcome, the investigator has little control over events, and the focus is on a current phenomenon.

Multiple cases were used. As stated by Yin (1984, 48), “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.”

Two basic sources of data were used. “A major strength of the case study data collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence” (Yin, 1984, 90). In this case, the major source of evidence was in-depth interviews, most of which lasted two hours and several more than four. The quotes are the principal source of data in this research—they are the evidence on which I based my conclusions. Without them, it would not be clear how I reached a conclusion. Team members, agency personnel, and key interest groups were interviewed to corroborate the data. The other source was documents including newspaper articles, newsletters, agendas, letters, and memos.

As discussed in Miles and Huberman (1984, 46) the interviews followed a guide that was based on the research questions. Copies of the early and later interview guides are included in Appendix A. The guide provided some structure to ensure that certain questions I considered vital were covered (particularly the question of whether the effort had been successful). However, I encouraged the interviewee to direct the conversation toward factors they considered significant and asked each person whether there were any other questions they felt I should be asking (this often led to new information). As I began to see patterns, the later interviews were more focused.

Approximately 70 hours of interviews were transcribed, resulting in 310 pages of single-spaced transcriptions. A copy of each transcript was then coded by paragraph. The codes were based on the research questions, but the early interviews and coding helped to inform subsequent data collection (Miles and Huberman 1984, 54). Thus, the interview guides and codes evolved as the research proceeded. The coded paragraphs from all of the interviews for a case were then compiled and sorted by code in a database program. In addition to the sorted database, I attempted to remain close to the data by frequent reading of the original transcripts.

Once the basic criteria and detailed interviews were completed, written surveys were sent to all the team members (see Appendix B). The survey was confined to the team members because 1) they represent a distinct “population” to sample and 2) it was clear that after their experience on a team, they had already grappled with many of these questions and had insights “from the front lines” that no mere observer could have captured. By this point, I had determined what seemed to be the key questions and this offered a way to ask all the team members the same questions (since the early interviewees were asked slightly different questions) and to confirm or challenge the



developing conclusions. The questionnaire asked each team member the same questions in the same way to ensure that the answers were comparable and that the results represented the majority of members. These questions were “closed” in that the respondents had only a few choices, often yes or no, but space was left for them to qualify their answer if they wished. This was helpful in determining the bottom line without equivocating, such as “seven felt it was a fair process and two did not.” While this would certainly oversimplify a complex question if it were the *only* information, it was a very useful means of summarizing and supplementing reams of qualitative information.

It is hoped that this approach provides “rich, thick description” of the intricate process the agencies experienced in trying to design their EDS teams. As described by Geertz (1983), “thick description” presents considerable detail regarding both the context and the meanings of events that are relevant to those involved in them. The approach is also consistent with what the anthropologist Helen Schwartzman (1986, 261-262) called for in future team research. In her review of the methodologies employed in team effectiveness studies, she called for both more attention to the “context” of the group's interaction and for examination of what meanings events have to the participants (not just to the researcher):

Adopting an ethnographic approach to work group studies would allow researchers to produce in-depth descriptions of the meanings that work activities have to participants...ethnographic observations would be specifically designed to produce rich, contextually “thick” descriptions of the actual problem-solving processes adopted by particular work groups. I would also suggest that these studies be specifically designed not to prove, test, predict, or change anything. If organizations act in order to discover what they are doing...then researchers must be allowed to conduct research in order to discover what they have been studying.

## ***Evaluation of the Method***

Katz (1983, 127) identifies four questions frequently raised regarding evidence in qualitative research: representativeness, reactivity, reliability, and replicability. Any methodology should take these into account.

### **Representativeness**

In developing a methodology, the researcher must examine whether the results will be representative: i.e., can the results be generalized to the entire population under study? According to Katz (1983, 134), representativeness in qualitative studies depends on the

richness and variety of the data: “the more differences discovered within the data, the greater the number of possible negative cases, and thus the more broadly valid the resulting theory.” A negative case is one in which the results contradict a theory. Thus, if the possibility of a large number of negative cases exists, but few are found, then the theory is validated. The more cases examined without finding contradictory, or “negative,” results, the more representative the theory.

Can the results of this particular study be generalized to the entire population of EDS processes? The answer is—not at this point. This study looks at three cases, not three hundred. The purpose here is to conduct an exploratory study intended to discover what the key variables are that will then require closer examination. Therefore, internal variation across many cases was sacrificed in order to probe more deeply in a few cases for what the key variables and relationships might be. The next step in this research will be to look for negative cases that could alter the emerging theory.

## **Reactivity**

An attempt was also made to avoid reactive effects, which are defined by Emerson (1983, 100) as “the ways in which the presence and actions of the observer affect and change the setting under observation.”

One way to avoid reactivity is to ask questions after a process is complete. That was the case in the Yukon Plan, which was finished before I began my research. In Alaska, the team’s work was complete, but its implementation was not. However, I did not feel that I had any impact on the course of events. In British Columbia, however, there may have been some reactive effect. The participants had not been in communication for some time and in the course of asking questions, I inadvertently became a conduit of information: e.g. “How did you feel about X? Oh, you didn’t know about X?” Also, just asking questions about whether an ongoing process has been successful or not can cause people to pause and evaluate, when they perhaps would not take the time otherwise.

I have also attempted to avoid quotes that could adversely affect a respondent’s relationships or could undermine a tentative agreement. In most instances, such information was not critical to the discussion and could be omitted. If the information seemed important, I did not reveal the identity of the speaker.

## **Reliability**

How do we know our descriptions are the “right” ones or that we have not overlooked disconfirming data? I wish I could say that the cases presented here offer a thoroughly

accurate portrayal of reality, but that, of course, is impossible. There are many perspectives on what happened and in most instances, it is not possible to say who was right or wrong. Was a facilitator biased? Was an effort fair? One “right” answer does not exist. At best, I can only attempt to cover the breadth of opinion on these issues and to root out what such perceptions were based on.

Other steps were also taken to maximize the reliability of the information. First, I am neutral on the question of wolf control. My focus is on the process used to deal with this issue, not the issue itself; I wish to know what lessons can be learned here that might apply to other environmental issues. I have tried vigorously to maintain neutrality on the substance of the dispute by interviewing people on all sides of the debate.

Second, I tried to interview several people involved in each effort. I spoke with seven team members of the British Columbia (BC) team and five others closely involved with the process. On the Alaska effort, twenty-eight people were interviewed, including ten of the twelve members of the team and eighteen others who were involved. On the Yukon effort, five of the nine team members were interviewed at length as well as four others who were involved.

Third, written questionnaires were returned from six of the eight BC Group members, nine of the twelve Alaska team members, and seven of the nine Yukon team members. Both of the indigenous members of the Alaska team were interviewed and one of the First Nations representatives on the Yukon team. In addition, two surveys were returned from Yukon First Nations representatives, but I was unable to reach the First Nations representative on the BC team.

Fourth, by interviewing a wide range of people and by attempting to present the range of opinion on a given topic (but not every opinion if several were quite similar), it is hoped that the resulting description is accurate and that disconfirming data have not been overlooked. I made a point to include information that contradicted either the other respondents or what the literature would recommend. I have also attempted to provide an indication of the extent of agreement with any given opinion among people interviewed.

Finally, copies of the cases have been sent to those who were interviewed at length to check the reliability of the information.

## **Replicability**

Replicability means that another researcher using the same methods should produce the same results. In most qualitative analysis, however, it is more difficult to specify just what those methods are and another researcher could reach different conclusions.

Katz (1983, 145) contends that negative cases again counteract this possible problem “The claim...that no negative case can be found invites the testing of findings without repeating the original research. A subsequent researcher can simply pick up where the [first] study left off, looking for a single contradiction.” Thus, while research procedures change and would be difficult to replicate, basic results can still be tested by other researchers.

However, in many respects, this particular study would not be difficult for another researcher to replicate. The set of primary questions I found to be most relevant could be used as a basis for analyzing these cases or other disputes to either confirm or contradict these results.

## VI. Organization of this Study

This research is divided into three parts: Part I is the Introduction. It includes Chapter 1 which discusses the research questions and methods and Chapter 2 which develops a preliminary theory of effective team design. Part II presents the Results. It includes a chapter on each case, presented in the order in which they began (Chapter 3, British Columbia, Chapter 4, Alaska, and Chapter 5, The Yukon). Part III compares the cases and discusses the conclusions.

## Chapter 2.

# The Fundamentals of Team Design:

### Purpose, Participants, Process, Politics and Product

This chapter presents a preliminary theory of effective team design which will be tested in the cases which follow. It summarizes and integrates previous research on team design from three bodies of literature: organizational management, public participation, and environmental dispute settlement. First I discuss the management literature on teams in general. The rest of the review is organized by the five major factors involved in designing a team: the purpose, the participants, the process, political and agency support, and the product.

## I. Management Research on Teams

There is a long history of team research in organizations. For example, near the turn of the century, Elton Mayo conducted a study of the effect of lighting on productivity. Two small groups of workers were put in separate rooms, in one the lighting was varied while in the other, the lighting remained constant. The results were quite unexpected—productivity increased in *both* groups. The relative isolation of the employees in the experiment compared to other workers had unexpectedly transformed both groups into “what we would call a team. They had a clear goal, an informal system of communication, an informal climate, and established decision-making procedures” (Parker 1990, 18). Mayo went on to conduct further studies of teams and became an advocate of the use of teams in manufacturing. Many other studies followed, including one conducted in the 1950s by Eric Trist (1981) who discovered that miners organized in teams had higher productivity and job satisfaction than miners who were not in teams .

Volvo was one of the first automobile manufacturers to use a team approach. They began with teams assembling entire units, such as transmissions, and this was so successful that they soon had teams of workers building entire cars. “Volvo's team approach became an intrinsic part of the workplace, resulting in both greater morale and a 25 percent reduction in production costs compared with Volvo's conventional plants” (Wellins 1991, 8).

Quality circles, used widely in Japan, became popular in the US in the 1970s. These circles were groups of employees who worked together to improve quality and productivity: for many companies, it was the first time that value was placed on workers' opinions. There were many examples of dramatic cost savings as a result of workers' ideas. But quality circles encountered problems because workers rarely had the power and authority to implement their ideas.

In the 1980s, “total quality management” (TQM) began to attract attention. TQM organizations focus more attention on teams than individuals: “In this setting, individuals are more likely to view their co-workers as colleagues and teammates, rather than as competitors” (Schmidt and Finnigan 1993, 14). During this decade, the use of teams with greater power to transform their ideas into action began to catch on “like wildfire” (Wellins et al. 1991, 9). The authors conducted a survey of 500 organizations that are using self-directed teams and found that the use of such teams is increasing. “The great majority of executives who responded to the Survey anticipate that over 50 percent of their work forces will be organized into teams within five years. Similarly, 83 percent of the work team members, leaders, and practitioners who responded to the Survey expect to see self-directed teams expand in their organizations rapidly over the next three years” (Wellins, et al. 1991, 225).

Reasons cited in the management literature for this increase in the use of teams include:

- improved quality in the product or service
- greater productivity in an increasingly competitive world
- better problem solving
- greater flexibility and employee creativity
- increased worker morale, commitment, and satisfaction
- reduced need for middle management supervision; teams self-manage
- dramatic reductions in absenteeism and turnover
- reduced operating costs
- faster response to technological change
- better response to workers' demands for greater democracy and autonomy (today's workers resent authoritarian control)
- improved cooperation within diverse workforce of different races, sexes, and cultures; conflicts handled more effectively

- ability to attract and retain the best people

Wellins (1991, 14) cites stellar examples of the power of teams to transform the bottom line of a corporation:

- Westinghouse Furniture Systems increased productivity by 74 percent in three years.
- Volvo Corporation's Kalmar plant reduced defects by 90 percent
- General Electric Company's Salisbury, North Carolina plant increased productivity by 250 percent compared with other GE plants producing the same products
- General Mills' plants that use teams are as much as 40 percent more productive than their plants operating without teams.

At first glance, it may seem that EDS teams would have little in common with a corporate team. After all, what could the widely-heralded Chicken McNuggets development team and a wolf management team possibly have in common? Certainly, there are major differences between EDS teams and the teams examined in the management literature, some of which are summarized in Table 2-1.

A salient difference is that in most of the management research, team members are employees of a single corporation who depend on the organization for their paycheck, thus giving it a level of control unheard of on an EDS team. EDS team members are usually volunteers from diverse interest groups and agencies. In the management literature, the members are likely to have a common, overarching goal, such as corporate profits, whereas EDS team members are often chosen because of their divergent interests. Corporate team members are often chosen because they get along well, but it is not unusual for EDS team members to have a history of adversarial relationships with other members. Many corporate teams, such as manufacturing teams, are established on a temporary basis (although companies use many ad hoc teams also) and the general public has less concern about the work of most corporate teams compared to EDS teams. Thus, relative to corporate teams, EDS teams have several handicaps to being effective.

**Table 2-1**  
**Differences Between Most Teams**  
**Examined in Management Research and EDS Teams**

Most of the Teams in Management Research	EDS Teams
Members are employees	Members are volunteers
Members work for a single organization	Members work for or associated with multiple organizations from distinctly different interest groups
Members likely to have common goal, such as corporate profits	Members may be chosen explicitly because of their divergent goals
Members often chosen because they get along well	Members may have a history of adversarial relationships with other participants
Team often long term or permanent	Team often established on temporary basis to deal with a specific dispute
External organizations, the general public and the press usually not concerned about the team's output	External organizations, the general public and the press often very concerned about the team's composition and output

Despite these differences, I believe the following discussion on the characteristics of teams will demonstrate that this literature is very applicable to EDS teams. It may be that what makes an effective team has more to do with group dynamics and basic human nature than it does with whether or not a team member is an employee or a volunteer. Having clear goals, a sense of commitment, good communication, and rewards and recognition are basic to team success whether the team is making Volvos—or drafting an agreement on wolf management.

## II. The Purpose or Task

One of the first steps in designing an EDS team is to determine exactly what the group will be expected to do. Does the task give the team a clear purpose and direction?




How compelling and inspiring is the task? Is it realistic? Will the team be making recommendations or actually setting policy (i.e. how much authority will the team have)? How these questions are answered will have a profound effect on the negotiations.

## ***A Ladder of Dispute Management Tasks***

Those involved in designing an EDS team have several possible tasks to choose from, including 1) exchanging information; 2) identifying issues and interests; 3) developing acceptable options; 4) developing recommendations; and 5) reaching consensus agreements (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 95).

These tasks can be thought of as a ladder of dispute management possibilities. Figure 2-1 postulates that where one locates on this ladder is directly proportional to how amenable the dispute is for settlement: if the dispute is not ready for settlement, exchanging information or identifying issues may be the only reasonable task available. The more ripe or suitable the dispute is for settlement, the higher one can locate on this ladder of tasks. Thus, before determining what the most appropriate task is, one needs to judge just how responsive the dispute might be to a settlement effort.

**Figure 2-1**  
**Ladder of Dispute Management Tasks**



## Is the dispute ripe for settlement ?

Several factors determine whether a dispute is amenable to settlement. McCarthy and Shorett (1984, 14) list several factors, but indicate that first the parties must be willing to negotiate. There is also general agreement that if the dispute involves fundamental values, chances of a consensus are slim. Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 201) define two characteristics necessary for a consensus agreement to be possible: “1) it must be possible to reframe the issue into solvable increments and 2) there must be an effective core of moderate people on both sides of an argument.”

The following list summarizes the attributes commonly associated with disputes that are ripe for settlement:

- The parties are willing to negotiate and compromise
- Fundamental values are not involved
- The interest groups/constituencies are clearly defined
- The issues are clearly identified
- The parties agree on the issues to be addressed
- There is a sense of urgency to resolve the dispute
- Groups are not seeking to establish legal precedents
- The primary government agency or decision-maker has defined a range of potentially acceptable decisions
- The affected government agencies are willing to endorse the mediation effort
- There is a high level of uncertainty regarding the outcome in the traditional forum
- The parties potentially have more to gain by negotiating
- It must be possible to reframe the issue into solvable increments
- There must be an effective core of moderate people on both sides of the debate

Most of the above criteria are self-explanatory, but the first two—what makes parties willing to negotiate and fundamental values—deserve additional discussion.

### *What makes a party willing to negotiate and compromise?*

“For an EDS process to be successfully instituted, everyone, particularly the authorized decision-maker, potentially must have something to gain in pursuing it” (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 29).

An EDS process will only be accepted if all the stakeholders believe they stand to gain more from a negotiated settlement than they would from unilateral or traditional means, such as elected officials or litigation. If a group is fairly confident of victory in one of these arenas, then it is unrealistic to expect them to be interested in an EDS process. If, on the other hand, an interest group is uncertain of the outcome in a traditional forum, or feels it stands to gain more through negotiations, it has reason to come to the table.

*The dispute should not involve fundamental values.*

“I want the orange,” demands one child in the parable familiar to students of dispute resolution. “No I want it,” insists the other. We have a definite impasse with clearly no possibility for resolution. Or do we? As it turns out, of course, one wants the fruit and the other desires the peel and both can be completely satisfied.

The difference between interest and position is illustrated here. An *interest* is a party’s fundamental desire, concern, or fear:

My Interest: I want the fruit to eat.

Jane’s Interest:: I want the peel for cooking.


A given *position* is but *one* means of satisfying our fundamental interests:

My Position: I want the entire orange.

Jane’s Position: I want the entire orange.

An impasse is often reached when people argue over positions such as these. But because a given position is just *one* means of meeting an interest; other means are also generally possible, but rarely thought of in the heat of battle. In this case, the entire orange would certainly meet Jane’s interest, but the peel would also do just fine. It is possible to think of other options, too, such as orange extract or orange oil. The first position was simply the first option she thought of, but she has not compromised her fundamental interests by accepting the peel if her interests are completely satisfied.

**Figure 2-2**  
**Positions are different means of meeting an interest**



People are amused by the story, but continue to hastily declare stalemates in their own disputes, often failing to see an analogy. But just as in the orange dispute, probing more deeply for the interests behind each party's position can unlock possibilities for settlement that no one could have imagined earlier. I may oppose the construction of an office complex while you are in favor of it. Clearly we have an impasse. Why do I oppose the project? Because I value open space, the trees and trails currently there, and peace and quiet. You may be able to meet my interests by leaving open space and the natural landscape around the building, preserving the trails, and routing the traffic away from my neighborhood. You may even prefer to do this in order to attract and keep talented employees who demand such amenities. Thus we may both be able to meet our most important interests. A party can be willing to negotiate and compromise—even be soft—on their positions, but they should not compromise their fundamental interests.

Interests are closely related to, and perhaps often synonymous with values and values are always a factor in public disputes. As McCarthy and Shorett (1984, 54) put it, “many, if not most mediators take the position that disputes are not primarily over facts, but over values.” The agency's technical expertise can help determine what is possible, but the public must assist in sorting out the value questions. EDS processes “acknowledge the value differences underlying many conflicts, yet try to resolve the resulting disputes by cooperatively seeking a common ground” (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, xiii).

While values are always involved, fundamental values luckily are not. EDS efforts do not attempt to resolve fundamental value differences, which will likely always exist. It is commonly recommended that if a dispute cannot be separated from the underlying fundamental values, as in the above example, it is unlikely to be settled by negotiation:

It is risky for negotiators to trade commitments on issues in which basic values are involved. In such cases, constituents may disavow the commitments made on their behalf or move to appoint new spokespeople. This can create great instability. If public officials seek to settle policy disputes involving fundamental values...dissatisfied disputants will almost certainly pursue the matter in other forums until they are satisfied. If your dispute involves constitutional questions or revolves around definitions of basic rights, consensus may be unattainable. (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 192).

But this begs the question, how does one distinguish a “fundamental” value from an “ordinary” value? Most of us view values as a pyramid with the most important values at the top and lesser ones at the bottom. But in most cases, it is actually very difficult to distinguish fundamental values from ordinary ones. Hans Bleiker, a public involvement specialist whose concepts will be discussed in more detail later, illustrates this complexity very well in a story he tells of the Olympic Games held a few years ago in Korea.

A Canadian was the favorite to win the gold in the individual sailing competition, but the day of the big race was stormy with dangerous waves whipping through the channel. Despite the conditions, the Canadian was doing well when he came over a big wave and saw another competitor struggling in the water. The rules required that every entrant wear a life jacket and be tied to their boat, but this person had violated both rules. The Canadian knew he would lose his chance at the gold if he paused to rescue the fellow, but he decided he had no choice but to stop and help.

So we have a clear case where a person’s life is more important than a medal. Most people would agree that human life is a fundamental value that should not be compromised. But this race took place over three days. Suppose that the next day the Canadian once again sees the same fellow swimming in the water with neither life jacket nor rope. Is he likely to stop again? Most would agree it is *less* likely. Yet we also agreed that human life is a fundamental value and that fundamental values can never be compromised. Now suppose that on the third day he comes over a wave and sees his son in the water. Will he stop this time?

Clearly, values are not strictly hierarchical. Rather than viewing the set of human values as a pyramid, they should be thought of as a complex web. In the above example, on the first day the value of a human life had to be weighed against the value of the athlete’s dream of a gold medal. The second day, it would have to be weighed against the value of individual responsibility as well as the chance left for a medal. On the third day, none of these other values may be as important as the bond between father and son.

All of us have an intricate set of values that interact in a complicated way in setting our priorities. It is difficult to predict how a given individual will weigh their many different values in making a decision. Because of this, I believe that the catch-all label “fundamental values” is over-simplified and applied prematurely in many disputes, including the wolf management debate.

How is it possible to reach a consensus when strong differences are involved? To answer this, it is first necessary to re-examine the definition of consensus: it is a package agreement all parties can accept because it meets their most important concerns. Consensus is rarely an agreement everyone is delighted with, but rather one they can accept. While it may not meet all of their concerns, the reason they can accept it is that it meets their *most important* concerns. Then what is the difference between consensus and compromise? Many people consider these to be exact opposites. On the contrary, consensus is almost always a *package of compromises* on several issues. On some points, a party may not need to compromise at all to reach agreement, but on other issues, a more significant concession may be necessary. Certainly the athlete above was making some difficult compromises on some of his fundamental values in order to meet others.

This is why it is helpful to reframe the dispute into solvable increments, or sub-issues. It is ironic that the very differences in values that caused the dispute in the first place are often also the key to opening the door to trades and agreement. Even when strong beliefs are at stake, people often value these sub-issues differently. Again, two people may reach a total impasse if the only issue they debate is whether or not to build an office complex, but if they break the discussion into sub-issues such as what to do with the trails, the landscape, the traffic, and the appearance of the building, possibilities for inventing new options, packaging, trading, and redefining issues open up.

Thus an attempt should be made to reframe the dispute so that it does not focus on sacrosanct values, but if it cannot be divided into solvable issues, if new options cannot be created, and if there is not an effective base of moderate people on both sides, then a consensus agreement is an unrealistic task.

This brings us back to the ladder of dispute management tasks. While a dispute may not be ripe for a consensus agreement, it may nonetheless be worthwhile for the parties to approach a different task on the ladder, such as exchanging information, discussing interests, or developing options. Opposing groups in the abortion issue, for example, have found it instructive to come together to explain their concerns. Afterward, participants have stated that they were surprised to find out that those on the other side were “human” with some legitimate concerns. This controversy is certainly not ready for a consensus agreement, but there is still merit in opening a dialogue. In many disputes,

such discussions may help prevent the controversy from escalating. It may also help define the issues and narrow the bounds of the debate so that the political process can deal with them more effectively.

The following briefly discusses the common tasks of EDS teams.

### **Exchanging information.**

Often, a dispute can be ameliorated simply by exchanging information and many misconceptions can be corrected through such an effort. Although a dispute may not be ripe for settlement in the form of a consensus agreement, exchanging information may help de-escalate the controversy.

### **Identifying issues and interests.**

In policy dialogue, it is not unusual to limit the task to a discussion of issues and interests. In which case “there does not have to be any explicit bargaining to reach a settlement; indeed, the parties may simply meet to improve their understanding of each other's positions or to clarify where they agree and disagree” (Gusman and Sachs 1987, 12). An advantage of not trying to reach a settlement is that it “helps people who do not want to compromise to understand that their more limited aims can be accommodated” (13). Simply coming to the table to discuss the issues can improve both communication and understanding between the adversaries and lessen the controversy. The drawback, however, is that the dispute generally will remain unsettled.

### **Developing acceptable options.**

Options can be developed for consideration by the decision-making organization. This takes less time than developing an agreement because “parties do not have to narrow options down to one and do not have to worry about final approval of their constituents” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 96).

### **Developing general recommendations.**

Going a step further, the negotiators can aim to reach consensus on general recommendations. This can also foster increased communication and understanding and, if all of the parties can agree, the agency is likely to give the recommendations considerable weight. In addition, some agencies may find this less threatening to their authority than allowing the interests to help develop an implementable agreement.

However, the agency should be very careful about convening such a group: “although an Advisory Committee's advice is just that: advice, you cannot solicit advice

and then consistently ignore it” (Bleiker 1990, V-6). The agency must be vigilant in making it clear to the negotiators that there is no guarantee their recommendations will be adopted and implemented. Despite this, if the group's recommendations are not used substantially, the participants are likely to feel betrayed, exacerbating the conflict.

### **Reaching implementable agreements**

The advantage of this as a task is that if participants do reach a consensus agreement, they could see their work implemented.

#### ***If possible, make the task a “complete and meaningful whole”***

There is considerable evidence from the management literature that teams may be more effective when they are granted this level of authority. Guzzo (1986) has done extensive work with quality circles. His research indicates that team performance depends on “the extent to which the task is a complete, meaningful whole” (47). It is widely known that teams on assembly lines are more motivated and produce higher quality products if they are responsible for an entire car, not just a bumper. Could it be that EDS teams will be more motivated and produce higher quality agreements if they are responsible for the entire plan and not just a “bumper” of recommendations?

In Great Britain, Hastings et al. (1986) are advocating what they call the “superteam solution.” In their guidelines for team success, they implore managers to divest responsibility and authority to such teams: “Provide them an exciting vision, assemble them, train them and then trust them, and they will surely achieve significant results...If you respect them and learn from them, they and the organization will benefit hugely” (173).

Self-directed or “shared leadership teams,” as discussed by Wellins, et al. (1991, 3), are “intact groups of employees who are responsible for a 'whole' work process.” They emphasize that the cornerstone of this approach is “empowerment” in which team members have complete responsibility for producing a product or service.

The high Arctic has been on the forefront of this approach. First used in Greenland, Norway and Canada’s Northwest Territories, the objective of what is called “co-management” is often for a team to set final policy regarding the use of natural resources, particularly the fish and wildlife that are so important to these indigenous cultures.

“Co-management is much more interesting [than traditional approaches],” concludes John Bailey, a well-known facilitator of co-management teams (and facilitator of the Yukon Wolf Management Team). “Many recent articles are about this more inclusive, more public form of wildlife management. Well that is something the Northwest



Territories has been doing for twenty years. They've been far, far ahead of most jurisdictions in that. It's ironic that now people down south are calling it 'innovative'."

There is a growing body of literature which discusses co-management cases which have reached implementable agreements (Freeman and Carbyn 1988; Osherenko 1988; Pinkerton 1989). These efforts involve agencies and users—thus far generally indigenous peoples—in determining how resources will be managed and the decisions they reach very often have final authority. According to Bailey, most co-management teams in the Northwest Territories are structured according to a formal land claims agreement, which generally calls for half First Nations and half agency appointments on the teams. In the US, the Marine Mammal Protection Act recently renewed by Congress, also calls for co-management by the US Fish and Wildlife Service and indigenous peoples. Co-management may be blazing a trail that the rest of the country may follow.

There are two principal problems with this as a task for an EDS team. First, many agencies may see implementable agreements as a threat to their authority. Second, as discussed earlier, the dispute itself must be ripe for settlement or an implementable consensus agreement would not be a realistic task.

### *Implementable agreements—a threat to agency authority?*

In most of the United States, including Alaska, this level of team authority is nothing short of radical. Often the principal objection to this as a goal is that the decision-making agency considers it to be "giving away their responsibilities." According to Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 138), "Government agencies and officials are particularly sensitive to issues of control. 'I have a legal mandate,' such officials frequently tell us. 'It would be inappropriate and perhaps illegal for me to accept terms dictated by someone else.' The answer, of course, is that in the types of consensual negotiations described in this book, no one dictates terms, or has terms dictated to them." The authors claim that the biggest obstacle to the acceptance of EDS is fear on the part of officials that trying to reach an agreement will infringe on their authority. "We contend that this fear is misplaced, given that the outcomes of [EDS processes] remain entirely under the control of the parties, including these same public officials" (184).

Wondolleck echoes this conclusion:

A common Forest Service response to suggested conflict management is that it is the agency's mandate, indeed its *raison d'être*, to make these decisions. If professional foresters were to let interest group negotiations decide the fate of the national forests, why have a Forest Service at all? Wouldn't agency officials be abdicating their responsibilities?

A counter argument is that it is also the Forest Service responsibility to represent all values in decision-making and to make decisions in a harmonious manner. There is clearly a need for a scientific, professional Forest Service. Professional expertise and judgment are critical for much of the day-to-day forest management tasks. But, when disputes like those described in this book arise, it is also their responsibility to represent each set of values in their decision. The Forest Service has a critical role in the conflict management process proposed here. The process does not occur outside agency jurisdiction, but rather within it, as a supplement to existing administrative procedures. Agency officials need to actively participate in this process, both to represent the nonvocal public that is not present as well as to provide the technical and scientific facts and administrative constraints that only they can provide.

The questions debated by EDS teams are not simply technical. “Although many of today's public land managers do not admit it, managing the national forests is inherently a negotiation process; it is no longer solely the professional silvicultural scientific management process that it...once was” (Wondolleck 1988, 221).

Cases have demonstrated that the agency can be better off through a negotiated agreement. In a dialogue between Getty Oil, the Forest Service and the Sierra Club, “Forest Service officials viewed the agreement as a godsend. They were relieved of the frustrating and time-consuming burden of themselves trying to resolve the differences between these two adversaries” (Wondolleck 1988, 221).

An agreement reached through an EDS process also allows the agency more control than if the issue goes to court. Tableman (1990, 313) quotes a Forest Service official, “The manager no longer has any prerogative once it's in the court...if it is negotiated, then he is the principal negotiator.’ Thus, if control over the decision is what is important, opting for participation in the environmental conflict management process may be the preferred choice.”

## ***The Need for a Clear, Inspiring Purpose***

There is wide agreement in the management literature that clear, engaging direction is critical to team effectiveness. “We know of no group we would consider effective that did not have a clear sense of direction” (Hackman and Walton 1986, 81).

Hastings et al. (1987, 33) concur: “...superteams are inspired by a vision of what they are trying to achieve. This provides a strong sense of purpose.” They also advocate that the team (in cooperation with their “invisible” team of sponsors) spend time initially defining what successful completion of the task will look like.

In the study by Larson and LaFasto, a clear goal seemed to be the best predictor of effective teams. “High performance teams have both a clear understanding of the goal to

be achieved and a belief that the goal embodies a worthwhile or important result” (1989, 27). This goal should be personally challenging to the members. “Formulate a clearly defined need...that justifies the existence of the team...Make the goal something noble—something from which people can derive a sense of identity” (1989, 133). The authors also found that a sense of urgency to meet the goal helps to focus a team. They concluded that “whenever an ineffectively functioning team was identified and described, the explanation for the team's ineffectiveness involved...the goal” and they noted that politics and personal agenda seem to be the greatest threats to goal clarity.

Wellins et al. (1991, 189) emphasize that effective teams have a clear sense of purpose and that team members must know their roles, feel a sense of ownership, and see how they can make a difference.

For EDS teams, this means having a distinct purpose that defines what the team is expected to do as well as what it is not expected to do. The issues the group will address as well as their level of authority should be well-understood. They should also be aware of the applicable legal, financial, administrative and resource constraints.

Beyond and perhaps more vital than these mechanical points, the task should also be one that will inspire and motivate the EDS team to give this effort their highest level of commitment.

### III. The Participants

The success of the effort will be affected by who is on the team, their knowledge and ability to work with people, as well as other skills. The EDS literature emphasizes how important it is to choose representatives wisely (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988; Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990; Gusman 1983; Gusman and Sachs 1987; Lee 1982; Moore 1989; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). As Doyle and Straus (1976, 167) put it,

When you decide whom to invite to a meeting, you may be making a more important decision than you think. It will have a significant effect on what happens, because there is, of course, a direct connection between who attends the meeting and the content and quality of the decisions that will flow from it.

It is also important to the credibility of the effort to know who chose the team members, what criteria were used to select them, and who they represent (i.e. themselves or an organized group).

## ***Who should be included?***

One of the hallmarks of environmental dispute resolution is the emphasis on direct involvement of all those who have a stake in the outcome. Not only is this important for the stability of the agreement—it is also vital to its ethical foundation. All potentially-affected interests should be invited to participate, including groups who lack social and political power and/or those who are not organized in a formal way.

In small disputes, it may be possible to involve everyone in the negotiations, in which case there is no need to keep uninvolved constituents informed. While this approach is impractical for most negotiations, it is important to remember that this is the ideal.

In most disputes, so many people are potentially affected that the negotiations would be unwieldy; therefore, the number of people at the table must be limited by some means. There is general agreement in the literature that anyone who could successfully challenge the outcome should be represented. “For an EDS process to be effective, all major stakeholders must be represented. If a major interest is absent from the process, it is possible that they will block or demand changes in any agreement reached” (Manring, et al. 1990, 83). If a key group is omitted, even unintentionally, the credibility of the EDS effort may be irretrievably compromised.

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 103) list four categories of affected individuals and groups that should be included:

- those with necessary standing to claim legal protection
- those with sufficient political clout to draw elected and appointed officials into the dispute
- those with the power to block implementation of an agreement
- those with sufficient moral claim to generate public sympathy.

According to Christopher Moore (1986, 105), participants in the negotiation should include those who:

- have the power or authority to make a decision
- have the capacity, if they are not involved, to reverse or damage a negotiated settlement
- know and understand the issues in dispute
- have negotiating skills
- have control of their emotions
- are acceptable to other parties

- have demonstrated or can demonstrate bargaining in good faith

Noticeably absent in these lists are groups who are affected by a decision—perhaps even more affected than other groups—but who are less likely to have the political or economic clout to block implementation. Those designing a team have a moral obligation to include these groups as well. In fact, Susskind and Cruikshank assert that consensus building (and EDS) approaches can do a much better job of protecting the interests of the least powerful (1987, 14).

These lists indicate that those with the power to block implementation and those with authority to make a decision should be included. This is consistent throughout the EDS literature, which recommends that the implementing agency be an equal member of the team. McCarthy and Shorett (1984, 64) concluded that this is critical to successful implementation: “In comparing agreements that are being successfully implemented to those where seemingly insurmountable obstacles have arisen, several observations seem germane: the chief implementing agency must not only endorse the search for a mediated solution, it must also be an active participant in the negotiations.”

According to Barbara Gray, “The most compelling evidence about omission of stakeholders deals with the absence of those with the power to implement the decisions. Failure to include these stakeholders greatly reduces the extent of implementation” (Gray 1989, 262). However, as discussed earlier, agencies are often reluctant to take a direct part in the negotiations, fearing that it may compromise their authority.

It should be noted that Hans Bleiker, who offers citizen participation workshops that have been very influential with many agencies, does not agree with the concept of representation:

If the issue of who should be on your advisory committee and who should not be on becomes a major issue of discussion, you are probably setting up a “by-invitation-only” referendum...this kind of manipulation of rights and responsibilities is difficult—if not impossible—to defend (Bleiker 1990, V-7).

This philosophy would preclude the entire concept of an EDS team unless everyone affected were involved. As mentioned earlier, this is virtually impossible in most disputes and often unnecessary. Most people have someone they trust who can represent them in negotiations.

## **Bringing constituents along.**

If it is not possible to involve all of the interests directly, and in most cases it is not, then it will be necessary to find some means of representing them. Whatever method is chosen, a primary objective is to bring constituents along.

Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 168) emphasize this point in several ways. They define a constituent as “a person to whom representatives are responsible and whose support is required if agreements reached in negotiation are to be implemented” (emphasis added). They stress that “constituents do not even attend meetings as a general rule, but they decide whether negotiations will succeed or fail...representatives of the parties have standing only so long as their constituents allow them to have it.”

How can negotiators be assured that those at the table can win the support of their constituents? According to Susskind and Cruikshank (1988, 105), an important step “is to clarify at the outset what representation means. Unlike elected officials with statutory authority, ad hoc representatives are rarely empowered to commit their members to anything. They should, however, be in a good position to shuttle back and forth between the negotiating group and the people they represent. Their task is not to speak for their constituents, but to speak with them.” They have the following advice for anyone who is trying to represent a constituency in a negotiation:

You begin as the spokesperson for your group's interests. Gradually, as you gain an understanding of the other side's interests, you become a spokesperson for the work of the [negotiating team]. You may well realize that your group's initial aspirations were unreasonable. But, without help, your group will not grasp this. The interactions between you and your membership that were adequate at the beginning of the process may no longer suffice. Consider additional meetings or periodic published reports to your membership. Make sure they can easily reach you—to ask questions or to express disappointment (p. 209 - 210).

Representatives may need to consider using several means of reaching their constituents. “To share their new analyses of the issues, representatives have used meeting reports, newsletters, and in one case, a conference on the EDS process and the final agreements. These mechanisms created dialogue that was beneficial for all. The representatives were able to clarify their stance by explaining the issue and the membership served as a check on the representatives, reducing the chance that the group's interests were not being addressed adequately” (Nelson, et al., 1990, 178-179).

The authors proceed to describe a ground water case in Wisconsin, where “representatives were expected to return to their constituencies and fight for the agreement. They were asked to argue strongly against any major changes their

organization might develop...This advocacy was important because the ...representatives...viewed the agreement as a finely balanced document resulting in a fragile 'consensus' of divergent interests.”

## ***How should the participants be chosen?***

Choosing participants is basically a two-step process. First, most EDS processes determine which categories of interests must be represented. These categories can be loosely defined groups such as “environmentalists” and “local residents”. Within each category, it will be possible to list several formal organizations or coalitions of organized groups. “For many policy issues, it is possible to identify lead organizations to which other organizations and individual stakeholders turn for information and action” (Gusman 1983, 199). As Warner (1978, 219) has discussed, publics can be “self-identified” by testifying at public hearing and writing letters, or identified by agency staff in their analysis of local organizations, geographic areas, and demographics.

Unfortunately, some key stakeholders may not be organized into a formal group and may need assistance in selecting a representative: “When a group or organization is disorganized, the mediator may...assist in designing a decision-making process to select a negotiating team or spokesperson” (Moore 1986, 105).

## **Who should select the participants?**

Once general categories of interests have been defined, it is necessary to determine who will select the representatives for each category. There are three principal ways to do this (with many variations in between). The literature presents the pros and cons of each but does not indicate which is preferable (indeed, there may not be “one right way” to approach many of these questions).

### ***The convening agency may choose the representatives.***

If the agency chooses the representatives, it must be diligent to maintain “a proper balance of interests and adequate representation of each different kind of interest” (Gusman 1983, 200). Once the basic categories of interest groups are determined, “the manager should discuss representation with the parties, give suggestions for numbers of participants, and see how they feel about them. The parties should be told that the suggestions are flexible. To avoid being accused of favoritism toward one side, the manager will need to explain the criteria being used” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 104).

The manager can work with all sides to develop the categories and to determine the number of individuals who will represent each party. “The manager should draft a list of categories and the number of representatives desired in each category. He or she can attach the obvious names to positions and leave blank the positions that do not have a candidate, and discuss the list with key people of each party. Each group should have an opportunity to comment on the list of names already suggested and should be asked to contribute to the undesignated categories. If someone objects to a name, the choice can be discussed with other parties in an effort to determine whether to retain the nominee or seek another person” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 105).

If agency staff have control of choosing the representatives, they can avoid confrontational individuals with hardened positions and attempt to select good problem solvers who also work well with people. They can also select people to represent unorganized groups. However, there are several distinct disadvantages to having the agency choose the representatives: 1) the interests may feel the agency is trying to “stack the deck” in its favor (which may in fact be the case); 2) the interests will have less ownership of the process; 3) it will be difficult for the agency to replace a representative who turns out to be abrasive and counter-productive; 4) the agency, due to bias or oversight, may fail to recognize particular interests or specific individuals.

*Allow organizations to choose their own representatives.*

A second alternative is to allow the groups themselves to choose their own representatives. “The parties should be reminded that the choice should be someone who is knowledgeable, who represents an interest group, and who can get along with other people” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 105). If there are too many groups to allow each to have a representative, the agency can designate the number of seats at the table, allocating a certain number to each interest (environment, business, local residents, etc.). They can then suggest that coalitions of groups within each category choose a certain number of representatives (of course, in a consensus process, it is not necessary for groups to choose the same number of representatives).

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 201) call this technique “clustering of interest groups.”

For example, most of the antidevelopment groups in the RiverEnd case were persuaded to accept a relatively small number of designated spokespeople to represent them in the negotiations. All the groups still had the option of attending meetings (as observers), but only the designated spokespersons were empowered to participate...It is crucial, though, that the groups involved choose their own designees.



This approach has two principal advantages. First and foremost, the groups have more ownership of the process: this ownership carries with it some responsibility for the long-term success of the negotiation. Gusman (1983, 202) points out that “people like to be powerful enough to have a meaningful voice in making the decisions that are important to them. The implication of this premise for the selection of negotiators is equally straightforward: involve interested parties in the negotiator selection process to the maximum extent that is practical.” Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 105) state that “the important principle is that parties are involved in the selection. They may be asked to nominate and select members from their own organization, or they may be asked to comment on the entire list of proposed participants.”

A second advantage of having groups choose their own representatives is that it can be in an organization's best interest to replace a strident, ineffective representative. If, however, the person was appointed by the convening agency and has no formal organization or coalition to report back to, it will be difficult for the agency to replace the individual without appearing to be creating a committee of “yes people”.

However, there are three disadvantages to allowing organizations to choose their own representative: 1) it will be much more difficult to reach consensus because the individuals will have much less flexibility. They are likely to have difficulty persuading their group to change its basic position on an issue. 2) organizations may choose extremists who refuse to compromise from the group's stated position. Strident individuals can actually widen the conflict. and 3) some key interests may not be formally organized and thus would be a bit more difficult (but not impossible) to include.

Often, potential and existing team members are allowed to comment on the entire roster of participants. This is true for both EDS and corporate teams. Interestingly, results of a survey of 500 companies using self-directed teams indicated that 89 percent involve existing team members in selecting new candidates for their team (Wellins, et al. 1991, 156).

***Have a neutral party choose the representatives.***

A third alternative, which lies between the first two, is to have a neutral third party choose the representatives. Gusman (1983, 201) concludes that this is the preferable alternative. A neutral facilitator can “work toward self-selection of negotiators through use of interactive processes of consultation with interested parties.” The facilitator would seek a group of participants “who are willing to participate, and who are acceptable to each other and to all known key stakeholders.” This group would form the “preliminary”

negotiating team. After the first meeting, the facilitator could consult with the group to determine if any additions or substitutions are necessary.

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 104) concur that an outside consultant can assist in selecting individuals. “This step is so important, in fact, that the first set of participants may want to employ an outside analyst to help with the conflict assessment. Such an analyst would not be influenced by past hostilities among or misapprehensions about potential participants. Tactically, the presence of an analyst can also make it easier to add groups at a later date if they were overlooked. The participants can honestly claim that an 'outsider' made the omission.”

Moore (1986, 105) is more cautious. “While the mediator usually should not choose who the disputants are or who will participate in negotiations, he or she may help the parties decide who should be present. Occasionally, a mediator may assist a party in selecting a spokesperson or identifying a person who will be both effective and acceptable to the other side.”

The issue of representation itself may need to be negotiated. “Sometimes, representational issues may seem insurmountable—for example, when one group insists that it should be involved, but a second group demands that the first group be excluded. These sorts of disagreements can almost always be resolved through negotiation....All too often, such disputes are mistaken for obstacles, when in fact they are opportunities to explore how well the groups will be able to work together on the more difficult issues that lie ahead” (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 106).

### **What criteria should be used to select individuals?**

According to the literature, the following factors are important in selecting individuals for a team: 1) they should possess a certain amount of diplomacy; 2) they should be clear on what being a team member will involve, 3) they should be opinion leaders who can bring others along; 4) some members should be “moderates.”

#### ***Personal characteristics are important.***

In addition to determining who will select the participants, it is important to know what personal characteristics to look for. Choosing individuals is a delicate balance, for it is important to select members with good negotiating skills while avoiding favoritism toward any particular point of view. Good negotiators know what their fundamental interests are and push hard for these, but they do not commit themselves to one position (Fisher and Ury 1981, 55).

There is general agreement in the literature that individual members are critical to a team's success. According to Parker (1990, 32), "in the final analysis, effective teams are composed of effective team players." Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 241) recommend several strategies for dealing with ineffective or difficult team members. But if these tactics should fail, they acknowledge the potential need for a replacement: "Part or all of the problem may lie in the personality of the individual representative...one can ask the person's constituents whether they would like to appoint another representative."

But replacing a member is likely to be an extremely sensitive issue. Thus it is far better to choose members wisely at the start. Wellins makes this point clearly:

Any good coach in the sports field knows that it's a lot easier to build a winning team with skilled and motivated players...Many teams have discovered that good selection is a critical and often irreversible part of the process. If the team is inadvertently stacked with dysfunctional members, it will be difficult to change their behavior or remove them from the team without disrupting the cohesiveness of the team...Careful selection of team members can prevent such casualties (Wellins, et al. 1991, 143-144).

Hastings et al. (1986, 95) conclude that "the members are the lifeblood of the team, its most important resource. They bring different knowledge, competencies and experience. And in Superteams they contribute these with enormous commitment, energy and enthusiasm."

In the literature, effective team member attributes frequently listed include initiative and the ability to listen, express disagreement in tactful ways, work well with people, learn quickly, and influence others. Larson and LaFasto (1989, 134) recommend that you "select good people—members who possess the essential skills and abilities to accomplish the team's objectives. Make whatever investment is necessary to obtain talented people who are capable of collaborating effectively with each other."

Some consider it essential to include a mix of personal styles on any team. In Hackman and Walton's model, effective group composition means as few members as possible with the diverse talents required by the task. The group should also "be balanced on homogeneity/heterogeneity (that is, members should be neither functional replicas of one another nor so different that they cannot learn from one another)" (Hackman and Walton 1986, 83).

In his research on teams, Parker (1990, 63) has identified four styles of team players, each of which contribute to team success in a unique and vital way. Each style also has identifiable weaknesses that can be improved upon. The four styles include:

- The Contributor, a task-oriented, dependable member good with technical data who presses for high performance standards;

- The Collaborator, the goal-oriented, “big picture” person who works well with others
- The Communicator, a process-oriented member who contributes to conflict resolution within the group
- The Challenger, who tends to question the methods, goals, decisions, and ethics of the team in an effort to improve the quality of decisions and avoid groupthink. But the effective challenger also knows when to support a consensus—“the perennial devil's advocate is not a positive team player” (1990, 85).

The most skillful team members will exhibit attributes of all of these styles. In an effort to build effective teams and also help members optimize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses, Parker has developed a Team Player Survey to determine which primary style a person may have (1990, 90). It may be beneficial to use such a survey to ensure that all of these personality types are included on an EDS team.

***Use simulations and videos to help choose team members.***

Wellins, et al. (1991, 148) describe two innovative methods of selecting team members that may also have potential for EDS teams. “Effective team members willingly pitch in, support and encourage others, volunteer to work on problems, and avoid adversarial 'me-against-you' situations. Because these qualities can be difficult to detect in a casual selection process, they often are overlooked.”

They recommend the use of group discussion and problem-solving simulations to evaluate the potential effectiveness of team members. This approach was used by Japanese auto companies when they first began hiring in their US plants and it is now being used extensively by corporations to choose work team members. Often, applicants are also asked to watch a video that portrays what it would be like to work as part of the team they are being selected for. Such a 'realistic job preview' helps interested parties visualize how teams really work.

Simulations and videos could be readily adapted for use in selecting EDS team members and could build on the extensive work already completed in teaching EDS through the use of simulations. While an agency could not use such a method without appearing biased, a neutral intermediary could. The emphasis would be on selecting people with certain negotiating skills, regardless of their personal opinions on an issue.

### *Choose opinion leaders.*

Many consider it advantageous for EDS teams to involve publicly active, influential individuals. Such people can play a pivotal role in “disseminating information to and transmitting and interpreting the views of broader, less involved publics. These people constitute a valuable potential base of support and a source of evaluative information” (Warner 1972, 263).

According to Warner (1988, 130), such opinion leaders can be chosen using three methods: positional, decisional, and reputational.

A positional list of opinion leaders is compiled by recording people who hold formal leadership positions in various private and public organizations. A...decisional list would consist of those who have been active and taken advocacy positions on important planning issues. Area newspaper files are usually the best source for such names. Finally, those interviewed from the first two lists are asked whose opinions would carry great weight locally if a decision had to be made on a planning issue of the type being studied. Those nominated by at least three persons are then listed as reputational candidates for involvement.

This is also consistent with the literature on innovation. The Cooperative Extension Service, a pioneer in this field, found early on that innovations such as new hybrid crops were accepted much more quickly if opinion leaders could be convinced to try it first. Then if they saw benefits, they used their extensive contacts to influence others. An agreement to settle a dispute also represents an innovation and could benefit from this same approach.

### *Include moderates.*

It is also important to include some moderates on the team. In general, this means moderate with respect to the issues in dispute. But taken in the largest sense of the word, this would also mean including people who are moderate in wealth and power as well as those who are moderate on the anthropocentric vs. biocentric scale (i.e. placing humans first vs. placing the environment first).

“If the moderates have departed, leaving the field to the zealots on both sides, a conflict manager may lack the necessary base of common sense among the parties on which to build a constructive strategy” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 201). In fact, according to noted mediator Christopher Moore, one strategy is to “isolate the extremes”—i.e. not include them on the team. If the moderates can agree and if there is a broad base of support for their agreement, the extremists will have less success in challenging it. A complicating factor here is determining just what constitutes an

“extremist,” since what is perceived as extreme by one group may be considered quite moderate by another. A more practical definition of extremist is a person or group that finds their position completely non-negotiable.

“Given a sound process and an outcome that all the participants support, you may be able to blunt a court's willingness to hear the complaint, or at least minimize the court's sympathy for the complainant” (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 201).

## ***Who should the participants represent?***

There are two principal schools of thought on this issue: joint problem-solving and policy dialogue, but the literature is not unanimous on which is preferable. In a joint problem-solving process, “the representatives often are individuals speaking for an interest area...through particular formal organizations” (Manring, et al. 1990, 81). These representatives are accountable to their sponsoring groups. In contrast, “conveners of policy dialogue groups frequently make explicit statements that group members are not speaking for their constituencies...These views correspond to different meanings of the word 'representative': a person empowered to make commitments on behalf of those he represents, or a person who is selected as a representative part of a population” (Lee 1982, 5, emphasis added).

### **Participants represent organized groups**

There are several advantages in having official representatives of organized groups. The organizations offer the representative support, expertise, counsel, and recognition. Even more important, formal organizations provide communication networks, including meetings, newsletters, etc. so vital for constituent education and feedback. However, progress may be much slower as representatives need time to check with their organizations and time to “sell” the agreement to them.

### **Participants represent only themselves**

The main advantage of having participants speak only for themselves is that this expedites the negotiations. Representatives have more freedom to present ideas without first clearing them with their organizations, and individuals are often more willing than an organized group to compromise. Another benefit of this approach is that even unorganized groups can be represented by someone who is part of that segment of society. However, a major drawback to this approach is that it is more difficult to keep

constituents informed. In some cases, it may even be hard to determine just who the constituents are. Thus, any agreement may lack the broad support so vital for implementation.

## ***How many participants should be chosen?***

A review of the literature indicates that there is no universally-accepted ideal size for a team. Conventional wisdom would indicate that groups of eight to twelve are optimal, but recent efforts have challenged that assumption. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), for example, are mavericks in this regard. They offer a fresh perspective worth considering:

Try not to fall victim to the old maxim that 'a good meeting requires only seven-plus-or-minus-two-people.' Structured properly and with appropriate assistance, groups of up to 50 or 60 can function effectively (1987, 202).

Our experience suggests that it is always better to include too many people or groups than too few—especially at the outset. There is a logistical advantage, of course, in limiting the number of voices directly involved in consensus-building discussions. That advantage is far out-weighed, however, by the problems that arise if someone decides they have been unfairly excluded (1987, 101).

They proceed to discuss a case in which four coalitions of interests selected 25 representatives each, using whatever means of selection it preferred. “Although a face-to-face negotiation with 100 people was difficult, it was certainly more feasible than a process involving ten times that number. The seeming unwieldiness of 100 participants was in fact a necessary evil. Ad hoc processes must sometimes embrace elaborate selection procedures if they are to overcome the charge that they are less representative than conventional processes” (102).

Schneider and Tohn (1985, 74) echo this concern in their analysis of two EPA regulatory negotiations. They conclude that their case studies “are likely to surprise advocates of small negotiating committees...Both negotiating Committees had at least 20 participants and worked well.”

Again, the advantages of larger groups are that it is less likely that someone will feel excluded and the more interests who take a direct role in the negotiations, the easier it is to keep uninvolved constituents informed and “on board”. What's more, each additional person who signs the agreement is one more advocate to defend it.

However, as Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 104) point out, larger groups will require more time to reach agreements and scheduling meetings becomes a problem. “Thirty

people can negotiate successfully, but a full-time support person will be necessary to coordinate their work.”

Larger groups also require subgroups to work efficiently. Subcommittees can work on individual issues and present their draft documents to the larger group for further work on an acceptable final agreement.

## IV. The Process

Process concerns how the team approaches discussion and settlement of the issues. Should a neutral intermediary be employed? What structure is used for discussion of the issues (group norms and ground rules, building on areas of agreement, frequent self-evaluation of the process, etc.)? What size group is optimal for an effective process? Does the team have deadlines? How many meetings will they have and how frequent will they be? Should the team remain active after an agreement is reached?

### ***Should a neutral intermediary be employed?***

There is general agreement that highly controversial issues benefit greatly from and may require the assistance of a neutral facilitator. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 94) conclude that “most distributional disputes—and certainly the most complex ones—can only be resolved with the aid of a professional intermediary, whose job it is to offer nonpartisan assistance at key steps in the negotiation process.”

A facilitator can be very helpful from the inception of the process. Susskind recommends “get yourselves a mediator/negotiator for the prenegotiation stage. Don’t wait until you are in the process” (Bardwell 1990, 149). This person can help in choosing participants, identifying and bounding the issues, developing ground rules and the agenda, dealing with the news media, notifying the general public, and arranging the meetings. Once the meetings begin, the intermediary will help to maintain constructive dialogue, search for underlying interests, and help the group proceed step by step through data gathering and developing options, and working from agreement in principle to detailed agreements. They will also assist in determining when subgroups are appropriate and usually spend considerable time between meetings discussing the options one-on-one with each participant.



## ***Establish a climate of openness and trust***

Whatever process options are chosen, both the management and the EDS literature emphasize the need for excellent communication, openness and trust among team members. A facilitator can certainly help in establishing a climate conducive to open discussion and in developing team spirit. If other cultures are involved, as they are in the cases examined here, it is also important to be sensitive to their communication styles.

Ground rules for communication are generally established at the outset by the group. Establishing these at the beginning is important, because, as Hackman and Walton (1986, 83) put it, “these norms tend to remain in place until and unless something fairly dramatic occurs to force a rethinking about what is and is not appropriate behavior.” However, most teams do reserve the right to modify the rules if necessary as the negotiations progress. These rules often specify how the process will deal with the media and include rules such as: all values expressed by the participants will be respected, that an individual’s motives will not be impugned, that members or their substitutes will attend meetings regularly, and that everyone has equal access to the floor.

After analyzing several EDS cases, Manring et al. (1990, 78) found that a clear understanding of the ground rules gave participants a good foundation for taking part in the process. Conversely, “in the case studies in which no attempt was made to establish clearly all ground rules and procedures, citizen representatives floundered, and were not as effective during the negotiations because the procedures were not well structured or understood.”

Careful enforcement of the ground rules is key to developing trust between the members. According to Larson and LaFasto, trust is produced in a climate that includes four elements: honesty, openness, consistency, and respect. “Trust is so fragile that if any one of these elements is breached—even once—a relationship is apt to be severely compromised, even lost. In fact, our research shows a predictable pattern of diminishing confidence once a trusting relationship is violated” (Larson and LaFasto 1989, 85). As one of their interviewees put it, “[Trust] is never absent very long on any team. It can't be” (1989, 94).

Parker (1990, 37) found that the ability of team members to listen to each other was “the single most important factor distinguishing effective from ineffective teams.”

In addition to establishing and enforcing norms that encourage listening and trust, there is wide agreement that the team should evaluate both their process and their progress frequently. In fact, Hastings, et al. (1987) recommend that any team process start by looking at performance criteria and determining how they will define success.

Then the team should stop periodically to examine how well they are functioning and to confront problems.

Wellins et.al (1991, 189) list several key factors necessary for a fruitful team process:

- 1) Commitment. Team members see themselves as belonging to a team rather than as individuals who operate autonomously. They are committed to group goals above and beyond their personal goals;
- 2) Trust. Team members have faith in each other to honor their commitments, maintain confidences, support each other, and generally behave in a consistent and predictably acceptable fashion;
- 3) Communication. This refers to the team's ability to handle conflict, decision-making and day-to-day interactions effectively;
- 4) Involvement. Despite differences, team members must feel a sense of partnership with each other. Contributions are respected and solicited and consensus is established before acting;
- 5) Process Orientation. There is a clear process for solving problems, setting agendas, holding regular meetings, and discussing how the group is functioning.

## ***Follow a Step-by-Step Problem Solving Process***

Following a systematic progression of steps to reach an agreement is also critical to success. “Parties who do not establish and follow a logical progression of steps will focus prematurely on solutions without understanding the problem or what other people need in a solution” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 69). If this is not done, the potential for agreement may be lost entirely.

Much has been written on the process of dispute settlement (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988; Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990; Fisher and Ury 1981; Gray, 1991; Lewicki 1985; Moore 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Every process is different because the team has some control over the process to ensure that it meets their needs. In general, however, the steps involved include:

- Adopting procedures
- Identifying issues and interests
- Educating the parties through joint data collection and analysis

- Identify areas of agreement on the data
- Developing broad goals and more detailed principles that everyone can agree to
- Generating options for solving each issue
- Developing packages of options that allow trade-offs across issues
- Crafting the final written agreement
- Implementing and monitoring the agreement

After the team has carefully established procedures and purpose, they begin to discuss the substance of the dispute. At this point, a clear statement of the issues is critical so that the group agrees and is clear on which problem(s) are they are trying to solve. This step is not as straightforward as it may seem, as the “real issues” may be difficult to determine at first. Also, in order to contribute to constructive dialogue and option generation, the issues should be stated as “how” or “what” questions that cannot be answered yes or no (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 58).

The list of issues to be discussed must also be bounded. “The parties appeared to be most effective when they bounded the issues according to 1) the parties’ authority over the outcome, 2) what the parties considered to be negotiable, and 3) what problem-solving was possible given available time and information” (Manring, et al. 1990, 86). Finally, it is important at this stage to prioritize the issues and to identify what the parties’ fundamental interests are, as any agreement must try to satisfy these interests.

Next, data is reviewed jointly and points of agreement on the facts are noted. Then the team should establish broad goals that everyone can agree on—in effect, these goals indicate where they are going. The subsequent steps—principles and detailed options for each issue—will spell out how the team intends to reach the goals. Use of a single negotiating text throughout this process will help in obtaining a final written document that everyone can accept.

Much, if not most, of the work of reaching agreement will actually take place before and between meetings. Effective facilitators generally interview the participants prior to the first meeting and continue to discuss the issues and options with each participant individually between meetings. Connie Lewis, the professional facilitator of the Alaska Wolf Management Plan, estimates that she spends ten hours on the telephone or in person with the participants for every hour the team spends in meetings. Participants are also likely to be caucusing between, as well as during, meetings.

After establishing draft goals, teams often begin generating options for each issue. The options are packaged into different alternatives to allow trade-offs across issues. The Group then crafts one “package” into a final agreement. Written agreements are essential “to prevent misunderstandings and to ensure accountability and commitment by all the stakeholders” (Manring et al. 1990, 90).

### ***Should there be deadlines? How frequently should the group meet?***

Most authors agree that deadlines are important. “If it did not matter when the parties agreed, it would not matter whether they agreed at all” (Cross 1969, 13; cited in Moore 1986, 239).

“Even in situations where time is not a concern, the mediator usually suggests a deadline so that negotiations are not unnecessarily prolonged...These deadlines are usually essential; they encourage the parties to acknowledge concessions and highlight the fact that mediation is producing results” (McCarthy with Shorett 1984, 33). In fact, in a study of successful groups, “time limits turned out to be a powerful organizing force...When deadlines were absent, fuzzy, or constantly changing, groups invariably encountered problems” (Hackman 1991, 480).

There is also wide agreement on the tendency for teams to delay action on the most controversial issues until the last minute. “Citizen organizers commented that it is wise to place critical issues at the beginning of the agenda. No matter how well-planned, the time ran out in every process; the final agenda items were rushed or in some cases dropped due to lack of time” (Manring, et al., 1990, 86).

In his study of management teams, Larry Hirschhorn (1991, 42) indicates that “much research suggests that halfway into a project, rarely is half the necessary work done...Paradoxically, 80 percent of the accomplishments get done in the last 20 percent of the time available to do the work.” He suggests that without deadlines, this final 80 percent of the work may never be accomplished. This is consistent with the findings of Wellins, et al. (1991, 191) who discuss four stages most teams go through in meeting their goals; stages they call: getting started, going in circles, getting on course, and full speed ahead.

But while deadlines are important, unrealistically short deadlines can undermine a process. At a minimum, extensions should be a possibility. “Parties often need additional time to reconsider a last-minute proposal or to gain constituent or bureaucratic

approval to reach a final settlement. Mutually determined extensions of deadlines may be a prerequisite for a settlement” (Moore 1986, 240, emphasis added).

### ***Should the team remain active after its goal is reached?***

There are two basic options here: 1) keep the team semi-active in some capacity; or 2) disband it. If at all possible, this question should be answered before negotiations begin.

#### **Have the team remain semi-active.**

While it is important for teams to have deadlines, it is not necessary to disband the team immediately after the goal is reached. “Citizen monitoring can increase the likelihood that implementation will reflect the spirit of the final agreement as well as keep the citizen group involved with the issues” (Manring et al. 1990, 92). There are often unanticipated practicalities encountered in implementation which require adjustments in the agreement. If the team is still meeting occasionally, it can deal with these problems. This important aspect is often omitted, however, “in a rush to end the process or because the citizens’ resources were overtaxed and representatives felt ‘burned out’” ((Manring et al. 1990, 92)

If the team remains active, the members can serve as a sounding board for the agency as it moves into implementation. They can assist the agency in determining how the public at large may react to different approaches. They can help to interpret the original intent of the agreement and meet periodically to monitor its implementation and to renegotiate problem areas.

In the process of reaching an agreement, the team not only learned a great deal about what the issues are, where people stand, what data is available, and what the agency's legal and financial constraints are, they also built working relationships with their former adversaries. All of this took time, hard work, and money to develop. The team represents a valuable resource and a substantial investment that should not be discarded lightly.

In a study of 161 cases where EDS was used to settle conflicts, Gail Bingham found that some of the cases established committees to monitor and guide the implementation of the agreements. She concluded that “such committees have made a significant difference in solving problems during implementation” (Bingham 1986, 124).

While it could be expensive to reconvene the group frequently, face-to-face meetings may not be required more than once a year. An example of this is the Bob Marshall Wilderness Plan in Montana. Following years of heated controversy, the plan was completed in 1986 by a task force of 45 people representing diverse interests (Ashor, et al. 1986). According to Steve McCool, professor of Wildland Recreation Management at the University of Montana and principal facilitator of the group, the team continues to meet annually to review implementation and consider problems, and it will also meet if an issue requires immediate attention. Unlike so many other controversial Forest Service plans, not one appeal has been filed on the Bob Marshall Wilderness Plan (Steve McCool, telephone interview with author, August, 1991).

### **Disband the team.**

But others recommend disbanding such a team before they have a chance to “take over.” This is a common concern in Alaska, where the specter of the “advisory-committee-gone-astray” is articulated by Hans Bleiker in his popular citizen participation workshops:

It is a simple but sobering fact of life that most experiences with Advisory Committees... are **bad** [sic] experiences both for the agency and for the potentially affected interests. ...Decision makers who use [a “popularity” type of] advisory committee are trying to turn their decision-making responsibility over to the public. ...there is a distinct tendency for members of **any** Advisory Committee to regard themselves as having **more** than just an advisory role. This phenomenon suggests real vigilance on the agency's part, or it will find that the Advisory Committee with which it has enjoyed a 2 - 4 year honeymoon of constructive, creative interaction is turning into a struggle for power” (Bleiker, 1990, p. V-6 -7).

As if that isn't adequate to frighten an agency out of the idea, he goes on to conclude his chapter on advisory committees with this foreboding admonition:

...without carefully designing and operating your Advisory Committee with your specific objectives in mind, you'll discover what at least 95% of public agencies discover with Advisory Committees that have existed for more than a few years: you may have created a monster. (p. V-12)

He neglects, however, to reveal any empirical evidence (either in his book or in response to questions) for such a cataclysmic result. Despite this lack of support for his conclusions, his workshops have had a major influence on public agencies in Alaska and have made them very wary of allowing a team to exist after its principal objective is achieved.

If the team is disbanded, the agency will save the expense of reconvening the group and it will avoid having the team “assume a life of its own”. However, this will also result in a loss of 'team spirit' and members may return to their earlier adversarial relationships: “trust...begins to dissolve when regular direct contact among the parties ceases, and if the parties lose confidence in the durability of their work, they are likely to return to their old ways of dealing with each other” (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, 150).

In addition, the agreement will lack citizen advocates to defend it before the general public and if no one is organized to monitor the execution of the accord, poor implementation is likely to result.

## V. Political and Agency Support

### ***Building Political Connections***

EDS processes do not operate in a political vacuum; on the contrary, they are often high-profile disputes which have political ramifications. Thus it is essential for EDS teams to build political concurrence for their agreement to last, because inevitably, the EDS process must be “linked in some way to established, decision-making authorities” (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 23).

The integration of the team within the larger political context must be considered in every aspect of the team’s design: the participants, the purpose, and the process. With respect to the purpose, the team will be more effective if the appropriate level of government sanctions the effort, its scope, and the level of authority granted the team. If a dispute is strictly local, the effort may require only the backing of local officials. If it is an issue with larger repercussions, state legislators, the governor’s office, and/or federal legislators will need to sanction the effort. If an implementable consensus agreement among the team members is unrealistic (as discussed above), the team may be able to narrow the focus of the debate and set the stage for political resolution.

With respect to the membership of the team, the literature emphasizes that it is important to involve those with authority to make the decision. Second, the literature recommends including opinion leaders who can bring constituents along.

Finally, the process should include a vigorous effort by the members, the facilitator and the convening agency to build external support for the team among both the general public and political figures.

The management literature confirms this need for building political connections. Hastings, et al. (1987, 43) emphasize the need to actively build formal and informal networks with what they call the “invisible team”—because “not only do these outsiders demand, they also provide.” They assert that marketing the team both inside and outside the organization is imperative to success. Both team members and group leaders need to be involved in promoting the team's image and credibility with outsiders. “Managing these important external relationships well is one of the keys to develop a clear sense of the team's purpose and direction. It is also crucial in securing the right resources when they are required” (1987, 71). Further, they advocate that every team have a sponsor with considerable political clout. The role of this sponsor is “a fighting one which champions the team's cause” (1987, 25).

Parker (1990, 53) concurs: “Building external support for a team is especially crucial for a new team or for a team with a new idea.” Larson and LaFasto make the apt comparison of external support to fans of a sports team. Certainly if an implementing agency and politicians do not support a team, it will have difficulty proceeding and/or any resulting agreement is less likely to be implemented.

## ***Agency Support—Recognition, Rewards and Resources***

As discussed earlier, the agency (or agencies) responsible for making the decision must be involved and share ownership in the decision. Beyond just being involved, however, the agency can also contribute to the team's success through a reward and recognition and by providing the necessary resources to complete the task.

A reward system should provide “positive consequences for excellent team performance” (Hackman and Walton 1986, 84). This reward system also places responsibility and accountability for the team result on the members and provides a strong incentive for team members to collaborate. Conversely, the members are also aware of the consequences of failure.

The principal rewards for EDS teams are public recognition for their work and, most important, implementation of the team's recommendations. On a more personal level, the highest reward is that the result will exceed their BATNA (their best alternative to a negotiated agreement). The consequences of failure are often that the agency or some other authority will make the decision unilaterally.

The EDS literature confirms this need for personal rewards: “Individual stakeholders must see a compelling reason to try collaboration. They must believe that their interests



will be protected and advanced throughout the process...Incentives are heightened when parties see a direct opportunity to pursue their self-interest” (Gray 1989, 263).

Other ways in which a convening agency can provide vital support to a team include material and financial resources and information helpful in completing the task.

## VI. The Product

If the team was expected to reach an agreement, it is best that they commit it to writing. Because it documents any agreement the team reached, the product is subject to most of the criteria for team success shown in Table 1-1. It should also be fair, address the key issues, and possess as much wisdom as possible through judicious consideration of possible impacts and use of the best data available.

A common maxim from the field of planning is also pertinent here: an implementable agreement, or plan, will specify both where it wants to go and how it is going to get there by outlining clear goals and setting measurable targets to reach the goals. This is shown in the “The Planning Pyramid” in Figure 2-2. I prefer to call it a pyramid rather than a triangle, because it represents something solid that will not easily “fall over.” In this diagram, a vision statement is at the top. Ideally, this should be a statement that inspires and motivates people. The rest of the pyramid outlines the actions to be taken to attain the vision. These steps are often called different things, such as objectives or actions, etc. but whatever the label, the steps are increasingly detailed as one goes down toward the foundation of the pyramid.

Some plans do a good job of spelling out lofty goals—which define where they want to go—but do not explain what needs to be done to reach them. The foundation of a good plan will be measurable targets which spell out the “who-what-when-and-how-many” items such as “the department must conduct surveys and calf survival should double within two years.” If a plan lacks these specific actions and measurable targets, implementers will not know how to meet the goals. Further, it will be difficult to judge whether the plan is in fact being implemented. Such plans leave so much “wiggle room” that the original intent of the agreement may be compromised or not implemented at all.

However, vision and goals are also important. Many plans omit the goals and instead present a laundry list of specific actions. This is equivalent to defining how they expect to get there without yet knowing where they are going. In this case, the actions will lack a unifying thread—why are we doing these things? What is the point? What is the big picture? When a plan lacks vision, people will not be inspired to implement it. If it lacks clear goals, people may not understand why certain actions are to be taken, e.g. why

should calf survival double? The answer should lie at a higher step in the pyramid and may be “wolf control must be proven to be effective or it must be stopped quickly.” Thus you move up the pyramid to answer why an action should be taken and down to answer how to meet the goals.

**Figure 2-3**  
**The Planning Pyramid**



A quality document will also be clear, easy to read, as brief as possible, and should exclude technical jargon. While not as important as the content, it should also have a professional look and layout which will make it more inviting to read.

Frederic Sargent et.al., in their book *Rural Environmental Planning*, discuss additional ways to evaluate the quality of a plan. First, he recommends listing all “strong recommendations, i.e., those that include the words: recommend, propose, should, shall, will, must and necessary. Weak recommendations are those that include the words may, could, might...Weak recommendations are not counted.” He also advises counting plan “implementation actions. List specific recommendations implemented, in progress, and partially or not implemented at all. Evaluate recommendations implemented and the percentage implemented per year” (Sargent et al. 1991, 155).

## VII. Summary

In summary, there is wide agreement that team effectiveness is the result of many interacting variables which establish a climate conducive to success. Based on the discussion presented in this chapter, a preliminary list of criteria which are likely to be

important factors in team design was developed as shown in Table 2-2. For the purpose of this research, these points will serve as criteria for analyzing the design of each team—i.e. was the design conducive to success?

Many of these criteria—ground rules for example—are widely-recognized as important for success. Others, such as who the participants should represent, are not as clear. Therefore, two questions will be asked regarding each criterion. First, was it present in each case (e.g.. ‘did this team have a clear purpose?’). Second, did the criterion appear to be important or relevant in each case (e.g. did a clear purpose really matter here?).

Thus the criteria will also be tested to determine, on a preliminary basis, whether they appear to be essential to EDS team effectiveness. Based on these results, this study will then develop a refined list of criteria for effective team design.

While these criteria will be used to examine whether the team’s design was conducive to success, the indicators discussed earlier (Table 1-1) will serve as the criteria for determining whether each effort, taken as a whole, was successful.

**Table 2-2**  
**Preliminary Criteria for Effective Team Design**

**The Purpose**

- Did the team locate at an appropriate point on the ladder of possible tasks?
- Was the dispute ripe for settlement?
- Was the purpose clear and inspiring?
- Was there a sense of urgency to complete the task?
- Was the task a complete and meaningful whole?
- Did the team have authority over the task?
- Did the team feel ownership of the product?

**The Participants**

- Were all potentially affected interests invited?
- Was the decision-making authority included?
- Was the process of choosing members perceived as fair?
- Did the participants have good negotiating skills
  - Were they good listeners? Were they articulate and tactful with diverse skills and different styles of negotiating? Were they capable of influencing others?
- Were opinion leaders involved?
- Were moderates included?
- Did the members represent organized groups?
- Was the team's size appropriate to the task?

**The Process**

- Was a neutral intermediary employed?
- Did the team feel ownership in the process?
- Was a climate of openness and trust established?
- Did the team have ground rules to encourage excellent communication?
- Was the process conducive to listening, trust and commitment?
- Was team spirit present?
- Did the team stop frequently for self-assessment of its process?
- Was a step-by-step problem solving process followed?
- Were there deadlines? Did the group meet frequently enough?
- Was the team involved in implementation and monitoring?

**Political and Agency Support**

- How were political connections made?
  - Was there a connection to established processes and authorities?
  - Did the appropriate level of government sanction and support the effort?
  - Were members opinion leaders with some political clout?
- Did those involved promote the team's image and build external support?
- Did the agency or agencies give the team resources, rewards, and recognition?

**The Product**

- Is it fair to those concerned?
- Does it address all the key issues?
- Is it wise? Is it reasonably cautious given existing data and uncertainty?

(see section 1.4.4.)

Does it define a desired future and set measurable targets (in sufficient detail)?

Does it report points where members agreed to disagree?

Does it include “strong” recommendations (will, shall, must)?


Is it clear, easy to read, and as brief as possible? Are maps and graphics clear?

Does it exclude technical jargon where possible? Does it look professional?

# Part Two

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## Results



*Footprint of a three-year-old timber wolf, actual size (from Lopez 1978, 20)*

## Chapter 3.

### Wolves—The Nature of the Issue

#### *Howl*

*It was wild, untamed music and it  
echoed from the hillsides  
and filled the valleys. It sent  
a queer shivering feeling along my*

*spine. It was not a feeling  
of fear, you understand, but a sort of  
tingling, as if there was hair on my back  
and it was hackling.*

—Alda Orton, *Alaskan trapper*  
(from Lopez 1978, 39)

This chapter provides an introduction to the wolf management controversy. It discusses the history of the debate, using Alaska as an example (more specific discussion of the history of the debates in BC and the Yukon is presented in those chapters). It presents a few points of wolf biology on which there is wide agreement and then discusses some of the key issues, beginning with the broadest and moving to the more specific. Finally, it takes a look at whether this controversy involves fundamental values which cannot be negotiated.

#### I. History of the Controversy

The wolf has been a mythical figure in cultures around the world. As Barry Lopez, in his study *Of Wolves and Men*, explains, “The wolf exerts a powerful influence on the human imagination. It takes your stare—and turns it back on you (Lopez 1978, 4).

The gray wolf, *Canis lupus*, once had the largest historical range of any large mammal in the world, with the exception of humans. But a combination of bounty hunting, poisoning, and habitat destruction has severely limited its range. Today, the gray wolf is virtually extinct throughout its southern range, but is still found in healthy numbers in the northern portion of North America. Table 3-1 summarizes information on worldwide wolf populations. At the current time, Russia and Canada have the largest numbers and British Columbia, Alaska and the Yukon all have healthy wolf populations.

**Table 3-1**  
**Worldwide Wolf Populations**

Location	Estimated Number of Wolves
Russia	70,000 wolves (despite a bounty program)
Canada	50,000
India	1,000-2,000
Italy	250 wolves, totally protected
•British Columbia	<b>8,000</b>
•Alaska	<b>5,900 - 7,900 in 700 to 900 packs</b>
•The Yukon	<b>4,000 to 4,500</b>
Minnesota	1500-1700
Wisconsin	30 - 40
Montana	30
Isle Royale	12
Michigan	6

Sources: ADFG 1991, 3; Archibald 1989, 171; Bailey 1993, 2

### ***Alaska's Territorial Days—Maximum Production of Ungulates***

As in much of the rest of the world, wolf control has a long history in Alaska. Some claim that Natives used trapping and denning—where pups are taken from dens and destroyed—to keep the wolf population in check. But it was the gold rush that brought hundreds of miners to Interior Alaska, creating a high demand for game meat and thus for wolf control. Market hunters, concerned that wolves were competing for the valuable game species, commonly poisoned leftover carcasses to kill wolves (Harbo and Dean 1981,51).

In 1915, the Territorial Legislature set a ten-dollar bounty on Alaska's wolves. Bounties were paid throughout the state and, in several remote villages, denning became the principal source of cash in the spring. In the period following World War II, federal wolf control programs became one of the “dominant aspects of wildlife management in Alaska. Biological information was still scarce and public attitudes were still largely anti-wolf” (Harbo and Dean 1981, 52).

Wolves were heavily controlled in the 1940s and 1950s through the use of aerial hunting, poisoning, trapping and bounties. Poisoning also inadvertently controlled the other major predator in the state: brown bears. The control programs resulted in increased abundance of moose and caribou, which were able to support a high hunter



harvest. To this day, older hunters continue to attend public meetings to complain about the loss of these once-abundant moose and caribou populations.

## **Public Opinion Shifts; Wolf Control Stops**

### **A new appreciation of wolves**

But public opinion was changing as a result of the wolf's extinction in many parts of the US and the growing ecological awareness of the general public. Biologists also were increasingly divided on the issue of wolf control.

In his famous essay, "Thinking Like a Mountain," Aldo Leopold (1949, 138) relates the experience that permanently changed his attitude toward wolves:

My own conviction on this score dates from the day I saw a wolf die ... In those days we had never heard of passing up a chance to kill a wolf. In a second we were pumping lead into the pack, but with more excitement than accuracy ... When our rifles were empty, the old wolf was down, and a pup was dragging a leg into impassable slide-rocks.

We reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes. I realized then, and have known ever since, that there was something new to me in those eyes—something known only to her and to the mountain.

During the 1960s, national interest in environmental issues increased and the 1963 publication of Farley Mowat's best-seller *Never Cry Wolf* inspired widespread sympathy for the predators. In 1964, the Leopold Committee recommended "the establishment of an advisory board, the need for internal reassessment, and explicit criteria pertaining to the control of poisons" (Harbo and Dean 1981, 55). These recommendations were adopted as policy by the Secretary of the Interior in the following year.

In 1966, Dr. L. David Mech, later dubbed the "wolf czar" for his preeminence in the field, published his landmark study, *The Wolves of Isle Royale*. In this work, he concluded that wolves took principally calves, infirm, and older adults and that predation had the important effect of keeping the moose population within the carrying capacity of the habitat (Mech 1966).

Dr. Mech later reversed these conclusions after finding that wolves also kill prime individuals and can actually extirpate a prey population (Mech 1974, 26).

I have learned that, far from always being 'balanced,' ratios of wolves and prey animals can fluctuate wildly—and sometimes catastrophically. Wolves may actually starve after killing off almost all the moose and deer in an area. This explains why wolf-control programs may sometimes ensure greater and more stable numbers of both wolves and the animals they hunt.

His first study, however, has had a lasting impact on the public misconception that wolves kill principally the old, the sick and the weak.

It has also been shown that wolves don't always kill just what they need; they sometimes kill and abandon the carcass. And wolves kill each other. According to Lopez (a wolf devotee himself), "Wolf lovers want to say no healthy wolf ever killed anyone in North America, which isn't true either. They have killed Indians and Eskimos" (1978, 4).

But public attitudes were changing and several means of wolf control, such as poisoning and denning, became illegal shortly after statehood. In 1968, the Alaska Legislature gave the Board of Fish and Game authority to designate areas where bounties would be paid and the Board subsequently abolished bounties in all but some management units in southeast Alaska, where bounties continued for several more years. In 1971, the US. Congress passed the Federal Airborne Hunting Act (Public Law 92-157), which prohibited hunting from aircraft, except under state permit for control purposes (the act also prohibited harassment of animals with aircraft). Following the letter of the law, Alaska issued aerial permits to wolf hunters through the winter of 1971-72, which "infuriated those who thought the federal law had completely banned such hunting"(Harbo and Dean, 56). As a result of the furor, the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) banned further issuance of permits.

### **IUCN Manifesto on wolf conservation**

New principles of wolf management were being considered internationally. In September, 1973, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) met in Stockholm, Sweden. The meeting was attended by official delegates from 12 countries having important wolf populations and was the first international meeting on the conservation of the wolf. Its Wolf Specialist Group adopted a Manifesto on Wolf Conservation, which included a Declaration of Principles for Wolf Conservation. The first Principle recognizes the inherent value of wolves:

Wolves, like all other wildlife, have a right to exist in a wild state. This right is in no way related to their known value to mankind. Instead, it derives from the right of all living creatures to co-exist with man as a part of natural ecosystems (IUCN 1974, 1).

However, the seventh Principle "recognized that occasionally there may be a scientifically established need to reduce non-endangered wolf populations." It went on to state that:

temporary reduction measures should be imposed under strict scientific management. The methods must be selective, specific to the problem, highly discriminatory, and have minimal adverse side effects on the ecosystem. Alternative ecosystem management, including alteration of human activities and attitudes and non-lethal methods of wolf management, should be fully considered before lethal wolf reduction is employed...Wolf reduction should never result in the permanent extirpation of the species from any portion of its natural range (IUCN 1974, 1).

In a further “Statement on Wolf Control” issued by the Wolf Specialist Group in 1984, the organization emphasized that whenever prey populations are so low that wolf control is initiated, then hunting should be prohibited until the control program ends (IUCN 1984, 2). These widely-respected IUCN documents would have a strong influence on wolf management plans in both Alaska and the Yukon in the 1990s.

In 1973, the Alaska Board of Fish and Game, which had final authority on state fish and wildlife policy, declined to institute any wolf control programs and issued the following “pro-wolf” policy statement, which would be controversial in Alaska if written today:


The various recreational and aesthetic values of wolves will be considered equally with similar values of the prey species in the final management decision. (Harbo and Dean 1981, 56).

## ***Ungulate Populations Crash, Renewing Calls for Wolf Control***

By 1973, all systematic control of wolves through bounties, aerial hunting, denning and poisoning had ceased in Alaska. But with an abundant prey base still in existence and the elimination of control efforts, wolf populations increased rapidly. As shown in Figure 3-1, this, in combination with a few bad winters, high harvests, and possibly degraded habitats, “all coincided in the early 1970s to bring moose and caribou populations crashing down” (Adams 1991, 1). Ungulates declined throughout interior Alaska and in southeast Alaska, deer populations declined to low levels on all major islands where there were wolves, but remained at moderate levels on islands without wolves.

In the case of the moose in game management unit (GMU) 20A south of Fairbanks (see map, Figure 3-2), the population appeared to be well below the carrying capacity of the habitat, yet poor calf and yearling survival had followed the mild winters of 1971 through 1974. This convinced biologists that wolves did contribute to the decline.


**Figure 3-1**  
**Decline of Interior Alaska Ungulate Populations**  
**1960s to 1970s**



Source: Harbo and Dean 1981, 56. GMU = game management unit.

Fairbanks residents were particularly concerned after several pet dogs were killed by wolves. According to Lopez (1978, 2), wolves got into the habit of visiting homes on the edge of town and killing pet dogs. A dog owner wouldn't hear a sound but the barking of his dog. Then silence. In the morning, the owner would find the dog's collar or a few of its bones stripped of meat. The wolves left behind little else but their enormous footprints in the snow.

By 1974, wildlife managers "reached a conclusion that was unthinkable 10 years earlier: in order to rehabilitate the depressed GMU 20A moose population so that desired levels of harvest by humans could be reinstated in a reasonable time, wolf control should be undertaken" (Harbo and Dean 1981, 56).



## ***Wolf Control Proceeds Despite Numerous Lawsuits***

In December 1975, the department submitted a wolf control plan to the Board of Game (the Board), which was now separate from the Board of Fish. This Board has final authority to set wildlife policy and the governor's appointments to it are some of the most controversial appointments in the state. The proposed plan included control programs for GMU 20A and 13 which were expected to run for three to four years, using fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters with only agency personnel participating. Wolf reductions were not to exceed 80 percent in GMU 20A, with the objective of achieving a ratio of 1 wolf to 100 moose. Numerous lawsuits filed to halt these programs were ultimately unsuccessful.


### **Wolf control “very effective” in GMU 20A, but not in GMU 13**

The control program in GMU 20A was very effective. By April 1977, after removing an estimated 162 wolves, the estimated wolf/moose ratio in unit 20A was 1:50-80, the decline in the moose herd was arrested and calf and yearling survival had increased (Harbo and Dean 1981, 61).

As shown in Figure 3-3, the pre-control population of 2900 moose in the fall of 1975, with a ratio of 14 calves per 100 cows, reached 3500 by the fall of 1978, with a ratio of 50 calves per 100 cows (Harbo and Dean 1981, 61), and the populations of moose and caribou continued to increase for the next ten years. Annual caribou calf mortality declined from a startling 93 percent to 44 percent when wolves were reduced and adult moose mortality declined from 20 percent to 6 percent (Boertje 1991, 2).

The number of moose per wolf increased from twelve moose per wolf to over 50 moose per wolf, which is why some claim paradoxically that wolves “never had it so good” as they do after a control program.

**Figure 3-3**  
**Statistics Before and After Wolf Control in GMU 20A**  
**1976—Before Control; 1978—After Control**



Sources: Harbo and Dean 1981, 61; Boertje 1991, 2; and Bud Burris, retired ADFG biologist, personal communication.

Such increases did not occur in the low moose population in nearby Denali National Park, where wolf control was not conducted and where winter conditions were virtually identical. “This clearly indicated that wolves had been the primary factor limiting growth of ungulate populations in GMU 20A” (Boertje 1991, 2). Now almost twenty years later, several species continue to be more abundant *outside* than inside the famous park. Many hunters and biologists point to this difference as a justification for “active management.” “There are many more moose, caribou and wolves in GMU 20A where active management is pursued and hunting is allowed than in nearby Denali National Park, where no management and no hunting or trapping is allowed,” said Bishop. “The potential exists for greatly enhanced viewing with proper management and access.”

“Now we have the wolf viewing center of the world almost with the highest wolf density darn near in North America,” said ADFG biologist Dale Haggstrom. “And we’re sustaining it too. When the control program was started in the 1970s, there were around 240 wolves in 20A and there are about 270 wolves there now. A huge proportion of the hunters who went into 20A saw wolves this past year [1991-1992], compared to usually

less than one percent of people who see them elsewhere. Yet that was a hard core reduction center in mid 70s to early 80s.”

“The fact that there are a lot of wolves in 20A now and you can hear them and see them—it's spectacular,” stated ADFG biologist and public relations officer Cathie Harms. “It's easier to see wolves in 20A than it is in Denali National Park—there are more of them in 20A. It's great, in fact a lot of people during our input phase for the area specific plans wanted to make that a wolf preserve area because there are so many wolves there. And we had to keep reminding them, well, that's true, but the reason the wolves are there is because of the reduction programs in the past.”

### ***Wolf control not effective in GMU 13***

The control plan had included a controversial experiment in GMU 13 which called for complete elimination of a population of about 45 wolves in one area to allow comparison of calf and yearling survival rates with that in a nearby area where wolves were not removed (Harbo and Dean 1981, 57).

While the wolf control program largely met its stated objectives in unit 20A, the results were very different in the experimental area in GMU 13, where dramatic increases in ungulate populations did not occur. This was due to heavy grizzly bear predation on calves, particularly in the first several weeks after birth. This was one of the first clear indications that bears, and not wolves, can also be a significant predator in an area.

### **Extensive, wide-spread wolf control takes place**

Despite the results in GMU 13, the success of wolf control in GMU 20A increased the demand for wolf control in other areas. Because of this, the Board took steps to make wolf control a routine department decision that did not require action by the Board. Between 1978 and 1986, several wolf control programs were conducted despite numerous unsuccessful court challenges. Environmentalists, many moderates, and some biologists within ADFG feel that wolf control was overused during this time.

“We just took the tool and ran with it,” said ADFG biologist Haggstrom. “Anyone who wanted a program got one. There were control programs in the Innoko, the Nowitna, in Aniak, Tok, Delta, around Fairbanks—we're talking big chunks of real estate all over the interior. It was just a commodity-based mentality. If there hadn't been a few surprises, such as inaccurate moose estimates and the discovery that bears, not wolves, were often the problem, there would have been even more control.”

Environmentalists were upset with both the number of wolf control programs and the lack of public information and public input about them. At the time, there was nothing



on paper that restricted wolf control from any particular area. Harms said that many people felt that “We never knew when or where it was coming. It just seemed like you proposed wolf control wherever you wanted it and we never knew where in advance.” At a minimum, many environmentalists wanted public input in the decision making process and a firm promise that some extensive areas would always be off-limits to any control actions.

In 1978, Robert Weeden, a widely-respected professor of natural resources at the University of Alaska, felt that both sides of the debate would have to make concessions:

As Alaska’s population grows and big game populations struggle to maintain themselves, wolves and hunters will come into sharper competition. At the same time, wolf protection interests will continue objecting to wolf trapping for fur and to wolf-reduction programs. The logical course of management, based on an attempt to please everybody, is to identify some areas where wolves are protected even when their prey gets scarce and hunting is poor, some areas where wolves will be killed when hunting and ungulates otherwise would be threatened. The problem is communication and acceptance.

Outside animal protection people can’t believe that wolves aren’t as scarce in Alaska as they are in the other 49 states; even the news in 1973-74 that wolves killed at least 30 pet dogs in and around Fairbanks made no impression. Gaining their acceptance of this fact and the unique role of hunting in Alaska is an absolute essential if “the wolf problem” is ever to be diminished. On the other side, hunters and the department have to accept the fact that wolves, alive and unmolested, have unique symbolic value to an urbanized nation longing to retain some evidence of lost wild America (1978, 225).

### *“Land and shoot trapping” approved*

In addition to control programs conducted by agency personnel, the Board of Game sanctioned an increasingly controversial practice of “land and shoot trapping” which allowed a person to locate wolves from the air, then land and shoot them. According to Bishop, the practice was considered “trapping” because the pelts were generally sold.

An increasing number of groups opposed the practice, contending that it was a “covert” way for the department to control wolf populations, that land and shoot trapping turned aerial wolf hunting into a sport, and that it was almost impossible to harvest the animals without first herding them into an acceptable landing area—a practice that is prohibited by the Airborne Hunting Act. In a wide-open area the size of Alaska, the practice was also open to abuse due to lack of monitoring and enforcement. Opponents of this provision flaunted the names of hunters, such as surgeon Jack Frost of Anchorage,

who was accused of herding and killing up to 60 wolves he had tracked by plane one winter under a land and shoot trapping permit.

### **Wolf control programs stopped again**

In March, 1986, planes and helicopters were used by ADFG personnel to locate and shoot 29 radio-collared wolves in the Minto Flats area (GMU 20B) west of Fairbanks. This was to be the last agency wolf control action until the winter of 1993-1994.

Although many lawsuits were filed before the wolf control programs stopped, it should be noted that the state either won the court cases opposing wolf control or was able to comply with the procedural requirements determined by the courts. As of 1994, litigation has only been successful as a delaying tactic, but not a permanent means of prohibiting wolf control.

But opposition groups were successful in stopping wolf control through the political arena. In February, 1987, Governor Cowper, who reportedly received more letters on wolf control than any other issue, announced that no public funds would be spent on wolf control during his administration and that other alternatives would be sought.

## **II. The Biology**

While scientists debate many points of wolf biology, there is wide agreement on the following factors:

1. The wolf population of 5900 to 7900 animals in Alaska is not endangered.
2. Wolves and bears commonly take 80 percent of newborn ungulate calves.
3. Wolves reproduce rapidly and can recover quickly from a control program.
4. Wolf control can be very effective in increasing ungulate populations if bear predation is not significant.

These points say nothing about whether it is right or wrong to kill wolves, they simply indicate some important aspects of the biology. The last three points are discussed in more detail below.


### **Wolves and bears commonly take 80 percent of calves**

According to caribou biologist Pat Valkenburg, "This is not like the lower 48 where hunters can take 30 percent of the deer population. First of all, habitat [in the lower 48] is

much more productive and secondly, they don't have any predators down there. But here it is common for predators to take 80 percent of the newborn calves. That means hunters can't take more than 5 percent of a population and even that may be reduced in many years.”

One ADFG study for one area indicated that predators accounted for roughly 80 to 85 percent of ungulate mortality, while humans accounted for 4 to 7 percent and 10 to 15 percent die of other causes (see Figure 3-4).

**Figure 3-4**  
**Causes of Moose and Caribou Mortality in Alaska**



Source: ADFG biologist Cathie Harms

In GMU 20E, where there is a relatively high number of predators compared to moose, “predators annually kill 31 percent of the post calving moose population while humans kill about 1.5 percent...Humans can safely kill larger percentages of moose populations (i.e. 10 percent) where predator populations are limited. Without predator management, moose and wolves will eventually occur at low densities throughout most of Alaska. These low densities will support little human use” (Boertje 1991, 2-3).

It is also clear that grizzly bears can be more significant predators than wolves. However, bear “control” is not needed because normal hunting can effectively reduce bear numbers and bear predation. As wildlife biologist and team member Anne Ruggles explained, hunters can take eight percent of a grizzly bear population to reduce bear numbers. But traditional hunting is ineffective for wolves, and even in a wolf control program you can take 40 percent of the wolf population and they will recover. Also, lone

wolves quickly move into any packless areas, where bears do not immigrate in the same way.

### **Wolves reproduce rapidly and can recover quickly from a control program**

“Because wolves have many pups and immigrate, it is common for a wolf population to increase by 50 percent in a year and it is not unusual for a population in a small area to double in one year,” said Stephenson. According to him, more than 180 packs have been monitored using radio telemetry for periods of two to eight years in Alaska. He estimates that there are between 700 and 900 packs in the state which include from 5900 to 7900 wolves. These studies have shown that yearling wolves migrate distances of 500 miles or more, dispersing widely into new areas (Stephenson et al. 1993).

Dr. L. David Mech, a preeminent wolf biologist, was invited to respond to questions from the Alaska wolf management team. He said he had no concerns about current wolf management practices in the state. When asked if wolves can sustain a 30 to 50 percent harvest over time, he responded simply, “Yes.”

### **Wolf control can be very effective in increasing ungulate populations if bear predation is not significant.**

As discussed earlier, programs in Canada and Alaska have demonstrated that wolf control can be very effective in increasing ungulate populations if bear predation is not significant.

## III. The Issues

One point everyone agrees on is that wolves are extraordinary animals. Tales of their remarkable intelligence, strength and endurance abound. The following implausible episode is but one example:

In the winter of 1976 an aerial hunter surprised ten gray wolves traveling on a ridge in the Alaska Range. There was nowhere for the animals to escape to and the gunner shot nine quickly. The tenth had broken for the tip of a spur running off the ridge. The hunter knew the spur ended at an abrupt vertical drop of about three hundred feet and he followed, curious to see what the wolf would do. Without hesitation the wolf sailed off the spur, fell the three hundred feet into a snow bank—and came up running in an explosion of powder (Lopez 1978, 3).

The world is fast running out of wild things and wild places. As people see the natural world dwindling around them, they are inclined to protect both wilderness and what they view as its symbol—the wolf. This is true regardless of the wolf’s relative abundance in some areas.

“Every living thing (and perhaps many a dead one as well) pays heed to the call of the wolf...it is an outburst of wild defiant sorrow, and of contempt for all the adversities of the world,” Leopold wrote (1949, 137). For him, the deeper meaning in the mystifying howl of the wolf is Thoreau’s dictum: in wildness is the salvation of the world.

## ***The Broader Conflict***

The wolf debate itself is actually just the tip of the iceberg of much larger issues dealing with wildlife and resource management in general. There are questions of ethics, sustainable use, ecosystem vs. single species management, animal and human rights, inherent values vs. values for human use, subsistence vs. recreational hunting, rural vs. urban cultures, and the ethics of consumptive use.

### **A symbol of wilderness**

Wolf control is clearly a very emotional issue for people on both sides of the debate. In addition to seeing it as a symbol of wilderness, many speak of the wolf as a “spiritual essence.” Others say they identify with the wolf. Fighting back the tears and struggling with her words, one woman testified at a public hearing, “When I hear of one wolf being shot, I cry all night long. It affects me very, very deeply.”

In addition to these very personal concerns, there is also a question of whether or not it is appropriate to “manage” ecosystems. “Isn’t it a contradiction in terms to *manage* wildlife and wild places?” they ask. They are opposed to managing ecosystems and see any manipulation—whether prescribed fire to improve moose habitat or wolf reductions to increase ungulates—as inappropriate or even unethical.

### **“Today Mama eat salmon. Tomorrow, salmon eat Mama.”**

Although I am not a hunter and I rarely eat meat, I am not opposed to hunting. Almost twenty years in Alaska has changed my perspective on that, as I know many people who live a subsistence lifestyle. But until this research, I did not really understand what drives some to hunt. Now I have gained a better understanding and even respect for many members of the much-maligned hunting community. Few hunters are willing to

admit it in public, but they are also deeply and legitimately affected by this issue and feel cornered by a growing opposition to hunting in general.

One hunter and trapper (who was neither wealthy nor a trophy hunter) was asked what was at stake for him in the wolf debate. There was considerable emotion in his voice as he said with conviction, “The death of our lifestyle is at stake here. One that my father and my grandfather had. It’s being out there, making your living on the land and being part of nature—something city folks will never understand. My children and my grandchildren may not have that chance because some rich animal rights activist in New York City doesn’t think it’s proper.”

Many of the rural people I spoke with felt that urbanites are increasingly ignorant of Nature’s life cycles. Once again, the insight of Aldo Leopold is pertinent, as he pointed out that, “There are two spiritual dangers in not owning a farm. One is the danger of supposing that breakfast comes from the grocery. The other, that heat comes from the furnace.”

In another interview that turned into quite a philosophical discussion, a Caucasian hunter said that people would never tell a Native to take a camera out and just *photograph* the animals, but they tell him that all the time. He asked why people think only Natives find hunting a spiritual experience, because it is also deeply spiritual for him. “For me, and for most hunters I believe, hunting is a way to touch the true meaning of life; it feels the way going to church ought to feel. We are all animals—an integral part of Nature—and there is no way for a person to feel closer to Nature and the cycle of life than through hunting. No afternoon frolic on some park trail is going to convey that.”

“Today Mama eat salmon. Tomorrow, salmon eat Mama,” he mused, quoting the Indian saying. “Sometimes I think the animal rights people try to deny that and think that by stopping hunting they may prevent their own mortality. But hunting changes your perspective. Fly this area on any day in the winter and you’ll see dozens of blood spots where wolves have taken moose and caribou. It’s not pretty, but that’s the way Nature is. Today I may kill a caribou, but someday it will be my turn and I will meet my fate and return to the earth. They say that humans should not disturb Nature; that we mustn’t interfere with its balance. Well, they might as well tell the wolves the same darned thing, because whether urban people want to admit it or not, humans *are* animals and we were meant to be as much a part of Nature as the caribou and the wolves.”

Hunters also point out that they are the ones who pay most of the bills for wildlife management in this country through licenses and taxes on equipment and therefore, they feel they should have more say in decisions than nonhunters. Traditionally, wildlife

agencies were closely allied to the hunting community (some believe they still are) and had a game production mentality.

Legally, however, wildlife is a common property resource that belongs to every citizen of the state. Many are also working to change the contribution nonhunters make to wildlife. They have proposed taxes on recreational equipment that will also go to wildlife management. And they point out that conservation groups have already spent millions of dollars on habitat acquisition and general funding of wildlife refuges, forests, parks, wild rivers, etc. which are beneficial to wildlife.

## **Subsistence**

Another issue underlying the debate in Alaska is subsistence hunting. Even more deeply divisive than wolf control, subsistence is an issue that often pits urban against rural and white against Native hunters. There are legitimate arguments on both sides. One argument, based on the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), is that if game are scarce, rural residents who have traditionally used the resource and who have fewer alternative sources of meat, have first priority. Others, basing their argument on the Alaska Constitution, say that it is illegal to discriminate; the wildlife resource belongs to everyone.

Currently, if there is not an adequate supply of traditionally-used game in an area, people must apply for a “Tier II” permit to hunt there. This is a means of allocating a limited resource for subsistence priority—i.e. for personal use of the meat and furs if that use is traditional for the individual. The criteria for obtaining such a permit include proximity of one’s residence to the area and demonstrated past dependence on the resource. Under these criteria, rural residents who have traditionally hunted in an area have top priority. Virtually all Natives and many rural white residents can qualify. While race is not a criterion, in general, urban, white hunters are less likely to qualify under these criteria. Many of them strongly oppose Tier II permits, saying that all interested residents should have an equal chance of hunting in an area. They prefer a system such as a lottery or drawing permit where everyone has an equal opportunity.

One argument for wolf control is that it will increase game populations so that there will be enough for both subsistence and sport hunters and thus eliminate the need to allocate the resource between the two. One hunter expressed the relationship between subsistence hunting and wolf control this way, “This subsistence issue scares me.” He felt it could really heat up if there isn't enough game to go around and “there won't be if we continue to give 80 percent of the calves to the wolves.”

These broader issues, like an iceberg lurking below the surface, will continue to have implications on the wolf management debate. Some feel that these issues must be resolved before anything more than a temporary truce can be gained regarding wolves and wolf management. Certainly a dialogue between the adversaries on these broader issues could be helpful because they do share a common concern for wildlife, a resource which could benefit if these groups worked together. But some of these conflicts, such as the ethics of managing wildlife, may never be “resolved.”

That is why the EDS literature makes a distinction between the words “conflict” vs. “dispute” and “resolution” versus “settlement.” As defined in Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990, 17) EDS processes are *not* designed to end the environmental conflicts that are fundamental and ongoing, such as the conflict between development and preservation. They are designed to negotiate disputes over more specific issues within the larger conflict. As mentioned in Chapter 2, leaders of the Sierra Club and the oil industry may agree on an approach to limited oil development in a specific site for a specific time, although their fundamental value differences have not changed and the wider conflict of preservation versus oil development will continue. Likewise, the authors choose the term *settlement* “to denote the ending of a specific dispute or conflict episode and not the once-and-for-all disappearance of conflict implied by the term *resolution*” (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 18).

## **More Specific Issues**

If the dispute is defined more narrowly, the possibility of obtaining at least a temporary truce is increased. Those opposed to wolf control raise two important questions:

- Are intensively managed areas ecologically sustainable? Can we continue to produce large numbers of ungulates over the long term?
- Are we instituting wolf control without seriously examining what it is that led to low ungulate populations in the first place? Can we manage other factors, such as harvests, so that such crises are avoided?

If we can find some middle ground on these issues—or better yet—enough biological data that we feel we can live with the risks, then the discussion can move on to still more specific concerns. In Alaska, I refer to the following five points as the “what, when, who, how, and where” issues (the issues are not exactly the same in the Yukon and BC, however).

1. **What** constitutes wolf control?



2. **When**—under what circumstances, if any, is it acceptable to consider controlling wolf populations?
3. **Who**—Will the general public be allowed to participate in wolf control programs?
4. **How**—What methods and means will be acceptable for controlling wolf populations?
5. **Where**—In what areas of the state, if any, can control programs be considered? Which areas, if any, will be off limits?

### **1. What constitutes wolf control?**

The definition is important so that everyone is clear on just what is being debated. How is it distinguished from wolf hunting? Is it acceptable for wolf populations to be regulated over long periods of time or should they be reduced quickly, then allowed to recover? What should this be called? Some agencies prefer the term “wolf management.” Outfitters in the Yukon call it “caribou enhancement.” But others contend, with good justification, that these are euphemisms. They prefer to “call it what it is”—i.e. a *wolf kill* or at a minimum, *wolf control*.

### **2. When—under what circumstances, if any, is it acceptable to consider controlling wolves?**

The issue of “when”, if ever, wolf control can be considered is fundamental. Is wolf control acceptable under any circumstances? There is an entire spectrum of answers to this question. One end of the spectrum is adamant that it is *never* acceptable. “Biologically, it may make more sense [to shoot them from the air],” Priscilla Feral of the national group, Friends of Animals, was quoted. “But it’s like saying: What’s the best way to kill a kindergarten class?” (Cole 1994, B1).

Some say control might be considered if and only if the prey species risks local extirpation. Some say it should never be conducted to benefit hunters. Some say it should be considered if the local people require meat for their subsistence needs. Some say control is appropriate if the sport hunting harvest is low (for the purposes of this study, I define “sport hunters” as those who hunt primarily for the meat, although they may have adequate money to buy it). And on the other end of the spectrum, some see no problem in controlling wolves to benefit the above as well as trophy hunters and tourists.

### **3. How—If control is deemed necessary, what methods and means will be acceptable for controlling wolves?**

If wolf control is deemed necessary under the conditions established under question 2, then what methods and means will be acceptable for controlling wolves? The sportsmen’s concept of fair chase is involved here. Many people do not feel that it is right to chase or shoot any animal from an airplane. Airplanes are used to hunt wolves because they are very difficult to hunt on the ground and there are only a few trappers skilled enough to catch them. Therefore, unlike most other large mammals, it is not possible to effectively decrease the wolf population by increasing bag limits or the hunting or trapping seasons.

“They're smart and they're *fast*,” explained wolf biologist Bob Stephenson. “They're very difficult to trap and almost impossible to hunt on the ground.”

Although there are few other options for effectively decreasing a population of wolves, the use of airplanes will always be controversial: “Considering the emotional appeal of the wolf and the fact that shooting a magnificent animal out of airplanes is unsportsmanlike, I think if they try to do that, all hell would break loose in the media—it would create a media event. There's no question about it in my mind,” said David Cline, Executive Director of the Audubon Society's Western Region.

But the fair chase argument carries little weight with subsistence hunters in Alaska. Until recently, success in hunting was a matter of life and death. “Well, should we make someone in Safeway have fair chase for Cheerios boxes? What's the difference?” commented a Native hunter.

#### 4. Who

If control is deemed necessary, who will carry it out? Will the general public be allowed to participate in wolf control programs? While this is much cheaper, many feel it is subject to abuse and would prefer that only agency biologists be allowed to do the shooting.

#### 5. Where

In what areas of the state, if any, can control programs be considered? Which areas, if any, will be off limits? [National Parks are already off limits.]

### IV. Does this dispute involve fundamental values?

The following respondents' comments from the British Columbia (BC) case illustrate first that this *is* a very difficult issue, but second, that it may be possible to meet the parties' most important concerns in a package agreement that they could accept.

***No room for compromise.*** According to Sherry Pettigrew, founder of the Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society, when the BC Wolf Working Group began, she thought compromise was possible. But in retrospect she knew there were some things that, as the representative and founder of NWPS, she was not willing to compromise on. “We do not support wolf control to increase ungulates for hunting. Not even if the ungulates have been overhunted by humans or if they are in a predator pit. People want this fast food

approach to wildlife management—‘if we have two or three low hunting years, let’s just take the predators out of the system.’ We have to get off this addiction to managing by intrusion.”

**“A real dilemma.”** Significantly, however, Pettigrew acknowledges that there may be situations where she would consider wolf control—albeit very reluctantly.

I think some of the realities were very helpful for all of us to hear, because it was Don Caldwell from the Guide/Outfitters Association who informed us that ‘Quite frankly folks, if the government isn’t going to do wolf control, others will.’ He listed numerous situations in which people are using all sorts of illegal methods to kill wolves just out of frustration that the government isn’t doing it. That really puts us into an awkward position.

There have been times when I’ve found myself thinking, ‘My god, I’d rather compromise and know that X number of wolves are being killed in a way that isn’t that cruel from the wolf’s perspective and does not have the chain effect that poison has, not to mention the trap baits and so on.’ It’s a real dilemma. I mean to eliminate illegal killing we have to have wolf control! Now in the Quenell Highlands the caribou population could be facing extirpation...that’s also a conundrum for us because I don’t want to see caribou go extinct from there, but I am not necessarily supportive of wolf control. I think there are many other things we could do.

**“There’s room for some negotiation.”** Rosemary Fox of the BC Sierra Club also indicates that there may be a thin sliver of common ground, although it will not be easy to reach:

The guides weren’t giving one iota from their position. Caldwell wrote a paper where he was advocating control to prevent declines and I remember reading that and thinking, ‘Well, we’re getting absolutely nowhere.’ If you have some groups who say control is acceptable only as a last resort to save a population from extirpation and you have the other group saying we need to control to prevent decline, then you have an awful long way to go to meet in the middle.

But something like the Yukon Wolf Management Plan I felt quite comfortable with because, although I’m philosophically opposed to wolf control, I have always acknowledged and the organizations I’ve been involved in—the Canadian Nature Federation and the Sierra Club—acknowledge that in certain cases where prey populations are in danger of extirpation—which is the principle of the Yukon Plan—control may be appropriate. So I could be involved in a negotiation of that sort certainly. There’s room for some negotiation. I think this is the position of the Naturalists too, they can accept control as a last resort sort of thing.

**Whose fundamental values?** Another question involved here is just whose fundamental values are we talking about? Does this mean *every* citizen? There will

always be someone who feels that their fundamental values have been compromised. Priscilla Feral, the director of Friends of Animals, who equates wolf control to killing a kindergarten class, and someone like Joe Vogler—who said he would kill the last pregnant wolf bitch on the capitol steps—will never agree. If these two extremes must be included in any agreement, then consensus is impossible and the issue will continue to fester for years to come.

But if more moderate groups on both sides of the issue are adequate, an agreement is far more likely. This will only work if the moderate groups are willing to publicly endorse the agreement and if they are backed by the broad majority of the public. While all parties should be invited, those who feel the issues are non-negotiable would be unlikely to take part. (A powerful case for excluding the extremes in wildlife management issues is presented in the thoughtful and provocative book *At the Hand of Man* (Bonner 1993).)

***Can the issue be reframed into solvable increments?*** If the issue is “Should wolves be controlled?” the negotiations will reach a stalemate as the groups line up in the “yes” and “no” camps. But if the dispute is subdivided into the more specific issues discussed above, then a settlement between a broad spectrum of moderate groups appears possible. The above comments indicate there is some common ground that wolf control might be considered under certain conditions. Thus, it may be possible for the parties to achieve their *most important* objectives although they may not obtain all they would like. For example, both sides might agree that control is acceptable in cases where the prey face local extirpation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, it is important to refrain from declaring that a dispute involves fundamental values until all avenues have been explored. If a broad spectrum of moderates are included and if the dispute is reframed into solvable increments, then it is possible that even an issue as tough as wolf management may be amenable to settlement—perhaps not with each and every stakeholder—but with a broad majority.

## V. Terminology

One final note before discussing the cases. Terminology has been a difficult issue in this study, and I have probably taken the easy path by referring to the two principal sides in this debate as “hunters” and “environmentalists” or “consumptive” and “nonconsumptive” users.

I dislike these labels for three reasons. First, it underscores the idea of two “sides” in the debate, without emphasizing that there is substantial middle ground in the deep

commitment both “sides” have to the wildlife resource. Secondly, it does little to break down the stereotypes which contribute to the conflict. Third, it implies that hunters are not environmentalists. In fact—although there have been well-publicized cases of abuse, and regardless of their motivation—hunters were one of the earliest groups to call for wildlife conservation and continue to be very active in its support. They do focus on game species, but considerable credit is due them for providing financial backing to wildlife agencies for several decades.

I would prefer to emphasize the common ground between these two groups by referring to both as “conservationists”, but unfortunately in discussing these cases, I need more than one label. I will continue to search for better ones.

# Chapter 4.

## The British Columbia Wolf Working Group

### 1988 to 1994

*This is a hard, tough process, full of pitfalls and dangers.*

*It takes work, organization, clear thinking and stamina.*

*—Mediator Gerald Cormick (1977, 10)*

In 1988, a team was established in British Columbia to make recommendations to the Director of the Wildlife Branch on how wolves should be managed. The team included the leaders of some of the most influential interest groups in the province with respect to wildlife management issues. They met periodically for almost five years. While the effort was not a stellar success, it inspired other teams which were able to go farther by building on the lessons learned from this one.

## I. History of the Controversy

As in most of the continent, wolves in British Columbia (BC) were regarded as vermin with a bounty offered on them beginning in 1870. In 1955, the BC Game Commission became the first wildlife agency in North America to eliminate the bounty, but the province continued a large-scale poisoning program until 1961 (Archibald 1989, 170). In the 1960s, as public opinion was changing, a number of steps were taken to replenish wolf numbers in the province, including a ban on trapping and a bag limit on the hunting of wolves. As a result of these steps, wolf numbers increased and currently may even exceed historic highs in some areas.

The largest increase occurred on Vancouver Island. In the early 1970s, the wolf was considered endangered on the island, but by the end of the decade, the population had increased dramatically and was having a major impact on black-tailed deer throughout the island. At the same time, wolf populations were increasing elsewhere in the province and expanding their territory into the southern interior. In the early 1980s, wolf densities in parts of northern BC were about 25 per 1,000 square kilometers (BC Ministry of

Environment, no date, 6). In 1988, the B. C. Ministry of the Environment (BCME) estimated that there were about 8,000 wolves in British Columbia (Archibald 1989, 171).

In 1979, the province established management objectives for wolves which indicated a commitment to maintaining viable wolf populations in wilderness areas and encouraging opportunities for people to listen to and to observe wolves in their natural habitat (Archibald 1989, 172). The policy allowed wolf control in established livestock management areas and the hunting and trapping of wolves where populations could sustain such harvest. It also included an objective “to control wolves on a site-specific basis where the main objective is to maintain another wildlife species at a desired level.”


An experiment in the Horseranch Range in northern BC was conducted between 1978 and 1980 to determine the effects of wolf control on caribou calf survival. The results indicated that calf recruitment in the Range was three to four times as high as it was before wolves were killed (BCME no date, 5).

Wolf control programs were then commenced in three separate areas to benefit the prey populations and the hunters who utilize them. First, aerial control began in the early 1980s in the Kechika Valley (Figure 4-1) in northern BC, where ungulate populations were dropping by 50 percent every three years. Second, a control program (using trapping, not aerial shooting) was conducted from 1986 to 1989 in the Nimpkish Valley on Vancouver Island, where the blacktailed deer population had declined 75 percent in six years. Third, wolf populations were reduced using helicopters in the Muskwa area where ungulates had declined between 1977 and 1984, while the wolf population had quadrupled to a density of 38 per 1,000 square kilometers “among the highest wolf densities ever recorded in North America” (BCME no date, 6).

The Kechika and Muskwa programs were the most controversial. While northern communities had been kept informed and largely accepted these two programs, the more urban population in southern BC had many objections. Agency regional biologists had a fair amount of autonomy when these control programs were initiated. Alton Harestad is a professor of biological sciences at Simon Fraser University and an original member of the Wolf Working Group. In his opinion, when people in urban areas began to question the programs, the regional biologists essentially said “‘You guys are from down south and you don't count. We're up in northern BC and we'll do what we want.’ That started the problem. The government ended up with all sorts of opposition. Earth First even parachuted in to create media attention.”

Things came to a head when a new group, called the Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society (NWPS), formed in opposition to wolf control. In 1988, they co-sponsored a





wolf management symposium in Vancouver with the BCME. This was intended to be an objective, broad discussion of the issue with all the major interest groups and biologists in attendance.

At this symposium, Ralph Archibald, then Fur/Carnivore Specialist with the Wildlife Branch of the Ministry, unveiled a proposed strategy for wolf management involving three zones: a “preservation zone” where wolves would be protected; a “control zone” where wolf control could be considered if proven necessary, and a “population management zone” where wolves could be harvested but not controlled. There would also be a commitment to involve the public in that strategy. This was the first time zones had been proposed as a means of resolving the wolf management controversy. The zoning concept was well-received; both the hunting groups and environmental groups were at least intrigued by the idea.

It was assumed that some groups would oppose the concept on the basis that it is unethical to kill wolves no matter where you do it. Harestad agrees that some groups will never support the zoning concept, but believes that it can still work: “vegetarians feel it’s unethical to eat meat no matter where you do it. But we have decided as a society not to be all vegetarians. Some of us want to be otherwise.”

As a result of the positive feedback on the zoning concept, Archibald drafted a proposal for a Wolf Working Group (the Group) that would work out the details of the zoning strategy: “I knew enough about wolf control in this province to know that there wasn’t enough public trust to leave that issue within the agency. There had to be outside review and auditing and what better group to play that role than the Wolf Working Group?” He presented the idea to the Wildlife Branch of the BCME and they agreed to support it. There were great hopes for the proposed Group, which member Alton Harestad called an “important and visionary initiative.”

## II. The Respondents

For easy reference, the following list provides a brief introduction to those who are quoted in this chapter.

Ralph Archibald.....Former carnivore specialist with the Wildlife Branch. He established the Group and was the first Chair.

Vivian Banci.....Replaced Archibald when he resigned from the Branch. Served as Chair of the Group.

Rosemary Fox.....Group member, representative of the Sierra Club

Mike Green ..... Group member, representative of BC Trappers Association

Alton Harestad ..... One of the original Group members representing the academic community. Professor of biological sciences at Simon Fraser.

Peter McPherson ..... Group facilitator.

Bill Munro ..... Deputy Director, Wildlife Branch, BCME

Sherry Pettigrew..... One of the original Group members representing the Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society, an organization she founded in response to the wolf control efforts in the 1980s

Don Robinson ..... Group member representing the BC Wildlife Federation. Former Director of the Wildlife Branch.

Michael Sather ..... Group member representing the Federation of BC Naturalists.

### III. Formation of the BC Wolf Working Group

#### ***Pre-negotiation Phase***

This section presents a description of the design of the team, but analysis of these design factors will be discussed at the end of the case.

#### **The Purpose: to give advice, develop a strategy – or both?**

The first concern in designing a team is to give it a very clear purpose and ensure that all participants understand and agree with it. In this case, despite efforts to make it explicit, the Group lacked a clear purpose that everyone agreed on. Officially, the purpose was strictly to give advice and develop recommendations. According to the original Terms of Reference (a document stating the purpose and basic rules of the Group), the Group was established to “gather a range of opinions and perspectives on the management of wolves in BC and to provide input and recommendations to the Director on policies, procedures, and management activities” (BCME 1988a, 1). While it was stated that the team “may make management proposals to the Director,” this was optional, not essential.

Often advisory groups are not expected to reach a consensus, but simply vote on a final recommendation. But this Group was expected to attempt to reach consensus recommendations, a far more demanding task. If consensus could not be reached, the Group would include “opposing or alternative views” but would not vote (BCME 1988a, 1-2). From the beginning, the Branch seemed to expect the Group to react to agency proposals. For example, at the end of their first meeting, the Group was given a draft of the agency’s proposed provincial wolf strategy to react to.

In sharp contrast to this official reactive, advisory role, Archibald, the founder of the Group, recalls that the Group’s purpose was a proactive one “to develop a plan for managing wolves. The Group was there to try to develop a consensus for the province.”

This confusion over the exact goal resulted in considerable frustration. Rosemary Fox of the Sierra Club felt that the official purpose was to give advice but the Group also felt compelled to write a plan. She wasn’t sure how this discrepancy had developed, “perhaps it was from Ralph [Archibald], but there was an assumption that we should develop a strategy. Also, part of what happened was that the Alaska team was formed after us and in a lightning period of time they came up with a strategy. It ran into problems, but they achieved it very quickly. I think that kind of achievement in Alaska also made our Group assume that we should be achieving something similar. Subsequently, we were driven by the need to develop a strategy.”

In a letter to the other members in October of 1992, Don Robinson of the BC Wildlife Federation (he is also a retired Director of the Wildlife Branch) expressed frustration with the Group’s purpose: “I have difficulty with the dual task of trying to develop a long term strategy while concurrently reacting to specific proposals” (Robinson 1992, 2).

While the exact objective was ambiguous, it was clear that the Group was not to deal with issues concerning conflicts between livestock and wolves. That was to be handled by the Provincial Problem Wildlife Committee. According to Bill Munro, Deputy Director of the Branch, the Group was not expected to deal with control for agricultural purposes, because the Cattlemen’s Association would insist on being represented and the Branch did not wish to expand the Group. “Maybe it was a mistake to divorce the two, but given the agonies that the Group has gone through, I don’t know how they would have survived if they had had to consider the use of 1080 [poison] in restricted areas.”

Four members expressed considerable concern about this limitation. “We all felt that was strange,” said one. “But we weren’t allowed to deal with it, although that is where much of the wolf control is taking place.”

The Group was also concerned about the focus on wolves rather than the ecosystem as a whole. “The one thing we had unanimous agreement on was that this was bigger

than wolves,” said Pettigrew. “We were trying to focus on wolves when we knew that there were ecological and land use issues that are the major problems here.” Robinson (whom the respondents regarded as objective despite his past association with the Branch) was uneasy with “this focus on wolves when so many other species are in more immediate need of attention.”

## **The Participants**

### *Organizations would be the basis for membership.*

According to Archibald, membership in the Group was based on attendance at the symposium “in order to build on that momentum” and “because all the groups connected with the issue were there.”

Archibald wanted to keep the group under ten people. He knew some of the interests that had to be at the table and balanced those with opposing views and added a representative from the United Native Nations and one from the academic community. As it turned out, every person finally chosen to sit at the table had also attended the symposium. Once the organizations were chosen, it was their responsibility to send a representative to the Group based on their own selection criteria, although Fox and Pettigrew indicated that they received invitations directly from the Branch and they were the ones most likely to be chosen by their organizations anyway. The representatives chosen were very active, well-known and influential people within and outside their organizations.

Additional organizations could only be included by unanimous agreement of the Group and the Director of the Wildlife Branch. According to Archibald, they discussed membership in some detail at the first meeting and everyone agreed that extreme views were not at the table, but there was “a reluctant consensus” that it would be very difficult to proceed if more extreme groups were included. The original eight organizations and their representatives are shown in Table 4-1.

## Table 4-1

### Members of the BC Wolf Working Group, October, 1988

(Organized roughly by point of view from anti- to pro-wolf control)

<u>Member Organization</u>	<u>Representative</u>
Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society.....	Sherry Pettigrew
replaced by .....	Barbara Meredith
Federation of BC Naturalists.....	Michael Sather
The Sierra Club.....	Rosemary Fox
The academic community .....	Alton Harestad
BC Wildlife Federation.....	Don Robinson
The United Native Nations.....	Ron George
replaced by .....	Larry Webster
BC Trappers Association .....	Mike Green
Guide Outfitters Association of BC.....	Don Caldwell

**Chair:** Ralph Archibald, BCME, Wildlife Branch

With the exception of Sather, the respondents agreed with Rosemary Fox of the Sierra Club that the team was basically balanced with representation from all of the major groups who are active in wildlife issues in the province. However, three of the ten respondents were concerned about the lack of representation of the public at large and Fox felt that if the trappers were in the Group, then the Furbearers Association, an anti-trapping group, should also be present—“but that idea was soundly vetoed.”

But Michael Sather of the BC Naturalists felt the membership was slanted toward consumptive interests. He classified the five representatives of the trappers, the academic community, the Wildlife Federation, the Guide/Outfitters, and the Wildlife Branch itself as “the pros” [pro-wolf control] and felt the nine-member team was unbalanced: “We were outnumbered most of the time. The team is only a partial sampling of the people who are interested in wildlife in the province. The pro wolf-kill advocates in the Group wouldn’t accept any of the more radical people on the committee and probably it was a good idea because we wouldn’t reach any agreement with them on there and some groups wouldn’t sit on the committee even if they were invited. So any agreement we came to, it would be excluding a fair chunk of wildlife advocates.”

It was clear from the beginning that the Group “members” would be organizations not individuals. It was hoped that these organizations would lend both greater credibility to the Group (since public trust in the agency had reached a low ebb) and greater strength to

any agreement they might develop (since it was these interest groups who would eventually support or oppose the result). Because the “members” were organizations, not individuals, the participants were to represent their groups and not their own personal opinions.

The agency was not a voting member of the team. Agency personnel were to play the role of resource specialists and it was not unusual for them to be asked to leave a meeting so the Group could debate in private. Asked what would happen if the group came up with something the agency could not live with, Archibald felt that was unlikely if the group was well-balanced. Further, he believed that if such a group developed something ecologically sound, “then I couldn’t think of one good reason why we wouldn’t implement the consensus statements of a group like that.”

## **The Process**

### ***A chair, but no neutral intermediary and no ground rules.***

Ralph Archibald chaired the first six meetings. Although he would definitely hire a professional facilitator if he had it to do over, he never considered hiring one at the time (a facilitator was employed for the last four meetings, beginning in March, 1992).

Although the Terms of Reference of the Group discuss such things as membership and the Group’s role relative to the Director of the Wildlife Branch, no ground rules for interpersonal conduct were established. Seven of the ten respondents felt that there were some destructive exchanges in the Group that could have been avoided if ground rules had been established and enforced.

The meetings were closed to the media and the public and Archibald felt this was helpful; they would not have had the same dynamics if each person had “a caucus sitting behind them.”

### ***No deadlines and meet “as needed”***

To avoid making the Group feel rushed or coerced, no deadlines were established. Instead, the strategy was to let everyone have a chance to speak on an issue, then try to get consensus, and if that was not possible, they would move to a new topic. But Archibald regrets the lack of deadlines, “It wasn’t as focused as it could have been and I think deadlines would have made things run much more smoothly.”

The Group was to meet on an “as-needed” basis. The Terms of Reference indicate that the Group should meet at least once each year at the call of the chair, the Director, or 3 of the members. As shown in Table 4-3, the group met a total of eleven times in the

five years between 1988 and 1993. Reasons given for the infrequent meetings were lack of funding, difficulty in finding times when everyone could meet, and the need to check with parent organizations, which often met only a few times a year.

**Table 4-2**  
**Schedule of Meetings of the BC Wolf Working Group**

<b>1988</b> .....	October 25 December 7-8
<b>1989</b> .....	August 1 October 26-27 December 11-12
<b>1990</b> .....	April 23-24; Archibald resigns.
<b>1991</b> .....	November 19; Banci is chair.
<b>1992</b> .....	March 30; Facilitator employed. Harestad resigns. May 4-5 August 10-11
<b>1993</b> .....	January 14

### **Political and Agency Support**

The Group was established by the Social Credit government that leaned in favor of wolf control. Archibald and those the Group referred to as the “consumptive” (pro-hunting) members felt the Group had considerable authority at the beginning. According to Archibald, “The Group could have reached agreement on something that could have been rejected by the Director. But the reality is that if that Group could have come to consensus, it would have been very, very difficult politically for anyone to back away from it.”

The nonconsumptive members did not trust the government’s motives entirely. Early on Fox, Sather and Pettigrew each expressed concern that the Group could be more for show than genuine input. All the respondents indicated that they trusted Archibald, but nevertheless, “he worked for the Branch, and the Branch may have had its own agenda.” According to Fox, “We did have political support at the beginning, although I think the Branch had the idea that if these anti-control groups were just educated they would see the light and recognize the need for wolf control. I’m sure that was in the back of their



minds. They were overlooking the fact that it's a matter of values as to whether you think this is appropriate or not. But I will say there was never a real attempt to manipulate us."

In Sather's opinion, "In the beginning, the Branch wasted a lot of time trying to co-opt the nonconsumptive use groups, but we were quite strong and they weren't able to do that. And the authority of the Group was a strange thing because it wasn't clearly defined throughout. Sometimes it seemed to be a high level of authority, but at other times, the Director of the Branch imposed his will on the Group fairly strongly, but it wasn't bad. It was hard to tell if push came to shove whether we really had any authority."

Everyone felt that if political connections are important, this Group certainly had them. "All of these groups have quite a bit of political power," commented Fox. "The guides, the hunters and the trappers are all powerful lobby groups, as is the Sierra Club. The Naturalists tend to be less activist, by their own choice, but they have a lot of respect certainly. NWPS tends to be more focused on education and they don't go in for political activity as much, but they are a major group on the wolf issue. The representative from the United Native Nations was quite influential, quite active politically."

## ***Negotiation Phase***

At their first meeting, the Group discussed the Terms of Reference, the Group's purpose and the rules of membership. Considerable distrust was evident as the Group discussed the potential implications of almost every line in the Terms of Reference. "The Terms of Reference became an albatross for us. I think we spent two dog-gone meetings discussing it—it was word-smithed to death," said Archibald.

### **The Group Reacts to Branch Proposals**

Two months later, at their second meeting, the Group was asked to try to develop a consensus response to the agency's proposed Provincial Wolf Strategy which included zones and review criteria for when wolf control might be considered. The Group also discussed a proposal to continue wolf control on Vancouver Island. No consensus was reached on these, but the comments and concerns of each member were compiled in the minutes and sent to the Director of the Wildlife Branch.

At this point, a consensus recommendation was highly unlikely. The Group had not yet defined what the issues were, they had no foundation of agreement in the form of goals or principles and they had not reviewed pertinent data regarding wolf management. According to the BC Trappers' representative Mike Green, "The Vancouver Island

control work was the first question they presented to our newly-formed Group and there was just no way we were ready to handle the question at the time. It was almost the opening gambit. ‘Well now that you’re all together and you’re a knowledgeable group—analyze this for us. What do you think we should do?’ Well, holy cow—the fur started to fly!”

Nine months elapsed before the third meeting, where they reviewed the wolf hunting seasons proposed in two areas. Once again, the outcome of the meeting was not a consensus, but a list of comments from each of the Group members regarding the proposed wolf seasons. These were sent to the Director.

### **Would Preservation Zones Lead to Local Extinctions?**

At the fourth meeting in October, 1989, biologist Dr. Fred Bunnell of the University of British Columbia made a presentation opposing the concept of preservation zones because both wolves and prey would likely be present in such low numbers that preservation zones “could lead to local extinctions.” BC Wildlife Federation’s Robinson agreed this was a risk, but his organization supported the preservation zone concept as long as there were some areas where wolves could be controlled.

“I look around the world and I don't see total protection working,” said Robinson. “This nice tidy picture of abundant wolves in locked-up-areas-forever is not the way it's going to be. I think that the wolves need to have some of those places, certainly. But that isn't where the bulk of the wolves are going to live. They're going to live where resources are managed. So we need a mix of options for true wolf survival.”

On December 11-12, 1989—fifteen months after their first meeting—the group still could not reach an agreement on the proposed zones or the review criteria for control proposals. At that point, the Group asked to meet without the government personnel present to see if a consensus could be reached. The minutes state that the Group reached agreement on the following: 1) [wolf] control may be required; 2) no control may be required (BCME 1989).

The Branch was very frustrated by this impasse. Deputy Director Munro explained that several divergent opinions on each issue were simply not helpful to the agency. “At the time, we were about ready to throw the Group in, as were some of the participants, because of absolutely no movement by some of the members.”

### **Branch Opposes Preservation Zones and Group Role in Criteria**

At the sixth meeting on April 23 and 24, 1990, Ralph Archibald had some discouraging news to deliver. First, he advised the members that the Branch did not feel

the Group had any role to play in determining the criteria which would be used to evaluate a wolf control proposal. These criteria are fundamental in any wolf management debate, as they determine the circumstances, if any, when wolf control can be considered. Predictably, many Group members were emphatic that the Group should have a role in developing these criteria.

Then Archibald revealed the even more depressing news that the Wildlife Branch no longer supported the concept of preservation zones. Archibald's brain-child, the preservation zones were considered by many to be critical to the environmental community's support of any proposed strategy.

Sherry Pettigrew, representative and founder of the Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society, recalls the Group's reaction: "Ralph came back to us with non-approvals for what the Group had struggled with and a few of the members just threw up their hands and said, 'Look, we just can't work with this. We make our recommendations and then the Branch comes back and says, 'No, we're not going to accept your preservation zones or your criteria.'"

Shortly thereafter, Ralph Archibald, architect of this "visionary process", resigned from his position with the Wildlife Branch. "I felt very dissatisfied and frustrated with the lack of agency support for the initiative and felt that I couldn't continue on in good faith with the Group because of that." He attributes this lack of support to the divisiveness within the agency, particularly on the issue of preservation zones.

### **Considerable Contention**

Nineteen months passed before the Group resumed meeting in November, 1991. Vivian Banci, the new fur/carnivore specialist, was the chair. In March, 1992 Banci employed a professional facilitator, Peter McPherson, to run the meetings. Barbara Meredith, a new representative of the NWPS, suggested a facilitator be hired so that Banci would be free to represent the ministry rather than also trying to run the meetings. An item of business at this meeting was the seemingly innocuous goal statement, "We are concerned about wolves and wolf management." They discussed "the consequences of reaching or not reaching this goal and the needs to achieve it" (BCME 1992, 3).

Deeply discouraged, biologist Alton Harestad resigned following this meeting, due to what he perceived as a lack of progress on the key issues, a lack of willingness on the part of the environmentalists to compromise, and their "continual" attacks questioning the integrity of government biologists. "When I left the group, about the only thing that they had agreed on was the Terms of Reference and the format of the minutes—that took three and a half years or so and even then the format of the minutes was a tentative thing that

they had to go back and check with their groups on. You can see why I got frustrated. I felt that we had not provided advice helpful to the Branch, we had not contributed to solutions on wolf management issues, and we had not done anything for wolves.”

Many biologists are not opposed to wolf control, and the Group has since been divided on whether there should be a representative from the academic community or a professional biologist. Considerable debate took place on whether such a member could be trusted, and as of June, 1993, Harestad had not been replaced.

At the May 1992 meeting, Bill Munro emphasized that the Group must try to reach agreement rather than sending the Director seven different opinions on an issue; “without a commitment to compromise, this Group will not succeed” (BCME 1992, 3).

In response to his statement, Group member Rosemary Fox of the Sierra Club asked that a paragraph be attached to the minutes stating that it had confirmed what she had suspected all along: “that the Group was set up to 'educate' its members and try to get agreement on controversial wolf control programs from a number of groups considered to be 'reasonable', so that these programs could be more easily-sold to the public.” She considered this to be manipulative, and reason for the Sierra Club to reconsider its participation in the Group (BCME 1992, 4).

In an interview, Fox explained that “I didn’t find the process manipulative. But when the Deputy of Wildlife came, he was reflecting some frustration. He said, ‘If you’re going to reach consensus, everyone has to give a little.’ But if it’s part of the basic philosophy of your organization that wolves should not be controlled to enhance game populations for hunters, how can you compromise? That is not negotiable. So I found his statement manipulative. But I think they felt sort of stuck with us at that point and the political support waned a bit.”

The Group did agree on two major tasks to develop in the coming year: 1) recommendations on wolf control proposals; and 2) a statement of agreement or a position paper outlining areas of agreement. This was the first time the Group insisted on being more proactive by developing their own position paper rather than just reacting to agency proposals.

The BC Naturalists’ representative, who some considered particularly prone to making personal attacks on others, had been replaced at this meeting by another representative of the organization. According to some members, this substitute seemed to work much more effectively with others and contributed to this relative breakthrough.

But at a highly confrontational meeting in August, the official representative of the Naturalists, Michael Sather, returned and reversed the decisions made by his substitute. “That was just a—a mind blower for all of us,” said McPherson, the facilitator. “The

member actually stapled me to the wall and said, 'are you questioning my work and my authority?' At which point I told them I was *leaving!* I said, 'Look. This is abusive conduct and this has got to stop.'" In McPherson's opinion, the environmentalists' deep distrust of the process is what caused them to "lose their composure fairly frequently."

"I did a lot of objecting in that Group," said Sather, "because I just don't accept anything that isn't agreeable to me. I think the Wildlife Branch and the pros [those in favor of wolf control] often saw me as the enemy. But when push came to shove I was more of an ally to them than were the other two groups, the Sierra Club and Northwest Wildlife. The facilitator was very good on the whole, but sometimes he overstepped his bounds in my opinion."

Following the confrontation, the Group decided that one consensus statement was unlikely, but they could probably continue to agree on a few issues and report their disagreements on others.

### **Close to a Breakthrough**

In October 1992, Robinson sent the Group some suggestions for developing a strategy (Robinson 1992). He suggested several management principles that could be extracted from the Group's general goal statement and listed several points of data that the Group could probably agree on and several questions they needed to consider. He concluded his letter with the following admonition, "The Group should either work toward a solution, or agree to disband" (1992, 4).

Several respondents found Robinson's letter a turning point, as there was a "more collaborative atmosphere" at their next meeting in January, 1993. The Group had several complimentary comments for the new draft of the Vancouver Island Wolf Management Strategy. This Strategy, written by the Branch, had taken several of the Group's principal concerns into account, including both preservation zones and a zone where wolves could be controlled to benefit the full range of uses from wildlife viewing to sport and subsistence hunting. The members all agreed to seek their organization's endorsement of the Strategy. All of the respondents felt that if the Strategy were agreed to, it would be the first real success of the Group.

While the BC Federation of Naturalists, one of three environmental organizations on the team, strongly opposes any wolf kills to benefit human hunting, the Naturalists did endorse the Strategy. Their representative, Sather, explained that it was a very difficult compromise for them, "but I went to the table from the beginning realizing that there's no sense sitting there unless you're willing to compromise on something, so it was a

compromise I felt that we could live with. After four-plus years it was quite a breakthrough.”

According to Sather, the preservation areas were key to the agreement, “The reason we wasted a lot of time—years in my opinion, was because we got away from the zoning idea that included preservation areas. Professor Bunnell told the Wildlife Branch that if they allowed any wolf preservation areas, he’d hold them personally responsible for wildlife declines. He’s a very respected figure and as a result of his talk, I could see a strong turning in the guides and the trappers against preservation areas. Once we finally got back to the concept of preservation areas, we started to get somewhere.”

But their breakthrough was short-lived. The Sierra Club and the NWPS both officially rejected the plan, even though their representatives supported it. Pettigrew felt that her replacement had essentially stepped out of bounds and did not speak for the NWPS when she expressed support for the strategy, “because the NWPS has never supported wolf control to increase ungulates for hunting.” Fox felt it was a reasonable strategy, but she could not get the Sierra Club to buy into it, partly because the Sierra Club views Vancouver Island “as their back yard” and did not want any control there to benefit hunters.

### **“A Death Knell”?**

Group member and trapper Mike Green laments that this lack of a consensus on the Strategy will probably “sound the death knell” of the Group. There have been no meetings and no communication between the Branch and the members since January, 1993. On June 11, 1993, Chair Vivian Banci began a one-year leave of absence from the Branch (she later resigned).

“In terms of the Group, the silence is the end,” said Robinson. But he expressed considerable optimism about the NDP government’s commitment to wise use of resources and felt that during the past few years a number of new initiatives had much improved the likelihood of new wolf and grizzly bear strategies.

Asked in March 1994 if he realized the Group members had not been contacted since their last meeting, Deputy Director Munro replied, “No. I didn’t realize that, but it must be a big part our fault then.” He stated that the reason that the Group had not been meeting was that no one had yet been hired to replace Banci. He expected a new person to be hired shortly and expected the Group to be revived and do more work, including a Strategic Grizzly Bear Management Plan. He did not expect any changes to be made in the Group’s role or composition.

## IV. Was the Team Successful?

This section discusses the criteria established at the beginning of this study for assessing the success of an environmental negotiation. The following results are based on both in-depth, open interviews with eleven people and more focused written surveys of the Group members themselves. Seven of the ten members and former members completed the questionnaire, six of whom had also been interviewed.

Table 4-4 summarizes the indicators of team effectiveness. These are discussed in more detail below but are summarized here. The effort was perceived as fair by most of the survey respondents, but they did not consider it particularly efficient and most felt that the Group did not meet its purpose. They were not able to reach consensus, although this was the objective and they did not produce a written agreement, although this was not a stated objective. Although wolf control is not a major issue in BC at the current time, the members thought this was due to other issues, such as forest practices, rather than a result of the Group's work. The majority of members felt it had increased the level of understanding between interest groups—at least temporarily—but they were evenly split on whether it had been personally rewarding. All seven indicated that they would be willing to participate on such a team again, although four stressed that there would have to be some changes in the approach. Finally, six of the respondents to the survey and interviews considered the process unsuccessful while only one thought it a success as far as its official purpose was concerned, three felt it succeeded in educating the participants and the agency, and two said it was too early to say.

Six of the seven Group members surveyed felt the process was fair. When asked if he thought the process was fair, facilitator McPherson paused, then revealed the tremendous weight on a facilitator's shoulders for the fairness of a process: "God," he said with an emphasis that seemed to implore Divine grace. "I tried my best to make it fair."

Only two of the seven respondents thought that the process was an efficient use of time and money both for the Branch and for themselves. Five felt it was not efficient for the Branch. However, this question also depends on the purpose of the Group. According to the Terms of Reference, the agency wanted a "range of opinions" as well as input and recommendations. While they did not reach consensus recommendations, the Group did provide the agency with a range of opinions and input on specific wolf management proposals. They provided these reactions in a timely fashion when requested to do so and at little financial cost. But the Branch did not find the diverse opinions to be helpful; it was frustrated by the lack of a consensus reaction to its proposals.

In the minds of many participants, the purpose of this Group went beyond advice to actually agreeing on how wolves should be managed in the province. In that respect, the effort was not efficient in terms of time—with no agreements reached on any aspect of wolf management after almost five years. In terms of cost, the meetings were not as expensive as those in the Yukon. These meetings cost the BC government about \$2,500 each (compared to the Yukon's estimated \$10,000 per meeting). Members were compensated for expenses, but did not receive honorariums.

**Table 4-3**  
**Indicators of Team Effectiveness—**  
**Results of BC Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 10 members and former members responded to the Survey)

YES	NO	Yes & No or not sure	Too early to say	Indicator
6	1			• Do you feel that the Wolf Working Group process was fair?
2	3	2		• Was it efficient in terms of the Ministry's time and money?
1	4	2		• Did the team meet its purpose?
	No*			• Did the team reach consensus on the issues?
	No*			• Was a written agreement produced (if expected?)
	3	4		• Has the level of controversy diminished as a result?
4	1	2		• Has it increased the level of trust and insight between groups?
4	4			• Did you find it personally rewarding?**
7				• Would you be willing to participate in such a team again?
1	6	3	2	• Did participants view it as a success?***
*Based on author's research, not the survey				
** Includes surveys and one interview respondent.				
***Includes surveys plus five interview respondents.				

Only one of seven respondents felt the team had met its purpose, while four thought it had not. One said that it was too soon to judge and another said the Group had met part of its advisory purpose, but then it just “faded away.”

While the representatives themselves did reach consensus on the Vancouver Island Strategy, their organizations did not ratify it. The Group did not produce a written agreement, but there was no mention in the Terms of Reference that the Group was



expected to produce a written agreement and the process was not designed with that in mind.

### ***Has it increased the level of trust and understanding ?***

Everyone felt that trust had increased between the representatives themselves and four of the seven felt that it had increased between the different interest groups. But all seven survey respondents thought that trust and understanding had not increased between the public and the Branch as a result of the Group.

Two felt there was more understanding, but not trust. As one consumptive user put it, “We all regard each other more highly than we did. But I still think [the environmentalists] might use under-handed tactics if they thought they could get away with it.”

### ***Did members find it personally rewarding?***

Four members and former members felt the experience had been personally rewarding and four did not. “It was a great experience,” said Sather. “Each meeting I found a very emotional experience and I think most of the other people did, too. Because the issue is so important to me and I feel so emotional about it, it was really neat to go there and confront those issues.” For Fox, the effort was very instructive and the insights into how other people were thinking were very valuable.

Four members stated that by the end they were deeply discouraged with what they perceived as a lack of willingness to compromise on the part of other members.

### ***Did participants view it as a success?***

Of twelve people who responded to this question, only one—Rosemary Fox of the Sierra Club—felt it was a success while six thought it was not. Another three considered it *partly* successful and two thought it was too early to tell.

Group founder Ralph Archibald of the Wildlife Branch:

We didn’t get as far as I wanted them to get, but that probably has more to do with my inability to lead the Group as well as someone else could have. But it was successful in that it brought people together and it educated them on the issue from many different perspectives. Anytime you educate a group of people, the exercise is successful.

Group Chair Vivian Banci (June 1993):

It's still too early to say if it was successful. But I wouldn't change anything about the Group. It's a good group.

Team Member Don Caldwell:

Was it a success? No.

Team Member Rosemary Fox:

It depends on what one's expectations were. The Group was set up to advise the Director of Wildlife on matters pertaining to wolves and we have done that on two major issues, a proposed wolf kill on Vancouver Island and the proposed Strategy for Vancouver Island. So in that sense, it has been successful. We did advise them, but not with one voice because we couldn't come to consensus. I did subsequently share everyone else's frustration when we got into strategy development and then couldn't reach agreement.

Team Member Mike Green:

If success is measured by coming to an agreement, and if two of the groups didn't sign the Strategy, then I'd say we blew it—we had our chance to act together and we couldn't.

Team Member Alton Harestad:

Successful? Not by a long shot. All we did was sit and argue. We did not offer helpful advice for the Branch. I thought that this group was very visionary and it would have opened up a whole new way of doing business. And if this doesn't work, then the Ministry might say 'oh it didn't work' and refuse to try it again. They didn't just let wolves down, they let the whole wildlife community down.

Facilitator Peter McPherson:

No. It is not successful because it has not grappled with the issues. I think the Group is embarrassed that they haven't accomplished more. They're beginning to realize that they may be judged on what's in those minutes and they may be found wanting.

Team Member Barbara Meredith (replaced Pettigrew):

It's too early to say..

Wildlife Branch Deputy Director Bill Munro:

The Group has been so polarized that it's had difficulty making any progress at all to this point. But the facilitator has helped and I feel a bit more optimistic about it now.

Team Member Sherry Pettigrew:

Yes and no.

Team Member Don Robinson:

(He rated the process 30 percent successful and 70 percent unsuccessful) It was successful in that the Branch and groups have a better understanding of how such a problem could be handled. I hope so—but even here I have doubts. But in terms of a definite document that outlines where and how wolves fit into the various ecosystems they inhabit and how they relate to human use of wildlife..

Team Member Michael Sather:

Not really [successful], but we came close. Our agreement on the Vancouver Strategy would have been a major achievement.

## V. Was the Team's Design Conducive to Success?

As discussed below, the team's design contributed to the lack of success in several ways. The principal problems were in the equivocal purpose and inadequately structured process. The following discussion points out several weaknesses in this effort, but it is important to point out that not much was known about effective team design at the time the Group was established. This intrepid team was venturing into largely uncharted territory.

### ***The Purpose***

#### **Did the team locate at an appropriate point on the ladder of possible tasks?**

Before determining whether the Group's task was appropriate, it is first necessary to examine whether the dispute was ripe for settlement. As discussed in the literature review and shown in Table 4-5 below, several factors determine whether a dispute is amenable to settlement. An evaluation of these criteria is presented below. These indicate that the dispute was reasonably ripe for settlement.

In this case, the groups were willing to negotiate and felt, initially at least, that they were willing to compromise. The interest groups were clearly defined, but the issues were not clearly identified at the outset nor did the parties agree on which issues to address. The groups were not seeking to establish legal precedents (which would have decreased their willingness to negotiate), but the government had not clearly defined a range of potentially acceptable decisions. The government did endorse the effort. When the Group began, the level of uncertainty in the absence of negotiation was substantial:

the hunters felt overt control actions were unlikely since they could result in another inflammatory media event such as the Muskwa, but the environmentalists felt the government was so pro-control that it would likely try again. Thus both groups could potentially gain more by coming to the table. No one really knows if there is an effective core of “moderate” people on both sides of the dispute on the national level.

On the basis of these factors, the dispute was reasonably ripe for settlement when negotiations began in 1988. And as discussed in the previous chapter, there is some room for negotiation on this issue.

**Table 4-4**  
**Was the dispute ripe for settlement?**

<u>yes</u>	The parties were willing to negotiate and compromise
<u>yes</u>	The interest groups/constituencies were clearly defined
<u>no</u>	The issues were clearly identified
<u>no</u>	The parties agreed on the issues to be addressed
<u>at start</u>	There was a sense of urgency to resolve the dispute
<u>correct</u>	Groups were not seeking to establish legal precedents
<u>no</u>	The primary government agency or decision-maker defined a range of potentially acceptable decisions
<u>yes</u>	The affected government agencies were willing to endorse the effort
<u>at start</u>	There was a high level of uncertainty regarding the outcome in the tradition forum
<u>at start</u>	The parties potentially had more to gain by negotiating
<u>?</u>	There was an effective core of moderate people on both sides of the argument
<u>?</u>	Fundamental values were not involved
<u>yes</u>	It was possible to reframe the issue into solvable increments

### Other purpose criteria

Table 4-6 presents the results of the written survey of Group members regarding the purpose of the Group. The respondents were divided on whether the Group’s purpose

was clear. While three members felt it was clear, at least at the start, three others thought it was definitely not clear and that this had caused problems. Likewise, three people thought the purpose changed over time. Only one member viewed the purpose as strictly to advise and react to agency proposals (two others mentioned that they felt the *Branch* viewed the primary task as giving advice and reacting to proposals). Six thought the principal task of the Group was to both give advice and help to prepare a strategy, though they differed on what form that help should take.

Likewise, the members were divided on whether they had the correct amount of authority. Some thought it would be inappropriate for members of the public to have more than an advisory role. Others felt they should have had enough authority to call for more meetings and to meet with the public throughout BC. One stated that they should have developed a strategy for *serious* consideration by the Branch, rather than simply make recommendations. Clearly there were different perceptions concerning what role the Group should play.

**Table 4-5**  
**Did the Group Meet the Purpose Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 10 members and former members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes/No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Purpose
3	3		Was the purpose clear?
3	3	1	Did the purpose change over time?
1			Was the principal task to give advice and react to agency proposals?
6			Was the principal task both to give advice and to prepare a strategy?
3	3	1	Did you have the correct amount of authority?
1	6		Did you find the purpose inspiring?
	7		Was your task a complete & meaningful whole?
5	1	1	-Should it have been?
1	6		Did you feel ownership of a product?
6		1	-Would this have been helpful?
4	3		Was there a sense of urgency to complete the task?

It should be noted that, although the first three questions had similar responses, it was not the *same* three people responding yes or no each time.

Five members pointed out that they were inspired at the beginning, but became very discouraged over time. One member was skeptical from the outset, but another still considers the effort inspiring. Significantly, all seven respondents felt that their task was not a complete and meaningful whole, and five thought that it should have been. Similarly, six did not feel ownership of a product and they felt this would have been helpful.

It is difficult for advice as a task to constitute a “complete, meaningful whole,” since the team participates only peripherally in development of a proposal and has little or no control over the final result. This cannot help but decrease the sense of ownership and responsibility for the product and it undermines the principal incentive EDS teams have: implementation of a consensus agreement.

Furthermore, in this case, simply reacting to agency proposals may not have been a proper choice for the task, since it could contribute to the environmentalists' feeling that the Group was intended as a rubber stamp. Given the pressure to react to one proposal after another, the Group was not allowed time to develop a common set of criteria which could be used for evaluating all proposals.

The final question regarding the urgency to complete the task was difficult for the Group members to answer. They pointed out that—although there was no sense of urgency to complete a *strategy*—they were under considerable pressure to react quickly when the Branch presented a control proposal to them.

## ***The Participants***

Table 4-7 presents the survey results concerning the participants of an EDS team. As discussed in more detail below, this team certainly had most of the key players present at the table. Some of those opposed to wolf control felt that the animal rights groups were not represented, but they conceded that an agreement was very unlikely had such groups been present. The decision-making authority was not an official member, but they were present as the Chair of the Group. The process of choosing members was perceived as basically fair, most of the members had good negotiating skills, opinion leaders were definitely involved, though all of them had strong opinions on the issue and could not really be called moderates. The members represented organized groups and this became a serious handicap. Finally, only six members were present most of the time—three in

favor and three opposed to wolf control—and this was not conducive to good group dynamics and problem solving.

### **Were all potentially-affected interests invited?**

Some members felt that the Group represented a very broad spectrum of opinion while others thought important groups were missing. Interests such as sheep and livestock producers and anti-hunting and trapping groups were mentioned by some respondents as groups that should have participated. Certainly the more “radical” elements from both ends of the spectrum were missing, as well as representatives of the “general public” (if such representatives are possible). But excluding the extremes can work if the more moderate groups represent the majority of the population and if they are willing to publicly endorse any agreement.

**Table 4-6**  
**Did the Group meet the Participant Criteria?**  
**Results of BC Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 10 members and former members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes/No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Participants
3	4		Were all potentially affected interests invited?
3	2	2	Was the process of choosing members perceived as fair?
5			If you did it over, would you have members represent organized groups?
	2		-or their own personal opinions
2	3	2	Were First Nations peoples adequately represented?
6	1		Was it preferable that the Branch was not a member of the Group?
5	1		On the whole, were members articulate and tactful?
6		1	Were opinion leaders involved?
2	4	1	-Should opinion leaders be included?
7			Were moderates included?
1	5		Was the team's size appropriate to the task?

The members were divided on whether First Nations peoples were adequately represented. Neither of the First Nations representatives responded to the survey, and others indicated that it was hard for non-Natives to answer this question. Several mentioned that both Native representatives did not attend frequently and their second representative said very little when present. However, the land claims negotiations were in progress and one member felt that took priority for the First Nations peoples, plus it was difficult for any one person to represent many tribes and the more than 90 bands in the province.

### **Was the decision-making authority included?**

The Wildlife Branch was not an official member of the Group and six of the seven survey respondents preferred this. The Branch staff were there to provide logistical support but not to negotiate. This is at odds with the EDS literature which indicates that a team's agreement is much more likely to be implemented if the agency is involved as one of the negotiators.

Archibald was held in high esteem by the respondents as a person of high integrity. He had this view of the agency's role: "We were there to listen and hopefully implement change consistent with what they were telling us. As an agency, we are here not to dictate but to reflect public values and if they're telling us that we should be doing something significantly different and there's consensus around the table, then to dismiss that I think is just completely irresponsible."

However, his superiors at the Branch did not necessarily share this philosophy. Thus, the agency could not truly play the role of a neutral chair, because they did have a vested interest in the outcome. It would have been better for a facilitator to play the role of the neutral. But whether the agency should be an active negotiator in the Group is a question I will return to.

### **Was the process of choosing members perceived as fair?**

The respondents were divided on whether the process of choosing members was fair. Three thought it was, two weren't sure and two thought it was not. One of the latter was upset about the "senseless debate" over whether to replace the academic member of the Group and whether such biologists could be trusted. The other felt that the agency had omitted important anti-consumptive interests.



### ***Who should the participants represent?***

Five respondents thought they would have official representatives if they did it over, but two would prefer that the members represent strictly their own personal opinions and not those of a group. One stated that official representatives have a tendency to try to gain the most for their organization rather than come to the best possible solution.

While having representatives of organized groups can make it much easier to bring constituents along and ultimately strengthen the consensus, this case demonstrates that the approach has serious pitfalls.

“It really protracted the process—just immeasurably,” said Archibald. “Instead of coming to a decision, it was, 'Well I have to go back and discuss this with my board of directors and they aren't meeting for 3-1/2 months', and we bumped into that a lot.”

“About the only decision we could make without checking back with our organizations was when to break for lunch,” said Harestad, who feels that having official representatives simply crippled the Group. “There was no interest in making progress. They were not responsible for the result. Only the organization’s interests mattered, not the Group’s. Rather than seeing themselves as part of the Group, they saw themselves as a single member trying to fight for a chunk of the pie,”

“If you are there just to give advice, I think official representatives are fine,” said Fox. “But if you want to develop a consensus on a strategy, you should have the range of values represented, but not have people tied to their groups. It is too difficult to bring your constituency to buy into it.”

### ***How should the participants be chosen?***

Organizations in this case chose their own representatives. However, according to several participants, some organizations chose strident “hard-liners” who defended the organization's perspective to the exclusion of others. Had all the team members been involved in the choice of representatives for each organization, it may have been easier to include those with negotiating ability and a willingness to compromise who could still represent their organization.

### ***Did the participants have good negotiating skills***

An effective team member should have excellent listening skills, be articulate and tactful, capable of influencing others, and willing to compromise their positions (but not their values). As Fisher and Ury have indicated (1981, 55), it is advisable for negotiators to be hard on their interests but not on their positions.

On the whole, the survey respondents thought that the members had good negotiating skills, were articulate and tactful and able to listen. But this does not appear to be consistent with the interview data. In the interviews, several of the same respondents, both pro- and anti-control, were indignant over personal attacks from the other “side” and many felt that the majority of members were unwilling to consider any but their own positions.

Three options could have been helpful here. First, a facilitator to enforce the ground rules would have kept the discussion above board. Secondly, at the beginning, some training would have been helpful for both the agency and the participants regarding consensus processes, what consensus really is and the difference between interest and position (as discussed in Chapter 2).

### **Were opinion leaders involved? Were moderates included?**

Six of the seven survey respondents thought that opinion leaders were involved (and one did not answer this question). All seven thought that moderates were included, and interestingly, they saw their own and like-minded organizations as the moderates.

The members were definitely opinion leaders—almost all were executive directors and presidents of powerful political lobbies in the province, but more genuine moderates may have helped break the impasse.

Facilitator McPherson said that the group was made up of two polarized interests and for them to agree on anything—including the weather outside—was not particularly easy. Pettigrew also attributed part of the Group’s difficulties to the lack of moderates: “there were three hunting and three nonhunting groups and one Native representative who wasn’t able to attend very often. So in a way, the very balance of the Group undermined it. It’s like a seesaw and when you have three people of equal weight on each side, you just stay in the middle.”

### **Was the team’s size appropriate to the task?**

Most of the survey respondents considered the Group’s size to be appropriate, but one thought that ten members would have been preferable. In fact, the Group may have been too small for effective dynamics. Generally six members attended the meetings and in general, this is not an optimal size, particularly if this includes three in favor and three against. Most mediators contend that groups of eight to twelve are optimal and, if plenary sessions and break-out groups are used, many more participants can be accommodated.

## **The Process**

As discussed in more detail below, the process the Group followed was almost a recipe for failure. The facilitator was present for only the last four of their eleven meetings—after many poor habits of communicating were already well-established. Because the agency was chair, the Group did not feel ownership of the process. Ground rules were never established. Such rules can be essential for a team deciding policies for the office parking lot let alone an issue as contentious as this. The Group did not stop to evaluate their progress and interaction, they did not follow a step-by-step problem solving process (as outlined in Chapter 2) and they had no deadlines. Finally, they did not meet anywhere near frequently enough to make progress.

Table 4-8 presents the survey results concerning the process the Group followed.

### **Was a neutral intermediary employed?**

No facilitator was present on the BC Group for the first three and a half years. On a case as contentious as this, everyone agreed the Group should have had an adept facilitator. In Ralph Archibald's opinion, "It occurred to me that if I had a facilitator on the Group with the skills of the facilitator I am working with right now on another issue, that we would have gotten a hell of a lot further than we did."

**Table 4-7**  
**Did the Group meet the Process Criteria?**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 10 members and former members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes/No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Process
6			Did you feel that McPherson was fair?
6			Did it help to have a neutral facilitator?
4	3		Was a climate of openness and trust established?
6			Was team spirit present?
	3	2- don't know	-Does some of this remain today?
1	4	2	Did the team stop frequently enough to evaluate their interaction?
1	5		Was a step-by-step problem solving process followed?
5			-If not, would you have benefitted from one?
	7		-Were small break out groups used?
	1	5 "Rarely"	-Did you use brainstorming?
	7		Was significant work happening between meetings?
4	2	1	-If not, would this have been helpful?
5	2		Were your needs for data fully satisfied?
3	3		Did you have adequate opportunity to hear or read conflicting scientific opinions?
	5		Were Native traditions and indigenous knowledge adequately explored?
4	1	1	Did certain members emerge as leaders?
5		1	If you did it over, would you have a deadline?
1	6		Did the group meet frequently enough?
3	4		Is it appropriate for the Group to end at some point?

Alton Harestad agreed: “Having a facilitator earlier could have changed the whole ball game. The new facilitator had no stake in it, whereas before the chair was from the Ministry and if you don't trust Ministry anyway...”

Everyone agreed that the facilitator was helpful and they thought he was fair. He helped focus their discussions, summarized the discussion, and sought common ground.

### **Was a climate of openness and trust established?**

The respondents felt that team spirit was slowly developing, but this may have occurred more quickly if the facilitator had been on board earlier, if ground rules had been established and enforced, if the Group had met more often, and if the Group had stopped more frequently to evaluate the process, not just the substance of their discussions.

The lack of ground rules allowed personal attacks which undermined the trust so critical to success. Facilitator McPherson would change that: “If I had it to do over, I would have stronger rules of conduct that would minimize judgmental language. I think I would also have some procedures that would prevent sabotaging of consensus as it reaches its final stages. I didn't lay out those rules because I was prepared to take the group where they were. Looking back, I think that was unwise.”

### **Was a step-by-step problem solving process followed?**

No problem solving process, such as that discussed in Chapter 2, was followed systematically. This definitely compromised the Group's ability to break their impasse and reach agreement. Reasons for this lack of a systematic process may include the confusion about whether they were there just to offer a collage of advice (not requiring agreement) or to develop and reach consensus on a wolf management plan. Another reason was the absence of a facilitator: “Until we got a facilitator, we just went around in circles,” said Fox.

They did not use break out groups and used brainstorming only a few times. All of the respondents felt that more brainstorming may have helped break the log jam. All of the members also indicated that there was no significant work happening between meetings. In many cases, nothing was discussed between meetings and even the Minutes took months to be sent to the members.

Three respondents felt that certain members emerged as leaders in the sense of providing insight, clarifying issues, and helping the group find common ground. It was interesting that each considered different people as leaders, although Rosemary Fox and Don Robinson were mentioned more than once. As one noted, “Robinson was emerging

as a leader. He certainly took the lead in trying to find a way out of the impasse over the strategy.”

When the team began, it would also have been helpful to discuss the consensus process as well as the range of issues and problems and then the members themselves could have helped to identify the priorities and decide on a course of action—rather than be given proposals to react to by the agency. This would help empower and motivate the team and give it the sense of ownership in the process.

### **Were there deadlines? Did the group meet frequently enough?**

Five of the ten respondents asked this question concurred that deadlines would have helped focus the group, but Fox, Sather, and Banci disagreed. Since Fox saw the purpose as stated in the Terms of Reference as an on-going advisory group, one particular deadline naturally seemed inappropriate. She also pointed out that they did have deadlines for reacting to agency proposals, though not for developing a strategy.

Sather was strongly opposed to deadlines: “You can't have deadlines. It's such a gut-level philosophical issue. When you have deadlines, people would be distrustful—I know I would be. I had a hard enough time watching the Wildlife Branch try to co-opt us in this process. If it had been put into a narrow framework of time, Oh my God! I think it would be really hard to build any trust.”

The literature would predict that the lack of deadlines and infrequent meetings (the Group met 11 times in almost five years) would vitiate a team's effectiveness, unless it were strictly intended to obtain eight different opinions. As Harestad put it, “Our discussions were open-ended. No one assumed ownership of it and it was just a continuous open-ended discussion.”

All but one (Don Caldwell of the Guide Outfitters Association) favored more frequent meetings, but there were disagreements about just how many were needed. Vivian Banci thought that three a year would be “just right” but others agreed with Harestad, who would have all the meetings within a short length of time, “By the time a year or six months rolls around, you've forgotten everything you discussed. You end up revisiting all the positions again and again and you just get nowhere.” Most of the respondents also favored increased communication between meetings.

Here again, the question of purpose comes to bear. According to Fox, the Group didn't need to meet frequently just to offer advice. “We were there to advise, and unless there was something specific such as the wolf control proposal for Vancouver Island, then we didn't have a lot to do. There wasn't any great advising to be done.”

## Political and Agency Support

Table 4-9 presents the criteria concerning the political support of an EDS team. In 1988 when the Group began, the Wildlife Branch and the Social Credit government then in power did endorse and establish the Group. Thus a connection was made to established processes and authorities and all but one of the respondents (who was not a member at the time) felt there was genuine political support for the effort when the Group began.

**Table 4-8**  
**Did the Group meet the Political Support Criteria?**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 10 members and former members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes/No or Not Sure	Political and Agency Support
5		1	Did the Social Credit government support the Group?
2	3	2	Did the NDP government support the Group?
2	3		Was the Social Credit government more supportive?
1	4	2	Did the Group have political clout?
4	1		Are teams still worthwhile if next administration can ignore a team's work?
1	6		Was there an effort by the Ministry, the Branch or others to promote the Group's image and build external support?
2	5		Did the agency give the Group the money, data, speakers, and resources it needed?
1	5		Did they offer any rewards if the team could reach agreement?
1	4		Did they give the team recognition for its efforts?
1	6		Would an honorarium have contributed to your effectiveness?
1	1	5	Should most teams be paid for their time?

But Archibald's faith in the political support waned when the Branch announced it would not support the concept of preservation zones or the Group's role in developing control criteria. "I don't think it would have been possible to reach an agreement at the time, given the soft agency support for the Group and what they were trying to do."

Late in 1992 the National Democratic Party (NDP) was elected. Described by one member as “very liberal, very far left of center by American standards,” the new government favors a more preservationist point of view. One official in the Wildlife Branch stated that “I don’t think any politician in BC right now would approve a wolf control program to benefit hunters. They saw what happened in Alaska and the Yukon and they have enough confrontations in important areas—they don’t need another one.”

NWPS representative Pettigrew, who was fairly suspicious of the agency when the Group began, acknowledged that the Social Credit government not only formed but also supported the Group. “Under the previous government there was more likelihood of wolf control,” she said. “For example, those who were high up in the administration who opposed wolf control were simply moved [out of their positions]. But we have to remember that the Group was formed under that government. We have to give them credit that they did go ahead and bite the bullet and get a group started. And it was under that government that we had a larger budget allocation and more meetings.”

However Bill Munro, Deputy Director of the Wildlife Branch, countered that the new government is still supportive and wants the team to continue. He said that although the Branch sees little hope for consensus in the Group, the reason for the recent lack of meetings was simply that Vivian Banci, former Chair of the Group, had not yet been replaced.

Others thought that political change had little to do with the Group’s abrupt end. One pointed out that there are new priorities, such as the forest practices act, one felt that Banci’s resignation was responsible and another thought that greater support would have come if the Group could have made progress.

Therefore, it is difficult to say whether political support declined due to the change in government or due to what many viewed as a team which had reached an impasse.

### **Did the agency or agencies give the team resources, rewards, and recognition?**

Five of the seven respondents felt that the agency did not give the Group the resources it required. “The Branch has been cheap and stingy keeping the Group down to one or two meetings per year,” said one. However, several people indicated that the Branch has been severely strapped for funds.

Facilitator McPherson would have the agency give the Group more positive feedback on the impact they had. “I don’t think the agency gave the Group enough credit. The agency made changes but never told the Group that they had been successful in



modifying the agency's point of view and I think that's really important. I would change the way the agency comes back to the Group. They should give them more feedback."

## ***The Product***

From the beginning, it was not clear whether the Group would produce any product and this became an objective only near the end. They came closest to having a product of sorts when they almost reached consensus on the agency's proposal for Vancouver Island. But when two of the organizations failed to ratify this consensus, the Group effort ended.

Greater emphasis on a written, implementable agreement from the beginning—even if only broad goals for managing predator/prey systems—would have increased the sense of accomplishment, trust and commitment among the members. Letting the Group draft their own document rather than just react to proposals would also have increased the level of trust in the sincerity of the agency and counteracted the sense that the agency was trying to “co-opt” them.

## **VI. Summary**

It was a tough journey. The excitement the members had felt at the beginning and their sense of defeat at the end was palpable. One Group member, who did not wish to be quoted, said, “We did our best to co-exist. The Group wasn't a bad idea, but it was the most frustrating exercise you can imagine.” Another Group member described the optimism he had when it started, the personal attacks that occurred, the Group's attempts to bridge these differences, his elation about their near-breakthrough, and his extreme disappointment when it was not ratified. He paused and said in a disheartened tone, “I guess we failed.” It is only natural for team members to feel partly responsible for the result, but in this case, the odds were against them, and most of the members recognized that.

The BC Wolf Working Group succeeded in improving the level of understanding between the members and the agency did use several of their recommendations in the draft Vancouver Island Strategy. But the Group met for more than four and a half years, during which time there were no substantive decisions regarding how wolf management should proceed in the province.

The team's design accounts for much of this lack of progress. In this case, there were two fatal flaws: 1) the lack of a clear purpose and 2) the lack of a sound process. The

purpose was vague, changed over time and was interpreted differently by the various members. The process, described as “a continuous open-ended discussion” was not conducive to systematic problem solving. While the addition of a facilitator helped, there were still no ground rules and little use of brainstorming and building a foundation of agreement prior to tackling more contentious items. The lack of deadlines and long periods between meetings also hindered progress.

In terms of participants, the effort was handicapped by including official representatives of organized groups. These groups had to ratify any agreement. This protracted the process and made it extremely difficult to reach a consensus. Allowing each member to represent their own personal opinions would have made the process more efficient. In addition, the Group needed more members with moderate views to help balance the extremes and more members than six to improve the discussion dynamics.

Political support for the Group waned, but whether this was due to the election of a new government or whether it was due—as the Branch claims—to the Group’s obvious lack of progress cannot be proven definitively. Even with considerable political support, this Group would have had difficulty due to other design problems.

The lack of a product was also an obstacle. A written agreement of any sort gives a team a sense of accomplishment which inspires them to take on even more difficult issues. The Group would have been more successful had it been designed with a written consensus agreement in mind.

But a full understanding of this case rests on a comparison with the next two attempts in Alaska and the Yukon to resolve the wolf management controversy—cases which built on the lessons learned from this one.

## Chapter 5.

### The Alaska Wolf Management Team

#### November, 1990 to April 1991

*It was probably the most intense thing I've ever done.*

*—Deputy Director, Wayne Regelin*

In 1990, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) established a wolf management planning team to make broad recommendations to the department on how wolves should be managed. The team members represented a broad spectrum of public opinion. After meeting six times in six months, they reached consensus on several, but not all of the key issues. But before they finished, the political climate took an abrupt shift to the right. Governor Walter Hickel was elected with strong backing from wolf control advocates. Several aspects of the Alaska team's design made it particularly vulnerable to the political overhaul that followed. But this effort provided many lessons on team design that strengthened and invigorated the intrepid team that would follow in its footsteps.

### I. A New Approach to the Issue

As an introduction to the wolf management debate, the history of the controversy in Alaska was discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of the early development of the wolf management team concept in Alaska.

#### ***Citizen participation considered by ADFG***

Despite an announcement by then Governor Cowper that no money would be spent on wolf control in his administration, there was mounting internal and external pressure on the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) to do something about perceived low levels of prey populations and consequent low harvest levels. Some of the Fairbanks staff of ADFG felt they needed to at least have the option of controlling wolves, but at the same time, they wanted to avoid the extreme controversy they had experienced earlier.

In 1985, four members of the Fairbanks office of ADFG attended a workshop on citizen participation offered by Hans and Annemarie Bleiker and in 1988, a few staff members attended a meeting in British Columbia where they discussed the newly-formed Wolf Working Group. According to Chris Smith, the current Regional Supervisor, these experiences "started a number of people within the department thinking about taking that sort of an approach to resolution of the wolf management issue. [The Bleiker workshop] happened...in the mid-1980s when we finally absolutely hit the wall in terms of implementing any wolf management control programs."

All respondents credited Bleiker's principles with helping them determine how to design the wolf management team. It is therefore important to understand his key points.

### **Bleiker: Citizen Participation as a "Means to an End"**

There is an enormous chasm between the Bleiker approach and that of genuine consensus-building. The Bleiker method is built on the belief that the public is the obstacle to getting the proper job done and the purpose of his workshops is to teach agencies how to overcome that often obstreperous public. Bleiker stresses that the purpose of citizen participation—which he refers to simply as “CP”—is to win public support for agency projects. As an agency, if you do your CP right, you won’t have any opposition. During a four-day Bleiker workshop I attended in 1991, there was never any mention of involving the public for any purpose other than building public support for a decision the agency has already made.

There was also no mention of the possibility that the public has some useful knowledge and ideas and can even improve the quality of decisions (which is one of the primary reasons for consensus-building efforts). In fact, one workshop participant asked for advice on a dilemma he often faced, “What if someone at a public meeting does have a good idea? We would embarrass ourselves and the agency to admit that it's a good one. What would you do in that case?” Bleiker recommended that the fellow simply say that they will take such ideas “under advisement.”

Bleiker claims that agencies need to learn “how to immunize your projects against vetoes” by the public. In a workshop for public agency employees held in Fairbanks in 1991, he began by saying, “you are technically expert in your field. You know how to come up with legitimate, solid projects to solve problems. This workshop is about how to get that stuff implemented. We specialize in getting controversial projects implemented and if you use our CP techniques, you will be able to show the public why you are doing the right thing.”

In his opinion, only a handful of agency managers know how to get their projects implemented and he calls these “implementation geniuses.” He discusses cases where such geniuses have been asked to assist in the implementation of a controversial project, such as a dam or a landfill, and within days of arriving in town, these people have persuaded the opposition to back down. Bleiker claims to have found several techniques these “geniuses” have in common which he presents in his workshops. According to him, most agency administrators “find implementation of their proposals frustratingly difficult. Their proposals tend to get stalled, shelved, stopped, torpedoed, compromised away, vetoed, etc.” The following quote, reproduced as written, instructs agency staff to imitate the implementation geniuses and view citizen participation as strictly a means of implementing their projects:

Implementation geniuses almost always implement their proposals without major delays! Their proposals do not get: stalled, shelved, stopped, etc. They simply implement..! They look at public involvement, citizen participation, internal and external relations,...public affairs, etc. as strictly a Means to an End...as a Tool for accomplishing certain Objectives...as a Way to Get the Job Done...They NEVER look at CP [citizen participation] as an End-in-Itself! but strictly as a Means-to-an-End!” [sic] (Bleiker 1990, note 22).

He makes an important distinction between consent-building and consensus-building. In his workshop held in 1991, he told an approving audience that “consensus is impossible, we all know that” and instructed them to avoid attempts to reach this impossible goal. Instead, they should strive for what he calls “grudging consent” or “informed consent.” He makes the apt analogy of obtaining the grudging consent of a patient prior to major surgery, and defines the concept as “the grudging willingness of opponents to (grudgingly) [sic] go along with a course of action that they actually are still opposed to” (Bleiker 1990, 28).

He instructs agencies to concentrate on those who can “torpedo” their projects. If agencies can win the grudging consent of these more radical people, their project can go forward. He discusses the need for actively managing public relations and marketing agency programs and he comments repeatedly on what he sees as a need for agencies to avoid “giving away their responsibilities” to members of the public.

In 1969, such concepts were denounced as archaic, undemocratic, and manipulative by Sherry Arnstein in her influential article “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (Arnstein 1969). She would be dismayed that some agencies and “CP” experts remain at the bottom of the ladder.

## **The team concept comes together**

Following the Bleiker workshop, the Fairbanks staff of the department requested funding to pay the Bleikers to assist them in developing a consent-building approach. “It took two or three years to get approval to do that. It was really frustrating” said Bishop. “It was so controversial that the administrations at that time didn't want to deal with it. First Sheffield and then Cowper and the top administration in the department didn't want to touch it. Whenever it came up, they were bombarded with objections to any kind of management of wolves from the Alaska Wildlife Alliance, Defenders of Wildlife, even Audubon and the Sierra Club, so they really didn't want to hear about it. It was a real tough proposition.”

According to Cathie Harms, the staff in Fairbanks proposed in a memo to the Director of the Division of Wildlife Conservation that “we would like to talk to you about wolf management and attempt to solve the problem rather than continue the screaming and yelling that's gone on for the past few years. And we didn't get an answer to the memo for two years!” Finally, they received permission to employ the Bleikers and develop a proposal.

First, they conducted a Bleiker “Needs Assessment”—a series of questions covering 15 pages—which an agency uses to determine all possible sources “likely to stop your project”, ranks these opponents on the basis of priority (those most likely to veto the project, etc.), and identifies communication techniques which can be used to obtain their grudging consent and thus achieve implementation of the project.

“I think initially some people who pressed for this approach to the wolf management issue felt, 'let's use this process to get public permission to do wolf control,'" said Smith. But Harms countered: “You can't convince me the original four staff members weren't sincere. I believe they were. Maybe some early Bleiker disciples were this way, but not the original four.”

Between 1992 and 1994, I spent many hours discussing public involvement with several members of the Fairbanks ADFG staff. At this point, they are genuinely interested in obtaining public input rather than simply using public involvement as a means of obtaining consent for an agency idea. They are open to exploring innovative means of genuine public involvement and, within ADFG, they have pioneered the use of citizen teams to resolve disputes. Some of these staff members may have changed in response to the “baptism by fire” they have faced over wolf control, others were likely sincere from the start.

However, the sincerity of the initial effort—or at least how open-minded it was—is called into question by the early memos regarding the process. These memos echo

Bleiker's principles of citizen participation as a "means to an end." The first memo, dated January 1988, cautions that how the "problem" was stated would make a difference to public acceptance: "It's important to remember that the problem is not 'How can we initiate wolf control?' [Instead,] "we decided to state the problem as follows: 'Relatively stable populations of ungulates and carnivores at moderate densities are important or necessary to maintain or improve the quality of life for people in the Interior. How shall we plan to manage predator/prey/habitat systems in interior Alaska to achieve this condition?'" (ADFG 1988a, 1). This assumes that everyone agrees that "this condition" is desirable and the only question is how to get there.

It goes on to say that "Not all PAIs [a Bleiker acronym for 'potentially affected interests'] understand that our success will significantly enhance people's quality of life...the PAIs don't all realize that we need and welcome ideas from them, but that we must drop ideas which aren't viable solutions" (ADFG 1988a, 2). This statement implies that all that is needed is to let those PAIs know that wolf control will enhance their quality of life and the department must drop nonviable solutions. It does not indicate, however, what constitutes or who will determine what a viable solution is.

Early in this research, I realized with some surprise that when ADFG staff spoke of "managing" wolves, they meant systematic wolf control. I am not trying to make a value judgment on this, I simply point it out because, like me, readers may have a different concept of what "managing" means. To further clarify definitions, when ADFG speaks of managing "predator/prey systems" the only predator involved is wolves, because grizzly bears—which have very low reproductive rates and are easier to hunt than wolves—are effectively controlled through normal hunting seasons and bag limits.

These definitions are important in understanding the ideas presented in the January memo, which identifies effective tools "to achieve our goal of managing predator/prey systems." In laymen's terms, this means "effective tools to achieve our goal of wolf control." It goes on to say that using the Bleiker needs assessment, "we identified a goal of sustaining moderate prey and predator densities, identified the most likely causes for being vetoed, and identified potential tools to help us achieve the goal...*We look forward to developing a plan of attack for managing predator/prey systems and developing the public's consent*" (ADFG 1988a, 4, emphasis added).

In other words, they used Bleiker's techniques to determine the most likely ways wolf control might be stopped and to identify tools to overcome that opposition. Following Bleiker's approach, they would actively "develop" the public's consent in order to "achieve the goal" of controlling wolves.

In May, the staff proposed several Bleiker techniques, including forums, open houses, and meetings with interest groups as well as an advisory committee designated to depolarize the various interests who disagree and to build consensus among them. ADFG felt such a committee was necessary since the interests were so polarized that control proposals would never get an objective review. (ADFG 1988b, 3).

The following ADFG memo, echoing Bleiker's "CP as a means to an end" philosophy, was given the subject, "Progress Report: Predator-Prey Management by Citizen Participation." In the department terminology, this translates to "wolf control through citizen participation."

While some of the tools traditionally used to manage predators...are finding less favor, consumptive use of the resources remains a high priority...and wildlife management is still needed. We believe that our best, if not only, hope of proceeding with the management of predator/prey systems where people have indicated a priority for consumptive use of big game prey is an approach involving intensive public participation...If we succeed in channeling some of that dissatisfaction and divisiveness into constructive support of Department programs, it will benefit all Regions and programs...Through this process we hope to achieve consent from the diverse public interests to use various management approaches. (ADFG 1988c, 3).

Their next task was to sell this approach to a public process to other regions of the department. This turned out to be a real challenge. According to ADFG biologist John Schoen, who worked in southeast Alaska at the time, the Fairbanks staff of ADFG was viewed by other regions within the department "as the principal instigators of unnecessary wolf control."

The other regions also doubted the sincerity of the effort. "We were essentially accused of camouflaging a program to return to wolf control -- good old-fashioned 'go out there and kill them' wolf control," said Bishop. "They figured it was going to be a charade in which we simply put on a show that sounded like the public was involved and then we'd go out and do whatever we pleased."

### **Fairbanks gets the go ahead for a public process**

After months of internal work, the Fairbanks staff was able to win the support of the previously cynical ADFG staff in Anchorage and Juneau. According to Chris Smith, as they came to understand the process better, they realized that the process could be more than simply a means of developing public consent. The staff realized that you could use such a process to refine decision-making, to involve the public, and "to determine whether or not you had actually made the correct decision." Thus the staff was changing



from a view of selling their decision, to a point of view of refining the decision. But from his statement, they were still making the decision prior to consulting the public. They were not thinking of getting public input prior to making the decision. By the time the process began in earnest, few within the department were questioning its sincerity and some previous opponents were actually supporting the effort.

### **November 1989—Board approves proposal for wolf planning team**

Once the Fairbanks staff convinced the rest of the department, they submitted a proposal to the Board of Game to Develop a Strategic Wolf Management Plan for Alaska (ADFG 1989). In November 1989, the Board approved the proposal, which included the concept of a citizen planning team that would make recommendations to the department. Based on the citizen team's recommendations, the department would prepare a plan for formal public review and submit this to the Board.

As shown in the timeline in Table 5-1, there would be three “teams” or distinct groups of people, involved in trying to shape Alaska’s wolf management policy. This has caused some confusion with the public since many do not know that the three groups were quite distinct. The first was the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team, comprised of citizens and one agency member. This was the only group officially designated as a “team.” In June 1991, this team agreed on a set of recommendations for ADFG to use in drafting the Strategic Wolf Management Plan. In November 1992, a second “team”, comprised of all the members of the Board of Game as well as several ADFG staff, three members of the wolf planning team, and three other citizens rewrote ADFG’s draft Strategic Plan as a group. The third “team” included 125 invited participants from such divergent interests as Greenpeace and the Safari Club International who took part in Governor Hickel’s Wolf Summit in January 1993.

In the interest of conserving both time and space, the first team, the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team, is the only one analyzed in detail in this study. However, before discussing this team, it may be helpful to introduce a timeline of events that followed the Board meeting in November 1989.

## Table 5-1

### Timeline of the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Process January 1990 to April 1994

<b><u>Jan. to Oct. 1990</u></b>	ADFG works on finding appropriate team members and a facilitator
November 1990	First meeting of the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team (“the wolf team”—the first of 3 “teams” to deal with the issue in Alaska over next 3 years). This first team would have six meetings in the next six months.
<b><u>April 1991</u></b>	Last meeting of the wolf team.
June 1991	Wolf team submits the <b>Team Final Report</b> of recommendations to the ADFG. Wolf team has no further official duties.
June to Sep. 1991	ADFG writes the <b>Draft Strategic Wolf Management Plan</b> , based on the team’s recommendations. This is circulated for public comment.
November 1991	The Board, three team members, three citizens, and several ADFG staff (“team” #2) rewrite and the Board adopts the <b>Final Strategic Plan</b> . Board eliminates land and shoot as method of hunting or trapping.
<b><u>March 1992</u></b>	ADFG writes Area Specific Plans which zone parts of the state for different levels of wolf harvesting and management. Anticipating considerable controversy, ADFG presents these to the Board as “drafts” rather than final documents. Board approves them as drafts.
April to Oct. 1992	ADFG rewrites Area Specific Plans and completes the Implementation Plans, which specified how many wolves would be taken from three different areas.
November 1992	Board approves the Area Specific and Implementation Plans for Interior and Southcentral Alaska which call for removal by ADFG marksmen in helicopters of approximately 350 wolves (out of statewide population of 5,000 to 7,000 wolves in an area which covers about 3% of the state) to benefit the hunters’ harvest of caribou and moose in those areas.
Nov.-Dec. 1992	ADFG and Governors Office receive some 40,000 calls and letters in response to Board’s decision. ADFG Commissioner invokes a moratorium on aerial control of wolves for 1993 and calls for a “Wolf Summit” of all major state, national and international interest groups to discuss wolf management in Alaska.
<b><u>Jan. 16-18, 1993</u></b>	Wolf Summit is held in Fairbanks. This third “team” included 125 people representing animal rights, conservation, tourism, hunting, trapping and Native interests. The purpose of this group was simply to exchange information and discuss the issues.
January 1993	The Board dismantles most of the <b>Strategic Plan</b> adopted in 1991 and all of the wolf-related decisions they enacted in November 1992.
June 1993	Board “revises” the Strategic Plan, simplifies and retitles it the “Wolf Conservation and Management Policy for Alaska.” Board reauthorizes land

and shoot hunting and calls for ground-based wolf control using trapping and baiting in GMU 20A.

**Winter 93-94**

Despite the protest of animal rights groups., ADFG wolf trapping program begins in GMU20A (est wolf pop. 200-250 animals)

April 1994

ADFG announces that 98 wolves were trapped by the agency and another 52-54 by private trappers from GMU 20A over the winter.

## II. The Respondents

For easy reference, the following list provides a brief introduction to those who are quoted in this chapter.

Dick Bishop ..... former Regional Supervisor of the Fairbanks office of the Wildlife Conservation Division, ADFG. Currently lobbyist for the Alaska Outdoor Council (AOC), a hunting and fishing organization.

Valerie Brown..... a team member and Executive Director of the Alaska Wildlife Alliance, a group founded to oppose wolf control. They were particularly opposed to any predator control to benefit hunters.

Scott Bothwell..... a team member and member of the AOC

David Cline..... team member and Executive Director of the regional office of the National Audubon Society

Ray Collins ..... team member from remote community of McGrath, member of local Fish and Game Advisory Committee (advisory to the Board of Game)

Dale Haggstrom ..... ADFG wildlife biologist

Cathie Harms ..... ADFG wildlife biologist and public information officer

John Hechtel ..... ADFG wildlife biologist, prepared list of possible team members

Robert Heyano ..... team member and prominent Native leader in Bristol Bay region, commercial fisherman

Larry Holmes ..... team member, member of Fish and Game Advisory Committee, avid bow hunter

David Kelleyhouse .... Alaska Director of the Wildlife Conservation Division, ADFG

Connie Lewis ..... Facilitator of the Wolf Team from the Keystone Center, a mediation firm specializing in natural resource disputes based in Keystone, Colorado

Doug Pope ..... former Chair of the Alaska Board of Game

Wayne Regelin .....Deputy Director of the Wildlife Conservation Division, ADFG  
Anne Ruggles .....team member and independent wildlife biologist  
John Schoen.....statewide conservation biologist, ADFG  
Chris Smith.....Regional Supervisor of the Fairbanks office of the Wildlife  
Conservation Division, ADFG.  
Bob Stephenson .....wolf biologist with ADFG  
Dave van den Berg ....representative of Northern Alaska Environmental Center  
Skip Wallen.....member of Board of Game  
Dean Wilson.....team member, trapper and fur buyer from rural Alaska

### III. Formation of the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team

#### ***Prenegotiation Phase—January to November 1990***

**The purpose: to provide recommendations, not make decisions**

As stated in their letter soliciting recommendations for team members, ADFG made it clear that the purpose of the team was to provide consensus recommendations to the department. The department would then use the team's recommendations to develop a Strategic Wolf Management Plan:

The role of the Planning Team is to make recommendations to the Department and the Board on how wolves should be managed in Alaska. Recommendations from this team and all interested parties will be used to help develop a statewide strategic management plan. The Department will then submit a proposed plan to the public and the Board for formal review and eventual adoption. It must be recognized that the Department considers these recommendations to be very important and will follow them as closely as possible, but that laws, regulations, and cooperative agreements with other agencies do limit how wolves can be managed...Group consensus will be the preferred approach for resolving conflicts and formulating recommendations (ADFG 1990a, 2-3).

This letter also spelled out the goals and objectives of the team effort.

#### **Goals**

To help increase public awareness, understanding, and agreement on wolf conservation and management in Alaska

To help promote communication among the public, interest groups, and the ADFG

To advise the Department and the Board of Game on the management and conservation of wolves in Alaska.

## **Objectives**

To review the status and ecology of wolves in Alaska

To review existing policies and procedures for the management and conservation of wolves in Alaska

To recommend goals and objectives for the management and conservation of wolves in Alaska over the next 5 to 10 years

To identify which uses of wolves are in conflict with each other and recommend ways to reduce or eliminate these conflicts

To expedite the flow of information between the Department and the broad spectrum of public interest groups

To recommend specific management options for ensuring the long-term conservation of wolves in Alaska and for satisfying the greatest variety of public desires for wolf management in the state. (ADFG 1990a, 2)

### ***Did the team have the appropriate level of authority?***

The team members and ADFG staff were asked what they thought of the level of authority the team had and what they thought of making the group strictly advisory. Twenty-five out of twenty-eight people interviewed felt the team had the correct level of authority. A sampling of the range of opinion on this question is presented below.

***The agency perspective.*** Deputy Director of the ADFG Division of Wildlife Conservation Wayne Regelin was emphatic, “In writing and from day one, they knew it was recommendations and that we couldn't follow them all; that we intended to follow as many as we could. That's what I said from the start. It's the responsibility of the department to draft this plan, not the team's. We are not going to relinquish the department's authority and statutory requirements to do the planning. We are going to get your help, but then we will have to take it and write it up as a department plan.

Everybody knew that we had to take and redraft the team report into ours and that it wouldn't include everything.”

ADFG biologist John Hechtel was responsible for screening potential team members. In his opinion, recommendations were the only option because it would not have been possible for anyone to give the agency's stamp of approval to a team agreement. To him, there was no single individual in the department who could say, 'Yes, you have my word that everything you say will be implemented.’ He said the department is not monolithic; within the department there are many points of view so no one individual could speak for the entire department.

“We were just using the team as a sounding board,” said Hechtel. “I was never under the impression that it was going to be taken verbatim, but I was also never under the impression that we were just going through the motions and were going to ignore it. It was a good faith effort by the department to get some ideas on how to make wolf management more palatable to the broad majority of interests.”

ADFG biologist John Schoen was asked if the department ever considered allowing the team to draft the Strategic Plan. “No. Never,” he replied. “The Department of Transportation doesn’t select a group of the public and say, ‘OK, you be our engineers and build this bridge.’ OK?...We're the people who have been to school. We're the wildlife experts. We should develop the plan, based on public input and we could use the team to provide us that input...I mean, we're the engineers.”

***All but one team member agreed.*** For team member and avid hunter Scott Bothwell, recommendations were appropriate, “What they were looking for, I believe, was a sign of public consensus so they could feel better about doing what they wanted—doing more active management [of wolves. The term “active management” is used locally to mean wolf control]. But I didn't feel that we were put together just to reach a consensus, although that's important. In a court of law, public input is very highly regarded nowadays, and I believe that's what we were doing, no matter what decision we came out with, I think we were sort of a pawn, and that the Board and the department needed to show that they were getting public input. Processes like this are not just to avoid lawsuits, they're to help the department win law suits by showing that public input was used in the decision making.”

Team member and Regional Executive Director of the Audubon Society, Dave Cline, agreed that an advisory role was fitting, “I think the public's role has to remain advisory and there's no way that I would be expected to be appointed to any body and then require that the agency adopt [the resulting agreement]. I think that's asking too much...They need to take it very seriously and they have to have a very credible decision-making

process so that they carry out, as best they can, the wishes of the majority rather than the interests of a small minority.”

However, five members who were surveyed stated that they would not participate in such a team again unless there were strong assurances that the recommendations would be used.

***But Brown would “make it binding.”*** Valerie Brown, a team member and then Executive Director of the Alaska Wildlife Alliance (AWA)—a group strongly opposed to wolf control—felt that the purpose should have gone beyond just advice. She volunteered the following opinion before I asked her the question: “One thing I would do before investing my time in this again is make it binding. Because, why waste your time? We spent so much time on this thing and if it's not binding, what is the point? That would put a lot more pressure on you [as a team member], but you would know that if you can agree on something, it would be implemented. I don't see any other reason to go through it. I don't need to spend six months of my time in intense negotiations with people to give Fish and Game one piece of information that's no more important than some other piece of information that they get from the general public. I think everybody [on the team] felt the same way—they were putting in a great deal of personal time and effort into this.”

## **The participants**

### ***ADFG would select the members based on recommendations***

On March 2, 1990, a letter was sent to 68 groups as well as several individuals soliciting recommendations for members of the team:

The Wolf Management Planning team will consist of 10-12 members representing a broad spectrum of public concerns, values, and interests about wolves. They must also be committed to working toward consensus...Thus, our goal is to seek people who can represent at least one major interest or set of values...We will be checking and cross-checking references and acceptability of candidates among groups and individuals. (ADFG 1990a).

Respondents were asked to give a brief statement of their concerns regarding current wolf management and describing their objectives for wolf management.

More than 60 recommendations were received. Over the next eight months, staff spent much time checking the recommendations and developing a list of likely candidates. The candidates were not interviewed, but biologist John Hechtel telephoned members of interest groups to see if they felt a candidate could represent their concerns.

He also had to build trust in the process with the public, the various interest groups, and the candidates themselves who doubted the agency's sincerity.

"Going into this, there wasn't a good formula that 'this is how you do it.' We were going into it a bit blind and selecting the team members was the toughest aspect of the whole process," said Hechtel. "A lot of people thought this process was not a good faith attempt by the department. They thought this was just smoke and mirrors to conceal our real motives. That was a serious concern. It was a classic case where both sides were wary of the process and our motives. What I did was spend a fair amount of time calling people saying, 'Look would this person share your point of view, could they represent your interest?'" The key thing is that there was feedback in the process of selecting people."

Of the seven team members whom I interviewed in depth, five had no problem with the agency choosing the members, one thought it was acceptable but not the most democratic way, and one felt that the interests should have chosen their own members.

David Cline of the National Audubon Society was comfortable with the agency choosing the members, but thought that coalitions of interest groups could have chosen their own representatives. "There are probably more democratic ways to select people...perhaps they could take various groups and say, 'We can only have one representative, but you bring the person that you'd like to have', rather than the department selecting the person they're most comfortable with. That's basically what went on."

Valerie Brown was the only respondent who objected to the agency choosing the members. She felt that the groups should have chosen their own members. "Fish and Game chose the people sort of unilaterally," said Brown. "They asked for recommendations from every community and every group they could think of. I think they were fair in their attempts to contact everyone who's interested. But the final decision was a closed door process. I think that's a problem because they're deciding who should represent the constituencies rather than each constituency deciding who should represent them. I think they were trying to facilitate cooperation. They wanted to choose who was reasonable, but who is reasonable is not necessarily who best represents a constituency."

### *Several criteria would be used to select members*

There were several concerns on all sides about how the team would be chosen. The agency imagined what they call a "red-green scale" from pro-wolf-control people to those in favor of no manipulation of wildlife populations and wanted the team to be balanced in



this respect. The team would include one agency member and a representative of the Board of Game would observe the meetings. ADFG wanted the team to include representatives of animal welfare interests, nonconsumptive users, environmentalists, trappers, recreational and subsistence hunters, Natives and non-Natives, tourism and big game guiding (ADFG 1990a, 3). Because they also felt public education was a likely part of the solution, they wanted someone with a background in education. In addition, at least one participant should be a member of a local Fish and Game Advisory Committee and the team should have broad geographic representation within the state and include a national interest (i.e., a state resident who is a member of a national organization) (ADFG 1990a, 2-3).

According to several sources, then Director of the Division of Wildlife Conservation, Lewis Pamplin, had promised one person a seat on the team early on. The staff expressed dismay about this “political appointment”, as they did not feel that this person represented an actual constituency, but they had no choice but to include them.

In reviewing the remaining candidates, Hechtel felt he had to serve also as a salesman for the process. “There were a lot of things to convince people of. One of them was that we didn't need a perfect balance of ideologies on the committee. People were real concerned that it was going to be a voting thing: six green to five red. There was a lot of misunderstanding and paranoia about how the process worked. Everyone was afraid that a six to five vote would mean either the loss of predator control or the institutionalization of aerial hunting. But in a consensus process, any one person has the right to say, 'No way; this is unacceptable.' Consensus is real hard to get people to understand. The process of educating people took a lot of time.”

#### *No former employees or Board members.*

The agency decided that no former ADFG employees or Board of Game members would be eligible to serve on the team. Because both ADFG and the Board were perceived by many as pro-wolf control, the team designers felt that the environmentalists would not even consider negotiating if former employees or Board members were on the team. However, this decision made the leaders of the most prominent sporting groups ineligible.

“The trouble with ex-employees is that the environmentalists would wonder, 'Are they representing themselves or are they secretly representing the department?’” explained Hechtel. “That would add a whole additional layer of suspicion that we had a hidden agenda.”

But it greatly concerned the sporting groups, a concern aggravated when the department announced that two paid executive directors of environmental organizations (Brown and Cline)—both with extensive experience and stature relating to the wolf debates—were to be on the team, while the proposed team members who were in favor of wolf-control were then relatively unknown people with little negotiating experience at the time. According to biologist Cathie Harms, this decision incensed the sporting groups. According to the Board of Game Chair Doug Pope, many hunters complained that the team was an “elitist” organization that did not represent them.

In separate interviews, both Brown and Cline insisted that it would not have bothered them to have former employees or Board members on the team. Cline said, “I think it's more important to have constituency groups represented by whomever they like, whether its Dick Bishop or Joe Blow it wouldn't have been a problem for me. I think it's up to the interest group.”

But eight of the members surveyed did not believe this was a problem. Those representing hunting interests did not feel that they lacked experience and those representing non-consumptive interests agreed that the hunters on the team were very capable of articulating the concerns of their group.

There were three compensating factors that helped keep the hunters on board to some extent. First, seven of the twelve final team members were avid hunters. Second, team member Scott Bothwell belonged to the Alaska Outdoor Council (AOC)—the state's most prominent sporting group—and he reported back to them frequently (and became AOC president following the team process). Soft-spoken, thoughtful and a good listener, Bothwell was described by other team members as a “consensus-builder” and “good problem-solver.”

Third, the team included a young guide/outfitter, Chuck McMahon, described by one respondent as “a hard-core redneck and proud of it.” McMahon had nominated himself and, according to Cathie Harms, “one of the reasons that we had the hunters stay on the wagon and keep going with this process was simply because Chuck McMahon is a second or third generation wolf hunter using airplanes. He said right out on his recommendation form, ‘I've done this [wolf hunting using aircraft] a long time and I want to keep doing it.’” Guide McMahon found nothing wrong with charging fees for non-Alaska residents to shoot wolves from his airplane, as he had done in the past. However, while he held very strong opinions, team members also described McMahon as “articulate”, “charming” and—probably not without some significance—“very good-looking.” Even Brown described him as “incredibly cooperative and open.”

### *No “extremists”*

While many would consider both Brown and McMahon to be extremists on opposite ends of the spectrum, groups on the far right—groups like the NRA or the Safari Club International—were not at the table, nor were the animal protection groups—such as Friends of Animals or The Fund for Animals on the left. Cline felt this compromised the credibility and stability of the agreement, “Whenever you get into a public controversy like this, extremists tend to participate to a greater extent than quite a few of those who were represented on the team.”

However the mediator, Connie Lewis, felt that it was appropriate to limit the group to those willing to work out a compromise, “Like most processes, you have to strike some sort of balance between having all potentially affected interests involved and putting together a team that can actually come up with a consensus. If someone totally opposed to wolf control had been on the team, it would have been a pointless exercise. The rule of thumb is that you want to include anyone who has the ability to preclude the recommendations from being implemented and the 'anti-any-kind-of-wolf-control' groups probably won't have that ability.”

### *No one from outside Alaska*

No one from outside the state was on the team, although Cline, as a representative of a prominent national group, would ostensibly represent that concern. All nine team members who responded to the written survey felt that it was not necessary to have someone from outside Alaska. Team member Larry Holmes felt that this was an Alaska issue taking place on Alaska’s state lands and no control was even recommended for federal land, therefore the lower 48 need not be represented. Many of the hunting groups opposed having non-Alaska residents on the team because they felt it was a decision for the state, not the nation, to make.

Of those interviewed and/or surveyed, only ADFG biologist Schoen thought that including national interests was critical, “Alaska has a lot of national interest lands and wolves don't occur in abundance in the natural situation...anywhere else. More realistically, if we want to develop a plan that works, we have to satisfy that national interest or we're going to be slapped with lawsuits forever.” Schoen did believe, however, that Cline could represent the national interest.

### *The agency would be an “equal” member*

According to Regional Supervisor for Fairbanks, Chris Smith, ADFG decided not to run the meetings, but rather to be an equal member of the team, “We said all right, we are

going to retain the ultimate responsibility for making the final decisions...but for development of these recommendations...we are going to approach the table on the same basis as every other interest...We felt that was absolutely essential to the functioning of the team.”

A contradiction is evident here, however. If the agency retains ultimate responsibility for the final decision, it has more power than the other team members and therefore cannot really claim to be approaching the table on the same basis as every other interest.

Wayne Regelin, Deputy Director of the Wildlife Conservation Division of ADFG, became the agency representative. Regelin describes his role this way: “I tried to play the role of just another team member that represented the division so my role was slightly different than everyone else and I was the one who had most of the technical information. I knew what was legal, what we could and couldn't do, what the budget restraints were. So I guess my role was adviser many times and trying to not necessarily direct them to a decision, but to provide enough information so that we could get a decision made. Often times when we would bog down, I saw my role as saying, 'Hey, we've got two options or three options. You can't do these things because the statutes won't allow it or it's totally uneconomical, it will never happen' and that sort of thing.”

While some felt Regelin was a bit too “active” in the meetings, others felt he played a key role in providing the agency perspective. Cline felt Regelin had to be there, “I personally feel that somebody with credibility like Wayne needs to be there to provide the agency perspective. He did a lot of educating of the team members.”

But in Brown's mind, the agency was not at all an equal member of the team, “The agency was under the same pressures to compromise and yield at the team meeting, but after the meetings, they didn't have to stick to what they agreed. They got to change their minds, which wasn't fair. They should have been under the same pressures as everybody else.”

### *The board would send one observer.*

They decided to have one observer from the Board of Game. This observer could keep the other Board members abreast of developments and avoid any “major surprises” at the end. Due to the wide diversity of opinion on the Board, Regional Supervisor Chris Smith saw this decision as the only option, “It would have been impossible to involve all seven Board members on the planning team, yet if you were to pick any one member of the Board, you would end up with one-seventh of the Board's philosophy.”

The members of the team, the general points of view they represented, and their particular interests in the issue are summarized in Table 5-2.

*Participants would represent general points of view, not organized groups*

Ralph Archibald of the British Columbia Wolf Working Group convinced ADFG that they did not want to have representatives of organized groups. Harms saw this as critical, “We didn't want to turn this into a voting thing. We wanted people who could listen, understand, comprehend, and then reach consensus points by some degree of compromise. When you get somebody politicking and campaigning—'let me be your representative'—they're going to toe the hard line. What we wanted were people who could represent those interests, but not be bound to them by all the support and the lobbying...So we just knocked organizations out of it.”

According to facilitator Connie Lewis, the participants' only function is not representing—they have other functions besides that, including problem-solving in a team setting. In her opinion, “it was real explicit and we enforced it at every meeting that they were not formally representing any group.” She felt that one of the criteria for a good team is that it should include “a group of people who are good problem solvers—not radically on one side or the other, but who represent a middle kind of perspective and who have a reputation for being real constructive problem solvers. We had a few of those people as well as a few who were definitely out at the ends of the spectrum.”

Nine of the twelve citizen team members were asked if they would change this. Three said they would, five said they would not and one had no opinion. Member Scott Bothwell: “I don't know if it would work any other way. I don't know that you have any choice in that. A group sets up policies and resolutions which are their ideal...and you just can't get everyone's ideals to meet halfway.”

## Table 5-2

### Members of the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team

(Organized roughly by point of view from anti- to pro-wolf control)

<u>General Viewpoint and Interests</u>	<u>Representative</u>
Animal welfare, nonconsumptive use.....	Valerie Brown
Alaska Wildlife Alliance, Executive Director	
Nonconsumptive use.....	David Cline
National Audubon Society, Executive Director	
Nonconsumptive “wolf enthusiast” .....	John Doore
Educator, new to the issue.....	Peggy Cowan
Independent wildlife biologist.....	Anne Ruggles
Rural hunter and Fish and Game Advisory Comm. member ...	Ray Collins
Urban bow hunter, F&G Advisory Comm. member .....	Larry Holmes
Rural native hunter.....	Robert Heyano
Subsistence hunting, Eskimo hunter and trapper.....	Bob Ahgook
Urban hunters, Alaska Outdoor Council member .....	Scott Bothwell
Big Game Guide, rural hunter and trapper.....	Chuck McMahon
Trapper, fur buyer, member AK Trappers Assoc .....	Dean Wilson
Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game.....	Wayne Regelin

Three members felt they were compelled to represent their organizations. Brown called it “a fiction” that the members were not representing their groups. And Cline said that it was just wishful thinking that they could represent only their personal views. “That’s what was asked of us, but many of us do work for or represent constituencies. For example, I could not offer recommendations that I felt were totally out of line with the National Audubon Society policy toward wildlife management.”

Dean Wilson, a team member, trapper, and fur buyer, felt it was very contradictory to ask team members to represent only their personal views, yet keep their constituents informed and try to bring them along. “That was a joke wasn’t it? It was a play on words. I think not all, but most of the members felt they were representing a certain group.”

Both ends of the spectrum were going to have a difficult time bringing their constituents along. Wolf biologist Stephenson pointed out how difficult it was for Brown

to make concessions (and it was equally difficult for Scott Bothwell of the AOC and Dean Wilson with the Trappers Association). “Valerie Brown was in a real tough spot,” said Stephenson. “Her constituency was really not into compromising on anything and here she was with this den of thieves talking and making concessions and maybe even talking potential wolf reductions at times. It was real hard on her because in back of her were fairly strident people who do not want to change their views. Her constituency wants to be part of an organization that is saving wolves and if you tell them ‘Well, the wolves are already saved,’ you’ll be real unpopular.”

## **The process**

### *A neutral facilitator who would “work for the team”*

When ADFG began designing the process, they did not expect to hire a professional facilitator/mediator and some thought that Deputy Director Regelin could run the meetings, but he disagreed. As he explained, “You know people wanted me to be the facilitator and I felt very strongly that it shouldn’t be my role. I didn’t have time in the meetings to try to run it as well as participate and understand what everybody was saying. It was a question of money as much as anything and once we made the decision to spend the money and make this a higher profile thing, hiring a professional was sort of a given. It was such a controversial issue, we needed someone totally unbiased to run the meetings and keep us from getting bogged down and involved in personalities rather than focusing on solutions.”

From the beginning, Hechtel thought that a professional facilitator would be important. When asked why he felt this way, he responded that part of it was his experience in staff meetings that are run by good biologists but “they have staff meetings that are just horrible.” For him, running meetings involves several skills that biologists don’t necessarily have. He explained that in doing the groundwork for seating the team, he came across several publications on dispute resolution and became very interested in the subject and thoroughly convinced that a professional facilitator was essential for this controversial project. “The amount of suspicion and wariness of the various parties in approaching this also convinced me that we needed someone who would have credibility with all the groups.”

Once the key people in the department were sold on the idea of a facilitator, Hechtel was directed to contact several different mediation firms to obtain information. He found that most of them charged between 700 and 1,000 dollars per day for meetings and that this included the extensive preparation time. He contacted well-known mediator Gerald

Cormick at the University of Washington who recommended the Keystone Center's Connie Lewis.

ADFG prepared a contract and received several bids. At this point, the team members had been selected, but they did not play a role in selecting the facilitator. John Schoen contacted people he trusted who had considerable experience in negotiations and asked what they thought of the different facilitators who had applied. These personal contacts convinced him that Connie Lewis would be an excellent choice. Wayne Regelin interviewed the candidates.

"Connie said she would *not* work for the Division. She would work for the *team*," said Harms, who indicated that Lewis's conviction on this made a strong, positive impact on Regelin. "I'm convinced that she was a real king pin in helping the team work," continued Harms. "Finding her was a stroke of good luck. You know, some things we plotted and picked and chose, and some things were just dumb luck."

Lewis was hired about one month before the first meeting. ADFG briefed her on the issues and then she called every team member at least once prior to the first meeting to discuss what they felt the issues were.

Without exception, everyone had high praise for Ms. Lewis's abilities as a facilitator. Many ADFG staff agreed with Regelin that having an independent facilitator was "the best decision we made in the whole process."

### *The deadline was firm and the team would meet once a month*

The team's first meeting was held in November, 1991 and their deadline for the final report was June, 1992. The reason for the deadline was so that ADFG could rewrite the team's recommendations into their own report, take public comments on it and submit it for consideration at the Board's meeting in November 1992. The agency was very firm about the deadline and all the respondents agreed that it was important to have a deadline.

They also had to determine how many meetings to have. In Alaska, such meetings can be very expensive since many members were coming from small, isolated communities. The experience of the wolf planning team in British Columbia influenced the number of meetings and how close together they would be. In Bothwell's opinion, "We discussed the wolf planning team in British Columbia that was meeting every six months for two or three years and they were accomplishing almost nothing. Just too long between meetings—you would end up starting over again each time I would think. I think by having the meetings closer together and in as few months as we did...then you're increasing people's efforts to make those meetings and to consider all the material."



Before the team met, ADFG had decided that six meetings would be needed. Biologist John Schoen described how the decision concerning the number of meetings was made. First, they went over the budget and felt they could afford to have six meetings, with the option of having one more if they needed it. ADFG worked with Connie, who informed them that they would need to have an introductory session to lay out the ground rules for the team, to get to know each other, determine where they wanted to go as a group, and to have a brainstorming session to identify issues. They would need to have a “biological session” to bring in experts and go through the scientific data. They also wanted to have public testimony in Anchorage and Fairbanks, they needed to leave adequate time to start writing the plan, and they did not want to have the meetings last more than 3 days. They felt that it was difficult to get everyone together and that time would be needed between meetings to read material and discuss issues on an individual basis, so monthly meetings seemed best. Working within these constraints, Lewis and the department felt that six monthly meetings would be most appropriate.

#### *Open meetings, but only team members could participate*

In conformance with the state open meetings law, the public as well as the press could attend all meetings. However, only team members and those called upon would be able to participate in the discussion. The team would accept written comments as well as public testimony at two formal hearings, one in Fairbanks and one in Anchorage. Information about team activities would be available through media announcements, minutes of the meetings, and news releases. The facilitator would act as the point person for media contacts and calls to team members would be referred to Ms. Lewis.

#### *No “monster committees” wanted*

The team would be disbanded as soon as their recommendations were complete. Hans Bleiker, the public involvement specialist and ADFG consultant, had convinced the agency that the team should be disbanded quickly. In the handbook for his workshops, Bleiker warns that if an agency fails to remain extremely vigilant, a team will slowly begin to assume more than just an advisory role. After a few years, the agency will finally awaken to find what “at least 95 percent” of agencies discover: “you may have created a monster” (Bleiker 1990, p.V12).

A year after the team was dismantled, ADFG biologist Harms said she thought it was appropriate to stop the team rather than create another long-term body, “To my mind, you know, there gets to be a fine line between delegating responsibilities and it didn’t break my heart to stop the team.”

## **Political and agency support was tentative**

Political support for the team was never very solid. The team was assembled under Governor Steve Cowper's administration. Cowper himself had announced that no wolf control would take place under his administration. However, while the team was formed by the Cowper administration, the final authority on wildlife policy in the state is the Board of Game. The Board had endorsed the concept of the team, but at that time, the seven-member Board was divided four to three in favor of wolf control. With the administration opposed to control and the Board largely in favor of it, it is difficult to say how much political support the team actually had, even if the Cowper administration had remained in office.

But whatever political support the team had at the beginning, it evaporated when the political climate shifted dramatically. In November 1990, just prior to the team's first meeting, conservative Governor Walter Hickel was elected. He belonged to the Alaska Independence Party, which had long-advocated wolf control. Joe Vogler, the colorful founder of the secessionist party, was legendary for his tough talk on individual and state's rights. Vogler had outraged all but a few when he stated that he would "kill the last pregnant wolf bitch on the capitol steps."

According to a senior staff member at ADFG, following Hickel's election, there was increasing pressure from hunting groups to begin wolf control as soon as possible and not spend so much time working with planning teams and getting "endless public input." However, the Hickel administration said publicly that they did support the team effort and would wait for their recommendations.

In April 1991, just prior to the last team meeting, Dave Kelleyhouse—dubbed "Machine-Gun Kelleyhouse"—was appointed Director of the Wildlife Conservation Division of ADFG. An ADFG biologist and outspoken advocate of wolf control, Kelleyhouse had acquired his nickname when he sought agency permission to purchase a machine gun for use in a 1981 wolf-control program west of the community of Tok. As a result of this and other strong actions taken to promote wolf control, he was once the subject of a secret ouster attempt by the Alaska Board of Game (Medred 1991, C1).

Regarding his new appointment, Kelleyhouse said he did not expect much controversy because "I think people are too shell-shocked." One of his first actions as Director was to call the leaders of state environmental groups to tell them that he wanted to work together and to emphasize that they had a common concern for the wildlife of Alaska. But Cindy Lowry of Greenpeace responded to his appointment by saying, "It's our worst nightmare come true...It's like declaring war on wolves" (Medred 1991, C1).

## **Negotiation Phase**

### **Establishing protocols**

The first meeting of the team was held on November 14 and 15, 1990 in Anchorage, a full five years after the general concept of a team took root. Connie Lewis chaired the meeting. She emphasized that members must be in a frame of mind to strive for consensus, yet maintain their basic values; no one would be expected to compromise those values. According to the minutes of the meeting, the group developed the following ground rules:

1. Articulate your interests and concerns
2. Try to understand other interests, keep an open mind, and listen
3. Try to fashion solutions that meet all interests (not just our own)
4. Understand that not every recommendation will be your first choice
5. All values will be respected and considered to be valid
6. All comments will be depersonalized
7. All disagreements will be discussed on a professional level
8. Everyone has equal access to the floor
9. Team members will serve not as formal representatives of their respective organizations/agencies, but rather as individuals.

The team decided to strive to reach consensus on all issues. If consensus could not be reached, options would be presented in the final report. Although they were not to represent any particular group, they were expected to represent broad constituencies and members were to review meeting summaries with these people to obtain feedback and share information. Those not associated with any groups were asked to share information “as best they could.”

### **The issues**

In a brainstorming session, the team developed the list of issues shown in Table 5-3. Close examination shows that this list does not meet the basic definition of an issue. Webster describes an issue as “a point of debate or controversy” and Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, 127) define an issue as “a matter or question that must be addressed if a conflict is to be resolved. It can best be stated as a [how or what] problem to be solved.” The list the team developed includes more than issues and none of the topics are stated as

questions. The list is actually a combination of data needs, potential solutions, and a few very broad issues, such as “predator control programs.” Many of the terms, such as “technical” are too abbreviated to be widely understood.

People often underestimate the power of carefully-crafted issues. Exactly what the issues are and how they are stated can be critical to the success of a negotiation. They help to crystallize what the problem areas are, help to keep the data gathering focused and bounded, and open possibilities for prioritizing and trading. How issues are phrased can contribute to an impasse or broaden the possibilities for meeting underlying interests. For example, compare what the problem solving dynamics would be from an issue such as “Should 1080 poison be used to kill coyotes?” vs. “How can we protect the lambs the coyotes are preying on?” With the former, the participants are likely to reach an impasse between those in favor and those opposed to using the poison. But the second approach to the same issue opens far more options, focuses on common ground between the two sides, and strives to meet the underlying interests at stake.

Over the next few months, the issues, discussed earlier in Chapter 3, crystallized into the following:

- What is wolf control? How is it distinguished from wolf hunting? Can wolf populations be regulated over long periods of time or should they be reduced quickly, then allowed to recover?
- When—under what circumstances, if any, is it acceptable to consider controlling wolves?
- Who—Will the general public be allowed to participate in wolf control programs?
- How—What methods and means will be acceptable for controlling wolves?
- Where—In what areas of the state, if any, can control programs be considered? Which areas, if any, will be off limits?

### **Joint fact-finding**

At their second meeting, the team began hearing from a long list of experts in wolf biology, predator/prey relationships, enforcement of regulations, and the economic value of wolves.

The biologists were selected to give several different viewpoints. John Schoen was responsible for setting up a panel of biologists to discuss the biology and while he felt that good information was important, he did not feel that data would solve the dispute. He thought that following the biologists’ discussion, the team recognized that the biology issues weren’t really in debate and therefore they were ready to “move on to the personal philosophy of how we should be treating animals...That is not a scientific data issue,

that's a gut feeling issue and you're really not going to change people's minds with data on that."

**Table 5-3**  
**Issues by Category**  
**(Identified at Initial Meeting)**

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<b>Technical</b>
Definition of terms
Wolf population monitoring/technique/data, uses and needs
Pack dynamics
Predator/prey relationships
Predator control programs
Enforcement capabilities
<b>Goals/General policy</b>
Long term population goals
Management goals/area
Ethics of study/technique
Assess user groups/needs
Attitude of the general public
<b>Management strategies</b>
Method and means/area
Needs of user groups/area
Need for predator control/area
Interagency coordination
State economic development
<b>Implementation</b>
Education/responsibilities of all parties
Public/agency/interagency relations
Role of politics - biology
Recognition of decision making body/timing of action
Enforcement

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(Source: ADFG 1990b, 7)

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***Team reaches agreement on several points of information***

Following the technical presentations, the team identified points that members agreed with as well as questions raised and additional information needs. The final set of team agreements on the data, or "findings", are listed in Table 5-4.

This team spent most of four out of their six meetings gathering data. Four of the nine team members surveyed felt this was fine , but the rest of the team members thought that more time following the data review would have been helpful. Bothwell pointed out

that such joint fact-finding is preferable to having each member study data on their own, because everyone can discuss different interpretations of the information.

### **Table 5-4**

## **Findings of the Alaska Wolf Management Team**

1. Wolves have intrinsic value and provide multiple values to society:
  - Consumptive and nonconsumptive use
  - Worldwide symbol of wilderness to many people
  - Role in nature as an integral component of natural food chains
  - Contribution to rural economies
  - Special social/cultural relationship to people in rural Alaska
2. Wolves exist as part of a complex ecological system and Alaska land ownership is complicated, therefore successful wolf conservation requires integrated protection and preservation of habitat and prey species and an opportunity for the meaningful involvement of all managers and interest groups.
3. The wolf population in Alaska is not endangered. The density varies greatly throughout the state. The current statewide population estimate of wolves is approximately 6000, but the population will vary over time due to factors beyond human control.
4. Wolf populations can sustain harvest, but sustainable harvest levels vary.
5. Alaska is fortunate to have one of the larger wolf populations in the world and currently has extensive habitat and prey. Therefore, we have a special responsibility to ensure that wolves and their habitat are conserved.
6. Wolves can affect prey populations and in some situations can keep prey populations at low levels. Human intervention can speed recovery of the prey population in some cases.
7. Wolves are vulnerable to the growing human population, habitat fragmentation, disease, development, reduction in prey populations, access corridors, habitat conversion such as livestock grazing and game farming and over harvest.
8. Wolves and their prey are of vital importance to the economy and nutritional needs of people in many areas of rural Alaska. Healthy ungulate populations are necessary for rural Alaska.
9. The use of snowmachines can, in some circumstances, have an adverse impact on wolf populations.
10. The Department currently has no ability to regulate overflights. Unregulated overflights can have adverse effects on wildlife.
11. Breeding of wolf-dog hybrids creates potential problems for wild wolves, e.g. disease, genetic contamination, and harm to public perceptions of wild wolves.

### **The team begins work on a written agreement**

At the third meeting, the team began work on their written report. They agreed on an outline, wrote draft goals, and agreed on a set of principles to meet the goals. The three goals included:

1. Ensure the long-term conservation of wolves throughout Alaska.
2. Provide for consumptive and non-consumptive uses and values of wolves and their prey, consistent with the principles of wildlife conservation and with due consideration to public review and comment.
3. Help increase public awareness, understanding and agreement on wolf conservation and management in Alaska.

At the fourth meeting, they listened to more presentations as well as testimony from the public in Fairbanks and began discussing the issue of same-day airborne hunting of wolves.

At the fifth meeting, they listened to two presentations, took public testimony in Anchorage and began a discussion of zoning and other management strategies. The group agreed to extend their next and final meeting by one day in order to have adequate time for their deliberations. They prepared the following quite daunting list of “things to do” at their final meeting in April.

## Agenda for Final Meeting

### **Report**

- Review new maps of areas of totally protected, control, etc.
- Revisit issue of zoning
  - concept in general
  - amount of [wolf control? or land area?] in each zone
- Discuss management in multiple-use areas
- Review section on wolf control in intensive use areas. Address remaining serious questions.
- Consumptive use of wolves—discuss land and shoot
- Review the other sections developed by small groups last meeting, but not discussed:
  - non-consumptive uses of wolves
  - enforcement
  - education and information exchange
- Review draft introduction written by Connie Lewis
- Review and comment on rest of report

### **Miscellaneous:**

- Hear from reindeer herders
- Discuss implementation
- Social gathering

Source: ADFG 1991, 7

### **Sixth and final meeting: April 26 - 28, 1991.**

While no respondent commented about any other meeting specifically, most had something to say about the last one.

“I was drained after that. I was absolutely, physically drained,” member Dean Wilson said.

Regelin agreed, “I think that you get down to the very end and there are two or three issues that are the most difficult. We knew they were there from the very day we started and we had to address them. Having another meeting would have just meant that we didn't address them until the next meeting. When things got extremely tense, Connie would say, 'let's put that aside and move on to this area.' Because—I'm serious—we had lots of tears in the group. It's a very emotional issue—on all sides. It was probably the most intense thing I've ever done.”

Lewis was concerned, “The two issues of land and shoot and who would do the shooting had me sitting on the edge of my chair on the last day wondering whether we were going to be able to resolve it.”



Cline was ready to move on. “You can always, on a complicated issue like this, take a lot more time, but I was more than anxious to end it. I felt we'd had more than ample opportunity to present all of our recommendations.”

“After about one more meeting, I would have choked some people, I was so frustrated,” said Wilson, a trapper and fur-buyer. “We did not arrive at a consensus on the key issues. I believe part of the reason was that some individuals had salaries being paid by organizations who had written positions against the issues that we were dealing with. My business was losing \$500 a meeting while other people were being paid to sit there. I had put out a lot and it felt like some people were dragging their heels. They could afford to out-wait me.”

But Ruggles felt they had made considerable progress. “We made it clear that control is not intended to be a common practice and that no one wanted a decrease in the statewide wolf population. Also, before the team, no one was working from data. We generated a data base and provided a structure for future discussion.”

“How did I feel about it? I felt terrible about it,” said Brown, who feared the final agreement was so general that they had given the department a *carte blanche*. “I just went out of there thinking, 'Oh, my God'.”

## **The team's final report**

### ***Areas of agreement***

At their last meeting, the team finalized several agreements. They commented on the final draft, written by Lewis. Then, as the agency put it, “the team *offered* their recommendations to the department” (emphasis added).

Their recommendations were presented under the categories in the following order:

**1) *Habitat conservation.*** They endorsed the state's fire management plans and the use of prescribed fire where appropriate to enhance habitat. They opposed development of sensitive wildlife areas and expansion of reindeer herding or livestock grazing. The recommendations discouraged game farming and advised that wolf habitat be address when ADFG commented on permits for the use of state lands. They supported designated wilderness areas to protect wolf habitat for the use and enjoyments of hunters, trappers, and nonconsumptive users.

**2) *Enforcement.*** The team recommended increased funding for enforcement of all wildlife regulations, increased penalties for second infractions, and careful regulation of motorized vehicle access for hunting.

3) *Nonconsumptive uses of wolves and their prey.* They recommended that agencies encourage nonconsumptive enjoyment of wolves and develop wolf viewing/listening areas and establish guidelines for responsible wildlife and wolf viewing. Buffer zones should be established to protect wolf packs around Denali National Park and Denali State Park.

4) *Consumptive use of wolves.* They acknowledged that maintaining a healthy prey base is vital to overall conservation of wolves. They recommended that wolf harvests be restricted if the wolf population is below the desired level and recommended that as ungulate populations increase, populations of wolves should also be allowed to increase. If wolf populations are low, the subsistence harvest of wolves should take priority.

5) *Operational wolf management plans.* The team recommended that ADFG prepare “operational management plans” which would set population and harvest goals for ungulates and predators based on principles of wildlife management. These plans should be developed through a public process and be reviewed by an independent Interagency Wolf Specialist Group consisting of three or four agency and/or university biologists that have expertise in wolf biology.

**Zones defined but not located.** The team liked the basic concept of zones that British Columbia had attempted to implement. Therefore, they recommended that the operational plans also zone areas of the state and they developed six zones of varying levels of management intensity, from an area where no harvesting of wolves would be allowed to a zone where the objective is intensive management to maintain a high sustainable harvest of both wolves and their prey.

Wolf control could be considered in two of the six zones—national wildlife refuges (although control on these national interest lands is unlikely) and intensive management areas. Intensive management areas were defined as “that portion of a state GMU where wolves, ungulates and their habitats are intensively managed to provide sustainable high levels of human harvest, consistent with scientific principles of wildlife conservation.” These areas “should be no larger than absolutely essential to achieve specific management objectives as specified in operational management plans. Wolf control is not intended to be a common practice. The team recommends that intensive management designations will be established only in a small portion of most game management units. These areas would include portions of state lands, BLM, private owned lands and military lands” (Alaska Wolf Management Team 1991, 3).

The zones were a breakthrough because they offered something to both sides. Those opposed to wolf management felt they had “won” the areas where wolves would be

completely protected and those who favored production of ungulates for human use expected to gain areas that would be managed for that purpose.

Brown felt that the protection areas were critical to her acceptance of the package and Harms felt this was a significant change from past management, “There was never anything on paper that restricted wolf control from any particular area and one of the things that the environmentalists won in this process is that there [were to be] areas where there is a firm promise in place that there will not be any wolf control.”

Some of the sportsmen were not enthusiastic about the intensive management zones. But Harms felt that they too had gained: “[the team report] says there will be areas where the highest priority use is consumptive use by people -- that's a gain for the sportsmen. Although a lot of sportsmen say, ‘Until I see you shooting wolves out of an airplane, I don't believe it. I haven't won anything.’ Well, the fact is, the team report said there will be [certain zones] in the state where the highest priority use of wildlife is consumptive use by people. That has never been formally recognized in the past and it is here. But it also says there will be areas where wolves will be protected.”

**6) *Wolf control in intensive management areas.*** In this section, the team spelled out what should be done if wolves were “increasing to undesirable levels.” They recommended that first the wolf harvest be increased through normal hunting and trapping. If this was not successful, the following steps could be taken progressively: 1) ADFG should hire professional trappers to trap wolves; 2) permits could be issued for land and shoot hunting; and 3) permits could be issued for members of the public to aerial shoot wolves under guidelines, such as “the number of hunters receiving permits will be limited” and “each hunter will be allowed to kill a specific number of wolves in a specific area” and must report the number and location of wolves taken within five days.

**7) *Research.*** They recommended that ADFG continue research on wolf ecology, predator/prey and habitat relationships and non lethal methods for reducing predation.

**8) *Education and information exchanges.*** The team had extensive recommendations on education to inform both sides of the debate and to educate young people about the issue.

**9) *Public Participation.*** The team recommended that the public be involved in wildlife management decisions and that a similar team process should be considered by any agency facing a significant controversy.

### ***Did they address the key issues?***

The five principal issues discussed earlier and repeated below included basically what, who, how, when and where. The team reached an agreement on two of the five

issues. As discussed below, the group achieved consensus on who could be involved in wolf control and how wolf control could be carried out. These were major achievements compared to the controversy that had gone on before.

However, they: 1) reached an ambiguous agreement on what constitutes wolf control; 2) they did not answer the question of when wolf control could be considered; and 3) they did not attempt to determine where wolf control could be considered. The answers to these critical questions were left to ADFG.

***Consensus reached on “Who”***—Will the general public be allowed to participate in wolf control programs? Consensus was reached on this issue. The team concluded that the public could participate in wolf control, but the number of pilots must be limited, both pilot and shooter must obtain a special permit, and they must be knowledgeable of the area and excellent shots. No mention was made in the final team report of agency personnel using helicopters to remove wolves.

***Consensus largely achieved on “How”***—What methods and means will be acceptable for controlling wolves? The team concluded that the use of private sharpshooters in private airplanes could be considered if normal hunting and trapping and permits for land and shoot hunting did not reduce the wolf population adequately. The team also agreed that land and shoot hunting could not be allowed anywhere except as a means of control in intensive management areas under special permit.

However, the team also left the door open to changes by the department when they recommended that the operational plans, which would be developed by ADFG, “determine which methods and means for wolf control are allowable” (Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team 1991, 3).

There was no consensus on whether the use of same-day-airborne as a method of hunting wolves (not “controlling” them) could be allowed anywhere. Some members opposed allowing hunters to take wolves the same day they flew in a small plane because of problems with enforcement. Others felt that “without land and shoot and/or same-day-airborne hunting there would be almost no opportunity for reasonable success for a sport hunter, resident or nonresident, to legally take a wolf in the winter when the hides are prime” (Alaska Wolf Management Team 1991, 3).

***Partly addressed but difficult to interpret: What is wolf control?*** This question was partially addressed. At their second meeting, the team defined wolf control as “a program to dramatically reduce the wolf population in an area” (ADFG 1991a, 8). This distinguishes wolf control from wolf hunting, where the objective is to take only the sustained yield and not reduce the overall population. However, at their next meeting, they realized that members were using the word control to mean two distinct things: 1)

wolf reduction, which would dramatically reduce the population to benefit ungulates and 2) population regulation, which would maintain a wolf population below its carrying capacity in order to benefit ungulates (ADFG 1991b, 5).

Brown was strongly opposed to long-term regulation of wolf populations. She felt that if wolf control must be done, do it, get it over with and let the population recover. But others felt that long-term regulation was preferable to dramatic, highly controversial, short-term wolf reduction programs. There was no consensus on what circumstances, if any, would be appropriate for regulation as opposed to reduction. There was consensus, however, that both of these approaches would be referred to as “wolf control.”

In their final report released to the public, wolf control was defined as “a program to reduce the wolf population in an area” (Alaska Wolf Management Team 1991, 1). Later, ADFG interpreted this definition of control to include both regulation and reduction and there was disagreement among members as to whether that was in fact the intent.

*No resolution of “When”*—under what circumstances, if any, is it acceptable to consider controlling wolves? This is the crux of the issue, but the answer to this critical question was left to two general statements:

- 1) “wolf control is not intended to be a common practice;” and
- 2) wolf control could be considered in intensive management areas “if ungulates are declining and wolves increasing to an undesirable level.”

But in the minds of some people, wolves reproduce rapidly and are always increasing to undesirable levels. Clearly, both of these statements leave significant room for interpretation. That interpretation would be done by the department in what the team called “operational plans.” The team recommended that these plans should “establish population levels, trends, and predator/prey ratios that would trigger management action” (Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team 1991, 3, emphasis added). But the team did not attempt to set these important “triggers” themselves.

The environmentalists had agreed that intensive management areas could be part of the plan and this meant that wolf control could be considered in certain areas. This alone was a “huge” compromise in Brown’s opinion and she was only willing to go along with it if there would be areas set aside for wolf protection.

After they defined the zones, they spent considerable time trying to decide what intensive management meant and when it could be applied. Several questions were debated, including how much of a reduction could be made in the wolf population? How low did the prey populations have to be before control could occur? Did human hunting

have to be eliminated before a control program could be initiated? But the team did not reach agreement on these issues.

“There are good things in this document,” Brown said of the team's Final Report. “There are points about education and enforcement. But this question about when wolf control is okay and when it's not—that is the crux of the controversy. But we didn't solve that. That is why every Board of Game meeting for the last ten years has been a battle and that's why Governor Cowper got more letters on wolves than he got on any other issue. It's not about whether we need more public education you know. So we did waste six months in that sense. We wasted more than six.”

*No resolution of “Where”*—The system of six different zones was key to the compromise but the team did not determine either the location or the size of the zones. The team did agree that a buffer of undetermined size should be established around Denali National Park and that intensive management designations, where control could be considered, “will be established only in a small portion of most game management units.” But the definition of “small portion” was likely to differ substantially between the different factions.

ADFG claimed the zone boundaries were a local, not a state-wide issue, and that they should be determined at the local level. They attempted to address this “local issue” the following winter when individuals and organizations across the state were given maps to draw their own proposed zone boundaries. Predictably, the environmentalists drew huge areas for wolf preservation zones and the hunters drew equally large areas for intensive management.

Unaware that they were stirring a sleeping giant, the Hickel administration sided with the hunters. In the area-specific plans that were released in October 1992, no new areas were designated for wolf protection. But for areas where wolf control could be considered, ADFG zoned an area larger than many states. The department would soon discover that the zones were not just a local issue or even a state-wide issue. The zones would figure prominently in a national debate.

In 1992, Bothwell told me that some team members had requested that maps be supplied so that they could discuss general boundaries, but this never occurred. Although Bothwell favors carefully-managed wolf control, he said that he had “a number of mixed feelings at the end. I didn't know exactly how it was going to be implemented. We didn't know what the maps were going to look like, and actually to date now, the wolf control zones are much bigger areas than I had envisioned. Although it looks like there may have been some shortcomings in the way we did things and some lack of depth in particulars on some of these issues, I don't know that you could put twelve people

together and accomplish much more than we did.” Asked if one more meeting might have allowed them to be more specific, he replied, “One more meeting may have been helpful, but I think it's actually questionable because people aren't going to make all those decisions until they run out of time. You have to be up against a deadline.”

Lewis concedes that on some issues, it was necessary to settle for something less specific than what she had hoped for. “This process was like a lot of others—we pushed for compromise and specificity as much as possible, but the way you get consensus sometimes is not to be very specific and leave some 'wiggle room' so people can place their own interpretation on things.”

She was disappointed that the team ran out of time to deal with the issue of implementation. “We had scheduled it for the last day, but ran out of time. It took us until literally ten minutes before the bell when people had to leave to catch their planes—the last day of the last meeting to nail down the consensus.”

The team provided Lewis with comments on the final draft of their report, she completed the writing, and the team's official duties ended. At the time, this was perfectly appropriate in team member Anne Ruggles' view: “The team was disbanded because its goal was met. The team opened the whole process to public discussion, but if they kept the team on, it could become just another layer of bureaucracy.”

Their report was submitted to the ADFG on June 3, 1991.

## ***Implementation Phase***

### **Development of ADFG version of Strategic Plan**

#### ***Director Kelleyhouse writes the first draft***

David Kelleyhouse, Director of the Wildlife Conservation Division of ADFG, designated himself as the one to “take the team's report and write it up as a department plan.” In a recorded interview, he described how he personally wrote the first draft of the department's Wolf Management Plan:

“I sat down with the team report and I personally wrote the first draft of the Strategic Plan. I didn't even feel that it would work very well to try to convene a group of department biologists to write the plan. We had to have something out there that the staff could comment on, but to do it in a diverse group would have been nearly impossible. I think people would have jumped up and walked out of the room.

“I was as faithful to that team report as I could possibly be and come out with a Strategic Plan that I knew would work on the ground. The reason they reached consensus

was that each group got different provisions in there, but if you took the whole team report and tried to make a plan out of it, it wouldn't have worked because of the often-conflicting statements. Someone with field experience, knowing what would work on the ground, had to sit down and resolve those apparent conflicts, and it also took some degree of interpretation. One of the more contentious items was the provision in the team report that said the department should have the ability to take emergency actions, and it got no more specific than that. I considered that to be a very important provision. Hence, I came out with the Emergency Situation Plan, and that's how I chose to implement a recommendation of the team.

“And another thing that was contentious was a statement in the team report that said wolf control shouldn't be any more heavy-handed than necessary. I changed that to two distinct levels of wolf management: reduction, which would be a fairly deep reduction for a short period of time, and population regulation, which means that you take the sustained yield off the population of wolves each year so that the population doesn't grow. I thought they really liked the term wolf control because it had a sizzle to it and had been used in fundraising around the country. When I chose to be more specific in what was going to occur, and call it reduction and regulation, that irritated some people because I robbed them of their buzz word. I was trying to make it less sensational, but I caught some flack over that. But as soon as I came out with a draft, people had plenty of time to air their views on it in front of the Board of Game, so I feel that we've played the process on the up and up.”

### *Differences between the team's report and the Strategic Plan*

The plan written by Kelleyhouse was edited by the staff. Harms concedes that the September draft was quite different from the team report. “Oh yes, they're dramatically different. If we had asked the planning team to write our Strategic Plan, that would have been giving away our responsibilities. We asked for their input and that's what the team report is...This [team report] was strictly advice, and we made no promises whatsoever about adhering to every detail.”

ADFG insisted that the team had not written a “plan,” but just recommendations and it was the agency's job to turn what sounded like rough recommendations into a workable plan. However, ADFG did not start from a clean slate, which would have made the distinction between the two much more clear. It was clear that ADFG had literally rewritten the team's report without the team's participation. The two documents are remarkably similar in organization and content with some conspicuous differences that



reflect differences in philosophy. If the team felt any ownership of their document whatsoever, this approach was sure to irritate at least some of the team members.

As shown in Table 5-5, the ADFG draft altered the team's goals, for example eliminating the word "nonconsumptive" and changing "public review" to "public demand." ADFG omitted the "Principles" section of the team's report, altered the definitions of the six zones, and substituted the terms "regulation and reduction" for "wolf control" (the team had not reached a consensus on whether regulation should be permitted). ADFG allowed regulation and/or reduction in three zones instead of just reduction in two, it added human use goals to each zone and added an emergency situation plan "to quickly begin temporary reduction of wolf numbers to avoid decimation of prey populations upon which people and wolves are dependent" There was no mention in ADFG's draft of the team's agreement that "wolf control is not intended to be a common practice" (ADFG 1991a, 2, 7; Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team 1991, 1-3).

The team had agreed that land and shoot hunting "could not be permitted anywhere except as a means of control in intensive management areas" (in which case a special permit is required) (Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team 1991, 3). But the ADFG draft specified that land and shoot would be allowed as a means of hunting in two of the zones and in an emergency situation in yet another zone. ADFG also eliminated the Interagency Wolf Specialist Group that the team had proposed for outside review of wolf control plans and substituted "professional biologists outside ADFG will be asked to review the implementation plan." Unlike the team report, ADFG did not say who these biologists would be, how they would be chosen, nor did they specify, as the team had, that this review must be available to the public.

**Table 5-5**  
**Changes in the Goals between the**  
**Team Report and ADFG’s Draft Strategic Plan**  
(Significant changes underlined)

Goals of Team Report	Goals of ADFG Strategic Plan
<u>Ensure</u> the long-term conservation of wolves <u>throughout Alaska.</u>	<u>Conserve</u> populations of wolves, <u>their prey</u> and wolf habitat throughout their <u>historic range</u> in Alaska.
Provide for consumptive and <u>nonconsumptive</u> uses and values of wolves and their prey, consistent with the principles of wildlife conservation and with due consideration to <u>public review</u> and comment.	Provide the broadest possible range of <u>uses</u> and values of wolves and their prey that meet wildlife conservation principles and reflect <u>public demand.</u>
Help increase public awareness, understanding and <u>agreement</u> on wolf conservation and management in Alaska.	Help the public become more aware of and better understand the uses, conservation and management of wolves, <u>their prey</u> and habitat in Alaska.

The team had specified several general criteria that must be met prior to aerial wolf control, such as involvement of local people, but these did not appear in the ADFG draft. ADFG also subdivided the team’s “Operational Management Plans” into “area-specific” plans (which would zone areas) and implementation plans (which would specify the number of wolves to be removed and the population objectives for both wolves and prey). While ADFG called for public review of the area-specific plans, there was no mention of public review of the likely more controversial implementation plans. The team had agreed that professional trapping and permits for land and shoot or aerial shooting of wolves could be used for methods. To these, the department had added “wolf population regulation or reduction by department personnel using aerial shooting and trapping” (ADFG 1991a, 7). The team had indicated that both private pilots and shooters must be residents of the state, but the ADFG did not include this statement. This opened the possibility that game guides could charge nonresident hunters thousands of dollars—as they had in the 1970s—for the chance to shoot wolves from the air.

### *Reactions to the draft Strategic Plan*

The department's Draft Strategic Plan was released for public comment on September 9, 1991. The facilitator and two team members from each “side” were asked what they thought of this draft. All five felt that the draft differed significantly from the team’s recommendations.

“They think that their draft is based on our report,” fumed Brown. “That indicated to me that our report was very, very bad. So I went back and read our report and concluded that our plan wasn't bad, it was just too nebulous on the recommendations. There was clearly too much latitude and they took every inch of it. They created whole new sections like the emergency situation plan and the new definition of control—the regulation and reduction thing. To me, a key to our success was that at least we were going to call wolf control, wolf control. Because if you're going to kill wolves—even if we don't agree it should be done—we'd like it to be done under a wolf control program. They basically changed the definition of wolf control from an emergency, short-term measure, to a chronic, systematic, institutionalized reduction of wolf populations. So that is really, really key to why we don't like what's happening.”

Lewis would have preferred that the team “be active in development of this draft for the Board. But as it was, the department cruised right along and put it out and the team had no more significant role than any other member of the public. They could have helped encourage the department to come out with something that was closer to what the team had recommended.”

Bothwell liked the new plan but concedes that it was different, “To be fair, the Strategic Plan interpreted our report more favorably to my viewpoint than to that of someone who isn't interested in hunting.”

Team member Dean Wilson felt that only some of the team’s recommendations were followed, but he felt that the team had not addressed several key issues and thus ADFG was forced to develop their own solutions.

Cline objected to the new draft, “The report the department put out in September was very shallow, very limited and covered only a fraction of what actually was in the team report. They even redefined our definitions, let alone what the various constituents wanted in terms of an agreement. When I first saw the state's draft plan I realized that they were just deciding to go their own way pretty much and only bringing forward what they essentially had to live with and they dropped out a whole host of specific recommendations developed by the team.”

## Development of the Final Strategic Plan, November 1991

### *A second “team” rewrites the ADFG draft Strategic Plan*

Following a public comment period, the Board of Game met in early November, 1991 to review the September draft Strategic Plan. Prior to their official meeting, the Board met with the Alaska Wolf Management Team and ADFG staff for a two-day workshop.

Following the workshop and public testimony, the Board meeting was to begin. Normally, non-Board members can observe but cannot participate in an official Board meeting. But Board Chairman Doug Pope, decided to recess the Board meeting and reconvene as a “Committee of the Whole” so that the Board members could interact less formally with others.

Pope invited three team members—Brown, Holmes, and Ruggles—who were able to remain in Fairbanks. In addition, he asked Dave van den Berg, a member of the Fairbanks Northern Alaska Environmental Center (NAEC), Dick Bishop, former Regional Supervisor of the Wildlife Conservation Division and now a prominent member of the Alaska Outdoor Council, and Byron Haley of the Fairbanks Fish and Game Advisory Committee. But Pope did not invite team member and trapper Dean Wilson. His voice breaking, Wilson recalled, “I don’t remember just who was invited, but I wasn’t. I kind of resented that. I felt like, what’s wrong with me? My perspective is as good as the next person’s.”

Pope was prepared to rewrite the plan line by line with the entire committee. “It was an historic and unprecedented moment to have the people who had an interest in the issue invited to deliberate with the Board,” said Pope. “Those people actually set aside their prejudices, rolled up their sleeves and went to work. If they had not participated with that level of interest and commitment it would have collapsed. So I think that's the lesson of the Strategic Plan: you could create that same situation, have different players, and it might not even get to first base.”

“Scared the living tar out of me,” Harms said when asked what she thought of the Board's decision to rewrite the plan. “We staff members started this planning process, got this idea going, selected the team, got the recommendations from them, we put out the draft plan, then we went to the Board of Game and said, 'Look at all the great stuff we've been doing and the Board said, 'Thank you. We'll finish that'. And I thought 'Whoa! We just lost control of this puppy.' “

“There was an attempt by the department to take over,” countered Pope. In his view, ADFG wrote a draft plan and then took the position that the Board should simply endorse the concept and let the department finish the plan.

“The hell with that,” he declared. “The Board was going to finish the plan.” He said that some of the team members were clearly miffed at what the department was trying to do and that some members of the public felt the team was an elitist institution, so they weren’t willing to accept any recommendations that came from the team. To him, the only way of resolving the two competing concerns, was to bring everyone together.

“But there was quite a behind-the-scenes back room brawl over this,” Pope continued. There were some Board members who were flatly opposed to permitting somebody from the Alaska Wildlife Alliance or the NAEC to participate, but Pope was adamant that they be included. “I’m absolutely convinced that bringing these people in to deliberate with us was what saved the Strategic Plan.”

### *“Pure power politics”*

After five days of work, the Board endorsed the Strategic Plan unanimously. Asked if he had hoped to get such a consensus from the committee, Pope said, “To tell you the truth, I had to twist some arms to get that unanimous vote. This is pure power politics.” He went on to describe how, prior to this meeting, the hands of the department to do any wolf control were virtually tied. There were four votes on the Board to reinstate wolf control and there were three votes to basically eliminate most elements of wolf control. Pope knew that the people who wanted an outright repeal of any limitations on wolf control couldn’t live with a divided vote. There had to be seven votes or the public wouldn’t embrace it. So he made it clear that if the Board members who favored control did what they wanted to do in the plan, he would vote against it. “They knew that if I voted against it, the whole thing would collapse. I was willing to risk the whole thing rather than adopt a plan that I didn’t think would be embraced by the public.”

### *The Final Strategic Plan*

The resulting Strategic Plan had reincorporated a few of the team’s recommendations that ADFG had taken out. The first goal, for example, blended the two earlier versions as shown in Table 5-6.

The final plan reincorporated the “principles” section from the team report. The Board added a seventh zone and indicated that the public could nominate independent biologists to review and comment on the implementation plans and that their review would be available to the public, but did not say (as the team had) that these biologists would form an interagency committee. The final plan called for “due consideration to public review” of the implementation plans and specified that these plans must include a justification for the action as well as other alternatives considered. The final plan also

included more detail than either of the previous two drafts on the permits required for private pilots and indicated that they must be Alaska residents. Unlike the ADFG draft, the new plan gave more detail on and attempted to define an emergency situation so that this would not easily be used to circumvent normal procedures (ADFG 1992b). Also at this meeting, the Board concurred with the team and—contrary to ADFG’s plan—voted to eliminate land and shoot as a method of hunting or trapping wolves.

**Table 5-6**  
**Statewide Strategic Wolf Management Plan:**  
**The Evolution of the First Goal**

<b>Team Report:</b>	
<b>Ensure</b> the long-term conservation of wolves <b>throughout Alaska</b>	
<b>ADFG Draft:</b>	
<b>Conserve</b> populations of wolves, <b>their prey</b> and wolf habitat throughout their <b>historic range</b> in Alaska	
<b>Final Plan:</b>	
To ensure the long-term conservation of wolves throughout their	historic
range in Alaska in relation to their prey and habitat.	

The following January, 1992, the terms of Pope and two other members of the Board expired. The Hickel administration appointed two new Board members, both retired ADFG staff, and re-appointed Rosemarie Maher, a Native from Northway. All three appointees strongly favored wolf control. The change left the Board, which operates by majority vote, with just one member (Skip Wallen) who was basically opposed to the wolf control except under dire circumstances.

### **Development of the Area-Specific and Implementation Plans**

Following completion of the Strategic Plan, the agency held several workshops and collected more than 200 written suggestions for the Area Specific Plans. These plans put zones on the map where it would be possible to control wolves by various means and zones where wolves would be protected. The drafts were to be completed by March 1992. The Implementation Plans, to be completed by November 1992, were expected to

determine the actual locations, the means, and the numbers of wolves, if any, to be removed.

The Area Specific Plans were more controversial than some expected. In addition to what some considered unnecessarily large control zones, these plans included population objectives that were clearly important factors in wolf control. For example, if there were 20,000 caribou in an area and the population objective was 60,000 caribou, it was fairly clear that wolf control would be necessary to reach the goal.

“Back when the team's report came out, it was incredible the kind of accord—nobody was calling anyone a blood-thirsty killer or a tree-hugger,” said Dave van den Berg of the NAEC. “But in January 1992, when we had a public meeting to discuss the Area Specific Plans, everything fell apart. One guy raised his hand early on and said, 'Well, should we split up the room and us go to that side and them to the other?' It was because the department, behind closed doors, without public input, had decided how the Strategic Plan would fit on the map and that just punched buttons on all sides.”

In response to this growing concern, the plans presented to the Board in March were presented as “drafts” that would be resubmitted to the public for review before final adoption.

There was considerable controversy within the department over the plans. ADFG biologist John Schoen was concerned that the area plans would not be balanced: “If our plan is primarily a wolf control plan, or perceived that way, the environmentalists are going to ask themselves, ‘What did we win?’ And if they don't have something to show for their hard work and effort, there's going to be a big backlash and we will lose. Everyone will lose. And if we have wolf control in 20E and 20A and there's not a buffer strip around Denali Park or something. If we don't show the other side of the spectrum, “Look, this is what you got. And yes, there will be some wolf control, but it's going to be in a small area, and you're going to know where it is and you're not going to like it, but look what you got.” If you can't show some kind of a balance, I think the whole effort will break down.

Harms and Haggstrom were also advocating that the department designate areas for wolf protection, not just intensive management. “Dale and I have been pushing real hard for people to recognize that we don't have enough in the area specific plans for the environmentalists to consider that they won something,” said Harms at the time. “It's difficult to get some members in the department to think that they have to look for places where wolves can be protected. We've been working on it, but it ain't easy...and it really concerns me.”

The department completed the plans and held public workshops in Anchorage and Fairbanks in October 1992. The new plans called for wolf control in GMUs 13, 20A, and 20E to begin early in 1993.

Both Brown and Cline felt the new plans bore little resemblance to what the team had intended. “It would have been a lot cheaper for all concerned if ADFG would forego the use of citizen advisory bodies if they intend to ignore them anyway,” Brown said in an editorial (Brown 1992). Brown said that the three alternative maps presented by ADFG represented “a lot of wolf control, more wolf control, or all wolf control. Those were what they considered the scope of interests. So where were they when we were developing the team’s plan? Rather than significant additional protected areas, which were part of the recommendations, what you’ve got instead is the wheels greased for wolf control and no significant additional protected areas for wolves. They have one piece—one tiny piece—of Chugach National Forest that’s closed to wolf hunting and trapping that was not closed before and that is by no means significant. It’s a little band of land that sort of connects Kenai Peninsula to Anchorage. Out of the entire planning area—all six game management units—*that* is the only area that has any additional protection.”

Cline said in an interview that the team intended “intensive management to be in very limited areas and any control would be done over a very limited period of time and that’s not the way these plans now read. The intensive management zones are very large and wolf control can be open-ended and in the worst case end up a year-in year-out practice.”

“I am appalled at what I see a few department hard-liners...trying to accomplish,” Cline wrote in a letter to Governor Hickel. “Given what ADFG is now proposing for wolves, I can’t see that conservationists got anything. In fact, we now have less to show for our cooperative efforts in wolf conservation than before the team sat down at the negotiating table!...By throwing out the team’s many sensible recommendations, department extremists have betrayed the consensus-building process. Lawsuits...and boycotts are likely” (Cline 1992).

Final action was scheduled for the November 1992 Board meeting.

### **November 1992: new Board passes “ambitious” wolf control plan**

The Board took public testimony on the plans beginning on Friday, November 13, 1992. The entire spectrum of concerns were voiced. Everyone agreed that people were more respectful of opposing points of view than they had been before the planning team process. Board member Skip Wallen felt that, “This time people were courteous and focused on the issues more than strictly emotions. I think the team had a lot to do with changing the atmosphere.” Public testimony was completed on Saturday, November 14.



Breaking stride with its peers, the NAEC tried to honor the “balanced” agreement the planning team had developed. It was willing to go along with wolf control in the southern part of unit 20A, but was opposed to control proposals for units 20E and 13 (see Figure 3-2). No other environmental group was willing to support wolf control in any area.

### *Small concessions to environmentalists*

On Monday, November 16, the department announced that it had taken public testimony into account, had “reconsidered” some things, and had met on Sunday to draft entirely new proposals. Due to a “lack of time”, these new proposals would not receive the benefit of public review. But one Board member commented that public testimony is not helpful anyway, since it is so emotional.

The new proposals included several areas that were “down-zoned” from the department's previous proposal. These included 1) a large buffer on the north and east sides of Denali Park where no wolf harvesting of any sort would be allowed; and 2) areas close to Fairbanks and private lands within Wrangell-St. Elias National Preserve changed from Zone 5 (wolf control a possibility) to Zone 4 (wolf control not to be considered). Some environmentalists were clearly pleased with these decisions.

### *Big concessions to hunters*

On Tuesday, when the audience had dwindled to a small group of listeners, Kelleyhouse announced that in exchange for the concessions he had made the previous day, he felt justified in taking aggressive action to help wildlife populations that were in serious decline. He proceeded to reveal new proposals for GMUs 13, 20A and 20E which changed both the population and the harvest objectives that had been included in the public review draft. He proposed three separate areas for wolf control programs and made the analogy that he felt about these the way a parent feels about his children: it would be impossible to choose one over the others and declared he must have all of them, or none.

This announcement caught several people off-guard. On one end of the spectrum, people were pleased that the department was “finally going to approach intensive management of heavily-hunted areas.” Others sat in stunned silence.

### *GMU 13 – “ambitious and optimistic”*

The deliberations began with GMU 13, a large area north of Anchorage that receives considerable hunting pressure from both urban sport hunters and rural subsistence hunters. The proposal emphasized heavy moose and caribou production (Table 5-6).

Kelleyhouse admitted that the new proposal was “ambitious and optimistic.” Particularly surprising was the fact that this new ADFG proposal was prepared *after* public testimony and did not receive review and comment by the public. What is the purpose of public comment if the agency can completely change the proposal after the public has departed?

“Since both caribou and moose are at record highs and likely near carrying capacity in this unit, is it wise to increase them further?” Wallen asked. Department biologists admitted that they “have some hesitation—it may not be possible to increase the population further since it is probably very close to carrying capacity.” They said that prescribed fire and cow hunts might be required to maintain the proposed moose population, but they felt a harvest of 6,500 animals would be possible if wolf control were instituted.

**Table 5-7**  
**Changes in Population Objectives**

Between the October, 1992 Public Review Draft  
and the November 16, 1992 ADFG Proposals  
Example — GMU 13

	Moose		Caribou		Grizzly Bear	
	October Public Review Draft	November ADFG Proposal No Public Review	October Public Review Draft	November ADFG Proposal No Public Review	October Public Review Draft	November ADFG Proposal No Public Review
<b>Current Population</b>	22,000	same	45,000	same	"unknown"	"roughly 600-1600"
<b>Population Objective</b>	25,000	<b>25-30,000</b>	40,000	<b>40-60,000</b>	600-1200	<b>300-500</b>
<b>Harvest Objective</b>	1800-2000	<b>2000-5000</b>	4500	<b>4500-6500</b>	<75 (<25 female)	<b>&gt;125</b>

“Because this is a Wolf Plan, not a Bear Plan,” was Board member Rose Marie Maher's response to the question of why wolves were being removed from unit 13 when bears appeared to be the problem. Kelleyhouse feared that although wolves were having

little impact at the moment, with such a high ratio of prey to predators, “the 200 wolves in the area could conceivably increase to 1,000 in three year's time. Then we would have a problem on our hands.”

The department also contended that land and shoot hunting by private hunters was the only cost-effective way to remove the wolves. The inflammatory nature of this method of control gravely concerned Wallen, “people don't like making a sport of high-tech removal of wolves.”

Bob Hayes, a wolf biologist from the Yukon Department of Renewable Resources, was incredulous over the proposal, “In Unit 13 they’re increasing abundant wildlife so they can have more abundance. And they’re letting private airborne hunters do the killing. You can’t do that. People just won’t accept that as legitimate wolf management.”

Board member Wallen was the only vote opposing the new plan for GMU 13.

#### *GMU 20A and 20E deliberations were less contentious*

The department proceeded to discuss the new proposals for units 20 A and E. Each of these units also had more ambitious population objectives, but the justification for these proposals did not concern as many people as the proposal for unit 13.

“We would watch for days as this mighty herd crossed the Yukon River. There were caribou in every direction—as far as you could see,” a Native elder from the Yukon told the Board. The Fortymile Caribou Herd—once the largest on the continent with some 500,000 animals—had declined precipitously due largely to overharvest by humans in the 1950s and 1960s. Today the herd numbers 20,000 to 22,000 animals. Biologists from the Yukon testified that, lacking this magnificent herd as a basis for the food chain, its former range is now a “biological desert.” Natives and others in the Yukon are particularly concerned about the welfare of this herd, but while most of its range is in the Yukon, the calving grounds are located in Alaska. According to Rick Farnell, wildlife biologist with Yukon Renewable Resources, the high density of wolves on the calving grounds within GMU 20E precludes this herd from returning to its former numbers.

The Delta Caribou Herd in unit 20A south of Fairbanks was also in trouble. It had declined by more than 50 percent due to unfavorable weather and heavy wolf predation. “Human harvest played an insignificant role in this decline, that is indisputable,” said caribou biologist Pat Valkenburg. Many considered this area an emergency situation requiring immediate wolf control to protect the young. No one argued, as they had in unit 13, that there was a lack of biological justification for control in these units. It seemed there was a possibility of a sliver of middle ground here.

Looking pale and defeated, Nicole Whittington-Evans, who had replaced Valerie Brown as Executive Director of the AWA, sat quietly listening to the discussion. She was asked if she would be willing to give ADFG what they wanted in units 20A and 20E if they would give her what she wanted—no control actions in unit 13. She responded, “Oh, we would consider that a win!” Would she put that in the organization's newsletter? “I wouldn't refer to it as a win,” she replied. “But I would explain why we found it acceptable.”

Kelleyhouse was asked: if the AWA would not oppose control in units 20A and 20E, would he be willing to “give” them unit 13?

“Absolutely no way,” he declared. “As I said, I feel about these units as a parent feels for his children. I can't possibly choose one over the other. And besides, if we did that, there won't be enough game to go around—there isn't enough even now—and it would become a big subsistence issue in that unit. Nobody wants that.”

The Board passed the control proposals for 20A and 20E. At the end of the meeting, Board member Roger Huntington stated that he had changed his mind on unit 13 after hearing what he considered much stronger justifications for control in units 20A and E. After some discussion, the Board voted on whether to reconsider its decision on unit 13. The motion failed when the vote was tied 3 to 3 (with one member absent).

“Director Kelleyhouse is clearly on a roll,” one biologist commented when asked what he thought would happen next. “But this in-your-face strategy is going to cost him—and the department.”

The meeting adjourned...and the fallout began.

## **Howls of Protest**

### ***An estimated 40,000 calls and letters***

So Kelleyhouse was quoted in the New York Times, “We feel we are going to create a wildlife spectacle on a par with the major migrations in East Africa. Mom and Pop from Syracuse can come up here and see something that they can't see anywhere else on earth,” (Egan 1992, A8). Many reports referred to the state's goal for wolf control as one means of creating an “American Serengeti” that would benefit tourists.

The news spread quickly. According to Harms, in the next few weeks, ADFG and the Governor's Office would receive an estimated 40,000 calls and letters opposing the wolf plan. Demonstrations were held in San Francisco and Seattle. Senator Kennedy's office telephoned ADFG inquiring about the plan. There were calls for a national tourism

boycott of Alaska. Newspapers around the country published a flurry of angry letters to the editor. In Fairbanks, the NAEC, which had tried to honor the spirit of the wolf management team by accepting some control in unit 20A, was shunned by national environmental groups and received an anonymous fax that said, "Greenies don't kill wolves, compromises do."

"There's a tremendous outrage that some of the last remaining wolves in the world are going to be killed," Wayne Johnson of Seattle-based Project Wolf USA said. "We think we can harness that outrage and let it spread" (Badger 1992a, 1).

"Americans want wilderness and the wolf is its symbol," said columnist Mike Doogan. "They don't see that killing wolves for the convenience of wildlife managers and their constituents, the hunters, is a good idea." (Doogan 1993, F14).

On a radio talk show, Governor Walter Hickel would make what he thought was an innocuous statement in defense of the plan. "You can't just let nature run wild," he said. Within days, these words appeared nation-wide on posters and bumper stickers—as well as buttons on the lapels of many environmentalists. The Governor did not improve his image with environmentalists when he sent a jovial letter to his fellow governors and many conservation groups offering to send them some wolves.

### *State tourism industry 'in the crosshairs'*

Soon after the Board's action, protesters in San Francisco called for a tourism boycott of Alaska. The National Parks and Conservation Association canceled their plans to hold their annual meeting in Denali National Park and wrote their 300,000 members asking them not to visit the state.

"What you see happening is the tourism industry coming to life as never before as major players in the management of natural resources," commented Allen Smith, Alaska regional director of the Wilderness Society (Balzar 1993, 4C).

Preliminary estimates showed that \$85 million in tourism business could be lost. The tourism industry moved quickly to distance themselves from the Board of Game's decision. "I think the effort to manage wildlife shouldn't be associated with the effort to attract visitors," said Tina Lindgren of the Alaska Tourism Marketing Council

**A boon to animal rights groups.** Donations from new members poured into the coffers of animal rights groups. Wayne Pacelle, director of the Fund for Animals, said "I've been working with the Fund for five years, and I've never seen such a negative reaction to a hunting or control policy. When you touch a nerve, you reach people who are not in your core constituency. They're moved to act like never before." (Badger 1992b, 1).

Friends of Animals, In Defense of Animals, and Fund for Animals ran ads urging people to support the boycott and to send donations to help in the fight. Some of the ads also declared that “most outrageous of all, much of [the shooting] will take place on your federal lands.” In reality, the vast majority of the control action was planned for lands that belong to the state. But the groups seemed to think that the end justifies the means. Pacelle acknowledged that the ads skated along the edge of accuracy, but said that the ads had achieved a response “beyond expectations” (Badger 1992a, 1).

### *A mountain out of a mole hill?*

But many hunters continued to voice strong support for the plan “Most of the state is totally off-limits to wolf control,” said Ken Vorisek, an avid bow hunter. “Wolf control was proposed for less than three percent of this state and now the environmentalists want to take even that away from us so that they can live in their apartment in some city and feel they've saved something.”

Asked what he thought of the furor over the Board’s decision, team member and big game guide Chuck McMahon replied, “These people are creating a mountain out of a mole hill—you're never going to please them.”

### *Surprisingly, total wolves killed in the state would decrease under the new plan*

While wolf biologist David Mech did not want to take sides on the issue, he received so many phone calls about it that he printed a “Fact Sheet” to save time and “to put it in perspective” (Bostian 1992a, C6). He pointed out that during the past ten years, about 10 to 20 percent of Alaska’s wolf population had been killed each year. Due to the increased areas of total wolf protection, this was actually expected to decrease to a 5 to 7 percent harvest. His sheet included the following:

## **Table 5-8**

### **Fact Sheet Prepared by Dr. L. David Mech**

#### **1. Are wolves in Alaska endangered?**

No. Only the wolves in the lower 48 states are on the endangered species list. There are about 7,000 wolves in Alaska.

#### **2. Are they protected?**

Like other game and furbearers in Alaska and other states, Alaska's wolves are protected by closed seasons for much of the year; at other

times, they are subject to hunting and trapping. The new program triples the area over which wolves are totally protected.

**3. What is new about the current wolf control program?**

It sets up new zones where wolves will be totally protected and others where the populations will be controlled.

**4. Over what percent of Alaska will the control be applied?**

About 3 percent.

**5. What percent of Alaska's wolves will be killed each year by the program?**

About 5 to 7 percent. [about 300-400 wolves the first year and an additional 100 to 300 in subsequent years]

**6. During the past 10 years, what is the average percent of Alaska's wolf population that has been killed each year?**

About 10 to 20 percent. [Because of the increased areas of protection, the total number of wolves killed would actually decrease as a result of the plan.]

**7. How will the new program change that?**

The percentage of wolves taken will remain the same or decrease because of other restrictions on taking wolves elsewhere.

**8. How much of a wolf population can be killed without reducing it?**

Studies indicate that to reduce a wolf population, 28 to 50 percent of a wolf population must be killed.

“Voodoo biology,” US. Representative Peter DeFazio (D-Oregon) called it. He announced that he would introduce legislation to make it difficult for Alaska to implement a plan to kill wolves (Lawmaker 1992, 1). One possible avenue would be an amendment to the Airborne Hunting Act which would prohibit any state from obtaining a permit to do aerial control of predators.

At this point, a fact became known that would cause the department to lose whatever remained of its credibility with conservationists. If wolf control were conducted by the agency personnel, it was widely-known that wolves would be radio-collared to help track and shoot them from helicopters. As it turned out, a year prior to the Board meeting of November 1992, the department had radio-collared wolves in the Fortymile area “in anticipation of the Board’s decision,” said ADFG Regional Supervisor Chris Smith.

According to Smith, the collars were to help in gathering research data and “to have those collars on the wolves so that if the Board did authorize it, we could conduct the [control] program as best as possible.” Conservationists responded angrily saying basically, “You guys planned this all along.” Cline was quoted in the Anchorage Daily News saying that ADFG was telling the public they were open-minded when in fact they had already made up their minds (Ahn 1992, A2).

One biologist worried that misinformation was now difficult to combat. “We needed an in-state consensus, but we lost all that by going for too much—we’ve flown in the face of the team’s recommendations. The current Board allowed the department to stampede things through and now we’re right back where we were before — injunctions, litigation, boycotts, etc.”

Hyperbole ruled the day. The national media contributed to the misinformation. Many misconstrued the plan to kill 80 percent of wolves in some areas to mean 80 percent of the wolves in the state. Some played favorites when it came to quoting biologist(s). Out of five articles from major national papers, all of them quoted only biologist Gordon Haber for opinions on the control action. Haber is an independent biologist funded by the Alaska Wildlife Alliance (which was founded in opposition to wolf control) and other animal protection groups. While it is certainly legitimate to report his opinions, they differ markedly from those of the majority of wolf biologists, who are quick to point out that none of Haber’s work has been accepted by the scientific journals. But none of this schism is reported. Instead, you will see quotes such as this one highlighted boldly in The New York Times article, which was the first paper to carry the story: “Some biologists say the state has entered a dangerous phase of ‘playing God,’ that will so upset the natural cycles that it will actually produce fewer animals” (Egan 1992, A8, emphasis added). This same quote was picked up and similarly highlighted in papers nation-wide, yet the word “some” is clearly misleading, since Haber was the only biologist the author had contacted.

Former Board Chairman Doug Pope felt that all hope for a compromise was gone. In an editorial, he stated that when the Strategic Management Plan for wolves was adopted in 1991, Alaskan environmental groups had made an important concession that wolf control was appropriate as a temporary measure when necessary to avoid or eliminate an imbalance between wolves and their prey. By conceding that some wolf control was appropriate under these circumstances, the local environmental organizations had opened the way to a consensus.

To Pope, the importance of the Alaska environmental groups in that breakthrough could not be overemphasized. This courageous concession had put their credibility on



the line, but had also virtually “stilled the chorus of criticism” of any wolf control measures by national and international groups. Without the state environmentalists on board, no progress on settling this controversy would have been possible. With them, the issue could be settled by Alaskans with a minimum of outside interference. Pope said that the next steps should have been slow and deliberate by focusing on circumstances of true biological necessity. “But there the process broke down. Because of a shift in power on the Board, Hickel's senior wildlife managers felt free to betray Alaska environmentalists and the hard-won consensus almost immediately.”

He felt that ADFG had recklessly “jerked the rug” out from under Alaska environmentalists and in the process, greatly increased the influence of national and international groups over all resource issues in Alaska. Pope predicted, “Betraying Alaska environmental groups is going to exact a heavy price.” (Pope 1992, B10).

### *Commissioner suspends wolf control and calls for a Wolf Summit*

On December 5, 1992, less than three weeks after the Board's decision, the Commissioner of ADFG suspended implementation of wolf control measures and announced plans for a large meeting of national and international groups across the spectrum which ADFG billed prominently as The Wolf Summit. In a press release, ADFG Commissioner Carl Rosier stated that, “Everything is going to be on the table.” The purpose of the Summit would be to provide information and “an opportunity for dialogue on the issues.” (ADFG 1992).

Some groups were very reluctant to come, so ADFG declared a moratorium on all aerial control activities for the coming year. This was to “lower the temperature a little bit...so we could have some chance of constructive dialogue at the summit,” explained Kelleyhouse. (Bostian 1992b).

A new group, called the Alaska Wildlife Conservation Association (AWCA), formed in Fairbanks to support the Board's decision and to protest the right of “outsiders” to interfere in an Alaskan issue. The Fairbanks newspaper added to the hysterics when they ran a story saying that the leaders of this group, who were “prominent members” of the community, refused to be publicly identified because they feared serious violence by eco-terrorists. The AWCA took out full-page ads in the local paper proclaiming that the wolf issue is a state's rights matter and charging outside groups with extortion and lying. Flyers read, “Eco-Extremists are coming to the Summit.” One member insisted, “Wolf management should be based on biology, not politics.”

## **The Wolf Summit, January 16 - 18, 1993**

“The possibilities are wide open,” Fairbanks reporter Kelly Bostian wrote. “What else could people say about an event that promises to throw animal-rights activists and frontier-spirited Alaskans together to argue over killing wolves?” (Bostian, 1993, A1).

On the opening day of the Summit, a boisterous throng resembling a military rally had assembled outside the Carlson Center in Fairbanks. The Alaska Wildlife Conservation Association had urged everyone in favor of wolf control and/or state’s rights to be there. They wore blaze orange arm bands and issued these to others at the door. Many were clad in fur hats, fur coats and fur boots “looking for all the world like a brown bear would if it walked on its hind legs and carried a picket sign” (Doogan 1993, F8).

They held signs saying: “USA: Free Alaska,” “Our steak is in the wild,” “Wolf management, not wolf worship,” and “Minnesota, want some wolves?” One man had a large artillery shell on his back with the words, “For wolves and greenies.” Inside, pelts were draped over the railings and much of the crowd wore furs.

Some visitors were not amused. “I find it very offensive and clearly meant to intimidate,” said a representative of the Sierra Club from Anchorage.

Professional mediators Christopher Moore and Bernard Mayer of CDR Associates in Boulder were hired to facilitate the meetings. More than 175 people from Alaska, other states, and Canada were invited to participate in the summit. About 125 people representing animal rights, animal welfare, environmental, conservation, tourism, hunting, trapping, and Native interests participated in the three-day event and more than 1500 people crowded in to observe.

On the first day, the mediators explained that the summit was designed to allow people to talk about the problem and generate options. First, biologists presented information on wolf biology, predator-prey relationships, and the wolf planning process in Alaska. Participants also gave brief speeches on their concerns. During the next two days, participants were assigned to one of nine groups with approximately 12 members each. Each group was facilitated by an employee from the state Ombudsman's office.

One sign of the neutrality of the effort was that, soon after the break-out groups began their discussions, the representatives of both extremes—Greenpeace and the Alaska Wildlife Conservation Association—both walked out of their groups declaring the discussions to be “clearly rigged” in favor of the opposite side.

During the Summit, there were dozens of exchanges between the diverse participants such as the following:

“People don't belong in the ecosystem,” an animal rights activist from San Francisco insisted repeatedly, pounding her fist for emphasis. At first the members of her group would pause and stare at her in disbelief, then try to continue without reacting.

Finally clearly exasperated, one hunter asked, “Then where do they belong?”

“At the Mall,” quipped another.

### ***No substantive agreements reached by Summit break-out groups***

While all of the groups agreed that there are circumstances when wolf control could be considered, only three of the groups reached any consensus on what those circumstances might be. There was, however, strong endorsement for an expanded educational effort. Several of the groups applauded the Wolf Management Planning team effort and four groups recommended that the department go back to the team recommendations, at least as a starting point for building a plan. Three groups expressed support for the Yukon Wolf Conservation and Management Plan and one recommended that the Board examine parts of the IUCN Manifesto.

Almost all of the participants I spoke with did not see any substantial progress at the Summit and did not change their minds as a result of the information presented. But two representatives of the Cincinnati Zoo stated that they had changed their opinion as a result of the Summit and had no further problem with the proposed wolf control actions.

### **The Board reverses its decision and calls for ground-based control**

“This isn't the first time the public is wrong, and they are wrong,” said temporary board member Jack Didrickson of Palmer. “Just because they're wrong, it doesn't mean the board has to play along with it” (Mauer 1993). Right or wrong, the Board did go along with it and at its January meeting following the Summit, they dismantled most of the Strategic Plan adopted in November, 1991 and all of the wolf-related decisions they had enacted in November 1992.

In June 1993, the Board “revised” the Strategic Plan and retitled it the “Wolf Conservation and Management Policy for Alaska.” In it, they proposed a few general criteria for when wolf control could be considered and stated that wolf control would be implemented using the most humane, selective, and effective methods available. The Board authorized land and shoot trapping, provided the trapper was 100 yards from the aircraft when shooting. Finally, the Board called for a ground-based wolf control program in GMU 20A conducted by the department and private trappers using trapping and baiting (setting traps near carcasses of dead animals).

“It will be mass slaughter,” said Barbara Brease, spokeswoman for the Alaska Wildlife Alliance. The organization claimed that the combination of on the ground trapping and land and shoot from 100 yards would allow “de facto aerial wolf control” on a statewide basis (Bostian 1993, C1).

In the winter of 1993-94, the agency trapped 98 wolves in GMU 20A and private trappers took another 52 to 54 wolves, out of an estimated wolf population of 200 to 250 animals.

## IV. Was the Alaska Team Successful?

This section evaluates the success of the Wolf Planning Team based on the criteria established in Chapter 1. The following results are based on both in-depth, open interviews with twenty-eight people and more focused written surveys of the team members themselves, sent out in May 1994. Nine of the twelve members completed the questionnaire, eight of whom had also been interviewed.

Table 5-8 summarizes the indicators of team effectiveness. The written survey respondents were divided on whether the process was fair, whether the team met its purpose, and whether they reached consensus on the key issues. Most, however, thought the process was efficient, that the team produced a “good” document, and that the agreement had a broad base of support when it was *first* released. The majority did not feel that the key issues had been settled or that the level of controversy had diminished as a result of the team’s work, and they were divided on whether the team had had a lasting impact. Only one respondent thought that the Hickel administration had followed the intent of the team’s report. No one thought that *most* of the recommendations had been implemented, seven respondents felt that *some* of the team’s recommendations had been implemented at one point, and two were emphatic that none of the recommendations had been implemented. They were divided on whether the team had had a lasting impact. They thought that the level of trust and insight between groups had increased, but most did not consider this a lasting phenomenon. Despite their many criticisms of the process, eight of the nine respondents found the effort personally rewarding and seven would be willing to participate in such a team again, although several mentioned that changes would be necessary first. Finally, only one member pronounced the process a success, while four felt it was not, and four (including one interviewee who did not complete the survey) thought it was at least partly successful. The key points from the surveys are discussed in more detail below.

### ***Do you feel that the team’s recommendations have been implemented?***

Seven respondents thought that some of the recommendations had been implemented, if only temporarily. Examples given were the zone system and the buffers around Denali Park that were part of the plan until 1993 when the Board eliminated them. Others mentioned that there is now some effort by the department to better educate the public about wolf ecology and management. Heyano thought that the state had implemented the

plan when it went through with a ground-based control program, but the department did not follow through with the zone system.

But two other members disagreed. One said simply “Hickel threw the plan out” and the other commented, “What is left? Nothing!”

**Table 5-9**  
**Indicators of the Alaska Team’s Effectiveness—**  
**Results of Team Member Survey**

(9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

YES	NO	Yes & No or not sure	Indicator
5	4		Do you feel that the Wolf Planning Team process was fair?
4	4	1	Did the team meet its purpose?
5	3		Did the team reach consensus on the key issues?
7	2		Was it efficient in terms of the agency's time and money?
8	1		Do you think the team's report was a "good" product?
8	1	1	After your report was released, did it have a broad base of support?
3	6		Have the key issues been settled?
3	6		Has the level of controversy diminished as a result?
	No*		Has the decision-maker endorsed the agreement?
1	7	1	Did the Hickel admin. follow the intent of the team's report?
7	2		Have some of the team's recommendations been implemented?
4	3	2	Has the team's effort had a lasting impact?
5	4		Has it increased the level of trust and insight between groups?
1	5	3	-Was this a lasting phenomenon?
8	1		Did you find it personally rewarding?
7	2		Would you be willing to participate in such a team again?
4	4	1	At this point, do you think the wolf planning team was a success?
*Based on author's research, not the survey			

## ***Has the team had any lasting impact?***

Four respondents felt that there was a lasting impact, three thought not, and two thought it was still possible to have an impact if the team's recommendations were adopted. According to Holmes, the effort showed the public that opposing sides could work together. For Ruggles, the process had changed the department in that ADFG now recognizes that it *must* involve the public in planning, especially for issues with such intense value implications, and the public now recognizes the value of such planning processes. But Heyano said that it would have an impact only if the state decides to take all of the team's recommendations and apply them.

## ***Did participants find it personally rewarding?***

Eight of the nine survey respondents found the effort personally rewarding. They mentioned the chance to share their point of view with others, the opportunity to watch a professional facilitator, learning to give and take, learning to listen, a sense of accomplishment, learning more about wolves and ecosystems, and stimulating discussions as reasons. The person who did not find it rewarding did not explain why.

Cline found it definitely rewarding, "It was a very worthwhile exercise and it caused us to hold our tongues and not to react as emotionally as we were inclined to do to observe the skills of a facilitator. That was the first time I'd been in an exercise where there was a professional facilitator, so just by participating in that it was a good experience."

ADFG biologist Schoen felt that some of the staff had grown considerably through the process. He felt that, in the beginning, some of the staff wanted wolf control and were trying to sell wolf control through this process. But after the team process, he saw what he felt was a dramatic difference in the ability of the Fairbanks staff to listen to both perspectives. "I was really proud of them in that they were walking a fine line of balancing both perspectives, they were being polite and honest to both sides and I think they have grown quite dramatically in their maturity and willingness to balance the program."

Two members said the experience had a positive effect on their marriages: "Personally rewarding?" responded one. "Well my wife says I'm a much better listener now. She thinks it was real successful in that respect."

Three of the team members entered positions of leadership following the team experience. Anne Ruggles is now a member of the Board of Game, Scott Bothwell became president of the Alaska Outdoor Council, and Larry Holmes is Chair of the

Anchorage Fish and Game Advisory Committee and very active now in wildlife issues. Each of the three commented that the team experience increased their level of activity in these issues and was excellent training in an essential skill for leadership: an ability to listen to all sides.

### ***Would you be willing to participate in such a team again?***

Seven of the nine members surveyed would be willing to participate in such a team again. However, the following five members would only do so if the team had more control over the final product.

Brown said she would participate only if there was less ADFG control and Cline said he would not participate unless the ground rules were changed to insure team recommendations were taken seriously. Heyano stipulated that he would participate “only if I feel sure our work will be fully supported by the governing body who will make the final decision.” Holmes said he would want a commitment from the government to adopt the results from the committee. Anne Ruggles said that first the department needs to learn to be honest about the process. “If it has no intention of abiding by the results, they shouldn’t waste the time and effort.”

### ***Could you name some specific things you feel the team accomplished?***

Seven team members mentioned several different accomplishments, one felt they had accomplished nothing, and another could not think of any specific accomplishments. Larry Holmes felt that the team had developed the building blocks for eventually resolving the issue and Ray Collins considered the consensus on a number of critical issues and the zoning concept to be accomplishments. Robert Heyano felt that it gave something to all users while not giving any one view a total victory of opinion. Wilson thought it had opened some minds.

Anne Ruggles listed several things she felt the team had accomplished, including the consensus on value as well as the use of wolves, acknowledgment that there was no one right way to manage ecosystems, recognition of the need and right to provide for some unhunted, trapped or manipulated wolf populations, recognition of providing for some intensively managed systems to provide ungulates for hunting, and recognition that ADFG needed to greatly improve its public process and education effort.



Another member wrote that, “In the short term, we had a good working relationship. In the long term, it came to nothing and we’re back to square one. So I guess we *really* accomplished *nothing* as a group.”

### ***Did participants view it as a success?***

There were mixed reviews on the success of the team. Out of the eleven team members surveyed and/or interviewed, one felt it was a clear success, five considered it a qualified success, and five thought it was not successful. Department officials and Connie Lewis, the facilitator, felt the process was at least partly successful.

Team Member Bob Ahgook:

It was successful in a way. There were lots of good ideas and maybe someday it will work.

Team member Scott Bothwell:

Yes it was [a success]. The team allowed the department justification for actions by showing that they had involved the public. That’s very important today.

Team Member Valerie Brown:

We lost everything. I mean everything that I wanted is not in there any more. You know, it hasn't resolved anything. We're right back where we started from...it's as polarized as it ever was. I really do think that we wasted our time because we didn't solve it. And we didn't even agree that we didn't agree. We didn't do anything.

Team Member David Cline:

No, it was not successful. Most if not all the team recommendations were either ignored and/or not implemented by a new ADFG administration.

Team Member Ray Collins:

It was successful in that we reached agreement on most points and produced a good report. I would have liked to see follow-up letters on how the plan was being implemented and when it was scrapped, a letter informing us of that or perhaps a chance to meet and discuss it. I think the plan was good. I hate to see the work lost. It is disappointing that it was not carried out.

Team Member Peggy Cowan:

No. It was successful to a point but then it failed because it was truncated.

Team Member Robert Heyano:

No. If ADFG and the Board would have taken our exact recommendations and enacted them, then it would have been a success, but they haven’t done that.

Team Member Larry Holmes:

Yes, in itself, it was a success. Individuals with different philosophies and value systems learned to work together. Unfortunately, the final product did not entirely reflect the recommendations of the team. If the team had more authority and time to draft the strategic plans and review and comment on the final product, the project would have been a resounding success.

Team Member Chuck McMahon:

No. It was basically a waste of time.

Team Member Anne Ruggles:

Yes in achieving a consensus and cooperation among people with disparate values and the sense of cooperation was communicated to the public and the public was supportive of our work. But the department should have maximized that by continuing to involve the team.

Team Member Dean Wilson

It was an admirable effort. It was a good try and I think many issues could be resolved in this way. Unfortunately, we were not very successful, we were moderately successful.

Director David Kelleyhouse:

Yes it was successful. I wouldn't change a thing about the team.

Facilitator Connie Lewis

Yes, it was a success. The issue of wolf control has not been put to bed in this state, but I don't think that means it was not a success. I think a whole lot of progress was made and whatever happens next, there's a good place to work from. Better understanding of where people stand, what the possibilities are and what the sensitivities are. For all of those reasons, I would say it was definitely a success.

Former Board Chairman Doug Pope:

The team didn't address all the issues that needed to be resolved, so the Board had to resolve them. But it was successful in that it was the beginning of bringing people together.

ADFG Deputy Director Wayne Regelin:

I think that it allowed us to have very good discussions with a wide diversity of opinion and it produced a product that was very, very valuable for the Division to move forward with its planning effort. I think what ended up coming out of the statewide Strategic Plan could never have happened without the planning team's effort. I think that they brought up some issues that became big parts of the plan and that we wouldn't have included as an agency as much. I feel that there are some differences between the state Strategic Plan and the team's recommendations, but in general I felt that they were followed about as closely as they could be.

ADFG Regional Supervisor Chris Smith:

Overall I was still very pleased with the result. I think that we accomplished some things through that approach that we could not have accomplished any other way

## **Summary**

In summary, the process was perceived by the participants as at least partly fair, it was efficient for the agency, and it met its purpose to some extent. The team reached consensus on some of the key issues, they succeeded in producing a written agreement, the process increased the level of trust between groups temporarily, and almost all of the participants found it personally rewarding. However, only one member pronounced the process a success, while five felt it was not, and five thought it was at least partly successful.

In their evaluation of the process, ADFG biologists Haggstrom et al. (1993, 20) said that the department did not succeed in its attempt to develop a statewide wolf management plan that most Alaskans could accept. But they felt the process had yielded some benefits in that some staff have learned how to communicate more effectively and involve people in decision-making. A rapport with new and existing interests has been enhanced in some cases, and the experience may “serve as a catalyst for further introspection and constructive change” in the department. Further, they reaffirmed the belief among some staff that active citizen participation can help overcome distrust and help settle issues, even one as contentious as wolf management. Personally, I have marveled at the continued conviction of many department staff that an agreement, or at least a temporary truce, is still possible. They are the employees who took the brunt of the enormous public furor over the 1992 decision by the department’s leadership and the Board of Game. Many other dedicated staff would have given up, but these people are still committed and still trying.

## **V. Was the Team's Design Conducive to Success?**

In this case, the team’s overly-restricted purpose, lack of political support, and a product that was not sufficiently detailed were the biggest obstacles to success.

## The Purpose

Table 5-10 presents the survey results concerning the purpose. All of the team members thought the purpose was clear—the team was strictly advisory but a written consensus agreement on broad goals was clearly expected. This purpose was inspiring for most of the team members. There was a sense of urgency to complete the task. Most of them thought the team had the correct amount of authority and that the agreement should not have been binding. However, five members said they would not participate in such a team again unless they had strong assurances that their recommendations would be taken very seriously. Also, four of the nine survey respondents thought they would have been more inspired had the team been given more control over the final product. Only two of the nine thought the team should have drafted all three levels of plans, with the assistance of the department and subject to board approval, while six disagreed.

**Table 5-10**  
**Did the Team Meet the Purpose Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**  
(9 out of 12 citizen members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Purpose
9	0		Was the purpose clear?
8	1		Did you find the purpose inspiring?
8	1		Was there a sense of urgency to complete the task?
6	2	1	Did you have the correct amount of authority?
1	8		Should the team's agreement have been binding?
4	3		If you had more control, would it have been more inspiring?
3	1	1	-Might the team have been more effective?
2	6	1	Should the team have drafted all of the plans subject to Board approval?

All but one member found the purpose inspiring. Anne Ruggles felt it was definitely inspiring because people with disparate values were able to get beyond stereotypes, discuss an emotionally-charged subject and reach consensus on many issues. Ray Collins

wrote that it would have been more inspiring if the team had more control over the final product, but he questioned whether the members would have been able to commit that much time to the effort. Heyano commented that he has a personal interest in resource issues and liked the idea of common people attempting to solve them. But one respondent made a point well-taken that this has always been a divisive, controversial debate and “one can hardly be ‘inspired’ when asked to compromise one’s ecological values.” The words ‘motivating’ and ‘engaging’ would be preferable when describing the purpose of an EDS team.

In a critique of the process prepared by team member Anne Ruggles in conjunction with members of the Fairbanks ADFG staff, they concluded that there must be agreement on the goal of the planning process and that it must not be used to achieve a pre-determined result. Such an approach, they said, is worse than no public involvement at all as it seriously undermines the credibility of the agency (Haggstrom et al. 1993, 7).

In this case the purpose was clear, but inappropriate. The team was to make recommendations on how wolves should be managed and these recommendations, as well as those of all other interested parties, would be used by the department in developing a statewide strategic wolf management plan. ADFG emphasized that there was no guarantee that all—or any—of the advice would be used. They made it clear that the team’s recommendations would not take priority over any other input the agency received, yet they stressed that they expected to use at least *some* of the recommendations.

### **Log cabins and consensus**

And here lies a fundamental problem with making a consensus agreement strictly advisory. The agency receiving the advice generally feels free to pick and choose among the recommendations, taking some and leaving others. But unlike traditional advisory groups—which generally produce either a collection of opinions or a majority vote—a consensus process results in a *package* agreement, each piece connected in an often essential way to others. Like a log cabin, you cannot remove one log without endangering the entire structure. In most consensus processes, many trade-offs are made, e.g. one side gives up “A” in exchange for “B”. Such trade-offs are often what enable the divergent parties to find an acceptable agreement. Most likely the accord will not meet all of their concerns, but they may find it acceptable if it meets their most *important* ones. In the Alaska case, the environmentalists agreed to swallow a bitter pill: Log A—wolf control could be considered in some areas, provided that Log B—new areas of wolf protection—was also included.

Oblivious to the need to preserve the integrity of the agreement, the agency blithely considered both of these points to be separate, unrelated recommendations. They viewed the points in the agreement as separate logs instead of an almost-finished structure, so it seemed that removing a log here or there would not cause a problem. Thus they chose to keep log “A” but remove log “B” and then were puzzled why the environmentalists felt the house had fallen in. After all, the department had warned the team that only *some* of the recommendations would be used.

If an agency wishes to pick and choose among the recommendations, then it would be far better to use the traditional advisory committee format and not attempt to develop consensus recommendations. If an agency wants to use a consensus process, they must be extremely careful before selectively implementing the agreement. They should check with all of the team members to determine if they are adding or removing a key element. For even if the agency was an integral part of the process, it is difficult to second-guess how one of the members feels about adding or deleting a particular point. They should also be well aware that any tinkering may cause a delicate consensus to fall apart and escalate the conflict.

Does this imply that a team’s agreement must be binding? No, it is possible for recommendations to work, provided the agreement is given *very* serious consideration, that the agency has a healthy respect for the package nature of such an agreement, and that any changes are fully discussed with the team prior to making a decision. Such discussion is the minimal degree of respect the team members deserve for the tremendous effort required of them.

This is also a reason to keep a team active throughout the development of a plan. They should assist in preparing an implementable agreement, not just broad goals that can be interpreted many different ways. The task in the Alaska case was not a complete and meaningful whole, as recommended in the management literature. In keeping with the above metaphor, this team laid the first few rows of logs on what they may have thought would be a country cabin, but the agency discarded some of their logs and finished the structure as a military blockhouse. Even if the political climate had not changed, disbanding the team so early in the process was a prescription for controversy, since it would be difficult for any administration to finish the plan as the team had envisioned. Had the team helped develop each stage, they would not have felt as betrayed and would have had ownership in the final product, something that was clearly missing in this case.

## **The Participants**

Table 5-11 presents the survey results concerning the participants. The members were divided on whether all potentially-affected interests were invited, whether the process of choosing members was fair, and whether it would have been better for interest groups to choose their own representatives. Most preferred that the members represent themselves and not organized groups. They were largely in agreement that it was not a problem that those opposed to control were more experienced in public debate than those who were in favor of control. It was surprising that all of the respondents were opposed to having someone from the lower 48 on the team. They were divided on whether tourism should have been represented and whether Native peoples were adequately represented.

Interestingly, the two Native members on the team—Ahgook and Heyano—both felt that First Nations peoples were adequately represented. Robert Heyano, a team member and Native from Dillingham, felt that Native interests were adequately represented and stressed several times in an interview that he did not feel that it was a “Native” issue.

The survey respondents agreed that most members were articulate and tactful. Many interviewees felt that some members had participated very little and were “too quiet.” While they stressed that some people can leave a deep impression with very few words, most of the respondents thought it would be better *not* to have real quiet people on the team. Heyano felt it would be preferable to choose members who “have a good handle on English and can express themselves well.” The use of videos and simulations by an unbiased third party could have improved the selection of individuals with these skills.

They were divided on whether the participants were well-informed prior to the team, but all of the respondents felt that such prior knowledge is important. Several interviewees had also commented that a few members were almost completely new to the debate and that this required extra time to bring them up to speed. In addition, one member stated that she did not have a stake in the outcome, but she agreed with the others that all members *should* have a genuine stake in the result. Finally, most would not change the size of the group, but one member would prefer that the agency not be an official participant. When it is important to limit the size of the group, yet have as many genuine stakeholders at the table as possible, it is vital to make every seat count. In this case, it would have been preferable to have more members from the non-consumptive side rather than members who were not genuine stakeholders in the outcome.

It would be difficult to argue that *all* of the potentially-affected interests were invited, since both those few who want wolves eradicated except in parks and those who want all

wolves protected were missing. Many expected the AWA to represent the animal rights groups, but Brown disagreed and was quick to point out that the AWA is not anti-hunting, as most animal rights groups are.

In addition, Brown felt that the team was not balanced because there were only two people opposed to wolf control, while there were seven largely in favor (Ahgook, Bothwell, Collins, Heyano, Holmes, McMahon, and Wilson). Even Scott Bothwell, who represented hunting interests, shared Brown's concern: "Honestly, if I were an 'anti' member I would have felt outnumbered and that the effort would be questionable, but as it turned out, the consensus format still made it a valid exercise." Ironically, many sport hunters felt little ownership in the process, even though most of the members on the team were hunters. A person with good negotiating skills who was very influential in the hunting community would have helped to bring this key constituency along.

ADFG had wanted to include a representative of the tourism industry, but the final team did not have one. However, a tourism industry representative would not be able to predict what might cause a boycott. It would be better to have someone who is either likely to *call* for a boycott or someone able to influence the average person likely to *respond* to such a boycott. In this case, had groups such as the Alaska Chapters of the National Audubon Society, the AWA, the Wildlife Federation and the Sierra Club found a wolf control action acceptable, the extremes would have been more isolated and the boycott less effective. Therefore, these groups were more important to have represented than the tourism industry and they needed more than just two members.



**Table 5-11**  
**Did the Team Meet the Participant Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Participants
5	4		Were all potentially affected interests invited?
4	5		Was the process of choosing members perceived as fair?
4	5		Would it have been better for interest groups to choose their own representative?
3	5	1	Your members represented themselves instead of organized groups. Would you change this?
	8	1	Was it a problem that those opposed to wolf control were experienced in public debate, but those in favor were not?
	9		Should some members have been from the lower 48?
5	4		Should Alaska tourism interests have been represented?
5	2	1	Were First Nations peoples adequately represented?
8		1	On the whole, were members articulate and tactful?
7		2	Would it be better NOT to have real quiet people on a team?
6	1	2	Is it important to have good negotiating skills?
5	1	1	Were opinion leaders involved?
4	2	2	-Should opinion leaders be included?
8	1		Were moderates included?
8	1		-Should moderates be included?
5	4		Were all members reasonably well-informed about the issues prior to the team?
9			-Is it preferable to have well-informed members?
7	2		Did all of the members have a genuine stake in the outcome?
9			-Should all members have a genuine stake in the outcome?
2	7		Would you change the size of the team?

The participants represented themselves, not organized groups, so their agreement did not require official ratification by organizations external to the process. This improved the chances for consensus. The disadvantage of this is that it can be more difficult to

bring constituents along, but if a team includes members who are influential “opinion leaders” with a general constituency, it will be possible to bring others along without the burden of having groups ratify any agreement. However, as three members said, it was a “fiction” that they were not representing their groups—they certainly were. But unlike an official representative, they did not require the endorsement of their entire organization. Had this been the case, it would have been difficult if not impossible to reach agreement.

Some argued that no one from organized groups should have been involved. But on an issue of national interest such as this, the value of having someone from the Audubon Society and the AWA involved—even if they are not “official” representatives—is very high. Had ADFG taken a more moderate approach and had these people sanctioned the final plan, they would not have eliminated the conflict, but they would have carried considerable weight with their peers nation-wide and dampened the controversy. Likewise, it was very important for someone to represent the Alaska Outdoor Council on the team in order to bring this vital constituency along.

The members were reimbursed for expenses but were not paid an honorarium. Some felt it was unfair that two members were “paid to sit there” by their organizations, while others suffered financial losses in their businesses. However, one respondent pointed out that some of the team members make “a lot of money killing wolves” through hunting, trapping and/or fur buying while others make nothing. In her opinion, what job members have is not as important as whether or not they have a genuine stake in the outcome.

Such financial differences should at least be made clear to all potential members before they agree to take part, and honorariums might be considered in order to avoid the accusation that “only the rich, the paid, and the retired” can afford to take part in consensus-building endeavors.

## **The Process**

Table 5-12 presents the survey results concerning the process. In this case, the team had a sound process that contributed to their ability to reach an agreement. They benefited from the skills of an experienced and capable facilitator who was hired prior to their first meeting and who allowed the team to assist in shaping the process. Everyone agreed that she established a climate of openness and trust. One of her first actions was to have the team adopt a set of ground rules which she enforced firmly but gently (one indication of Lewis’s skill was that several people said that she could cut people off yet they wouldn’t even realize she had done so). Everyone gave her high marks for her sensitivity and integrity. Only one person would change anything about her approach and

he stressed that in his opinion she was honest and sincere, “but listened more to certain members than others.”

**Table 5-12**  
**Did the Team Meet the Process Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**  
 (9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Process
8	1		Did you feel that Lewis was fair?
1	7	1	Would you change anything about her approach?
9			Was a climate of openness and trust established?
8	1		Was team spirit present?
4	4	1	-Does some of this remain today?
6	2	1	Did the team stop frequently enough to evaluate their interaction?
8			Were small break out groups used?
6			Did you use brainstorming?
6	2		Was significant work happening between meetings?
7	2		Were your needs for data fully satisfied?
6	0	0	Did you have adequate opportunity to hear or read conflicting scientific opinions?
4	4	1	Did the team spend too much time discussing data?
3	3		-Would you change this?
2	5	1	Were Native traditions and indigenous knowledge adequately explored?
6	2		Did certain members emerge as leaders?
5		1	Was such leadership helpful?
6	2		Was your deadline appropriate?
6	2		Did the group meet frequently enough?
3	6		Was it appropriate for the team to end after submitting its report?
7	2		Would it have been better to have the team to continue to meet occasionally to review implementation and provide input?

Under her direction, the team followed a systematic, step-by-step problem solving process, building a foundation of agreement and slowly but surely venturing into the more sensitive issues. They used brainstorming frequently to list all possible ideas before

evaluating and prioritizing them. Eight of the members recalled that small break out groups were used, particularly in one instance when Brown and McMahon—the two strongest opponents on the issue of same-day airborne—were asked to work something out on the issue. Most agreed that significant work was happening between meetings. As mentioned earlier, Lewis said that she generally spends ten hours outside the meetings discussing the issues for every hour in formal meetings.

While their problem solving process was systematic, their identification of issues was weak and this caused some wheel-spinning. Until a team has a crystal clear concept of what problems they are attempting to solve, it is difficult to be efficient in solving them. This contributed to the fact that many of the critical issues were left for the final meeting.

They also spent a disproportionate amount of their very limited time gathering data. It appeared as though they were trying to avoid the painful process of hammering out an agreement on the toughest issues. Many of the team members felt it was essential to spend this time so that “everyone was working from the same sheet of music.” If so, then more than six meetings were needed so that there would still be time to discuss the issues and develop agreements.

Seven of the nine survey respondents felt that their needs for data were fully satisfied. Six thought they had an adequate opportunity to hear or read conflicting scientific opinions while the other three respondents did not answer the question. But the members had very different responses to the question regarding how difficult it was to come to agreement on the data. One checked ‘very difficult’, two checked ‘difficult’, three chose ‘not very difficult’, and three chose ‘fairly easy’. There did not appear to be any particular pattern to the responses—for example Brown thought it was very difficult while Cline said it was fairly easy. Four respondents thought the team spent too much time discussing data, four disagreed and one wasn’t sure. Three said they would spend less time if they could do it over, three said they would not and three had no response.

Two survey respondents thought that Native traditions and indigenous knowledge were adequately explored, but five did not and one wasn’t sure. There were two Native members of the team, Robert Heyano and Bob Ahgook. Both felt that Native traditions had not been adequately explored.

Eight of the nine members surveyed felt there was a sense of team spirit while they were meeting, but only four thought that some of this still exists today. When asked how the group dealt with strong differences of opinion, two members (on opposite ends of the spectrum) felt such points were ignored, one said that they were permanently tabled when the team ran out of time, four said that they brought up such differences and tried to work them out, and two felt that they used all of these methods.

Most agreed that their deadline was appropriate, but they did not feel that the team met frequently enough. They should have attempted to meet at least once every two weeks until a first draft was prepared. At that point, they could have released the draft for public comment and then revised it, perhaps meeting less frequently at that point. While deadlines are essential, an extension should have been granted when it became clear that the team would not have time to cover all of the key issues.

Importantly, the majority of the respondents felt that it was *not* appropriate for the team to end after submitting its report and that it would have been better to have the team continue to meet at least occasionally to review implementation and provide input.

## ***The Product***

The product the team agreed on was an excellent start. It was perceived as balanced by many and all of the team members met at least some of their primary concerns. It defined broad goals for wolf management, recognized the inherent value of wolves, and identified several principles to meet the goals, including a zoning system. It also gave some direction on a public process that ADFG should follow. But while it provided a good general sense of direction, it did not address all of the key issues and it left too much room for interpretation.

**Table 5-13**  
**Did the Group Meet the Product Criteria**

<b>Criteria concerning the Product (the Written Agreement)</b>	<b>Alaska Wolf Mgmt Team</b>
Is the agreement fair to the stakeholders? Did everyone meet at least some of their primary concerns?	Yes, the team report was.
Does it address all of the key issues?	NO
Does it define a desired future and set measurable targets with sufficient detail?	It did define a desired future, but did not include measurable targets in adequate detail
Does it report points where members agreed to disagree?	Not all of the points of disagreement.
Does it include some "strong" recommendations (will, shall, must)?	YES
Is it clear, easy to read and brief as possible?	Some key points were not clear.
Are provisions included for renegotiation?	NO
Are maps & graphics clear?	No maps or graphics included
Does it exclude technical jargon?	Largely, and included glossary of terms
Does it look professional?	YES

## ***Political Support***

Some aspects of the team's design were weaknesses—but political change was its nemesis. Wolf control was a key issue in the 1990 election and, quite simply, the pro-wolf control side won. It would have been difficult for any EDS process to withstand such a political about-face. The previous government had established the process and the new administration pledged to support it, but in fact they disregarded and/or misunderstood many of the team's recommendations.

**Table 5-14**  
**Did the Group Meet the Political Support Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Political and Agency Support
1	7	1	Did the new administration follow the intent of the team's recommendations?
6	2	1	Should anything be done to ensure that a team's work survives a political change?
6	2	1	Are teams still worthwhile if next administration can ignore a team's work?
1	6	2	Was there an effort by the agency or others to promote the team's image and build external support?
8	1		Did the agency give the team the money, data, speakers, and resources it needed?
	9		Did they offer any rewards if the team could reach agreement?
6	3		Did they give the team recognition for its efforts?
4	5		Did it seem unfair that some were paid by their groups to attend while others lost money ?
1	6	1	Would an honorarium have contributed to your effectiveness?
3	2	4	Should most teams be paid for their time?

Could anything have been done to avoid such a derailment? I have only speculative hindsight to go on, but some aspects of the team's design made the team *particularly* vulnerable to political overturn. First, the team should have gone beyond broad recommendations and developed an implementable agreement. This would have made it very difficult for the agency to "finish" the plan in its own way. If the agency were also a member or close participant, such a team is unlikely to devise agreements that are not within constraints.

Second, had ADFG allowed former department or Board members to be members of the team, they would have been able to choose very influential members (such as Dick Bishop and/or Sam Harbo). Both are knowledgeable, articulate and tactful negotiators perceived as fairly reasonable by the other side, and they have considerable influence with both the new administration and sporting groups. In combination with a hunter and

consensus-builder such as Bothwell, supporters of the new administration would have had more ownership in the process while still leaving room for compromise.

It would also have helped if the agency had seen its role differently. When the process began, the agency was very wary of “giving away” its mandate to make wildlife management decisions. After the dust had settled following the public reaction, there was a new attitude among much of the staff. As one senior staff member said after the process, “biologists can say what’s *possible*, but it is not their job to say what’s *right*.” In their assessment of the process, team member Ruggles, and ADFG biologists Haggstrom, Harms, and Stephenson (1993, 18) emphasized the need for a serious commitment for such a process from the agency’s leadership: “public communication and conflict resolution for a major public issue cannot be done by a few interested employees. An agency must provide leadership and resources for a coordinated, effective effort.”

## VI. Summary

The Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team's principal accomplishment was its agreement on goals, principles, and findings regarding wolf management in the state and its development of the zones. These were definite breakthroughs, as they demonstrated that there was common ground between the two extremes. The effort also succeeded in changing the agency’s attitude toward and understanding of public involvement, at least in the Interior Region of Alaska.

The team’s purpose was quite clear: they were to develop written, consensus recommendations. But this case demonstrates one of the strong disadvantages of this as a purpose. The team was limited to developing broad recommendations, which they then turned over to the department to “pick and choose from” in developing the agency’s plan. However, this is a fundamental difference between traditional advisory committees and consensus processes. As discussed above, a consensus agreement is not a smorgasbord. It is a house of cards that must either be taken as a package or rearranged with extreme care. Also, whether the administration had been pro- or anti-wolf control, some differences in interpretation were inevitable once the team was disbanded. This would not have been a problem had the team been allowed to develop the entire plan—from general goals to zoning maps and implementation plans.

The participants did not represent organized groups and most could feel free to express their own opinions and not those of their group. The agency was an integral part of the team, although they had more power than the other members. The team included people with moderate views on the issues as well as those on both extremes, and most



members were dedicated to finding a compromise. However, “consumptive” users predominated on the team, leaving the two nonconsumptive representatives feeling outnumbered. While this is not technically a problem in a consensus process (since all members have veto power) it is nonetheless a definite disadvantage psychologically .

On the other hand, having prominent members of the environmental community on the team without equivalent members from the hunting community was probably unwise. This contributed to a lack of ownership in the process by sport hunters, who voiced their concerns to a sympathetic administration.

In terms of process, the team had the benefit of an accomplished facilitator from the beginning. They followed a clear problem-solving process, building on a foundation of agreement and using considerable brain-storming and small groups to stimulate creativity. They had a firm deadline which was helpful. But they did not define the issues adequately at the beginning. Like a soccer team without a clear idea of which goal they're heading for, this team did not have a clear outline of what the issues were initially and thus did not focus quickly on solving them. As a result, they ran out of time to deal with several key points.

Another procedural problem was that the team did not meet frequently enough. To make real progress on these difficult issues, meeting twice or more per month would have helped the team cut through the data and grapple with the key issues. As it was, the participants became “re-entrenched” and forgot important details between meetings. When crafting an intricate and delicate agreement, it is often necessary to maintain some momentum which can only be properly done by meeting frequently. If, after meeting more frequently, the team still had not reached agreement on primary problems, a brief extension of the deadline should have been granted.

Although these were weaknesses, the biggest obstacle in this case was that the administration changed to one which was decidedly pro-wolf control and it discarded and/or interpreted the team's broad recommendations to its advantage.

Unfortunately, this effort is seen as a total failure by many in Alaska. Officials of other resource agencies have told me that they are reluctant to try an EDS process because of “the great debacle the wolf team turned out to be.” In June, 1993, the Board of Game dismantled almost all that remained of the team’s agreement. The two extremes in the debate continue to be deeply divided.

But there was once a sliver of common ground here. Had the agency chosen to stay within it, there would have been controversy, but not a firestorm. The decision to disregard the concessions of the more moderate environmentalists opened the door for a

powerful alliance between them and the animal rights groups. Now the agency will find it difficult to regain credibility with the moderates.

Thirteen people gave their all. They argued, debated, cajoled, laughed and even cried. And they came close—very close. But bona fide success eluded them.

It was up to another team in another place to carry on...

# Chapter 6.

## The Yukon Wolf Management Team

### April to September, 1992

*We showed that a random group  
of people can work together and  
do something truly monumental.*

*—Team member Patty Denison*

The Yukon. Its name alone conjures up an image of frozen nights and endless miles of wild country lying silent beneath the shimmering northern lights, the silence broken only by the occasional howl of a wolf.

Most of us imagine it as a place where the frontier attitude of conquering the land still prevails. But—just as still waters run deep—the Yukon cannot be judged from its surface alone. It is a land of contrasts: vast wilderness and sophisticated espresso shops, people who seem to have stepped right out of the Old West, well-traveled people with considerable formal education, and First Nations peoples who have been blazing a trail for aboriginal rights worldwide.

Perhaps it was this rich diversity within a small area that created fertile ground for a remarkable innovation—the Yukon Wolf Management Team.

## I. History of the Controversy

As in other parts of the world, wolves were not appreciated by the settlers in the Yukon. Private use of strychnine poisoning to kill wolves was used in the Yukon beginning in the 1920s and bounties were introduced in the 1930s. Government poisoning programs started in the 1950s and between 1957 and 1967, a total of about 600 wolves and many other animals were killed as a result of hundreds of poison baits that were set out each year. The use of poison continued until it was outlawed in 1972 (Yukon Wolf Management Team 1992c, 3).

In the fall of 1982, a controversy began over the proposed renewed use of poison by the government to control wolves. Despite much public opposition, the government

began a poisoning program near Whitehorse in late 1982, but the program was stopped after one month with three wolves killed (Clarkson 1989, 22).

Two aerial wolf control programs were also conducted in the 1980s. From 1983 to 1985, wolves were killed in the Coastal Mountain area in response to moose declines. From 1983 to 1989, wolves were taken in the Finlayson area in response to woodland caribou declines (Figure 6-1). Although conservation and animal rights groups called for a boycott of tourism in the Yukon to protest the programs, the government proceeded.


One of the most-studied wolf control programs, the Finlayson program proved effective in increasing ungulates. In the period 1983 to 1985, an estimated 85% of the wolf population in the Finlayson area was shot from helicopters by agency biologists. During the same period, Natives voluntarily reduced their harvest of caribou. Between 1987 and 1990, the caribou population in the area increased from 2000 to more than 6000 and the moose population doubled. Significantly, the wolf population recovered to pre-control numbers within three years after the program ended (Yukon Wolf Management Team 1992c, 4).

At the current time, wolf, moose and caribou all appear to be increasing in the Finlayson area and no one knows if an equilibrium will be met. “If the caribou and moose populations cannot be held at higher densities for a time, there may be no point in conducting control programs. It will take 20 to 30 years to really understand all that took place as part of the Finlayson experiment” (Yukon Wolf Management Team 1992b, 9). To monitor the Yukon’s wolf population and to understand the long-term effects of control, the Yukon Department of Renewable Resources now has one of the most active wolf research programs in North America.

Bob Jickling, a team member, seriously questions the ethics and sustainability of such programs, “If this kind of practice continues, the intensively managed areas will become less like wilderness and more like farms. Should this happen? Are intensively managed areas ecologically sustainable? Should we be more concerned with seeking ways to manage human behaviors such that they become more sustainable, rather than manipulating ecosystems in response to human demands?” (Jickling 1993).

But Jim Babala, who represented the hunting guide’s (or outfitters’) perspective on the team, felt the results of the Finlayson experiment should diminish the controversy. “With such a swift recovery of wolves within a period of four years [in Finlayson], one has to wonder why there is such a fuss over the protection of wolves. There are now more wolves within the...area than there were before. This pretty well speaks for the durability of the wolf as a species. Coyotes and cockroaches are the only creatures I

know that have done better. Wolves in the Yukon don't need as much protection as animal-rights activists



and wolf extremists try to advocate—wolves now living in the Finlayson caribou range have never had it so good. What really needs protection is the northern way of life that has always made the Yukon such an interesting and great place to live” (Babala 1994).

In 1992, the wolf population in the Yukon was estimated to be 4000 to 4500 animals, with wolf densities ranging from 3 to 4 wolves per 1000 square kilometers in the north to 18 wolves per 1000 square kilometers in the south (Yukon Wolf Management Team 1992c, 3).

Controversy erupted again in late 1991. A subcommittee of the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board (the Board), a citizen advisory committee, held a series of public meetings concerning the drastic decline in the Aishihik (pronounced A-zhee-ak) caribou herd. The herd’s population had dropped from an estimated 1500 animals in 1981 to an estimated 785 in 1991, with a very low calf:cow ratio of 9:100 (a hunting closure had been imposed in 1990). The views expressed at the meetings were “overwhelmingly in favor of a wolf control program in the Aishihik Lake area” (Bailey 1993, 3)

At about the same time, the Board had asked another subcommittee to investigate how to prepare a wolf management plan for the entire territory and this subcommittee had also conducted a series of public meetings. In late 1991, the Board recommended to the Minister of Renewable Resources (the Minister) that “planning for a wolf control program should begin immediately” and that caribou hunting in the area be closed (Bailey 1993, 3). The control program was called for despite the fact that the management plan subcommittee had not yet completed its work.

According to Babala, when word of the proposed control got out, “it went over to Germany and down into the states as fast as you can wink. Boy, the fax lines were smoking and the papers were full of people protesting from outside. It was almost like a great big air raid, something like happened over in Pearl Harbor. They just came in and bombed the newspapers and made all kinds of threats.” International animal rights groups threatened to call a worldwide boycott of Yukon tourism if the program proceeded.

The Minister restricted caribou hunting as recommended by the Board, but deferred any wolf control until a Yukon-wide wolf management plan could be completed. “In recognition of the Fish and Wildlife Management Board’s prejudicial position on the issue, the Minister chose to establish an independent wolf management planning team...similar to the format that was used to develop a strategy for wolf management in...Alaska” (Bailey 1993, 3).

## II. The Respondents

For easy reference, the following list provides a brief introduction to those who are quoted in this chapter, including both team members and others.

Jim Babala.....a team member who describes himself as “an old mountain man,” has spent most of his life as an outfitter in the Rockies of Alberta and “the wilds of the Yukon.” He favors wolf control in certain cases. A resident of Whitehorse.

John Bailey.....the team facilitator. He has a degree in zoology and fisheries and worked as a biologist in Ontario and the Northwest Territories (NWT) before becoming senior administrator for the NWT Department of Renewable Resources in Inuvik. He was facilitator of the Beaufort Sea Polar Bear Management Plan and the Inuvialuit Region Grizzly Bear Management Plan and has also facilitated caribou and muskox management workshops. His specialty is co-management of renewable resources.

Bill Brewster .....Minister of Renewable Resources under the Yukon Party government, elected in October, 1992. A “tough old-timer” and former outfitter from Haines Junction strongly in favor of wolf control. Babala described Brewster as a man who “got his knowledge of wildlife from the real world—not the San Diego Zoo.”

Patty Denison .....a team member representing nonconsumptive interests. She has experience as a wildlife technician and lives in Teslin. Considered a strong consensus-builder on the team, although she was basically opposed to wolf control.

Larry DuGuay.....biologist and policy analyst with the Wildlife Branch of the Yukon Department of Renewable Resources. He helped to establish the team and sat in on several meetings.

Bob Hayes .....a wolf biologist with the Wildlife Branch. He helped establish the team, collected information they requested and sat in on most of the meetings.

Bob Jickling.....a team member representing nonconsumptive interests. Professor of environmental ethics at Yukon College and an outspoken critic of wolf control.

Dan McDiarmid.....a team member described as “a definite consensus-builder—soft-spoken and very thoughtful.” McDiarmid is a trapper and



subsistence fisher from Stewart Crossing, a village of 35 people in central Yukon who also serves on that area's Renewable Resource Council.

### III. Formation of the Yukon Wolf Management Team

#### ***Pre-negotiation Phase***

At the request of the Minister, the Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team (the team) was established in March, 1992. According to one interviewee, it was not surprising that the New Democratic Party [NDP] government set up such a team: "public process was very much a part of the [NDP] government's approach. In fact, some complained that they [the NDP] had too much public consultation and consensus building."

Larry DuGuay, a policy analyst, and wolf biologist Bob Hayes, both of the Fish and Wildlife Branch of the Yukon Department of Renewable Resources (the Branch), were the principal designers of the process. "This is a very big issue in the Yukon," explains DuGuay. "We have a small population with a large interest in all resource management issues, a large hunting community, and a very active environmental community."

DuGuay and Hayes examined both the British Columbia and Alaska processes before they began. They considered British Columbia to be an example of "what not to do" because members there "could not waver from the party line." This convinced them that team members should represent basic points of view and not any organized groups. They felt that Alaska was a "pretty good example" but that the Alaska team had not addressed the key issues and had not gone far enough in specifying how their plan would be implemented.

#### **The Purpose: to build a vision and write an implementable agreement**

This team located at the highest point on the ladder of EDS tasks: they were to write an implementable agreement (this would still require formal adoption by the Minister and the Cabinet). The team members believed from the start that if their diverse team reached a consensus, the government was highly likely to endorse it.

In their Terms of Reference, written by DuGuay and Hayes, a helpful distinction was drawn between the goals of the *team* and goals of the *plan* the team was to create. These two are often blurred which causes confusion. The first goal for the *team* was to create a

Yukon Wolf Management Plan. The second goal was to ensure that the public's interests regarding the values and uses of wolves are incorporated into the plan.

The Branch established three goals for the management plan itself: 1) to ensure the long-term conservation of wolves throughout their present range in the Yukon; 2) to increase public awareness and understanding of the uses, conservation and management of wolves, their prey and habitat in the Yukon; and 3) to provide guidance to the Department of Renewable Resources and the Fish and Wildlife Management Board in responding to management situations.

Next they listed other terms of reference they expected the team to follow. These points, shown in Table 6-1, would be extremely controversial in Alaska, yet they formed the foundation of the Yukon effort. The order in which they are listed is also significant, in that the first instruction is to consider wolves and their prey as part of the total ecosystem rather than pursue single species management. No mention is made of wolf control until the eighth point, in which the team is asked to consider both the technical and ethical aspects of implementing such programs.

DuGuay and Hayes wanted the team to ignore, for the moment, the problem in the Aishihik area. Instead, they asked the team to think long-term and holistically in building "a vision of how wolf management ought to proceed" for the future throughout the Yukon. According to DuGuay, Hayes, and Bailey, it was clear that the team was to establish criteria for when, if ever, wolf control could be considered. They did this in response to what they perceived as a failure of the Alaska plan to deal with this key issue.

Rob McWilliam, then Deputy Minister of the Department of Renewable Resources attended the first meeting of the team and assured them that they were "independent and would have sole control over the plan produced" (Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team 1992a, 1). Team member Bob Jickling, a staunch opponent of wolf control, felt this was genuine: "Our level of authority was pretty much absolute. We could have written that plan as we'd have liked."

Bailey recognizes that this level of authority is still considered a radical approach by most agencies. "I know it's radical," he said. "In this case, having the team actually write the plan was the best way to do things. If you want these plans to be more reflective of people, then you use agency people for technical advice, but it's the group's job to wrestle the ethical issues."

"Our autonomy was the only way we could work," said Patty Denison, also a team member. "Given that authority and knowing the confidence the government placed in us, we took it very seriously and worked very hard. It wasn't always pleasant and it sure wasn't the money. It was a clear task and people really gave it everything they could."

When asked if he felt this “absolute” authority given the team was appropriate, Larry DuGuay of the Wildlife Branch seemed surprised at the question. “It was fine to have the team write the plan, no problem. We were very pleased with the product we got out of it.”

**Table 6-1**  
**Terms of Reference**  
**of the Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team**

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1. The planning team will consider wolves and their prey as part of the total ecosystem rather than pursue single species management.
  2. The planning team shall make best efforts to ensure genetic diversity of wolf populations in the Yukon will be protected.
  3. The planning team shall consider the requirement for ongoing research and monitoring of wolves and their prey.
  4. The planning team shall address the short-term and long-term effects of wolf and prey habitat loss and fragmentation.
  5. The planning team shall address consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wolves and their prey.
  6. In all instances the planning team will give due consideration to the needs of subsistence harvesters, and otherwise to the traditional and cultural perspectives of Yukon First Nations.
  7. The planning team shall give full consideration to the planning goals as stated above, as well as Yukon, Federal and Yukon First Nation management goals and objectives as stated in the Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement.
  8. The planning team shall consider and make recommendations regarding wolf control/reduction including both technical and ethical aspects of implementing programs.
  9. The planning team shall address methods of reducing conflict between user groups.
  10. The planning team will address information and education requirements to help people understand wolves and their management.
  11. The planning team shall give consideration to existing government legislation, regulations and policy, including land claims management plans.
-

Three pressures created a definite sense of urgency about the task. The first was a requirement of the Native land claims agreement that the government respond rapidly to any recommendation from the Fish and Wildlife Management Board. Secondly, there was the political pressure to make a decision. Third, biologists and others were seriously concerned that the caribou situation was quickly becoming critical and that the moose population was dropping rapidly as well. Even many of those opposed to wolf control conceded that the caribou herd risked local extirpation. It was decided that the team's plan would have to be completed by the first of September, 1992, so that if the Aishihik situation met the team's criteria for wolf control, then a program could proceed in the winter of 1992-1993.

### **The Participants**

DuGuay and Hayes would have preferred to solicit nominations from organizations, but they were unable to do so because they had only three weeks to choose the members. They wanted a fair representation of a range of views on wolves and their management. In addition, their ideal team would have an equal number of women and men, an equal number of First Nations (Native) and non-First Nations people, a balance between rural and urban residents, and an equal number of consumptive and nonconsumptive users of wildlife. DuGuay and Hayes also thought it was important to have an outfitter on the team (although there are only 22 outfitters in the Yukon, they are quite powerful politically).

According to process coordinator DuGuay, they asked Branch staff members to recommend people in each of these categories who had “reputations for being capable of working in a consensus environment and finding compromises. We had good success in seating the team, but it was not as much from good process as it was good luck. Maybe it worked in the Yukon because we're fairly small here [population 32,322] and the people who are active are fairly well-known.”

Branch staff members generated a list of 25 or 30 people, organized by the eight categories and from that list they wanted to define a team of eight people. Their greatest difficulty was finding people who were available, as the effort was expected to require most of the weekends between May and August, which is a busy time in the north. It was particularly difficult to find First Nations representatives because land claims negotiations were going on at the same time and only three Native representatives were located who were available for the summer.

After the first team meeting, the Council of Yukon Indians complained about their lack of equal representation on the team. In response, the department invited them to appoint another two members to the team, but CYI named only one (Billy Blair).

No member of the Fish and Wildlife Management Board was appointed to the team and this, coupled with the fact that the Board's recommendation to proceed with wolf control had been ignored, caused some hard feelings with Board members. A few members of the Board attended the first two meetings of the team, but the team members found their questions disruptive and requested that they allow the team to meet in private and wait for the result. According to one respondent, the Board was not pleased with this: "They went out and said the team doesn't have any idea what they're doing and all of those things that you don't want to happen."

The final team of three women and six men and the general interest groups they represented are listed in Table 6-2. According to DuGuay, "The reputations of the individuals were good enough that no one attacked them as government spokespeople at all."

All of the respondents felt the team was balanced as far as their views on wolf control. According to team member Patty Denison, the team was balanced as far as Native and non-Native and it had the extremes with a former big game guide and a member of the World Wildlife Fund. The range of viewpoints extended across the spectrum from those who "couldn't imagine even killing just one wolf" to those who "felt that the wolf had little or no value" and many members in between. Babala agreed that the team was balanced in the categories established by Hayes and DuGuay, but he felt it was seriously unbalanced in terms of education: "they put all of the college-educated people on the nonconsumptive side and that made it tough for the rest of us."

## Table 6-2

### Members of the Yukon Wolf Management Team

(Organized roughly by point of view from anti- to pro-wolf control)

<u>General Viewpoint Represented</u>	<u>Representative</u>
Those strongly opposed to wolf control.....	Bob Jickling
Those generally opposed to control .....	Patty Denison
Independent wildlife biologists and ..... those critical of past management	Scott Gilbert
Those who see arguments on both sides .....	Dan McDiarmid
First Nations, not entirely comfortable with ..... wolf control	Juanita Sydney
First Nations; consumptive use.....	Ed Schultz
First Nations, consumptive use.....	Frances Woolsey
First Nations, Native elder.....	Billy Blair
Those strongly in favor of control; outfitters .....	Jim Babala

#### *The agency would not be a member.*

Because the team was to be completely independent of agency influence, the agency was not a member. DuGuay, Hayes and other staff members were often present, but only at the invitation of the team.

“They would ask us to leave,” laughed Hayes. How did he feel about that? “I thought that was great. [Agency] people only came when invited and that’s the way it should be.” Hayes stated that the Branch was very clear that its role was to provide technical information while the team's job was to deal with the social issues. He felt the Branch still had ownership in the result “because we were allowed to comment on all the drafts” and he and DuGuay sat through many of the meetings. “There were no big surprises,” said Hayes.

According to the facilitator, “If the agency had five or six people sitting there, the group would definitely have been constrained. This issue really has less to do with the biology of wolves or of prey species than you might think. The toughest work of the team was trying to reach consensus on the ethical considerations. The agency people all said they would not speak to those concerns because that was not their role as they see it.

They weren't there to say if it was good or bad, just to talk about the biology of wolves and predator/prey relationships.”

According to Jickling, a professor of environmental ethics at Yukon College, the agency was treated like any other commenter and thus it did have input into the process. “There would have been a fair amount of cynicism had the agency been involved. The agency would have had a fair amount of authority based on their expertise as scientists. But in fact these decisions aren't scientific in nature anyway, they have more to do with ethics and social concerns. We allowed the agency to review the drafts and send along comments and they went into the pile like everyone else's. So there was a sense that if we were making any errors of fact or suggesting something that couldn't be implemented, we would hear about it.”

McDiarmid felt the Branch should not be a member. “The resources belong to the people,” he stressed. He said it always ends up too scientific and unworkable with wildlife technicians involved.

In addition to having more ownership in the result, another argument in favor of the agency being part of the team is to ensure that recommendations are within financial and other constraints. While such constraints were discussed, the team was more concerned with whether wolves were being managed properly than whether a budget was being met. “You can't let the budget dictate the goal,” said Jickling. “Either you find the money to do it the right way, or you don't do it. It's not going to be treated lightly. We're not into ad hoc management anymore.”

## **The Process**

### *An experienced biologist/facilitator*

John Bailey, a wildlife biologist-turned-facilitator who calls himself “a strong proponent of real public involvement and co-operative management”, was chosen to run the process. Based in Whitehorse and a personal friend of Hayes, Bailey had considerable experience in wildlife management planning in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, where “co-management”—the equal participation of First Nations and government agencies in setting wildlife policy—has been widely-used for twenty years.

According to him, the Yukon team did not use the Alaska plan as a model, although they looked at it and did use the goals and principles from Alaska's Strategic Plan as a place to start. “Connie [Lewis] was over and I had a long talk with her,” said Bailey. “But our team decided not to take the same approach. The Alaska group never wrestled

down the real issues; I always feel it's a cop out to pass it on to someone else to wrestle down the issues."

### *A firm deadline*

The schedule was tight. The team had five months to digest the technical information, write at least two public drafts of the plan, and engage in a consultation process with the general public to receive comments on the drafts.

Could they have met a few more times if they couldn't make the deadline? "Boy, that wasn't even an issue," Hayes responded. "The one and only expectation that the Branch made was that this plan be ready by the first of September. If it wasn't ready, then the planning team was over."

### *The meetings would be closed, but public comments would be solicited*

Dubbed the "Ghost Team" by a member of the Fish and Wildlife Management Board, the team meetings were closed to the public and the only person to comment on the plan and answer questions was the facilitator. "We became a cloistered jury," comments Denison. "We were supposed to be a non-biased jury, trying not to bring in our own personal bias until we had studied the information. That was very important, and without the press involved, we had time to do that. I personally didn't talk to anyone about this for fear of leaks—that someone would use it for their benefit by taking it to the media or a political group. We were never open to telephone calls, misquoting and all the hype the media brings with it, but I think it really bothered them that they couldn't access us and make some news for awhile."

Jickling agreed that closed meetings were critical. "The meetings were closed and that was absolutely essential. I have a strong sense that if we'd been plucked up there on a stage there would have been opportunity for the audience to divide and conquer."

While the meetings were closed, detailed and descriptive minutes from each meeting were available to the public within one week and were sent to everyone who expressed interest in the process. In addition, the first draft of the plan was published verbatim in the Yukon News and the Whitehorse Star in June and the third draft of the plan was published in July in the Yukon News. Written comments were solicited both times. John Bailey also attended meetings of the Northern Tutchone and he held public forums in several communities to obtain comments on the plan. Transcripts of the public forums and all written comments were given to the Team members.



### *Consensus was the objective*

At their first meeting, the team agreed to strive for consensus. Bailey felt that “this compelled the members to accommodate the views of others and was the most effective means of achieving compromise decisions which best reflected the variation of opinion on the more controversial aspects of wolf management (i.e., wolf control, hunting restrictions). To have used a method of decision-making such as voting would have alienated those members who did not win votes and would generally establish a more confrontational and competitive environment for the team to try to work in” (Bailey 1993, 9).

While the team would strive for consensus, people would be allowed to sign minority reports if they chose not to agree with something. “We certainly didn’t encourage that,” explained DuGuay. “But if we were confronted with it, it was important to have an indication of the respective views. But the individuals on the team really did want to find consensus and came prepared to compromise.”

### **Political and Agency Support**

Without exception, the respondents felt that the government that established the team gave it firm support. Such an approach was consistent with the former government’s general philosophy of a high level of public involvement in decisions.

Asked if he thought the previous government would really have implemented whatever the team came up with, Hayes responded that at the time, “There was no sitting down and saying okay, if it goes like this it won’t be acceptable. There was absolutely none of that. It was very clear, whatever we get from the team, we get from the team. If they said, ‘No way, we won’t ever do wolf control’ then that’s what we would have to do. Now what the politics would say, I don’t know. We’re just the Branch, and there’s a political forum that changes and that really judges where we’re going to go.”

### *Team members would receive an honorarium.*

Unlike most EDS teams, the participants on this team would receive \$200 per day plus expenses for their contributions. While it is standard in the Yukon to pay advisory committee members, Larry DuGuay indicated that this was “the highest honorarium that we have paid for any committee work we’ve ever done. The department’s view was that these people were contributing a great deal and we wanted to place a value on that. I wouldn’t change that—I think it contributed to the team members’ concept of self-worth and in terms of what we got out of the team, it was a nominal cost for the product.”

All the respondents felt the group would have done the job without the pay, but that the honorarium made a very significant statement about the government's commitment to the process.

"I don't think any of us knew what we were going to be paid before our first meeting," said Denison. "Our total commitment was already there—it was a commitment for our whole summer's weekends and we all would have done it without the pay, but [the pay] was an indication of our worth in the agency's eyes."

Jickling agreed that it made a statement: "The pay wasn't enough to make a career out of it and no misuse of it was evident. But we were considered 'consultants' and treated as such and every member felt very much valued."

## ***Negotiation Phase***

### **Introduction**

All of the team meetings took place for two days on weekends. At the first meeting on April 4 and 5, 1992, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Renewable Resources stressed that the team was independent and that he looked to the team for consensus on wolf management in the Territory.

The facilitator reviewed the conditions for the process. The principal conditions were that members would attend meetings as individuals (not as official representatives), they would "develop a plan that reflected all aspects of wolf management and that would allow input from the public (Bailey 1993, 4).

The team then developed and agreed to the following operating procedures (Bailey 1993, 4):

1. The team would operate by consensus, seeking unanimity where possible.
2. All meetings would be conducted "in camera" (in private).
3. A press release would be prepared after each meeting.
4. A detailed meeting summary would be prepared within a week of each meeting and made readily available to the public.
5. The team encouraged written comments from the public, publicizing a mailing address, fax and telephone number.
6. Individuals could be invited to give presentations to the team at the meeting.
7. Once an initial draft of the plan was prepared, it would be widely distributed and public meetings would be conducted.

8. All inquiries from the media were to be directed to the facilitator who would be the sole spokesperson for the group.
9. Resource people would be invited to attend meetings to present material and answer questions of the team members.

Connie Lewis, the facilitator of the Alaska Wolf Management Plan, then gave a summary of the Alaska process. Denison felt that Lewis's "words of wisdom were invaluable in getting us off to a good start. She told us what the pitfalls would be and she was so right. She simply said that there will be issues where it looks like there's no hope, but don't give up, it's there, just keep going with it. The message I got was 'We [the Alaska team] worked really hard, but we didn't quite make it. You're a new team—carry on and go for it!' When we arrived at the troublesome spots, it was as though she had already opened the door a crack. I often thought of her and I mentioned to our group, 'Okay, we're at the point now that Connie warned us about and she said we can work through this.'"

## **Data**

The second and part of the third team meeting was devoted to a discussion of data. It is significant that at these informational meetings, the first order of business was to hear from an elder about traditional Native approaches to wolf management. This indicates the level of importance and respect traditional knowledge is assuming in the Yukon.

"We don't mind killing wolves, but the wolf must not be made a fool of," cautioned a Native elder (Matthewson et al. 1993). The team was told that traditionally, denning had been used to control wolf populations and increase moose and caribou for subsistence. But because of their spiritual value, Native people never tried to eliminate wolves and because the wolf is a clan symbol, it must be treated with respect, even if it is hunted or trapped. The use of snowmachines to hunt wolves could be done in a respectful way, but shooting wolves from aircraft and massive hunting of them could not be. The elder felt that wolf reduction should be done by Natives in an on-the-ground effort.

Next the group heard from three Branch biologists on the status and ecology of wolves, moose and caribou and from an expert on non-consumptive use of wildlife. "The team became very astute in assessing the information given us, pointing out flaws and asking real pertinent questions about the biology," said Denison.

"We had actual Yukon data and many of the questions we had answers to," said Hayes. "We have a good database on long-term wolf recovery—good local information lends credibility. But we said there's a lot we don't know. We do know that if you're

going to do this, kill the whole pack. Small packs actually have to kill [prey] more often.”

The tight schedule made it challenging for the agency to obtain all the information. “There were only one or two weeks between meetings and I was just running like a madman trying to collect all the biological information they requested,” said Hayes. “They had only one day of basic information about wolves, moose and caribou, although they were reading lots of information between meetings. Several members were very interested in the data, but in the meetings, they didn’t want to hear 15 or 20 different biologists. They just went straight to the issues.”

## **Goals and principles**

At the third meeting, the team moved on to discussing goals and principles. Bailey began the session with a copy of the goals and principles from Alaska’s Strategic Plan because that gave the team something to start with that they could then modify to suit their needs.

The goals developed at the third meeting are listed below. These established what the final plan should accomplish. Their first goal was that the plan should insure the long-term survival of wolf populations throughout the Yukon. The second goal included providing for a variety of human values of wolves and their prey—indicating that consumptive use could be legitimate—but it also stated that the plan will provide for the inherent/existence values of wolves.

1. The Plan will be a reference for use by government agencies, cooperative wildlife management boards and other interested parties to insure the long-term survival of wolf populations throughout the Yukon in relation to their prey and habitat.
2. The Plan will provide for a variety of human values of wolves and their prey and the inherent/existence values of wolves.
3. The Plan will identify opportunities to increase public awareness and understanding of wolves and management decisions affecting wolves in the Yukon.
4. The Plan will recommend the conditions under which wolf control may be used to manage Yukon wolf populations. (Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team 1992c, 5).

When the team reached consensus on as many goals and principles as they could, they developed the following structure for the plan, which also served as the basic agenda for the group. Bailey suggested that the first issue should be nonconsumptive use, as this

was the easiest to achieve consensus on. Therefore, it appears as item five, while wolf reduction would be discussed later, after the team became more accustomed to agreeing on some items.

1. Introduction
2. Wolves in the Yukon
3. The principles of the plan
4. The goals of the plan.
5. Non-consumptive use of wolves in the Yukon
7. Management of ungulates in the Yukon.
8. Wolves and agriculture
9. Wolf reduction programs.
10. Public education and conflict resolution.
11. Research requirements.
12. Future review and amendment of the plan (Bailey 1993, 6).

With the exception of the goals and principles sections, the facilitator began the discussion of each section by asking if the members had suggestions for potential recommendations that dealt with the topic, such as nonconsumptive use. After listing all suggestions on flip charts, the team discussed, amended or discarded each of them based on the consensus of the group. During discussions, a separate list was kept of points which members felt belonged in a preamble to the section. These preambles were written by the facilitator based on these points.

During the discussions, there were a few outbursts and even a threat of physical violence at one point, but members said Bailey responded quickly to these. This would be expected because the group's discussions were very personal. "Everyone eventually had to come out and expose their feelings, you know," said Denison. "In debating an ethical issue, say, what value does a wolf have, people had to really look inside themselves in arguing that. If they felt the wolf had no value, eventually they had to say so in this group, and that was traumatic. It was also traumatic for someone else to say they felt the wolf was a spiritual essence. To say those things—it was like talking about God and debating it. It's a very deep, personal thing for most people."

By the fourth meeting, they had completed drafts of the first eight sections and it was necessary to deal with the question of when, if ever, wolf control could be considered. The team, with Bailey's assistance, had been careful to develop a foundation of agreement on goals and principles and less difficult problems before discussing this most controversial issue. "It was still a tough one," said Bailey. "But it would have been a lot tougher—if not impossible—if we had tried to deal with it right at the start."

The Yukon team braced themselves, determined to confront this most difficult problem head-on. As Denison put it, "When we got to wolf control, we had people who wouldn't acknowledge it as even a possibility at all and people who insisted it be in there. It seemed it would just be impossible—we knew it was going to be very stressful, just overwhelming."

### **Conditions when wolf control could be considered**

Respondents used words like "brutal", "very painful" and "I felt just like jello afterwards" to describe their fourth weekend together when they faced this issue. It was clear that most of the participants agreed wolf reduction programs could be considered under certain circumstances, but what those circumstances were varied enormously between the members.

To aid the discussion, Bailey suggested and the team agreed to divide the topic into three sub-issues: 1) a set of conditions required before wolf reduction would be considered; 2) the decision-making process which should be used to decide whether or not to proceed with a wolf reduction program; and 3) the implementation and follow-up required if a program were conducted. After much discussion, the team managed to reach consensus on the recommendations for each of these sub-issues. For a team with the diversity of opinions this team possessed, such an accomplishment required an heroic effort. These three sections are too long to reproduce here, but are included in section nine of the plan (a copy of which is included in Appendix B).

The plan emphasizes that control should be a method of last resort and that ungulates should be managed so that the question of control rarely if ever arises. But if it does, the conditions the team agreed to were:

1. Wolf reduction will be considered when a geographically separate population of ungulates are threatened with local extinction. OR
2. Wolf reductions will be considered when declining or low ungulate populations are such that conservation measures such as a total allowable harvest are applied either through Yukon land claims processes or an equivalent process [e.g. when the First Nations harvest is reduced]. AND
3. If a wolf control program is being considered, biological information, which can include local knowledge and extrapolation from other studies, must be collected over a period spanning two hunting seasons. During this period, a hunting closure will be placed on the area.

The information collected must include the following:

- i) the abundance and status of wolves, ungulates and bears.
- ii) the potential impact of bears as predators.
- iii) the number of ungulates, wolves and bears killed by people.
- iv) the status of the ungulate habitat in the area.

(Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team 1992c, 10).

According to Denison, these conditions were intended “to make wolf control as responsible as possible. It would be a last ditch effort, not a management enhancement tool.”

These conditions do not allow wolf control to benefit sport hunting and do not allow any participation by private airborne hunters in a control action. Certainly this lack of wolf reduction to benefit sport hunters would be a difficult provision for many Alaskans to accept, but it was not a major issue in the Yukon. Also in the Yukon there was “no question” of allowing private airborne hunters to “make a sport out of wolf control.”

According to Bailey, if control were to occur, the team wanted a methodological approach using the most effective and humane means available, which is currently helicopter shooting. However, the plan calls for research on non-lethal methods of control and indicates that traditional methods such as trapping and denning could be considered if shown to be effective.

## **Two public review drafts widely distributed**

Following their fifth meeting on May 23 and 24, 1992—and less than two months from their first session—the team completed their first draft of the Yukon Wolf Conservation and Management Plan. Bailey held a press conference to unveil the plan

and it was published in two newspapers for public comment. “Publishing those drafts in the papers was unprecedented,” commented Jickling. “No other public group has ever done anything like that here. [Because of this] the final plan was not a surprise to anyone.” The draft was also sent to approximately 150 people on the mailing list (Bailey 1993, 6).

The public was allowed time to review the draft before public consultation began. Bailey conducted public meetings in three communities and offered to hold meetings in any other community that would like one (only one responded to his offer). He also hosted radio call-in shows on two stations. The meetings and call-in shows were recorded and copies were provided to each team member. Copies of written, faxed and telephoned comments were also distributed to the members.

McDiarmid thought still more should have been done to solicit public comments because some people are not likely to read an entire plan and write a letter to comment. But he wasn’t sure what could be done. “Just putting drafts in the paper and expecting people to write back doesn’t quite do it—a lot of people don’t respond. There should be a better way. We didn’t have enough public meetings, but the wolf issue is a tough one to hold public meetings on. It’s such a controversy here that half the time you end up in a screaming match.” Bailey was dismayed that the public meetings had to be conducted in the summer, when it is difficult for people to attend.

However, as with most initial drafts, this one received lots of comments. The outfitters were particularly incensed. “That first draft that went in the paper left out a lot of stuff that I wanted put in there,” raged Babala. “My phone just about rang off the hook so many people were calling, asking, ‘Where were you, Jim, out fishin’? Haven’t you been at the meetings?’ Well I never missed one meeting the whole time. There was stuff left out of that first draft.”

In an editorial in the summer issue of *The Outdoor Edge*, a publication of the Yukon Fish and Game Association “for western Canada’s organized anglers and hunters”, Rob Moore expressed a common complaint that hunters are less likely to read drafts of management plans, less organized, and less likely to write letters than preservation-oriented groups. He wrote that the “‘information overload’ format seen in the [news]papers is a common tactic used to discourage many potential readers” and urged “Yukon hunters persevere!!” He claimed that the draft favored “preservation and promotion of wolf populations at the expense of ungulates and hunters. The underlying thrust...is to stop hunting in the Yukon” and urged hunters to join the Yukon Fish and Game Association and express their concerns (Moore 1992, 38). [The Fish and Game



Association did support the final plan, however, and called for the government to endorse it].

The team was somewhat discouraged by the comments they received, but Bailey pointed out that “at least 80 percent” of the comments were actually on the tone of the preambles of each section, while there were far fewer comments on the consensus recommendations of the team, which are the essence of the plan. At a meeting in mid-June, the team edited the tone of the preambles, which according to Bailey “was not difficult” and they made a few changes in the recommendations. The new draft was reviewed only by the team members and after their meeting in July, a third draft was published in one newspaper. Far fewer comments were received on this draft. The team met for their eighth—and last—meeting on August 29 and 30, 1992. They “considered the comments they had received regarding the second public draft and made some minor editorial corrections. The team members then signed off on the finalized [plan]” (Bailey 1993, 7).

### **The final plan produced on schedule**

On September 2, 1992—precisely on schedule—the Yukon Wolf Conservation and Management Plan was submitted to the Minister of Renewable Resources. Everyone experienced a sense of elation—and relief.

“Let me tell you, when everyone passed that plan around and signed the cover—there was a tremendous feeling of accomplishment,” said Bailey. “The strip of middle ground is very narrow on this issue. This was an extremely delicate consensus and I told the Minister to be very careful about making any changes, because it's very much a package. Several points may seem innocuous to someone else, but almost every element in that plan went through an exhaustive and at times exhausting discussion to get there. It's almost like a spider's web—if you change any element, it would be easy to upset the whole thing. You couldn't get closer to the outfitters without having a strong reaction from the other side and vice versa. It's not a “hunters” plan nor a “wolf-lover” plan, but the team did get accused of both.”

“I'm really proud,” said Denison. “I truly feel that the plan is representative of a wide spectrum of people with different views and different values. It is an ecosystem-based plan and we tried to look at the wolf independently, but always remind ourselves that it is simply one species that is part of a whole. It involved compromise and that is the only way this issue can make any headway at all. Most members were willing to give a lot. The plan is not what I wanted or could have imagined—it's not my perfect plan. But it

had enough of what I believed was important and I think all of us felt that way. People were surprised that it's such a small plan, but it captures the essence."

"I was pleased that we used words like 'resource' and 'use' far less than other plans do," said Jickling. "This was to reflect the idea that wolves and other species are not simply utilities. The plan makes it clear that wolves should not be treated as vermin, but should have the same kind of regard as other big game species. And the plan doesn't set up an irrefutable formula for deciding about a particular issue. In my mind, it creates an opportunity for ongoing discussion."

"I eventually got the basics of what I wanted in that plan," said Babala. "I'm for wolf control, but just at certain times. I'm not one of those who believes that every wolf should be done away with. There's plenty of room for wolves in the Yukon. But if game herds have been decimated, steps need to be taken. If hunters caused the problem, then hunters should be put on quotas. But wolf reduction may still need to be part of the strategy. If there hadn't been a wolf reduction clause in there, I don't think it would have been well-accepted at all. People would have been so steamed up—there would have been so many hot people around here. But this way, there was a little bit for everybody and I think that's what made it successful."

Some outfitters still did not like the plan. According to Bailey, "Some outfitters who phoned me thought that the conditions in the plan are too restrictive and that it will be impossible to do wolf control, but that's patently false. The agency biologists responsible for wolf control certainly don't hold that view."

## **Other provisions of the plan**

### ***Inherent values recognized***

Most of the respondents wanted to emphasize that the plan is not a wolf control plan. Denison and Jickling were quick to point out that the plan highlights the inherent value of wolves and that non-consumptive uses and viewing opportunities are important. The plan states that ungulate management must have as its objective that "populations are not allowed to reach levels where wolf reduction might be considered necessary" and it stresses that key ungulate habitat areas should be given full protection from development.

### ***Methods and monitoring***

The plan states that helicopter shooting is currently the most effective and humane means of reducing populations, but recommends that non lethal means such as birth-control (which has been used successfully to control fox populations on a limited basis)

be considered. It also states that “some traditional methods of wolf control which involve increasing trapping and hunting efforts or killing pups at den sites could be considered as alternatives to shooting from helicopters.”

If wolf reduction is necessary, the plan has two “fail-safes” to halt a program if results are not as expected. First, if calf survival of the target ungulate species in the area has not increased significantly (at least doubled) during the first two years of wolf reduction, the program should be suspended and the situation re-evaluated. Second, if the population level of the target ungulate species fails to meet the predictions of the experimental design after five years, the reduction program should be suspended. It also calls for a ban on all hunting of the target ungulates for the duration of the reduction program and specifies some alternatives for obtaining meat for the local subsistence hunters. It also recommends that only one wolf control program which uses helicopter shooting should be conducted in the Yukon at any one time.

#### *Public education, conflict resolution, and research*

The plan calls for increased public education to dispel the myths held by both extremes in the debate—that wolves are villains who kill for the sake of killing on the one hand, and that wolves are harmless predators who kill only the sick and the weak on the other. In an editorial, Babala stated that many people base their views about wolves on inadequate information: “the once-in-a-decade camper knows all about bears and wolves and so does the high school teacher who makes an occasional river trip...The majority of [those opposed to wolf reduction here] have never been to the Yukon, nor do they take time to understand the entire Yukon Wolf Plan. The wolf is not the ‘mouse specialist’ as stated by Farley Mowat, but is very capable of killing the largest of big game animals.” (Babala 1993).

The plan also recommends that First Nations people and others outside government be given the opportunity to work out their differences in co-management groups established by the Yukon land claims.

Finally, the plan specifies research requirements in several areas, including traditional knowledge, so that wildlife management will be better-informed, less dependent on extreme measures such as wolf reduction, and more in keeping with a holistic, ecosystem approach.

#### *No “zones”, but conservation areas recommended*

Some people in Alaska were surprised that the Yukon plan did not include zones where wolves would be managed differently. But in Bailey's opinion, members of the

Yukon team “decided that zones did not resolve anything. It was a sense that if there is a ‘right way’ to manage wolves, that should be appropriate everywhere.”

Larry DuGuay felt that “Alaska’s zone approach would allow more than one wolf reduction program at a time and our team felt that this is such an extraordinary management tool that it should not be used in more than one area at a time. So zones weren't necessary.”

However, the plan does specify that “conservation areas which provide habitat protection over very large areas should be identified and designated.” According to one respondent, the words “habitat protection” (not wolf protection) are key here.

## ***Implementation Phase***

### ***“I didn't appoint 'em”***

DuGuay and Hayes indicated that they lobbied hard in support of a complete government endorsement of the plan. But shortly after the team submitted its final plan, a more conservative—but minority—government was elected. Described by an ardent opponent of wolf control as “somewhere to the right of Attila the Hun”, the new government was strongly supported by outfitters (three former outfitters are in the six-member Cabinet), and it pledged to “do something” about the Aishihik caribou situation. John Bailey considers the change of government to be “one of the larger factors that account for the fate of the plan. If we hadn't had a change of government, the plan would have been adopted right away.”

The new government is composed of six people who are all elected and are members of the Legislature as well as Cabinet members. Bill Brewster, the newly-elected Minister of Renewable Resources, is a “tough old-timer” and former outfitter who has lived in the bush all his life. In Brewster’s mind, the wolf management team was strictly advisory: “That's right. And I didn't appoint 'em. The other government appointed 'em and I think they did that just because they didn't have the guts to do what I have to do now [reduce wolves in the Aishihik area].”

But didn't the last government indicate that if the team reached consensus, the result was highly likely to be adopted as policy? “Well that's why they're not in power anymore, because they made some stupid remarks like that. Why would any government that's elected by people appoint somebody who will turn around and walk all over you and you can't do nothin' about it? You'd get hung politically.”

## **Council of Yukon Indians Objects**

In addition to the change of government, the Council of Yukon Indians (CYI) surprised many when they announced that they would not endorse the plan. Minister Brewster said he would not sign the plan until the First Nations' concerns were taken into account (one respondent felt Brewster was “delighted to have this avenue out of the tough spot” of giving other reasons why he wouldn’t sign the plan).

CYI alleged that the plan did not have enough traditional knowledge incorporated in it nor did the plan have adequate participation by the First Nations in its development (although four of the nine representatives were First Nations people and the CYI was asked to name a fifth, but did not do so).

According to one respondent, “The CYI’s objections were political—there were other things happening that had nothing to do with the plan that compelled them to object. They work in a political field that I can’t even imagine and they’re going through the steps they have to do.” They did not wish to discuss what they thought these “other things” were.

Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that when the team members were selected, many CYI leaders were preoccupied with critical land claims negotiations. But Bailey thought they could have done more to take part in the negotiations: “they [CYI] declined a fifth seat on the team and one of their appointees, while effective when he attended planning sessions, missed most of the meetings due to other commitments. The other aboriginal members who were on the team brought a valuable perspective to the group, but if the CYI was not satisfied with these nominees, they should have used the opportunity they had to nominate another member to the team. Furthermore, they did not use the opportunities they had for review of drafts of the plan effectively and likely could have addressed the concerns they had by participating fully during the planning process. Future similar processes should ensure the full commitment by all participants prior to beginning” (Bailey 1993, 11).

In the summer of 1993, Department biologist Hayes worked with the fourteen First Nations to draft what is essentially an appendix to the plan, including more specifics on how traditional knowledge will be used in managing wolves and how the First Nations people will be involved in implementation. Hayes pledged to thoroughly address their concerns in this “implementation plan.”

Prior to completing the implementation plan, Hayes said, “We will do an implementation plan with the First Nations and we will respond to all of their concerns which were documented in their letter to the Minister. The Natives want to be recognized as part of any management actions. They want more specifics on their role in wolf

control programs, what local tools they can use before aerial control would come into play and how traditional knowledge and methods will be incorporated. CYI and the various bands have to agree to any wolf control in local areas...They are very concerned about getting the wildlife populations back up. We'll be able to satisfy them."

### **Fish and Wildlife Management Board accepts the plan**

Following CYI's announcement of their concerns, the Fish and Wildlife Management Board also refused to accept the plan. Considering its earlier objections to the entire team concept, this was not surprising. However, former wolf management team member Patty Denison became a member of the Board in the fall of 1992. According to Denison, "I argued long and hard on why they should adopt it not only for wolves, but other management issues. Eventually they did. As I had told them, in one instance the Board made a decision and then they could turn to the plan and say 'This is why we made this decision'. The plan was helpful. I think the wolf plan is very threatening to a lot of people because it changes the status quo dramatically. It's not going to be very comfortable for people who have enjoyed unlimited access to these resources. But the Board is now [June 1993] calling for the government to endorse the plan and that's a big step.

### **Aishihik "caribou enhancement" program announced**

While Alaska was embroiled in controversy as a result of their own wolf control proposal and was preparing for the Wolf Summit, the Yukon government announced on January 12, 1993 that a "scientific approach" was to be taken to recover the Aishihik caribou herd. According to the press release, the "project's design follows all of the criteria outlined in the Yukon Wolf Conservation and Management Plan" (Yukon Government 1993).

There were calls by animal rights organizations for a tourism boycott and the Department received some 2,000 letters of protest. According to Minister Brewster, the letters indicated a poor understanding of the environment in the Yukon, "some of these people are saying that we should have dogs out there looking after our sheep and caribou—well clearly they don't even know what they're talking about." [Caribou are not herded by people. But this idea was tried on a reindeer drive across northern Alaska in the 1930s. Wolves ate the dogs, as well as the reindeer.]

According to Hayes, of an estimated wolf population of 210, biologists killed 60 wolves from helicopters in the spring of 1993. Another 50 were killed by other means [illegal, private use of poisons was suspected]. Brewster indicated that by the summer of

1993, caribou calf survival appeared to have markedly increased and the program was likely to boost the caribou population after just one year.

### **Did the 1993 Aishihik program follow the plan?**

There was considerable controversy locally over the control action, but with an interesting new twist. This time, people were basing their arguments on whether or not the plan had been faithfully implemented. The Yukon Conservation Society and others claimed that the control violated the plan's requirement that hunting be stopped for two years prior. While caribou hunting had been stopped, moose hunting had not. The First Nations people had volunteered to stop moose hunting, but the government had granted five moose permits to two outfitters in the area. Since the outfitters were not going to stop moose hunting, the Natives also refused to stop, and according to one biologist, this meant that another three or four times as many moose would likely be taken from the area. While moose are not the target species of the control program, their population is definitely depressed and many feel there should have been a two-year moratorium on moose hunting before a wolf control program began.

Another strong objection was that the government was not implementing the entire plan. Very much a carefully-crafted package, the plan specified many other recommendations in addition to the criteria for assessing a proposal for wolf control. Plan provisions such as limiting the hunting seasons and bag limits on wolves were intended to officially recognize the inherent value of the species. Conservation areas were to be set aside to serve as a scientific control area to compare with regions where wolves were reduced. None of these were addressed by the government prior to the wolf reduction program.

Jickling was very disappointed in what he saw as the government's "selective implementation" of the plan: "The plan is a package and the package as a whole needs to be accepted. Aishihik didn't even come close to meeting the plan's provisions."

Was the plan implemented selectively? "Well yes, because it's just a guideline right now," Minister Bill Brewster said flatly.

Asked in the summer of 1993 if they expected the government to endorse the plan soon, respondents had a range of reactions from "I hope so" to "all hell will break loose if they don't," but everyone expected eventual endorsement.

Minister Bill Brewster indicated that he would take the plan to the Cabinet as soon as the details were worked out with the First Nations and "I will fight for it. I know we have to have some type of plan like this so that everyone understands the goals." Then will the Cabinet sign it? "Well I think so," he replied. "But they may knock some things out of

it—they may say that they won't take certain sections. That's the privilege of people being elected to government.” Could he specify what those sections might be? “No way,” he said with a hearty laugh. “You're not gonna corner me on that one.”

### **CYI's concerns addressed**

Hayes worked with the 14 First Nations during the summer of 1993 to write an implementation plan which addressed their concerns. In an interview in October, 1993, Ray Quock, who helped review the implementation plan on behalf of CYI, indicated that the implementation plan was acceptable to CYI. According to him, the plan, which will function much like an appendix to the original plan “clearly outlines First Nations involvement in issues like this [wolf control].” He felt the problem had stemmed from inadequate First Nations representation when the team was formed and that the three Native representatives the agency had chosen “were not the ones the CYI would have chosen.” But Quock now supported the plan and hoped that the revised version would soon be endorsed: “They [the Yukon Party government] would be committing political suicide if they didn't.” (Buckley 1993b, 32).

### **An attempt to shelve the plan**

But to everyone's surprise, instead of endorsing the revised plan, Brewster announced in early December 1993 that the cabinet “won't pass the [plan] until at least 1995.” People were particularly perplexed by the reason he gave, which was that First Nations groups were not adequately consulted when the plan was first written. The First Nations now supported adoption. Lawrence Joe, a First Nations representative from the Aishihik area, responded that he was disappointed by Brewster's decision. And Bob VanDijken of the Yukon Conservation Society said “it seems public consultation is being used as a tool to try to delay this” (Buckley 1993a).

Public opposition to the decision to shelve the plan was swift and strong. The Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society issued a statement opposing the decision. Trevor Harding, a Yukon legislator, asked, “Given that many people—including the wolf planning group and the First Nations—dispute [Brewster's] new process excuse, will he now tell us why, in straightforward terms, he will not adopt the plan?” (Blackburn 1993, 1).

In an editorial, one member of the public denounced Brewster as “just plain wrong...He said Yukoners hadn't been adequately consulted. Wrong. Yukoners were consulted and no group is objecting to the plan. His weak-kneed, quivering reply that the plan drafting process was flawed won't wash with Yukoners who kept track of the plan's



development. He blamed CYI for holding things up. Wrong. CYI's concerns have been addressed. When is the Yukon Party going to stop using so-called problems with CYI and First Nations as a cover-up for the Yukon Party's hidden agenda?" (Hardly 1993, 7).

### **About-face: The Yukon Party endorses the plan**

Within days of his announcement that the plan would be shelved until at least 1995, Brewster did an about-face and announced that the cabinet had endorsed the plan. What precipitated this abrupt turn-around? According to one observer, "We'll never know exactly what happened because the cabinet meets in camera [privately]. But it was looking more and more like a handful of outfitters against everyone else. They were increasingly isolated and the intense local pressure for endorsement must have finally gotten to them."

According to McDiarmid, "They weren't bending to pressures from groups outside of the Yukon—that didn't seem to bother them—but when the Yukon people started to say 'You should implement this plan in order to carry out this [wolf reduction] experiment properly' and 'Why did you waste all this money doing this type of plan and getting it approved by all the different parties if you're not going to implement it?' The pressure from within the Yukon—and from within their own Department of Renewable Resources whose biologists were mostly behind it—is what forced them to implement it."

In the spring of 1994, helicopters were used to conduct wolf control in the Aishihik area. There were some protests. Wildlife Branch vehicles were vandalized and a road was blocked temporarily by protesters. A few individuals even chained themselves to the balcony of the Parliament chambers—which was seen by some as a particularly odd and ineffective form of protest. But there were no major reactions and the control program continued as planned.

## IV. Was the Team Successful?

This section assesses the success of the team based on the criteria established in Chapter 1. The following results are based on both in-depth, open interviews with nine people and more focused written surveys of the team members themselves, sent out in May 1994. The survey results regarding the success of the effort are presented in Table 6-3. Seven of the nine team members completed the questionnaire, five of whom had also been interviewed.

## ***Was it perceived as fair?***

With CYI's concerns addressed, all of the respondents felt the process was basically fair, although there were suggestions for some fine-tuning, and these are discussed below. No one felt the agency or the government was trying to manipulate or "co-opt" them. Everyone felt the promise that the team would have absolute authority was genuine and fair. All of the respondents interviewed in the summer of 1993 were disappointed that the plan had not yet been endorsed, but they did not blame either their process or the plan itself for that.

Six of the respondents felt that the team had reached consensus on all the major issues, but one member pointed out that "some issues were just not 100 percent consensus. But do they have to be?"

## ***Was it efficient in time and cost?***

Without exception, everyone agreed that the effort was efficient. The plan was definitely efficient in terms of time, requiring only five months (and only eight meetings) from start to finish. According to biologist Bob Hayes, the entire cost was about \$90,000, including staff time, and the agency felt the expense was very reasonable considering that it is "a very big issue" in the Yukon.

Bailey thought the entire cost and the honorarium were quite reasonable: "I've been involved in lots of plans and if you can get one done for less than \$100,000 you are doing very well. Also, I would have found it unusual if [the members] hadn't been paid. "

## ***"We wanted the product to stand alone"***

The team produced a carefully-worded document that addressed all the issues they had set for themselves. From their first meeting, producing a written consensus agreement was their primary task and Bailey strongly encouraged the team to produce a plan that included both broad goals and measurable targets.

At a time when it seems that most professionals in the dispute management field are focused more on process than product, this strong emphasis on the product itself was striking. According to Hayes, "We wanted the product to stand alone. We wanted *it* to be remembered, not the process that created it." Significantly, six of the nine respondents used the words, "the plan has a life of its own now." They firmly believed that the document itself had a power and influence that could not be ignored.

**Does the agreement outline clear goals and set measurable targets?**

A review of the plan indicates that it does outline clear goals and sets measurable targets. As McDiarmid put it, “One thing I like about it is that everything the plan says should be done can be measured. We wanted that. Some argue you can’t measure all of the things, but I really think you can.”

**Table 6-3**  
**Indicators of the Yukon Team's Effectiveness**

(7 out of 9 team members completed the survey)

YES	NO	Yes & No or not sure	Indicator
7			Do you feel that the Yukon wolf planning process was fair?
7			Was it efficient in terms of the agency's time and money?
7			Did the team meet its purpose?
6		1	Did the team reach consensus on the key issues?
7			-Was the final plan technically accurate?
7			-Was it based on adequate, reliable data?
6		1	-Are the resources involved conserved as a result of the plan?
7			-Is this approach sustainable over the long term?
	5	2	-Have irreversible decisions been made?
5	2		Is there a method for detecting & responding to negative effects?
7			After your report was released, did it have a broad base of support?
3	3	1	Has the level of controversy diminished as a result?
4	2	1	Is the government currently implementing the plan?
6	1		Has it increased the level of trust and insight between groups?
2	1	3	-Was this a lasting phenomenon?
7			Did you find it personally rewarding?
6	1		Are team members more active and/or entered new leadership positions?
7			Would you be willing to participate in such a team again?
2	2	2	Was the groundwork laid by the Alaska team important to your success?
7			<b>At this point, do you think the wolf planning team and/or the plan was a success?</b>

## ***Wisdom of the agreement***

While the true wisdom of the plan can only be judged in the long-term, a sincere attempt was made to minimize negative environmental effects and to consider the entire ecosystem, not just the wolf. The team certainly tried to keep this holistic perspective in drafting the plan. The plan requires that specific research questions be answered and several criteria met prior to beginning wolf reduction and includes what the team members call “fail-safes” to ensure that a control program is stopped if the results are not as predicted. These and other provisions of the plan attempt to conserve wolves, their prey, and their habitat in perpetuity. In addition, the plan emphasizes the “intrinsic value” of wolves, a concept that was controversial in the Alaska plan and which was not included in Alaska’s final draft.

In the Yukon, the original plan and the implementation plan also recognize the potential social and cultural impacts of the decisions. Both the original and the revised plans emphasize the value of the traditional knowledge of the indigenous peoples of the Yukon, the need to sustain their subsistence way of life, and the need to integrate their concerns in both the decision-making and the implementation process. They also recognize both nonconsumptive as well as consumptive values of wolves and their prey and that people have many different, but valid concerns about the issue.

## ***Stability of the agreement***

### **Does the agreement have a broad base of support?**

Everyone agreed that the plan has a broad base of support. With the exception of CYI, whose concerns were addressed, no organized group came out in opposition to the plan. Several conservation groups, including the World Wildlife Fund, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society and the Yukon Conservation Society called for endorsement as did the Yukon Fish and Game Association—the Territory’s principal sport-hunting organization.

Asked in the spring of 1994 why the government finally endorsed the plan, Babala said, “There was a good deal of support for the plan and the process. People here wanted it.”

In the summer of 1993, Hayes said, “You get nothing from the conservation groups that there’s anything major wrong with the plan. At first most of the outfitters hated it. They thought it would be too hard to do any wolf reduction, but that has changed now with Aishihik. The First Nations people thought it was too cumbersome, that it didn’t

respect local knowledge of population declines and what was out there before, that it was too scientific and too representative of western traditional values. But that is being addressed in the implementation plan. Almost everyone now is in favor of it's adoption."

Bailey felt the breadth of the Yukon Plan helped to create this support: "The Yukon exercise dealt with all aspects of wolf conservation and management, including non-consumptive use, hunting and trapping, the management of ungulates, research, public education and wolves and agriculture. The broad scope of the [plan] resulted in a more useful and effective management tool for wildlife managers and also indicated a clear commitment to consider more than wolf control programs. This was particularly important in generating widespread support for the plan" (Bailey 1993, 9).

### *Has the level of controversy diminished?*

In 1993, most of the respondents thought the controversy had diminished somewhat and that most of the problem was that the government took so long to endorse the plan. DuGuay thought the controversy had diminished partly because the plan managed to split what had been an alliance between animal rights and conservation groups.

At that point, one respondent said, "There's a lot of unhappiness about the government not endorsing the plan—and from really different people. It's not just conservationists, because a lot of very consumptive-oriented people are just saying 'Come on. Let's endorse it and get on with it.' It makes a lot of sense to the average person."

Babala: "There never was much conflict here locally. There's a few local guys opposed to reduction who gather up and do a lot of quick writing [to the paper] all of a sudden, but the people who are for wolf reduction only come out when it's really hot and heavy."

Bailey: "The fact that it hasn't been adopted yet has created a conflict in itself. Were it adopted, it would certainly decrease some of the conflict over the issue."

Denison: "The public debate continues, but now the letters in the paper are 'when are you going to adopt the plan' and they're coming from all sorts of people. It has had a calming effect—people take comfort in being able to refer to something."

*The plan split the alliance between conservation and animal rights groups.* DuGuay had an interesting observation on why this plan succeeded—one that echoed Doug Pope's opinion of what failed to happen on the Alaska plan: "We asked the team to give us direction on the moral issues and the team said yes, under certain conditions, we find it morally acceptable to utilize a control program as a management tool and they developed stringent conditions for its use. But that won't persuade an animal rights

activist—you will not change their opinion—and in that sense, the controversy has not been lessened. We expected to be open and honest with animal rights groups, but never expected them to find it acceptable because they're morally opposed to it. However, we saw a likely split in what had been the opposition. The other types of groups are conservation organizations with considerable clout, like the World Wildlife Fund and the Sierra Club. They wanted to see a plan with a sound biological foundation and a community-based planning process that was at arm's length from the government. Our planning process met those conditions and hence the debate has been less strident and difficult than it might otherwise have been. While it wasn't targeted to them [the conservation organizations], I think it muted their criticism. In the past, boycotts have been successful because conservation organizations and the animal rights groups were in the same camp on this issue. This time, that alliance isn't there. The criticisms that we've had [as of summer 1993] are not so much that we've started a control program as that we haven't endorsed and implemented the plan in its entirety."

But in 1994, the team members were equally divided on whether the conflict has diminished. Now, following the endorsement of the plan, the debate has changed to a question of whether or not the plan is currently being implemented as it was intended. Four of the respondents felt that it is, two felt it is being implemented selectively, and one said it is still too early to tell on some points. According to McDiarmid, "Yes, the government is following the plan now. But we'll have to see, after the control, if they follow through with the research and other requirements."

Team members Gilbert and Jickling both thought that the plan was being implemented selectively by the current government. Jickling was particularly concerned about the possibility of the new government reviewing the plan and breaking the fragile alliances. "It is not a done deal," he cautioned. "If they reopen the process and stack it with their cronies, they will trash it."

In a letter to the Whitehorse Star in February 1994, 72 Yukoners protested the wolf kill in the Aishihik area. "It is important to be clear that all opposition to this kill does not come from 'outside.' Many Yukon residents also oppose it, and urge you to take the opportunity that the second-year review provides to terminate further wolf reductions" (Whitehorse Star, 1994).

### **Are provisions included for renegotiation?**

The plan specifies that it is to be "reviewed" in five years, but it is unclear just who will conduct this review.

## ***Has it increased the level of trust and insight among all parties?***

Everyone agreed that the level of understanding between interest groups had definitely increased, but for two members, trust was another matter. Babala “There’s a couple of members I wouldn’t walk on the same side of the street with or have anything to do with them and they probably feel the same about me. Trust is a funny word—I understand them more, put it that way. We know one another now and how each other thinks.”

McDiarmid, “Trust and understanding? It has with me. I understand a lot of people more than when I started, I got a broader outlook on different interests. I would say that 90 percent of the team trusts each other. Only [a few of the members] don’t trust each other. The rest were pretty happy.”

## ***Did participants find it personally rewarding?***

All seven of the team members surveyed felt the process was personally rewarding and six of the seven felt that they were more active and/or had entered leadership positions as a result of the team experience.

When asked if he found it personally rewarding, Babala replied, “I certainly did. I do quite a bit of writing and I wrote a book a while back. You know the character of people and people’s ways are real important and I got quite a bit out of it. In fact, when I write another book, I’m going to go over that stuff. I’ve spent my whole life with wildlife in the Yukon and Alberta, but this was the first time I had anything to do with wolf extremists. That keeps a man’s interest up.”

First Nations representative Juanita Sydney said the effort was inspiring because it had given her the opportunity to positively change wildlife management in the Yukon. She added that since the team experience, she has become a local Conservation Officer and that the team experience “has added to my ethical side.”

McDiarmid: “Personally rewarding? Oh yes. Certainly. Opened my eyes to other people’s points of view. I learned a lot about wolves and wolf and prey relations. It was really educational—it was just like going back to school. We could use whatever resource people we needed. Negotiating skills? Well, I feel I’m more willing to compromise with people now than I was before I started. Before I had a much more one-sided opinion, whereas now I’m much more willing to see someone else’s side of the story.”



“We all went through a lot of discoveries and painstaking thought and emotion and it broadened us all a bit,” thought Denison. “I would often think back and say, ‘That person would never have said that two months ago.’ It wouldn’t have even occurred to them. It was an honor to work with all of those people. There were surprises—like a consumptive user reminding a person on the other side that an important nonconsumptive point had been overlooked! The experience is one I will never forget. I lost some friends over it, some who felt I was too much in favor of wolves. One person I knew well called and screamed at me for literally forty minutes. That was a disappointment. I guess that’s why I equate this to religion.”

All seven respondents agreed that they would be willing to participate in such a team again, but one specified that it would depend on the time of year.

The members were divided on whether the groundwork laid by the Alaska team was important to their success. Two thought it had played a role, two thought it had not, and two thought it had “somewhat” or “perhaps.”

Juanita Sydney felt that Alaska’s experience had helped. “We had a framework set for us through them; their downfalls and successes were guidelines for us.”

## ***Did participants view it as a success?***

***It managed to find that “narrow strip of middle ground.”*** All the respondents felt that the team had risen to meet the challenge and, on the whole, the effort was successful.

Team member Jim Babala

Yes, it’s been successful to a certain extent. I got basically what I wanted. It’s been accepted by the Wildlife Branch, by the First Nations people and by the Yukon Conservation Society. There’s a few things in it I’d prefer a little different. It leaned over too much toward protection for wolves. It got to be more of a protection deal for wolves than it was a reduction deal. In fact, it took quite a bit of going before we got any reduction in it. But you know there’s two sides to everything, the way I looked at it. What I found that makes this successful is that none of us thought we were 100 percent satisfied. Take Jickling—he never thought he had everything he wanted and neither did I, but maybe that was for the better. If either one of us had been 100 percent satisfied, it would have been all one way. This way, both sides had something.

Facilitator John Bailey:

This team took an issue with extreme and firmly-held views and they managed to put together a plan that found that narrow strip of middle ground. It did allow for control under certain circumstances, but it made wolf control accountable and it dealt with other things like viewing opportunities and inherent values. People aren't doing cartwheels over it, but overall they feel it is reasonable and

it has been well-received. This process can work and work much better than when the government just tells people what it will do.

Team member Patty Denison:

I would love to do it again. The team was very successful. I think we surprised everyone including ourselves. We were asked to do the impossible and we all tried. My greatest surprise was finding that, when given a task of working together and not just arguing but coming up with a solution, we could do it even though we were totally polarized. Working with the help of an exceptional facilitator who was able to get the best out of everyone, we started out with absolutely no agreement and worked and worked until we did find some middle ground and that was so exciting. People can be trusted. This type of team could work anywhere. If nothing else, we showed that a random group of people can work together and do something truly monumental.

Larry DuGuay of the Wildlife Branch:

Was it successful? I think yes. But is the measure of success whether it gets formally adopted? I don't think so. I think the measure of success is whether the government gets judged according to the standards that are in the plan and I think that is happening. Regardless of whether it is formally adopted, it really has a life of its own now here in the Yukon and nationally in Canada and even in Alaska. However, I do hope the government does adopt it and does proceed to implement it in a systematic way. There were some people in the department who participated very reluctantly in this process, but have since seen a lot of value in both the approach taken and the product. It will have a positive influence, although we probably wouldn't use the entire concept except in cases of extreme controversy.

Wolf Biologist Bob Hayes

They were very successful. This process has given us good ideas about how to manage all of our wildlife better.

Team member Bob Jickling:

The team was successful, we did arrive at consensus. I quite liked the way it worked. Given the representative voices of the people involved, the various kinds of perspectives were right there in the room the whole time and the net result reflects the same kind of breadth that we might have had if there had been a Territory-wide survey. But another team might not work as well. Ours worked because it was fair and the particular clutch of people worked well together and were fair-minded and reasonable. Not reporting to organizations allowed us to move quickly. There was a sense of urgency and members committed themselves to completing a plan everyone could live with.

Team Member Dan McDiarmid:

I think it was successful, mainly because it was diverse and all the different factions got something out of it. Nobody got everything they wanted, but everybody got something. What made it succeed was the level of public support—the plan is workable both for biologists and average Yukoners. It doesn't get bogged down with a lot of scientific facts and jargon, yet it was developed with a large amount of both scientific and traditional (local) knowledge.

Minister of Renewable Resources Bill Brewster:

I personally have a little problem with it...There are fourteen First Nations here and we signed the First Nations land claim agreement where we said that we'll keep food here for them and that's a commitment. We have to move a little faster than nature moves in providing that food for them.

In summary, by almost all of the criteria, this process was successful. It was perceived by those involved as basically fair. The agency felt it was efficient—that the time and cost were very reasonable for what they received. I find it remarkable that any team could produce this type of plan in just eight meetings. The team produced a written agreement that has “a life of its own” and which sets clear goals and measurable targets. To the extent that wisdom can be judged in the short term, the team made a serious effort to consider the entire ecosystem in their decisions and to follow the principles of sustained yield. The plan has a broad base of support, the level of conflict has diminished within the Territory and also nationally since the agreement split what had been an alliance between animal rights and conservation organizations. A government that opposed many points in the plan was eventually compelled to endorse it. The plan has been implemented (thus far, but some items require a longer time to implement). These factors should contribute to the plan's stability. The agreement gave power to ‘regular people’ and—counting the implementation plan that was added later—it requires a new level of input and control by First Nations people. The level of understanding has definitely increased and, overall, so has the level of trust. All of the team members interviewed felt the process was personally rewarding. And everyone but Minister Brewster felt the effort was a success.

## V. Was the Team's Design Conducive to Success?

This section examines whether this team's design was consistent with that recommended in the literature. If so, then the design may have contributed to this team's success. If it did not follow some of the recommendations, then either these are not critical or there were other compensating factors.

### ***The Purpose***

As shown in Table 6-4, this team met all of the criteria established in Chapter 2 regarding the purpose. It located at an appropriate point on the ladder of possible tasks, the dispute was ripe for settlement in this jurisdiction, the purpose was clear and inspiring, there was a sense of urgency, the task was a complete and meaningful whole which the team had considerable authority over and the team definitely felt ownership of the product.

**Table 6-4**  
**Did the Team meet the Purpose Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**  
(9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Purpose
7			Was the purpose clear?
7			Did you find the purpose inspiring?
7			Was there a sense of urgency to complete the task?
5		2	Did you have the correct amount of authority?
Definitely*			Was the task a complete and meaningful whole?
Definitely*			Did the team feel ownership of the product?
*Based on the interviews, not the survey			

#### **Did the team locate at an appropriate point on the ladder of possible tasks?**

In Chapter 2, I postulated that the more amenable the dispute is for settlement, the higher the team can locate on the ladder of possible tasks, with the “highest” task being development of an implementable agreement. This gives the team substantial, if not complete, authority over the result. The Yukon team did locate at this point and the resulting ownership in the product would be expected to be very conducive to success. With the exception of Minister Brewster, all the respondents thought that this was not only conducive to success, but the only effective way to approach the issue (this question is explored further under “Political Connections” below).

According to Bailey, “I think having the team actually write the plan was the best way to do things in this case...I have a lot of experience with co-management and the evolving process of moving a lot of responsibility for management away from centralized government agencies and having more public involvement in these things. If you want these issues to be more reflective of people, then you use government biologists for technical advice and load the team members up with information. Wolf management biologically is relatively straightforward, but you have the team wrestle with the ethical points. When you do a wildlife management plan, you’re always going to get criticism

from some quarters, but if the government writes it, you're going to increase the criticism and you're alienating the public just by having the government be the authors. In this case, the team owned the plan; it was their property, not the government's."

Patty Dennison's opinions on this issue agree with what the management literature would predict. The task of this team was a complete and meaningful whole and the team clearly had ownership of the product. Without this level of authority, Denison thought that the dynamics and level of commitment would have changed. "If the task had been just to develop recommendations, it would have changed the dynamics quite a bit. It would have been hard to get that level of commitment, since the result might or might not be used. When it was over, everyone [on the team] was quite sensitive to the possibility that someone could come along and change any of it; it became a very personal thing for the team—it was definitely *our* plan."

But the team's level of authority was inadequate for two team members. Although this team was mandated to come up with whatever plan they saw fit, as McDiarmid saw it, "if the political will did not like the outcome, they could have thrown it out and wasted a lot of time, hard work and money. Luckily there was enough public support to force political opinion. I feel this is very important to the success in this case." He pointed out that anything that demands so much effort should have more than luck to see it through.

As discussed in Chapter 2, several factors determine whether a dispute is amenable to settlement. An evaluation of these criteria for this particular case is presented in Table 6-3 below. These indicate that the dispute was reasonably ripe for settlement.

Although some thought Jickling and Babala were not willing to negotiate and compromise, all of the team members interviewed (including Jickling and Babala) felt that they were personally willing to compromise and that they thought most of the other members felt likewise.

The interests were defined, the issues were clearly identified at the outset, and the parties agreed on which issues to address. The groups were not seeking to establish legal precedents, but the government felt it would be wrong to define a range of potentially acceptable decisions (whatever the team came up with was to be acceptable). The government that organized the effort strongly endorsed it. When the team began, there was a high level of uncertainty about what might happen in the absence of negotiation. The respondents disagreed about whether the previous government would have instituted a control program without a team effort, indicating uncertainty about what might happen with the existing government, and with an election coming up, there was no greater certainty likely in the future. Thus, both camps could potentially gain more by coming to the table. No one knows if an effective core of "moderate" people exists on both sides of

the dispute on the national and international level, but most respondents believed that a core of moderates do exist within the Yukon itself.

**Table 6-5**  
**Was the dispute ripe for settlement?**

<u><b>largely</b></u>	The parties were willing to negotiate and compromise
<u><b>yes</b></u>	The interest groups/constituencies were clearly defined
<u><b>yes</b></u>	The issues were clearly identified
<u><b>yes</b></u>	The parties agreed on the issues to be addressed
<u><b>yes!</b></u>	There was a sense of urgency to resolve the dispute
<u><b>correct</b></u>	Groups were not seeking to establish legal precedents
<u><b>no</b></u>	The primary government agency or decision-maker defined a range of potentially acceptable decisions
<u><b>at start</b></u>	The affected government agencies were willing to endorse the effort
<u><b>yes</b></u>	There was a high level of uncertainty regarding the outcome in the tradition forum
<u><b>yes</b></u>	The parties potentially had more to gain by negotiating
<u><b>locally</b></u>	There was an effective core of moderate people on both sides of the argument
<u><b>?</b></u>	Fundamental values were not involved
<u><b>yes</b></u>	It was possible to reframe the issue into solvable increments

***Does this dispute involve fundamental values?***

This question was added to the interview guide later in the research and two people responded to it. Jickling thought that fundamental values are involved, but that none were compromised here: “Yes, fundamental values are involved,” he said. “You see, I teach environmental ethics, I am strongly opposed to wolf kills and I was deeply concerned about compromising fundamental values. But we never did anything that I can recall that someone absolutely refused to agree to. In the end, I felt like I could live with everything—and I am not saying that lightly.”

For McDiarmid, negotiation is *never* impossible, “if the participants go into it with an open mind, you can count on them to come out with a plan on just about anything.”

### **Was the team’s purpose clear and inspiring?**

According to the management literature, a clear and inspiring purpose is critical to success. No respondent hedged on this question—everyone expressed enthusiasm and conviction that it was definitely inspiring.

“It was a clear task and people really gave it everything they could,” said Denison.

McDiarmid responded with a laugh, “Was the task inspiring? Oh my yes. It was inspiring all right. Just the purpose itself is inspiring to me—to try to come up with a management plan for wolves and the difficult issue about whether you should do aerial wolf kills or not. When I got into it I was just thoroughly inspired by doing it.”

One distinction about this effort compared to BC and Alaska is that the purpose was clearly to go beyond the question of wolf control. The first goal of the plan was to be the long-term conservation of wolves throughout their present range in the Yukon. The item listed in the terms of reference was that the team will consider wolves and their prey as part of the total ecosystem rather than pursue single species management. These goals were ones that all of the team members could agree to at the outset. Thus, they recognized some common ground even before they took their seats at the table.

Their task was as complete and meaningful as is possible and without question, the team felt ownership of the product.

## ***The Participants***

Table 6-6 presents the participant criteria which are discussed in detail below.

### **Were all potentially-affected interests invited? Was it balanced?**

According to Bailey (1993, 9), “the two main criteria used in selecting the team members were to find people who would reflect the spectrum of views on wildlife management which exist in the Yukon and to have participants who would be likely to work toward consensus...the team represented the varying views very well and members usually demonstrated an interest in achieving consensus.”

With the exception of animal rights activists, the potentially-affected interests had been invited and were represented. All the respondents agreed that the team was balanced as far as their views on wolf control were concerned and that it was balanced in many other respects as well. However, the team may have benefited from more balance



among the members with respect to education levels and abilities to articulate their concerns. One member was unable to attend many of the meetings and this also caused a lack of balance in the opinion of some respondents.

**Table 6-6**  
**Did the Team Meet the Participant Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**

(7 out of 9 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Participants
5	1		Were all potentially affected interests invited?
2		5—didn't know how chosen	Was the process of choosing members fair?
2	5		Would it have been better for interest groups to choose their own representative?
	6		Your members represented themselves instead of organized groups. Would you change this?
4	1	2	Was it a problem that those opposed to wolf control had more formal education than those basically in favor of control?
2	4	1	Should some members have been from the rest of Canada?
5	1	1	Were First Nations peoples adequately represented?
6		1	On the whole, were members articulate and tactful?
7			On the whole, were members good listeners?
1	4	1	Would it be better NOT to have real quiet people on a team?
5	2		Did most of the members have good negotiating skills at the start?
6	1		Did most of the members have good negotiating skills by the end?
3	4		Is it important to have good negotiating skills?
7			Were some members opinion leaders?
3	1	2	-Should opinion leaders be included?
6			Were moderates included?
6			-Should moderates be included?
4	2		Were members reasonably well-informed prior to the team?
4	2		-Should they be?
5	1		Did all of the members have a genuine stake in the outcome?
5	1		-Should all members have a genuine stake in the outcome?
4		2	The Branch was not a member. Was this preferable?
1	5		Would you change the size of the team?

Importantly the team was not divided “for” and “against.” According to Hayes, “The team was not pro-control versus anti-control. There were two people who had those views, but overall most people had a good feel for the problems of both sides. The best arguments were for conservation—which are not necessarily anti-control. One person represented the outfitter’s viewpoints, but he was very open-minded about some of the things on conservation of wolves. He was into trade-offs: ‘Okay, I’ll give you this if you’ll give me that.’ He basically wanted to make sure wolf control remained one of the possible tools. He ended up getting a great deal of flack from the pro-control people because they felt he let them down and that was real hard on him. Real hard. But in the end I think he saw a very good plan.”

The agency had difficulty locating First Nations representatives because the land claims were going simultaneously and many of their most experienced people were not available. CYI complained about their representation following the first team meeting and they were invited to appoint two additional members, but chose only one who happened to have little previous negotiating experience. According to DuGuay “My one disappointment was that at the end we didn't have the buy-in from First Nations. A few of our First Nations representatives weren't participating very effectively and one was unable to attend, so there was perhaps not as strong participation from them as we would have liked. More public consultation would have incorporated their concerns.”

The two First Nations respondents were divided on whether they were adequately represented and whether traditional knowledge had been adequately considered. On both questions, one said yes, the other no. One said she didn’t know what all the fuss was about since CYI had had an opportunity to designate representatives, but the other thought CYI should have chosen all of the First Nations representatives. Denison thought the plan will contribute to the importance of traditional knowledge and help empower First Nations people, “The plan gives great importance to local, traditional knowledge which has not happened in the past. It calls for more co-management and that will eventually build trust with First Nations people.”

Bailey: “They [the agency] tried to represent the spectrum of views on wolf management and they did that. Wolf management doesn’t have too many different views, but those that exist are held fairly strongly. A dozen or less people could easily represent the range of views on this issue. They probably should have had more input from groups on who should be on the team, not that they would be there to represent them, but they would have some input on who they were and they would be confident that their views would be represented. But the weakest representation was from the First

Nations, yet they were the ones who actually suggested the people who could represent them. But with the land claims their best spokespeople were tied up. Ed Schultz is a good spokesman, but he was very busy and didn't come much. We needed stronger representation. I had to do a lot more drawing out with them. They tend to be more reticent in that type of setting and I run into that all the time in my work. You have to make sure others do not dominate and draw out the First Nations people, not always, but generally."

Jickling: "The team was balanced and the representation was pretty good from people who have nonconsumptive interests and that hasn't always been the case in the past. There were enough of us. We aren't opposed fundamentally to hunting, but we represent a value set and there were enough of us there to have an impact."

Only one respondent felt that it would be preferable *not* to have real quiet people on a team, and that person identified themselves as "one of the quieter ones." The rest agreed with Scott Gilbert who said, "Quiet does not translate to thoughtless or unimportant. If you want outspoken leaders only, give it to the politicians." Most respondents felt that Bailey had done a good job of drawing out the more quiet members and one mentioned that a round table seemed to encourage greater participation. In Gilbert's opinion, if Bailey had done any more he would have been perceived as "picking" on the quiet ones. "Bailey frequently went over what had been written up on the board seeking dissenting opinions. Anyone that disagreed was given lots of opportunity to say so!"

Babala thought that although the initial team was balanced with regard to the main issue, a combination of overly-quiet members, members who did not attend, and members on the "anti-control" side who had more education left the "pro-control" side at a significant disadvantage: "It was balanced as far as for and against wolf control, but not on ability to speak out. They had one person there who never spoke enough words to earn [their] breakfast...and they had another person who was just too easy-going. [They were] for wolf control, but wouldn't come out and defend it. I was the one who pushed the hardest and at times I felt I was the only one. Ed Schultz and I were pretty much on the same side [but he couldn't attend very often]...I told him, 'We sure could have used you, it got pretty hot and heavy.'"

"Overall, I don't think it was a fair pick," said Babala. "The other side was more educated than our side. Denison, Jickling and Gilbert—they have the education on their side. There wasn't anyone highly educated on our side. They have more education on paper than I have. My opinion is they're just a little bit slicker, that's all. Take a fellow like Gilbert [who has a PhD in wildlife management]. Boy, could he manipulate words and change things around to suit himself! Instead of a 'will be' he would put 'may be' or

‘could be’. We had a big go-around over that. I’ve only got a grade ten education and that was years ago in a small mining town school. I think they were quite surprised—they didn’t think I knew as much as I did, because I read a lot and write a lot. But when they choose people, they should try to get education even. Don’t have one side with little education and then go and get some university people that’ve got degrees for the other side. When they get these educated-type people, make sure that there’s some on each side.”

But McDiarmid thought this was actually an asset: “I thought the education on one side and not on the other made a good balance in that they brought out scientific points and we brought out the common peoples’—trappers and hunters and those who live close to the land—we brought out their points of view.”

McDiarmid also brought out an interesting point on the benefits of choosing both extreme and moderate members: “I think sometimes Bob [Jickling] and Jim [Babala] couldn’t see each other’s point of view but they were really the only ones. I don’t think that stalled the process, I actually think it may have helped it. Although I often agreed with Jim, I found myself trying to help him see Bob’s side. Even though I didn’t agree with Bob’s opinion, I could understand what he was saying and I found myself trying to explain it to Jim and point out that we should remember the other side’s concerns. So it was important to have them there. They both had such extreme outlooks on it that the rest of us, who could see both points of view, tried extra hard to find common ground between them. We tried to include some of each [of their concerns]. If either one of them had been missing, the plan would not have been as balanced.”

As indicated in Chapter 2, it is important to have some idea how potential team members will function. Many corporations use simulations to show both the participants and those choosing the members how they might respond in a similar situation. Hayes thought that in this case, they should have screened nominees more effectively for their ability to express themselves and a dispute simulation might have been helpful here. As Hayes said it, “The team was not balanced in the articulation of the views. If we did it again, I would ask the nominees more questions about wildlife management and their ideas about wolves. I would try to get a good feeling for that, not to exclude people’s philosophies, but to find out how much they have thought about these issues. That’s important. They need to have a clear position so they can articulate those views as well as possible. If they can’t articulate that very well, they will not be very effective on the team. We put the team together so quickly—it was a matter of ‘we’ve got to get them in two or three weeks, let’s run the list through and try to pick somebody.’ I’m not saying there was anyone unsuitable for the team, but a few didn’t provide the level of input we

expected. That's just a matter of being able to spend more time to meet with them and get a feel for how they express themselves."

**The agency: "We're not here to bother you."**

The Wildlife Branch was not an official member of the Team. They were asked to leave three or four times so that the team could meet privately, but otherwise Hayes and DuGuay and sometimes other Branch staff were present. However, they were there to provide technical and logistical support, not to negotiate. This is at odds with the EDS literature which indicates that a team's agreement is much more likely to be implemented if the agency is involved as one of the negotiators. But with the exception of Brewster, all of the respondents were strongly in favor of the agency playing no more than a support role.

Hayes thought that the Yukon Wildlife Branch is much more willing than other agencies to restrict itself to technical issues and let the public decide the social ones. "The department made a clear statement, 'We're not here to bother you. We're here to help you in any way we can,'" he said. "That's the difference between the Alaskan plan and the Yukon plan: it's a difference in the agencies. In the Yukon, we're very clear about this. The agency can tell you about the biology, but when it comes to what people want—the social issues—that's for the public to decide and that is clearly the most important part of the puzzle on an issue like wolves."

DuGuay also supported this concept, "This was an independent team and we were only there at their invitation. We had an independent facilitator and he was very independent. As in many of these processes, the agency did want to influence events and John [Bailey] kept us from doing that. He was really strong that way and strong with the team. One of the reasons we had the success we did was because of his ability to work well with those people and to insulate them from some very hot political and public concerns about the subject matter. We tried to insulate the team from those things so they could really grapple with the issues."

The majority of members preferred that the agency not be a member and felt that the agency had effectively restricted its role to simply technical support. But one claimed that the agency was a *de facto* member. "The department representatives had considerable and ad hoc influence over the agenda of individual meetings and were privy to every draft of the minutes of our meetings. I thought they *were* trying to influence the outcome *at times*."

### **Who selected the participants?**

In this case, the agency chose the members. If there were strong distrust of the agency, this might be perceived as an attempt to construct a rubber stamp committee. But none of the respondents felt it was.

Did the government stack the group with yes-people in order to get a quick agreement? “Absolutely not,” declared Denison. “I’ve heard that and I was really offended by that. Personally I was wary of the government and most of us kept a distance from them. We did not want their presence in the room when we were debating, we would ask them to leave.”

DuGuay and Hayes thought having the agency choose the participants worked well, perhaps because the Yukon has such a small population and people know each other. However, they would solicit nominations from all the interest groups if they had to do it over.

### **Did the participants have good negotiating skills**

The literature indicates that personalities are very important to success—that effective teams depend on effective team players. Can certain personalities be so difficult that they need to be removed from the team? The literature indicates that this may be necessary at times. While this is probably true, this case indicates that the skill of the facilitator may be even more important than the personalities of the individuals—that if the right strategies are employed, a crisis such as removing a member may be averted. Bailey indicates that he has never had to remove someone and hopes that he never does:

“Most of our members were very good at consensus building,” said Bailey. “But I did get close to the point of wanting one person removed with some of the [type of discussion] that was going on—but I talked with him, that I didn’t want that stuff at the table.” He said that how the participants sit at the table can make a difference. He has found that placing strong adversaries next to one another rather than opposite each other—the classic confrontational position—helps reduce the tension between them.

“I’ve had some real problems in the past,” he continued. “Usually if things are getting really rough I call a break and lay it out to the person that this can’t continue. In all cases, that has managed to get things back on track. I’ve never run into a situation where it just becomes completely unworkable—there are many things you can do before it gets to the point of removing someone. I’m sure it can happen, but I don’t want to see it happen. With wolf management, public perception is a big part of it and if someone is kicked off the team for whatever reason, you are going to run into big problems. Although, believe me, there were times when I’d like to have seen a number of people

just evaporate immediately because we would be so close to getting somewhere and then someone would be so contrary.”

One respondent felt that some moderate, consensus-builders are essential on a team: “There were one or two people on the team who had a very neutral, soothing effect. When they spoke, and reminded us of our objectives, we could move forward again.” Bailey also indicated that two of the members (one from each “camp”) were unusually good at consensus-building—they were continually looking for ways to meet everyone’s concerns. Asked how things might have gone in the absence of these two members, Bailey paused thoughtfully, then replied, “It would have been much more difficult. I might have had to play a more active role [in crafting possible agreements] and it probably would have taken more time.”

### **Were opinion leaders involved? Were moderates included?**

The respondents indicated that there were several people on the team who had moderate positions and who “could see both sides” of the issue. But they thought that, with the exception of Ed Schultz of the First Nations, this was not a group of opinion leaders when the team began. This is another way in which this case differs from the “textbook” ideal, possibly challenging the importance of opinion leaders on a team.

McDiarmid feels that it would have been hard to find opinion leaders on this particular issue. “I’m a trapper, but I don’t know if I could influence trappers. Wolves are such a strong issue, it would be tough to change anyone’s opinion.”

### **Who did the participants represent?**

There are basically two options here: members may represent themselves or organized groups. The literature presents the advantages and disadvantages of each, but is not conclusive about the preferred strategy. In this case, the members represented themselves, not organized groups. (However, it should be noted that two members were in touch with organizations. Jickling indicated that he spoke with conservation groups both during and after the process, but more for input than to try to garner their support. Some team members felt Babala was put in the position of having to represent the outfitters so that he was not as free to express his own opinion.) The lack of official representatives should make it easier to reach consensus, but it would be expected to lead to a lack of firm support for the decision. But as discussed above, this plan does have considerable support.

All of the respondents who were asked this question directly said they would not want to approach this any other way. The following are representative of the responses:



Bailey feels strongly that members must represent themselves, not organized groups. With official representatives, “you have members there who have fixed views that are actually the views of their organization and they are not able to have the kind of flexibility that you have to have from people if you’re going to reach consensus.”

Denison concurred, “I understand BC had professionals and lobbyists on the team. How can you go to the table with an open, unbiased mind if you have that pressure behind you to perform for your group in a predetermined way? That can’t work. That’s impossible. It might be a wonderful exercise in debate, but you would never produce anything. Jim Babala was the only one on our team who had a lot of pressure from his constituents and he would leave a meeting just fine and then come back very upset and say he didn’t mean to say something last time. I felt very sorry for him. I felt we were the losers there because we didn’t really get to know his own personal feelings. And if everyone had been in that spot, it would have been just a mess.”

“I would absolutely recommend that you keep organizations out of the story,” said Hayes. “It’s wrong. You’re not going to get the consensus of individuals that have a broad spectrum of views if you make them responsible to reporting and reflecting groups.”

But what do you do if the organizations object to the result? “Well, tough,” he continued. “But the fact is, we didn’t get that from any of the organizations at all.”

### **Was the team’s size appropriate to the task?**

The literature is not conclusive regarding the ideal team size. In this case, there were nine members on the team and all but one felt this was fine. “The size was just right,” said McDiarmid. “If any bigger, you could have gone on for a long time, but any smaller and you would have missed a lot of different ideas and different avenues to explore things.”

However, Babala made the point that with a few more members, it would not matter as much if one or two people are absent.

## **The Process**

Table 6-7 presents the survey results regarding the process criteria. These are discussed in more detail below.

## **Was a neutral intermediary employed?**

According to the criteria, if the issue is very contentious (as this one certainly is), a neutral intermediary is essential. But there is debate in the literature about 1) whether facilitators should have knowledge of the substance of the dispute and 2) how “active” an intermediary should be in pushing the members and crafting possible solutions. These questions may never be fully answered, because facilitating is an art, not a science, and there are many different yet effective styles. In this case, the facilitator did have knowledge of the subject area and was quite active in pushing members toward agreement and somewhat less so in crafting solutions.

Bailey was familiar with the debate and pushed the team to do what he calls descriptively—“wrestle down” the issues. Having had experience on other large carnivore plans for grizzly and polar bears, he also had a clear idea of what should go into a wolf management plan. In his opinion, his background in biology was “absolutely helpful. I think it’s critical that the facilitator knows something about the substance of the debate. It’s not enough to know just about facilitating—to me, you have to understand the subject area.”

Five of the seven respondents who were asked had the highest praise for Bailey’s ability. Denison, for example, had great respect for his skill: “He was completely neutral—to this day I have no idea what his personal views are on wolf management. He was very good at not losing it, even though they were all extremely stressful weekends. Some of them were just impossible, just terrible. But he was very good at staying calm, encouraging everyone and keeping us together. He would say, ‘You know, you’ve been going around and around, does anyone see any new avenues?’ He kept moving people ahead and keeping us to the point. The process involved very complex workings on many levels—emotional, psychological, cultural. There were men and women and First Nations and non-First Nations people and we express ourselves quite differently. He had to be sensitive to all of that. It must have been very draining.”

According to Hayes, “The plan was pretty much what I expected. But how it was done—I really didn’t expect it to be as smooth as it was, but that was clearly the contribution of the facilitator. He was pretty ruthless at times. He would not let an issue go on and on and would not let people back away from an agreement they had made earlier. He pushed them to work evenings instead of taking two extra meetings. Some thought he was simply driven. He was accused of being biased by both sides. Once he got agreement that there were some conditions when wolf control could be considered, he wouldn’t let that go. He insisted that they be specific about it and wouldn’t let them go back to talking about general ethics and morals. ‘What exactly would you recognize as

conditions?’ he would ask. He really went after those issues in a strong way—he was very directed. That might seem manipulative, but when you’re in an issue like this, you have to be fairly pushy or they’ll never agree and you have to get people back to the point right away. He also has a strong background in biology, which was important. His involvement was really key.”

All of the respondents thought that Bailey was quite forceful in pressing for agreement and all but one felt this was helpful. Survey respondents wrote comments such as “he had to be to keep the ball rolling” and “we needed him to keep us on track.” Denison said that the dictionary defines forceful as “effective and persuasive.” She felt the facilitator’s relatively forceful approach was very effective and helped the team through very difficult times when dealing with the most sensitive issues.

**Table 6-7**  
**Did the Team Meet the Process Criteria**

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Criteria concerning the Process
5	1		Do you feel that facilitator Bailey was fair?
2	4		Would you change anything about his approach?
6			Some have said Bailey was quite forceful. Do you agree?
5	1		If so, was a fairly forceful facilitator helpful in this case?
			How deal with strong differences of opinion?
			Would you change anything about how dealt with?
4	2		Did Bailey do a good job of drawing out quiet ones?
5	1		Was a climate of openness and trust established?
5		1	Was team spirit present?
4		2	-Does some of this remain today?
3	3		Did the team stop frequently enough to evaluate their interaction?
	5	1	Were small break out groups used?
5	1		Did you use brainstorming?
6			Was significant work happening between meetings?
6			Were your needs for data fully satisfied?
5	1		Did you have adequate opportunity to hear or read conflicting scientific opinions?
3	3		Were Native traditions and indigenous knowledge adequately explored?
2	3	1	Was it difficult to integrate scientific and indigenous information?
4	2		Given his wildlife biology background, did Bailey play a critical role in data gathering?
4	1	1	Is it important for facilitators to have a strong knowledge of the subject being debated?
			Did certain members emerge as leaders?
			Was such leadership helpful?
3	3		Was your deadline appropriate?
5	1		Did the group meet frequently enough?
3	2	1	Was it appropriate for the team to end after submitting its report?
3	1	2	Would it have been better to have the team to continue to meet occasionally to review implementation and provide input?

Asked if they would change anything about Bailey's approach, all but two said they wouldn't change a thing. One said that he would increase the respect shown the facilitator by some participants and some members of the public. And another said he would change just one thing: "I'd replace him."

It is not unusual for both "sides" of a debate to feel at times that a facilitator is biased against them. It is probably no coincidence that both "extremes" in this group complained at certain points that the facilitator was biased. Jickling complained to Bailey at one time that he felt he had been manipulated into agreeing on some items.

On the other side, Babala was compelled to confront Bailey at one point: "I had to get after him one time. I came home so mad I was just burnin' and my wife said 'Call him, that's the best thing to do.' So I just got on the phone and I told him right to his face he was biased toward the wolves...After that he seemed to back down a little bit."

It could not have been easy to have two quite polarized members on the team—one of whom was more vocal than the other—and make both feel that they have been heard. For his part, Bailey indicated that if he had any bias, it was for a plan he felt the team could reach consensus on. He pointed out that in his experience, people tend to claim the facilitator is biased when they feel they did not come out well on a particular point. He felt that the best indicators of his neutrality in the group were that, in the end, both extremes in the debate felt they had "won" on points important to them and that during the discussions, people on both sides of the issue—within and outside the team—claimed he was biased. "I got calls from outfitters who wanted to know if I went to the 'Farley Mowat School of Wildlife Managment.' They felt we were establishing conditions that would make wolf control impossible, which wasn't the case. And I was also accused of being strongly pro-wolf-control by the other side."

McDiarmid, who had attempted to find common ground throughout the process, was concerned that potential joint gains had been left on the table at the end. He expressed what team members often find at the end of such an effort—that the group was overly anxious to finish the process near the end: "When we felt we were getting close, we wanted to rush it and get it over with. People were burning out. Babala and Jickling were starting to disagree again about things and the team tried to rush to avoid opening that conflict. But I think the facilitator should have slowed the process down to make sure that we did a proper job without rushing at the end. On a few issues we were 90 percent in agreement, but we should have tried harder to get that last 10 percent, just to make sure we had really done our best and that everyone's concerns were fully addressed. I also felt that toward the end he spoke a bit too much of his own opinion, but he did a good job up until the end. Did I think he was biased? Yes, a little bit, yes. Not a

whole lot, but it seemed what he tried to do was—near the end—instead of helping out one or two people who were in opposition to what we were talking about, he attempted to bring them around to everyone else’s opinion. He shouldn’t have—I think that should have been the team’s responsibility. Mind you that seemed to happen only at the end, that’s why I say that I think at the end, instead of speeding up and trying to get it finished, the process should have been slowed a bit. I know everybody wants to get it finished and you’re tired of doing it and arguing and such, but that’s a really important part, right near the end.”

### **Was a climate of openness and trust established?**

This is identified in both the EDS and the management literature as a critical ingredient for success and the preponderance of opinion was that this case met this criterion. Those who responded directly to this question indicated that the climate was conducive to an open exchange (responses are listed in alphabetical order).

Babala: “It [the climate] wasn’t bad. The members were pretty good listeners.”

According to Bailey, “The Branch tried to find people who would try to reach consensus; who didn’t have everything thought out in black and white and if they didn’t get their way they’d storm out. But we had a bit of that. We had a few problems with the extremes on both ends and there was the odd personal comment that got tossed across the table. But again, that’s my job to sort that out, halt the proceedings, take a break and have a talk with the people involved to ensure that they conduct themselves in a civil way. I tried to get people to sit in different places, so they wouldn’t sit right across from each other, which is your classic confrontational position. You’d be surprised when someone’s sitting beside you, you’re much less inclined to get into a raging argument. And I would have chats with all the members between meetings or at breaks to try to prevent personal conflicts from arising.”

Denison: “Everyone treated each other with a great deal of respect, we became a very close-knit group. Out of all the hours we were together, I found that really amazing. I can only think of two times when things got quite heated and personal quips were said, but the facilitator stepped right in when those happened. I heard that in BC they let people get away with a lot of those tactics.”

Hayes: “They had a real ability to work as a team. Even though some were not as articulate as others, they did really respect each other’s views in a meaningful way. That was really positive.”

McDiarmid: “Everybody listened well and the commitment was definitely there and I think trust developed fairly quickly. We had team spirit, I would say so. Everybody

went along pretty well, even when the first drafts came out and some real radical responses came back all the members involved were in agreement on comments that came back that were really radical one way or the other. Everybody agreed that there had to be compromise.”

### **Was a step-by-step problem solving process followed?**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the EDS literature indicates the importance of following a step-by-step process and this case met this criterion.

Bailey describes his strategy: “How discussions are structured is certainly a critical element of the process,” said Bailey. “My role was to structure the discussion, keep things rolling, at times sort of pushing people, at times bordering on pushing a bit too hard. The way I organized the discussion was to first establish what the sections of the plan would be and have an open discussion, brainstorm ideas and then go through each point they listed. I did the drafting of the plan myself—once they have a draft in hand, it’s easier. I tried to get the team to agree on anything, just to get people accustomed to the whole notion that they can sit there and agree whole-heartedly with the opposite side of the table. We tried to go through what I thought were things we could reach agreement on easily and that did happen. No one wanted wolves eliminated from the Yukon and that was a starting point and we built from there. We spent a fair amount of time on ungulate management. Everyone could agree that ungulates should be managed in such a way that you don’t have to consider wolf control again. Everyone agreed that we don’t want to do wolf control and want to avoid it. We came to agreement on the basic principles fairly quickly and then, as we were working through the specifics, I would try to make sure the group was still consistent—I would say, ‘Look, this does not seem consistent with your principles.’ So it was very important to have a very strong consensus on the principles first. Once we had that in hand and we were functioning as a team, then we moved into the tough issues. They were still tough, but not as hard as they might have been if we’d dived right into them. I’m sure Alaska tried to find points they agreed on before moving on to the touchy issues. But in that case, I don’t think they tried to work on the touchy issues quite enough.”

“I talked to all the members fairly regularly between meetings,” Bailey continued. “Often they were having a real tough time coming to grips with an issue. Keeping morale up is a big part of my job. It was tough on them, we were working at a fast pace and people got the feeling that they were caught up in a fair amount of momentum, because I was pushing them pretty hard. That took considerable discussion between meetings to be sure they were not being steam-rolled. It was a very fine line to try to

keep everyone on board right until the end and have them sign, but not be bullied into signing it. That was just a very delicate operation.”

Denison describes the writing process this way, “There was nothing off-the-cuff about a single word of the document. None of that came easily without exploring as many avenues as we could before putting it on paper—every word, every sentence. We’d do a sentence and then someone might say, ‘It just doesn’t sound right’ and then someone else would suggest a better way. It was very exciting because it wasn’t one of us doing it, it was all of us. Working on the wording was really inspirational at times, really wonderful—we really wanted to build a vision...Each person was important. Some people talked constantly and some didn’t. Bailey would always bring the quiet ones out, and when they spoke, everyone listened carefully. They had clearly been thinking very hard and chose their words carefully.”

### **Were there deadlines? Did the group meet frequently enough?**

The deadline was tight, the group met frequently and there was a sense of urgency regarding the plight of the Aishihik caribou herd. The literature would indicate that this should have been an asset to the team’s performance by helping the group “keep their eye on the ball.”

But while no one wanted to do away with the deadline, most thought a little more time would have been helpful, as would meeting in the winter instead of the summer. The respondents thought frequent meetings were basically a good idea (they met almost every weekend until the first draft was complete).

Babala felt the deadline was too tight, that they needed a few more meetings and that they should have continued to meet once a week until the final plan was finished. McDiarmid thought two more meetings would have improved the final plan, but beyond that, more time was not necessary.

Bailey: “I would say we could have benefited from a bit more time. It would also have been preferable not to have it over the summer, because people are very busy here in the summer months.” However, he would not change the once-a-week schedule they used for developing the first draft because “that was important for keeping the momentum going.”

DuGuay felt that less frequent meetings would have been easier on the members and that more time overall would have helped: “The schedule had advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, meeting that frequently means you keep the momentum going and that worked really well. But it was a brutal and tiring experience for some. For humanitarian purposes, I think it would have been better to take more time and have



meetings maybe twice a month. More time also would have allowed us to incorporate more public consultation into the plan. I think you could do it in the eight to twelve month range.

Hayes, “I think going quickly into the plan was a good idea. They really sat down and didn’t play around with things. They digested piles and piles of data but they did not get bogged down in the technical details. They realized they only had a short time to do it and the facilitator was very good at getting through all the points in the plan.”

Jickling: “The imposition of the deadline definitely helped. Knowing that the Aishihik issue was out there and needed attention helped us perform the work. That was in the back of our minds that we had to get something in place right away for evaluating this issue.”

## **Monitoring**

The team disbanded when the plan was completed. The team was divided on whether this was a good idea. Three thought it was, one was undecided, and two members thought that at least a few follow-up meetings would have been helpful, although one commented that this would be “unthinkable” under the current government. Others felt that if the team continued to meet, the fragile consensus would collapse.

One respondent was opposed to keeping the team together: “I don’t think that having the team still together would make any difference...The group tried to make the plan fairly clear so there wouldn’t be debates afterwards. To me, the public should monitor the government’s implementation, not the team.”

Denison agreed that monitoring was unnecessary, “The plan really has a life of its own now and it doesn’t need the team to stay together in order for the plan to go forward.”

Jickling: “Disbanding the team seemed appropriate at the time. Sometimes we argued for hours over a single word, so it was a very delicate balance. Had we stayed together there might have been a temptation to have the plan reopened and it would have unraveled—it would have been a mess.”

McDiarmid: “Monitoring? I think that will be done anyhow by the different groups. It would be hard to do that because you’re looking at a five year period—it would be time consuming. I think you would have to rely on different groups in the public to see that that’s done. There’s certainly something in it for them to see that a section that they’re really keen on is implemented. So they would just naturally monitor that section themselves. That’s why its important to have something in there for everyone.”

## Political and Agency Support

Table 6-8 presents the political and agency support criteria which are discussed in more detail below. Political connections were quite strong at the outset: the government initially gave the group complete authority to develop the plan, although their result would still require the approval of the Minister. According to the criteria, both the political connection and the high level of authority should have been very conducive to success. The respondents agreed that it was. But the change of government severed this connection and almost derailed the plan. To avoid this, one respondent felt that connections should have been made with both the existing government and the opposition party while another thought such plans should be adopted prior to an election.

**Table 6-8**  
**Did the Team Meet the Political Support Criteria—**  
**Results of Team Member Written Survey**  
 (9 out of 12 members responded to the Survey)

Yes	No	Yes&No or Not Sure	Political and Agency Support
6			Are teams still worthwhile if next administration can ignore a team's work?
2	4		Did your team have political clout that helped force eventual endorsement?
5		1	Should anything be done to ensure that a team's work survives a political change?
2	2	1	Was there an effort by the agency or others to promote the team's image and build external support?
5			Did the agency give the team the money, data, speakers, and resources it needed?
6			Did they give the team recognition for its efforts?
3	3		Do you think the honorarium contributed to your effectiveness?
4		2	Should most teams be paid for their time?

In Denison's opinion, "It was a good decision to let the team write the plan, because we debated the issues at great length and from those debates, the plan evolved. If we had done those debates just to make recommendations and then someone else had put it in

their own words or given it their interpretation it would never work. Every word took on meaning and most of us can remember all of them and how they got there.”

McDiarmid thought the effort had given power to ‘regular people:’ “It gave groups who don’t have political power a chance to put their points of view forward and try to do something for the politicians that they couldn’t do themselves. It doesn’t pack political power because the Minister could just say no to the plan. But it gave them a chance to do something that the government couldn’t do. The government could not have sat down and written a plan that expressed the opinions of all of the different factions. I think they would have had biologists and legal people do it and it would have lacked the First Nations point of view as well as just regular people, what *they* felt about it. It would have been more scientific.”

The team’s effort was seriously (though unsuccessfully) challenged when the new government was elected and the new Minister refused to endorse the plan. But even the illusion of authority may have been an important factor in the development of this plan. It is possible that if the team had known that its result could have been so challenged and possibly ended up just advisory, the members would not have been as inspired, would not have worked as hard and the plan would not have developed a “life of its own” as so many claim it has now.

Jickling felt it would have been better for the plan to be adopted before the election: “I don’t think the present government would ever set up one of these things and if they did, I wouldn’t be asked to be on it. It would have been better if the plan had been adopted before the election.”

Babala thought the new government’s effort to shelve the plan was doomed to fail eventually: “Because this was set up by the NDP government, the new government couldn’t have canceled that out even though they wanted to. It wouldn’t have looked right and they understood that. It was set up very solidly and pretty well had to go right on through. If they would have canceled it out and hadn’t endorsed it, it would have been a real black mark against them.”

McDiarmid felt that the level of authority is what eventually saved the plan: “We made it clear right at the start that the government had to accept the plan or nothing—we were not going to do it otherwise. And that meant the *whole* plan, not parts of it or bits of it which was what the new government attempted to do. Was that better than just doing recommendations? I think so, yes. Otherwise, I don’t think you would have gotten a complete plan out of it. If the current government had their way, they wouldn’t have accepted the whole plan, only one side of it and not the other side. If we hadn’t had that level of authority, I’m sure that’s what would have happened.”

Although this worked, it was too close for comfort and he would want to do things differently next time: “The plan was just about undone by the change in government. That’s one thing I would change absolutely before something like this is established. We have the party in power and the opposition party and when a team is established like this—if it’s going to be near election time by the time the plan is done—then I think the government in power and the opposition have to agree about the level of authority the team will have. The different governments that we had—one was ready to accept the plan without hesitation and the other didn’t want it at all. It took a lot of convincing for the new one to finally implement it.”

### **Did members have political clout?**

The members of this team were not very active politically and were not widely recognized as opinion leaders. Based on the criteria, this may not be conducive to success. However, McDiarmid and Babala, who were asked this question directly, both challenged it as inappropriate. According to McDiarmid, “I think that politics should be left out of it. If you want them involved, then you might as well get them to do the plan to begin with—have the government biologists do it. I don’t think it’s right for the government to pull one direction or the other, they should stay out of it. If they want the kind of plan that involves all the different factions and get a public team to do it, then they should just let them do it and not try to have any influence over it. But have both governments agree to this type of process beforehand, so that [a change of government] doesn’t stall everything and put it on the back burner.”

Babala said, “I think it would be better not to have active political people on a team. When you’re politically active, you don’t have much maneuvering room.”

Juanita Sydney, when asked what the team’s principal source of political power was, said quite simply: “Politics is for the people and the people wanted the plan adopted.”

### **Did the agency or agencies give the team resources, rewards, and recognition?**

According to the criteria, the ideal team receives the material resources it needs as well as rewards and recognition for the work it does. In this case, all the respondents agreed that these are important criteria and the team members had high praise for the resources and support the agency had provided. The government originally offered a big reward, or incentive, to the group in pledging to implement whatever they came up with. But the NDP government may not have tried hard enough to build external support for the team and to recognize the team’s effort publicly.

Babala: “They were pretty good about resources. We had more paper work than you could imagine and I really appreciated that. I still go back and read that stuff. But I didn’t see any recognition. They just said we did a pretty good job. Some thought we did, some thought we didn’t.”

Jickling: “To their credit, the Branch realized that this was a very important thing and they just cleared everything out of their way to provide the context and input. All the staff were available on call each weekend if we needed information. They treated us well and did what they could to make it efficient.”

McDiarmid: “Support us? Oh yes, we could call anybody we wanted; they made sure that people we asked to speak were there. That was important to have the agency say, ‘This is your effort, whatever you need we’ll supply it.’ If they didn’t back us, we wouldn’t have had all the speakers from outside the Territory that we felt we should have and then the input could have been one-sided. Rewards and recognition? I don’t know. Sometimes I feel they did and sometimes I feel they didn’t. The people we dealt with, like the wolf biologists, DuGuay and Hayes and the Deputy Minister gave a lot of support. But it would have been nicer and created more confidence had the NDP government said more in the newspaper and on the radio about the team to try to get the message out and get the feedback. I mean there was no doubt they were supportive of both this process and the members they had selected—there’s no doubt there—but it would have been helpful if they had said a bit more publicly.”

## ***The Product***

Table 6-9 presents the product criteria. The best measure of its value is summarized in team member Scott Gilbert’s conclusion that the team itself was a short term assemblage—but the *Plan* is a successful legacy.

**Table 6-9**  
**Did the Team meet the Product Criteria?**

<b>Criteria concerning the Written Agreement</b>	<b>Yukon Wolf Mgmt Team</b>
Is the agreement fair to the stakeholders? Did everyone meet at least some of their primary concerns?	YES
Does it address all of the key issues?	YES
Does it define a desired future and set measurable targets with sufficient detail?	YES
Does it report points where members agreed to disagree?	No, the team reached agreement on key issues.
Does it include some "strong" recommendations (will, shall, must)?	YES
Is it clear, easy to read and brief as possible?	YES
Are maps & graphics clear?	No maps or graphics included
Does it exclude technical jargon?	YES
Does it look professional?	YES

## VI. Summary

Further discussion of this case is included in the next two chapters, but a brief summary is appropriate here. The Yukon Wolf Management Planning Team met all of the criteria for success, as established in this study. In addition, the team's design was conducive to that success, with two significant exceptions—the agency was not involved nor were opinion leaders, thus this case challenges the importance of these two criteria. This case also challenges the assumption that this issue involves fundamental values and is therefore nonnegotiable—that does not appear to be so in this particular jurisdiction, even though the team was extremely polarized.

In closing his interview, Bob Jickling characterized this process. His words seem to summarize the case quite well:

“It required just absolute dedication on everyone's part to complete the process. It was brutal, there's no other word to describe it but brutal—those weekends were incredibly intense. Sometimes I felt very good and sometimes very frustrated and despondent. Emotionally it was a roller coaster ride. I had the whole gamut of emotions and I would call some of the other members and they would cheer me up by pointing out the positive things that had happened.

“Is this a model? Well, based on my sample size of one, it seems promising. To me, there were three important things that made it work. First, there was fairness in selecting the members. They really did ensure that the broad range of people were there. Second, the particular group worked well together and that's an intangible. People were willing to seek consensus, yet not forego important principles. Third, we weren't representing organizations, but just general points of view. Looking back, there's not much that could have changed and worked any better.”

## Part Three

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# Case Comparison and Conclusions



## Chapter 7.

### Case Comparison

*Superteams are inspired by a vision  
of what they are trying to achieve.*

*—Colin Hastings*

This chapter looks at the differences between the three jurisdictions and examines whether it is appropriate to compare these cases. After answering this question in the affirmative, it compares the success of the three cases and compares their team designs. Finally, it presents a refined list of team design criteria.

#### I. Can These Cases Be Compared?

The answer to this question is clearly yes, these cases *can* be compared. It has been a legitimate, instructive, and remarkably rich exercise. By restricting the study to the wolf issue, all of the teams faced the same basic concerns, the same general interest groups were involved, and many of the same external factors, such as politics and social climate, were similar. By limiting the variation of these factors, it was possible to better isolate team design. In the ideal experiment, other factors would be held constant at their optimum level, and thus a change in success could be correlated to a change in team design. But in the real world, other factors cannot be held constant.

There are significant differences between the three areas that could be responsible for both the different approaches taken by each area and the different results. While a particular team design was correlated with a greater level of success, this does not prove cause and effect. Other factors could also be responsible, such as the personalities of the team members, the small population of the Yukon and its close relationship to the land, the skill of the facilitators, the relative isolation of the Yukon and a host of other possible factors.

Table 7-1 summarizes some of the differences in the three areas that have a bearing on the wolf issue. Hunting, for example, is a much more common activity in Alaska and the Yukon than it is in BC. Tourism is more vital to the economies of both BC and Alaska than it is in the Yukon, giving tourism boycotts more clout in these areas.

Litigation and the threat of litigation can be an effective form of protest in Alaska, but it is only beginning to be used by interest groups in Canada. As one team member put it, “We don't go out and sue everyone like Americans do.”

Alaska is a symbol of wilderness for the lower 48 and this brings intense interest from the rest of the country, which is not always well-informed on the issues. BC also experiences some of that, both from the rest of Canada and from the lower 48, but the Yukon does not have as much outside interest to contend with.

**Table 7-1**  
**Differences in the Three Cases**

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>British Columbia</b>	<b>Alaska</b>	<b>Yukon Territory</b>
<b>% of Population that hunts</b>	8% <sup>1</sup>	20 - 25% Including Subsistence <sup>2</sup>	25% Including Subsistence <sup>3</sup>
<b>Population</b>	2.7 million	552,000	32,322, almost 90% in Whitehorse
<b>Character</b>	Largely urban “the California of Canada”	urban/rural both extremes present	Almost 90% of population lives in Whitehorse, surrounded by an expanse of wild country
<b>Importance of Tourism in Economy</b>	Very Important. Perceived as pristine.	Very important—third largest industry which has advertised pristine nature of Alaska	Not as important as in BC and Alaska Perceived by many outsiders as less pristine than AK and BC.
<b>Use of Lawsuits by Interest Groups</b>	Infrequent, but increasing	Common	Infrequent, but increasing
<b>Interest of Rest of Country in Local Issues</b>	High Level of concern in rest of Canada and Lower 48 of US	Lower 48 extremely concerned about Alaska—“the last frontier”	More isolated; less outside interest
<b>Wolf-Related Issues</b>	Varies by Area	Methods, who will be involved and subsistence are major issues	Subsistence rights guaranteed. Methods not an issue, nor who will be involved

Sources: <sup>1</sup> Ralph Archibald, <sup>2</sup>John Schoen, <sup>3</sup>Yukon Renewable Resources Hunting License Recorder

## Issues

While the basic issues are quite similar in the three areas, there are some differences. In Alaska, subsistence is a major issue with implications for wolf management. In Canada, subsistence use by First Nations has clear priority while it does not in Alaska. Another issue is private participation in wolf control. Many in Alaska feel that allowing sportsmen to use their own aircraft is a legitimate and cost-saving means of conducting wolf control, while it is not even an issue in the Yukon, where only agency biologists in helicopters are allowed to carry out a program. Methods are not as much of an issue in the Yukon, since helicopters are almost the only means in this largely inaccessible territory.

## Populations

BC has a large metropolitan population, while Alaska has just one major city, and the Yukon's entire population is 32,322. The small population of the Yukon made it easier to choose team members and to keep the general public informed through newspapers and radio programs. Further, all of the respondents felt that the populations of the Yukon and Alaska live much closer to the land and have a less idealistic view of wildlife issues than the largely urban population of British Columbia. As Don Robinson of the BC Group put it, "The average perception of wolves by the people in the Yukon is quite different than the people sitting around the table in Victoria."

They also believed that environmentalists comprise a much larger part of the population in BC than in the other two areas. As Ralph Archibald put it, "British Columbia is the California of Canada, and perhaps that says it all."

It was notable that respondents outside the Yukon considered the Yukon's population to be fairly homogeneous, but respondents within the Yukon were quick to disagree. "There is just as much diversity here," Patty Denison asserted. "We have people who are totally opposed to any killing of wolves and people on the other side as well. We just don't have as *many* people in any of those categories."

Many respondents who were not familiar with the Yukon planning process, assumed that it was a simple plan basically recommending to "go out there and shoot them." Michael Sather of British Columbia voiced the opinions of many when he said, "In the Yukon, the population is so small, there is not enough opposition to wolf kills there to be effective. Their plan just said 'we're going to do wolf kills and if you don't like it get lost.'" When asked if he had read the plan, he replied that he didn't have to—he knew what it would say.

The Yukon team members were asked to respond to the contention by some that the Yukon succeeded only because it is less environmentally concerned than BC and has such a small population. The question elicited a fairly strong reaction. “BS!” fumed Scott Gilbert, a wildlife biologist generally opposed to wolf control. “The Yukon has much tighter ties to the environment than BC.” McDiarmid felt that because the Yukon and Alaska are considered by many to be the last great wildernesses, there is even greater environmental concern in these two areas. But Juanita Sydney thought it was helpful that the Yukon is small, less developed than BC and fewer groups to try to satisfy.

While animal rights groups would not approve of it, several conservation groups, including the World Wildlife Fund, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, and the Yukon Conservation Society have voiced strong support for the plan. One of the forceful members of the Yukon team teaches environmental ethics at Yukon College and is strongly opposed to wolf control. Also, sport hunting groups in Alaska strongly dislike the Yukon wolf plan because they consider it much too “green.”

This is evidence that the plan is *not* a wolf-kill proposal.

### **Is the wolf issue unique...or is it the acid test?**

“I’ve worked on many different species in my career,” said Ralph Archibald. “And there isn’t anything that comes close to approaching the emotions that are elicited any time someone talks about wolves.”

Certainly the wolf debate is an intense and emotional issue. It is possible that there are aspects of the wolf dispute which make these cases exceptional. For one thing, the wolf debate is so high-profile that politics may play a bigger role than in other disputes.

However, it could be that the wolf issue provides the acid test—if a method can work with wolves, it can work on just about anything.

## **II. Comparison of Team Success**

A comparison of the indicators of success for the three cases is shown in Table 7-2 and a comparison of the survey results across cases is included in Appendix C. The Yukon met all of the basic success criteria while BC did not meet many of the criteria and Alaska met some of them. All three efforts were considered by the participants to be fair attempts to resolve the disputes. On the whole, BC Group members did not consider their effort to be an efficient process, but most of the Alaska team members and all of the Yukon members surveyed considered their processes to be efficient.

**Table 7-2**  
**Comparison of Basic Success Criteria**

<b>Indicators of Success</b>	<b>British Columbia Wolf Working Group</b>	<b>Alaska Wolf Mgmt Team</b>	<b>Yukon Wolf Mgmt Team</b>
• Was the process fair?	YES	YES	YES
• Was it efficient?	NO	YES	YES
• Did the team meet its purpose?	NO 1 out of 7 thought it did	PARTLY 4 out of 9 thought so	YES 7 out of 7 thought so
• Did the team reach consensus on the key issues?	NO	NO	YES
• Was a written agreement produced (if expected?)	NO	YES	YES
If so, does it define a desired future and set measurable targets?	No written agreement was developed, therefore this is not applicable	NO, Agreement was not specific enough	YES
• Has it increased the level of trust and understanding between parties?	Yes, but just between the Group members	Between team members themselves, but two team members feel totally betrayed by dept and agency lost credibility with both sides of the debate	YES
• Did participants find it personally rewarding?	HALF 4 out of 8 did	MOST 8 out of 9	YES, 7 out of 7 did
• Did participants view the process as a success?	NO 1 out of 12 people thought it largely successful	NO 4 out of 9 team members thought it largely successful	YES 7 out of 7 team members said "yes" unequivocally

It was not clear whether the BC team was strictly advisory or if it was expected to write a consensus agreement. If it was strictly advisory, then it probably did meet its purpose, but if expected to write a consensus agreement, it did not. The Alaska team

members agreed that they had met their stated purpose to develop recommendations, and the Yukon members felt they had definitely succeeded in meeting their purpose of creating a wolf management plan for the Territory.

The BC team did not reach consensus on the issues. The Alaska team succeeded in reaching agreement on many of the issues, although they did not agree on two fundamental questions: what constitutes wolf control and when control could be considered. Further, they did not address the question of where it could be considered. In the Yukon, the team was able to reach consensus on all of the key issues, although everyone agreed it was a hard-won agreement.

BC did not produce a written agreement, but Alaska and the Yukon teams did. The report of the Alaska team lacked specific, measurable targets while the Yukon team developed both broad goals and measurable targets and specific criteria for each of the goals.

Of the two cases which produced written plans, the Yukon agreement has been much more stable than Alaska's. The Alaska team's Final Report did have a broad base of support, but it did not settle the key issues. This base of support eroded once the department took over and the controversy actually intensified after the Alaska team's report was "reinterpreted" by the new administration. The Director of ADFG claimed that the team's agreement was not within constraints, because it would not work "on the ground." The administration did not endorse the agreement, it has not been implemented, and the team did not include provisions for renegotiation. In 1993, the Board of Game dismantled the Strategic Plan that three team members, the agency, and an earlier Board had developed. One team member, Anne Ruggles, is now on the Board of Game and she continues to press the predominantly pro-control Board to at least consider some of the team's concepts. Otherwise, little remains of the team's work at this point.

In contrast, the Yukon team's agreement received broad and vocal support with organizations on both sides of the debate standing up in defense of it. The debate now is much less a question of whether or not to do wolf control, but rather whether or not the government is following the Yukon team's plan. There is now a process for determining if control is acceptable and criteria that must be met before and after it is carried out. The level of controversy over wolf management within the Yukon has diminished as a result of the plan, the agency believes the agreement is within constraints, and the government was virtually forced to endorse it. No appeals have been filed, the agreement is being implemented (but only time will tell how complete the implementation of the entire plan will be) and provisions were included for renegotiation.

Only half of the members interviewed in BC felt the effort was rewarding on a personal level, while all but one member of the Alaska team did. But in the Yukon, everyone interviewed felt that it was definitely a rewarding experience. All of the members interviewed on both the Yukon and the BC teams and all but two of the Alaska members would be willing to participate on such a team again.

In the Yukon, all seven of the team members who were contacted pronounced it a success, which is remarkable. Only one member of the BC group felt it was a success. In Alaska, four of the nine team members surveyed thought it was at least partly successful, but only one of them felt it was an unqualified success. Sadly, in both BC and Alaska, many members emphasized how hard they had tried, what an intense effort it had been, and how distressed they were about the results.

In summary, the BC Wolf Working Group succeeded in improving the level of understanding between the members and the agency did use several of their recommendations in the draft Vancouver Island Strategy. But most of the respondents did not consider the eleven meetings in four and a half years to be an efficient use of time and money, the team had an ambiguous purpose, it did not reach consensus, it did not produce a written agreement, it did not increase the level of trust outside the Group itself, and—while members found it personally rewarding—the majority of respondents, including the agency, did not consider it a success. No one was to “blame” for these problems, for this Group was the first and there was little information available at the time regarding how to design such a team. They were unaware that they were starting a grand experiment which would help to answer some of these questions, and like all trail-blazers, they made the going easier for those who followed.

The Alaska effort met several of the basic criteria for success—it was largely perceived as a fair and efficient process that met its stated purpose. However, the Alaska team did not reach consensus on all of the key issues, some team members felt betrayed by the department, and the majority of respondents did not view it as a success in the long run. But like a relay race, the lessons learned in these first two efforts helped the last one to cross the finish line.

The Yukon effort met all of the criteria established at the beginning of this study for determining success. Wolf control is likely to continue to be an issue in the Yukon, but there is now a firm foundation of agreement to build upon and goals to strive for. This case demonstrates that a team can act responsibly and rise to the challenge when given the authority to wrestle a very serious public issue.

### III. Were the Team Designs Conducive to Success?

The three teams differed in many aspects of their design. Table 7-3 summarizes these differences which are also discussed in more detail below. More detailed comparisons of the survey results from the three cases are shown in Appendix C.

#### **The Purpose**

In BC, it was unclear whether the Group would strictly react to agency proposals or attempt to forge ahead with an approach of their own. This lack of a clear purpose was certainly a handicap. Only one respondent considered the effort inspiring. None of the respondents considered their task to be a complete and meaningful whole and they did not feel ownership of a product. This can have a devastating effect on a team's motivation as well as their sense of responsibility for the result. Finally, there was not a strong sense of urgency to complete the task.

In Alaska, the advisory role of the team was quite clear, as was the mandate to produce a written consensus agreement. There was also a sense of urgency to meet the Board of Game's timetable. But the agency restricted the task of the team to that of developing broad goals to be considered when the agency drafted the more detailed plans. The agency made substantial changes to the team's approach and did not even consult the team before making the changes—a clear recipe for conflict. It makes no difference whether they had been forewarned of this possibility in advance. If the team had any ownership in their product at all, they would likely be offended by what amounts to a basic lack of respect for the tremendous effort the team had expended in creating their document. The agency also did not understand that a consensus agreement is not a smorgasbord that they could pick and choose from. It is a house of cards and few if any cards can be removed without collapsing the entire structure. When the department did precisely that, several of the team members felt justifiably betrayed and, what was a fragile consensus at best, rapidly deteriorated.

In the Yukon, the team's purpose was also advisory, but it was clear that the team would have full authority to write an *implementable* plan. This did not mean establishing a general direction, as the Alaska team was expected to do. It meant an agreement which could stand alone. The agency which established the team made it clear that they would give the document a great deal of weight. The agency seemed to have little concern that this was giving away their responsibilities. Instead, they saw their role as a technical one,



**Table 7-3**  
**Comparison of Team Design Across Cases**

<b>TEAM DESIGN FACTORS</b>	<b>B.C. Wolf Working Group</b>	<b>ALASKA Wolf Planning Team</b>	<b>YUKON Wolf Planning Team</b>
<b>PURPOSE</b>	Ambiguous purpose, whether to give advise, develop a plan or both? No priority placed on written agreement. Team largely reacted to agency proposals which hindered Group ownership in the effort.	Clear purpose: team was strictly advisory, but written consensus agreement on the recommendations was top priority.	Team had total ownership of agreement "to write it as they saw fit." Purpose clear and inspiring. Caribou herd in critical condition meant urgent need for settlement.
<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>	Official representatives of organized groups, accountable to their organization. Few moderates included. Agency NOT an official member.	Officially, they were to speak only for themselves; not accountable to any organization. Several moderates included as well as both extremes. Agency an official member of the team.	Officially, they were to speak only for themselves; not accountable to any organization. Several moderates included as well as both extremes. Agency NOT an official member of team.
<b>PROCESS</b>	No intermediary involved during first 2 years. No clear problem-solving process followed. No deadlines; Group met only 11 times in 4.5 years.	Intermediary employed for meetings. Clear problem-solving process followed. Firm deadline of 6 months. Met once per month.	Intermediary employed for meetings. Clear problem-solving process followed. Deadline of 5 months. Met about once/week until first draft was complete.
<b>POLITICAL AND AGENCY SUPPORT</b>	Group began under a government perceived as pro-wolf control. New government opposed to control, but reason for lack of meetings is unclear	Team began under a govt. strongly opposed to wolf control, but completed its task under govt. in favor of control.	Team began under a govt. reluctant to conduct wolf control, but completed its task under govt. outspoken in favor of control.
<b>PRODUCT</b>	Written agreement was not a priority and none was produced.	Written agreement produced, not all key issues were addressed and some points were not adequately detailed, leaving much room for interpretation.	Written agreement produced addressing all key issues and including measureable targets.
<b>END RESULT as of June 1994</b>	No agreement has been reached. Unclear whether Group will continue.	Recommendations given to agency in 1991, but only partially used by new govt. Parties more entrenched than before	Plan has such a broad spectrum of support that government was virtually forced to endorse the agreement.

while it is up to the public to determine how to navigate through the complex web of society's values.

There are more lessons in comparing the purposes of the three plans, but they will be saved for the concluding chapter.

## ***The Participants***

In each case, the teams were well-balanced in terms of the interests at the table. However, taking a bit more time to select members, conducting negotiations in the winter, and using videos and simulations may have helped in finding effective and influential spokespeople to serve on each of the teams.

### **Isolating the extremes may *not* be a fatal flaw**

An extremist is defined here as a group or individual who finds the issue under discussion totally non-negotiable. The criteria developed at the beginning of this study indicated that all potentially-affected interests should be invited—extremists as well. While they should certainly be *invited*, the cases examined here indicate that it may not be essential to include the extremes in the debate if the views of more moderate groups are represented, if these groups have the support of the majority of the public, and if the groups are willing to publicly endorse the plan.

Using examples from these particular cases, if the World Wildlife Fund, the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society find an agreement acceptable and if they have a larger constituency in the population at large than animal rights groups, then the agreement may be stable. Likewise, if a hunting guide organization objects, but the Wildlife Federation and more moderate groups find it acceptable, then an agreement may be fairly resilient to attacks from the extremes.

When given the choice of absolutely no settlement of an issue and continued conflict, or negotiating a truce even though not *every* stakeholder is at the table, the latter seems to be the more prudent course.

### **The agency need not be an equal member of the team**

This was a big surprise on the Yukon and BC teams and the members insisted that the credibility and public support of the teams would have been irreparably compromised had the agency been an equal member.

Most of the EDS literature recommends that the agency be an equal member of the team. There are many good arguments for this: it seems critical that the agency have

ownership in the result, they are perhaps the only ones who can provide adequate information on financial and legal constraints and they possess much of the technical information. Certainly in the US, most agencies would find it objectionable to play a role like that played by the Yukon Wildlife Branch.

But the Branch was in fact a participant, even though they were not a “voting” member of the team. Wildlife Branch personnel insisted that they did have ownership in the team's decision. They pointed out that they established this autonomous team, they observed most of the team meetings and they commented on all the drafts, thus avoiding any major surprises. The Yukon team members argued that with regard to constraints and technical information, the agency was always available—even on call all weekend—to answer questions. Secondly, they felt their job was not to discuss constraints; they felt they were discussing matters of right and wrong, of ethical and unethical. In which case, constraints are a detail.

It is not clear whether this approach would work in all cases, but it does warrant further investigation. In some cases, if the team has additional authority and the agency is a limited participant as in this case, perhaps the agency need not be a voting member.

### **Team members should represent general interests and not organized groups**

Another surprising result was that the teams in which members represented themselves had better success than the BC Group in which members were official representatives of organizations. Some feel that this was a powerful handicap on the BC team. But that team had many other difficulties as well, so it is not possible to say how much impact this single factor had.

Conventional wisdom would say that official representatives help team members bring constituents along and thus strengthen the consensus. But they also prolong the process and make it more difficult to reach agreement. The results presented here raise the question—are official representatives worth the price? For the sake of future study, I would hypothesize that it is better for team members to represent themselves and not organized groups. Now the task is to find cases to disprove this.

### **Members can be chosen by the agency**

In BC, several respondents claimed that organizations chose hard-liners who refused to compromise, but members in the Alaska and Yukon cases were chosen by the agency. In both cases, most of the members were committed to finding common ground and most respondents were comfortable with the choices that were made. As long as the final

team is balanced on the “red-green scale” , this may be fine. In Alaska, the interest groups were given many opportunities to respond to the growing list of potential candidates, but there was no time for such review in the Yukon. Alaska's approach is probably safer, since the Yukon may have succeeded at this totally in-house approach only because its population is so small and most of the candidates were well-known.

There are other alternatives that were not investigated here, including letting a neutral third party choose the representatives and having interest groups nominate a few candidates for the agency and other groups to choose from.

### **A new method for choosing participants**

Two of the respondents in the BC case informed me about an innovative method of choosing participants for a team in the community of Smithers. Ralph Archibald, who founded the BC Wolf Group, is now working with this team in dealing with disputes over forest harvesting. At a workshop, the community itself identified the range of values represented in their town and asked for nominations of people to represent those values. Forty people applied or were nominated, but everyone agreed that they wanted only twelve. All forty were invited to submit their selection of twelve people. From these, a committee of three people developed three alternative teams. The forty people reconvened, discussed the three alternatives and voted to select the final roster of team members. Thus the members represent general points of view, not organized groups, yet they were chosen by their peers, not the agency. This approach deserves further investigation.

### **Team members should be articulate people who work well with others and are dedicated to finding a compromise.**

Personalities have an impact on negotiations. Team members need to be articulate people who are dedicated to finding common ground without compromising their basic values. If some members do not voice their concerns, if they have difficulty articulating them, or if they are too aggressive, they will not be good spokespeople for their own interests and any written agreement will be less balanced as a result. In the three cases explored here, all three types of people were present—some who were very quiet, some who had difficulty articulating their concerns, and some who were unnecessarily aggressive. In each case, these personal characteristics became handicaps for the teams.

So much is riding on this important decision that agencies should consider two new methods for selecting team members. First, potential members could watch a video of a consensus-building effort. This will give them a better idea of what to expect and some

may determine right away that they would not be comfortable in such a team. Those prospects still interested could then take part in a simulation conducted by a neutral facilitator from outside the agency. The simulation should not involve an environmental issue so that selection is based on negotiating skills—not personal viewpoints on development versus preservation.

It may also be important to include people who are influential with their constituents. Termed “opinion leaders,” these people can use their networks to inform others and bring them along with the agreement. Some feel that such people will be less willing to compromise their positions. However, both Alaska and the Yukon had difficulty with some groups because the team members who were expected to represent their concerns were not adequately influential.

Agencies should also consider paying honorariums to team members. This would help compensate them for their time and make a statement about the value of the team. Furthermore, this could enable people to participate who could not afford to otherwise.

### **Do not make the team too small**

Small teams seemed adequate in the cases of Alaska (13 people, counting the agency) and Yukon (9 people). BC may have benefited from more moderates as the Group found it very difficult to agree on anything. Simply having additional members on the BC team may also have helped in providing more possibilities for coalitions and better discussion dynamics. Both Alaska and the Yukon had moderates involved as well as the extremes.

## ***The Process***

In British Columbia, the process, described as “a continuous open-ended discussion” without ground rules was not conducive to systematic problem solving. The addition of a very capable facilitator improved the process, but by the time he was brought on, adversarial habits were well-established and difficult to break. There were still no ground rules and little use of brainstorming and an inadequate effort to build a foundation of agreement prior to tackling more contentious items. The Group lacked a systematic problem solving process and, in sharp contrast to the other two groups, virtually nothing was happening between meetings. There were no deadlines—which can be a strong motivator—and they met twice a year on the average, which was too seldom to make progress. Such infrequent meetings are probably adequate if the only task is to react to proposals, but they are not adequate for developing a consensus agreement.

In Alaska, the team had the benefit of an accomplished facilitator from their first meeting. They followed a clear problem-solving process, building on a foundation of agreement and using considerable brain-storming and small groups to stimulate creativity. They had a firm deadline which was helpful. But they did not adequately define the issues at the beginning and this contributed to their lack of agreement on some key issues. Also, to make real progress on these difficult issues, meeting twice or more per month would have helped. The principal procedural problem however, was that the team was disbanded after their report was complete, yet the bulk of the work was yet to be done. The team should have remained actively involved—in an advisory role at a minimum—until all of the plans were complete.

As in Alaska, the Yukon team had an adept facilitator from the beginning who kept the team's interaction positive and focused. This case also shows the importance of frequent meetings and tight deadlines in focusing the team's efforts. Procedurally, the team moved quickly but systematically, first constructing a foundation of agreement on goals, principles and data. Remarkably, this took place in the first three meetings. By the fourth meeting, they were ready to confront the question of when, if ever, wolf control could be considered. They developed what many consider a judicious approach to that and forged ahead through the other issues, finishing right on schedule. It may have been helpful in this case also if the team had remained together in a semi-formal way to shepherd the plan through the endorsement process.

## ***Political and Agency Support***

In all three cases, the teams were established by one administration, but the government changed and gave less support to the team, in what could be called the “I didn't appoint 'em” syndrome. If the team was not a balanced group of the stakeholders, then an erosion of political support is to be expected. But if the team was genuinely balanced with much of the spectrum of opinion represented and if it was not a political rubber stamp, then the new administration may find it to their advantage to take the team's advice and avoid considerable controversy.

The potential for political change must be considered in designing an EDS team. First, all of those involved in the effort should be aware that political overhaul is a possibility. Secondly, be pragmatic and avoid establishing a team immediately before an election. Third, make sure that the other four factors of the team's design (the purpose, etc.) are optimal, as these can help make the process more resilient to political change. Some points to keep in mind:

- 1) A team which is limited to simply general recommendations is going to be more susceptible to political reworking than a team whose purpose is to develop a complete, implementable agreement, *even* if such an agreement is only advisory.
- 2) Make sure that the participants represent a broad spectrum of opinion and that they are chosen in a manner that is widely regarded as fair, so that the general public will accept the team as legitimate and support the effort.
- 3) Another way in which the participants can help make political connections is to include opinion leaders on the team. In the case of sport hunters in Alaska and First Nations peoples and outfitters in the Yukon, influential members of these groups could have helped the teams make more of the necessary political connections.
- 4) A sound process which the majority of stakeholders view as having integrity will also fortify the effort from derailment by political change.
- 5) The agency, the team, and those involved should attempt to build external support for the group and its work through press releases, public meetings, and widely-distributed drafts of their report.
- 6) Make sure the product is widely-perceived as fair and reasonable and that it offers more than a broad overview and does not allow so much flexibility that it can be easily misinterpreted.

## IV. Refined Team Design Criteria

Table 7-3 summarizes the criteria proposed as a result of this research. Many of these points, such as the need for a systematic problem-solving process, have been well-documented. Others are based on this exploratory study of three cases. They are not intended to be firm conclusions, but simply refined postulates that require additional testing on a broad scale to prove or disprove them.



## Table 7-3

### Refined Criteria for Effective Team Design

Starred items are strongly recommended for further research

#### The Purpose

- \* The more amenable a dispute is to settlement, the higher the team can locate on the ladder of possible tasks
- \* Whenever possible, the task should be a complete and meaningful whole  
The purpose should be clear and inspiring  
It is helpful if there is a genuine sense of urgency to complete the task
- \* A team benefits from having substantial authority over the task  
The team should feel ownership of both the process and the product

#### The Participants

- \* All potentially affected interests should be *invited*, but it may be necessary to either omit the extreme ends of the spectrum or allow them to deselect themselves
- \*\* In some cases, the agency need not be a member  
The convening agency may choose the members  
The participants should have good negotiating skills  
They should be good listeners who are articulate and tactful, yet inclined to defend their fundamental interests
- \* In most cases, it is helpful to involve people who are influential with their group  
Some moderates should be included, but every member should have a genuine stake in the outcome
- \* The members should represent themselves instead of organized groups  
A team's size may be a function of the number of opinions in society on the issue

#### The Process

- A neutral intermediary should be employed
- The team must have ground rules to encourage excellent communication
- A sense of team spirit is helpful
- The team should stop frequently for self-assessment of its process and progress
- A step-by-step problem solving process should be followed
- Deadlines are necessary and the team should meet frequently
- \* The team should be involved in implementation and monitoring

#### Political and Agency Support

- A connection is needed to established processes and authorities
- \* Members who are opinion leaders may assist in making political connections  
The appropriate level of government should sanction and support the effort  
Those involved should promote the team's image and build external support  
The agency should give the team resources, rewards (such as implementing their agreement) and recognition

#### The Product

- \* A high-quality written agreement is a key ingredient in the success of the team  
The agreement should be fair to those concerned  
It should address all the key issues

- It should be wise and reasonably cautious given existing data and uncertainty
- \* It should define a desired future and set measurable targets in sufficient detail
- It should report points where members agreed to disagree
- It should include some “strong” recommendations (will, shall, must)
- It should be clear, easy to read, and as brief as possible with clear maps and graphics
- It should exclude technical jargon where possible and look professional

## Chapter 8.

### Conclusions

*Provide them an exciting vision, assemble them,  
train them and then **trust** them,  
and they will surely achieve significant results.*  
—Colin Hastings

Three teams approached one of the most intractable environmental disputes of our time. Most would consider wolf management a case where resolution is impossible because fundamental values are involved. And yet, in one case, it *did* work. The Yukon team was able to reach agreement on this tough issue even though two polar opposites were at the table: one who felt strongly that wolves are a "spiritual essence" and the other who felt that wolves, coyotes, and cockroaches have a lot in common.

Why was one team able to succeed where the other two did not? What were the key reasons? The three efforts had much in common and learned from each other as they went along, which contributed to the success of the Yukon. But there are also some dramatic differences. The four most fundamental were 1) the purposes; 2) the role of the agency; 3) the importance placed on the quality of the document itself; and 4) the ability to regain a political commitment.

#### I. A complete, motivating, and common purpose

The Yukon case demonstrates the value of implementable agreements as a task for an EDS team. Other significant aspects of the Yukon team's purpose were that it was challenging, it demonstrated the faith the agency had in the team, and it focused on the common ground between the divergent members.

## ***The value of implementable agreements***

According to the dictionary, implementable means "to put into practical effect; to carry out." An implementable agreement, then, is an agreement that is more than lofty goals and general advice. It is an agreement that can be carried out.

In the past, agencies have developed the plan with "input" from the public. But it was just the opposite in the Yukon, where the *team* developed the implementable agreement with "input" from the agency! The Cabinet still had to approve the team's plan, but there was no question that the product the team came up with could stand on its own. It was a complete, implementable agreement—*not* just a set of general recommendations.

Chapter 2 discussed research in the management literature indicating that teams are more motivated and more productive when their task is "a complete and meaningful whole." This relationship has been demonstrated in automobile manufacturing, for example, where teams are more motivated and produce higher quality products when responsible for an entire car—not just a bumper. Might EDS teams be more motivated and produce higher quality agreements if they were responsible for the entire plan and not just a "bumper" of recommendations?

The analogy seems particularly germane here. In this study, the BC Group was asked to comment on what they thought of the "car" that the agency was building.

The Alaska team was asked to prepare a rough sketch that the agency *might* use *parts of* in building the final product. These two constraints were a double handicap.

In contrast, the Yukon team was asked to both design and build the car—and it rose to the challenge. Although there was no guarantee that the government would "buy" their finished product, the team produced the most sensible model they could. While the newly elected government was not pleased with it, the general public saw it as a good deal and eventually convinced the government to "buy" it.

In view of this evidence, should EDS teams also be given such "complete and meaningful" tasks? Is it possible that an EDS team's success is proportional to the authority vested in it? Based on this exploratory study, the answer is yes. The Yukon team performed a prodigious task and those involved in that process insisted it was no anomaly—that groups are capable of wrestling very tough issues. But, they insisted, teams need the trust and freedom to do so. Given this level of responsibility, teams have a greater incentive, take the task more seriously, and benefit from a greater commitment from the agency.

***“Make the goal something noble...”***

It is also instructive to compare the stated goals, or purposes, of the Alaska and Yukon teams. Goals are difficult to write and often soporific to read, but they are vital in getting a team off to a good start. A close look at Table 8-1 indicates that major purposes of the Alaska team were to increase public awareness, promote communication, advise the Department, review the status of wolves and existing policies, and recommend goals and

**Table 8-1**  
**Comparison of the Official Purposes**  
**of the Alaska and Yukon Teams**

<b>Goals of the Alaska Wolf Planning Team</b>	<b>Goals of the Yukon Wolf Planning Team</b>
<p>1. To help increase public awareness, understanding, and agreement on wolf conservation and management in Alaska.</p> <p>2. To help promote communication among the public, interest groups, and the ADFG</p> <p>3. To advise the Department and the Board of Game on the management and conservation of wolves in Alaska.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Objectives:</p> <p>a. To review the status and ecology of wolves.</p> <p>b. To review existing policies and procedures for the management and conservation of wolves.</p> <p>c. To recommend goals and objectives for the management and conservation of wolves in Alaska over the next 5 to 10 years.</p> <p>d. To identify which uses of wolves are in conflict with each other and recommend ways to reduce or eliminate these conflicts.</p> <p>e. To expedite the flow of information between the Department and the broad spectrum of public interest groups.</p> <p>f. To recommend specific management options for ensuring the long-term conservation of wolves in Alaska and for satisfying the greatest variety of public desires for wolf management in the state.</p>	<p>1. The planning team will consider wolves and their prey as part of the total ecosystem rather than pursue single species management.</p> <p>2. The planning team shall make best efforts to ensure genetic diversity of wolf populations in the Yukon will be protected.</p> <p>3. The planning team shall consider the requirement for ongoing research and monitoring of wolves and their prey.</p> <p>4. The planning team shall address the short-term and long-term effects of wolf and prey habitat loss and fragmentation.</p> <p>5. The planning team shall address consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wolves and their prey.</p> <p>6. In all instances the planning team will give due consideration to the needs of subsistence harvesters, and otherwise to the traditional and cultural perspectives of Yukon First Nations.</p> <p>7. The planning team shall give full consideration to the planning goals as stated above, as well as Yukon, Federal and Yukon First Nation management goals and objectives as stated in the Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement.</p> <p>8. The planning team shall consider and make recommendations regarding wolf control/reduction including both technical and ethical aspects of implementing programs.</p> <p>9. The planning team shall address methods of reducing conflict between user groups.</p> <p>10. The planning team will address information and education requirements to help people understand wolves and their management.</p> <p>11. The planning team shall give consideration to existing government legislation, regulations and policy, including land claims management plans.</p>

objectives for wolf management. The *last* point was to recommend specific options for ensuring the long-term conservation of wolves and satisfying the greatest variety of public desires. These are honorable purposes, but when compared to the Yukon team's mandate they appear rather prosaic.

Foremost, the Yukon team members were asked to consider wolves and their prey as part of the total ecosystem rather than pursue single species management. This charge was paramount. Conservationists have been calling for such an approach for decades, and here it is defined as the team's primary purpose.

But the Yukon's list of goals does not stop there. Team members were also expected to ensure the genetic diversity of Yukon wolf populations, consider ongoing research and monitoring, address both short and long-term effects of habitat loss, address consumptive and nonconsumptive use, and give consideration to traditional perspectives and the First Nations agreements. They were directed explicitly to consider and make recommendations regarding both the technical and the *ethical* aspects of wolf control. Their last responsibility was to *consider* legislative and regulatory constraints. Like an after-thought, the latter implies that such constraints should be considered, but should not fetter the team's creativity and their opportunity to devise something entirely new.

Ecosystem management, genetic diversity, ongoing research, short and long-term effects, the ethics of wolf control—quite a heady list! Many people would consider it an honor, as well as a substantial—perhaps even intimidating—responsibility to be entrusted with such issues.

But these goals represent more than a tall order. They demonstrate the agency's faith in both the appropriateness and the ability of a team of "ordinary" citizens to make decisions on these difficult issues.

Furthermore, they are points with which most potential team members would agree, regardless of which side of the issue they are on. Thus, they became a call to action which a diverse group could respond to with both conviction and *unity*. Differences would arise and need to be hammered out, but the team could arrive at the table with a common, higher purpose which would help them through the trenches ahead.

"Make the goal something noble," wrote two experts on team building. "Something from which people can derive a sense of identity" (Larson and LaFasto 1989, 133).

This meaningful goal was provided in the Yukon. And it made a difference.

## II. Resource agencies—

### owners or stewards of the public trust?

The dictionary defines "owner" as one who has control over property. In many cases, the owner is free to make unilateral decisions on how the property will be managed. In contrast, it defines "steward" as one who manages someone *else's* property. A steward is expected to have technical skill and to work with the owner to determine how to meet the owner's needs while managing the resource so that it will continue to be productive.

These two definitions summarize the difference between the agency's role in Alaska (and to some extent BC) compared to that of the Yukon. Ask those following the ownership model why they conduct citizen participation, and they are likely to say "because the public demands it," "because it is required by law," or "to build support for our projects." Fundamentally, these agencies feel that *they* should make all the decisions concerning the resource and that the public simply gets in the way of "doing our job." Some of these agencies have public relations specialists who are hired to "sell" the agencies' projects. Others have no one on the staff trained in public involvement. Instead, the responsibility is given to a biologist, forester, or other resource specialist under "other duties as assigned." These people are expected to conduct public meetings, which often take place at night and can be very draining, while still performing their "real job" during the day.

In contrast, the stewardship model views public consultation as an essential part of the "real job." It sees public involvement as a process of obtaining direction from the owners of the resource—the public. In this case, the public is analogous to the stockholders who hire managers to conduct day-to-day operations and handle technical issues, yet they remain the real owners of the company and reserve the right to set overall management direction.

The ownership model makes adversaries of the agency and the public as they duel for control of the resource. The stewardship model makes them partners who contribute different skills toward their common goal of conservation and wise use. Both partners are important players in making sound decisions.

### ***Alaska—the agency as owner of the resource***

In Alaska, the process began as an effort to build support for wolf control and convert the public into an "understanding" that wolf control benefits everyone. Even after the team was disbanded, the department continued to see it as the *agency's—not* the



public's—clear mandate to determine management priorities for wildlife. As Bleiker emphasizes, "You as agency staff are the experts, you know what to do. You just need to convince the public that it *is the* right thing to do and that *you* are the right agency to do it." This statement is classic "agency-as-owner" rhetoric.

### **Technical versus value questions**

As one Alaska agency biologist put it, "The Department of Transportation doesn't select a group of the public and say, 'OK, you be our engineers and build this bridge.' OK?...*We* are the ones who have been to school. *We* should develop the plan...I mean *we're* the engineers."

But this analogy is inappropriate. Dispute resolution processes *do not* ask the public to build the bridge. Questions such as how much concrete is needed and whether the substrate is adequate are *technical*. Those with proper training must answer the technical questions. But EDS processes *do* ask the public to help answer the *value* questions involved in whether we need a bridge at all and what types of land uses, such as parks or neighborhoods, should be avoided.

During the wolf management conflict in Alaska, several ADFG staff became convinced that the ownership model is obsolete. As one senior staff member stated, "Biologists can tell the public what is *possible*. But we can't tell them what is *right*." The latter is a question for the public to answer.

Unfortunately, the directors of ADFG, as well as the political administration, were glued to the ownership model. They saw it as their legal mandate to make management decisions and felt they would be shirking their responsibilities if they allowed the public to have any more than minimal input.

### ***The Yukon—the agency as steward***

The Yukon Wildlife Branch viewed their role quite differently. They saw themselves as stewards of a resource that does not belong to the agency, but to the public as a whole. Just as a steward of a piece of property must take care of the land under the general direction of the owner, so the Branch turned to the public—the owners—and asked how to manage the ecosystems, wolves and all. At the same time, good stewards are not simply puppets, but technical experts who share their knowledge of what the resource can support.

According to Wildlife Branch biologist Bob Hayes, much of the difference in the success of the efforts was due to the different agency philosophies: "In the Yukon, we're

very clear about this. The agency can tell you about the biology, but when it comes to what people want—the social issues—that's for the public to decide and *that* is clearly the most important part of the puzzle on an issue like wolves." The role of the Branch was to serve the public, not to determine social priorities.

This approach is radically different from that in Alaska. In essence, the Branch told the team that "This is *not* a decision that we are trained to make, it's really an ethical one, and the citizen team is more appropriate to assume that responsibility. We'll give you technical support, we'll help you in any way we can, but this really is a decision that *you* should make."

Yet it was not as though the agency was left out of the process. While they were not a negotiator at the table, they were a close participant. They reviewed all the drafts, they gave feedback, they provided research information, and at least some of the team members put considerable weight on the input from the agency. But the agency did not dominate the process, they were not a voting member, and they left the room whenever the team wished to deliberate in private. Five of the six team members surveyed definitely preferred that the agency not be a member, while one didn't care.

Rather than adversaries, as is the case in the ownership model, the stewardship model makes the citizen team and the agency *interdependent partners* who are searching for a solution with mutual respect.

## ***The EDS Team as a Grass Roots Jury***

This difference in the agency's philosophy also changes how the team views itself. It is not an advisory group assembled to simply debate the pros and cons of the various options. In the Yukon, the team members were brought together to make a decision. As team member Patty Dension described it, the team was like a cloistered jury, trying not to bring in their personal biases until they had studied all the information.

It is as significant as it is unusual that this team was not a "who's who" of prominent organizations. On the contrary, it was a distinctly grass roots team of relatively unknown people who were not politically connected and were not under a media spotlight. Intentionally, the individual team members were not even identified in the plan they wrote. This is consistent with the analogy of a sequestered jury.

Society puts enormous trust in juries to weigh the evidence and make serious decisions that come as close to justice as humanly possible. Given the same level of faith and respect, an EDS team will view itself much like a jury that has come together to weigh the evidence and make a difficult resource decision.

### III. The Product

Importantly, the Yukon provides an example of an agreement that *did* survive a political about-face. They had an excellent design in other ways, but the participants felt that their detailed, balanced plan was the key that finally unlocked the political opposition. Because the Yukon Plan was specific, dealt with all of the issues, and had an outspoken base of public support on both sides, the new government eventually had no choice but to endorse it.

People may object to the government's current control program, but most of their objections are couched in terms of whether or not the team's plan is being followed. For what greater reward can a team hope?

The plan provides both a vision of where management should go and a clear road map for how to get there and thus it is not as vulnerable to interpretation as was the Alaska team's report. Two years after the Yukon team disbanded, the document continues to have substantial influence. People who were not involved in its development have nonetheless found it reasonable and well-balanced and have rallied to support it. The plan serves as a standard which the public will continue to use in evaluating the government's implementation over the coming years.

A team's purpose, participants, process, and political support are clearly vital to its success. But if you want a team to have lasting impact, do not underestimate the power of a sound document which does its best to steer a wise course.

### IV. Political Commitment and Understanding

A final factor in the Yukon's success was political commitment. Just as in Alaska, the political commitment and understanding were there at the outset, but then evaporated. But in this case, the process itself regained that commitment. This highly public process, which had an image of dealing fairly with the issue and had the appropriate representation, stood the test of a political overturn. When government officials said they were not going to use it, there was an outcry from all sides, forcing a return of the political commitment. Thus, even though the political commitment started to falter at the end, the process was structured so well and its public image was so positive that it could then restore the political commitment.

This demonstrates the importance of political as well as administrative understanding of what constitutes an effective dispute resolution process. If an agency is going to engage in such an effort, they must do it for the right reasons, they must be committed to

it, and—most of all—they must uphold their part of the bargain. They must have a thorough understanding of the complex characteristics of issues, interests, positions, consensus and compromise. They must know that tampering with a consensus agreement may cause it to collapse. They must comprehend the role these processes can play in decision making. And finally, they must be committed to the result.

Most of all, everyone involved needs to be forewarned and willing to accept the *grueling* effort a dispute resolution process will require. Yet they should also be aware of the potential reward: the extraordinary power such a process can have in settling a major controversy.

Politicians and agency leaders should embrace these processes as a means to help them through complex and controversial decisions. Few politicians like to have things blow up on them the way the Alaska plan did. Most would much rather have a situation like the Yukon where the group was able—in a fair and forthright manner—to say that "we don't like making this decision and we wish we didn't have to make it, but we do. It is our responsibility and we think this is what should be done." As such processes become more common, society may view and accept them much as they do the role of juries in our justice system.

## V. Summary

The British Columbia, Alaska and Yukon teams were comprised of real people with real values, hopes, feelings. They were a group of diverse and deeply committed individuals who confronted an issue and did their best to settle their differences. During the process they experienced the entire gamut of emotions—intense anger, defeat, humor and, finally, for some of them, a genuine sense of pride. This study has attempted to convey the heart-wrenching effort—as well as the excitement and the elation—so often a part of a team's struggle to reach consensus.

Because these processes are inherently very intense for the members, those establishing a team are obligated to smooth the road as best they can. One of the most effective ways of doing so is through a sound team design.

This research shows the correlation between team design and the success of negotiations. In the case of British Columbia, team design explains most of the difficulties the Group encountered. In Alaska, several elements of the design handicapped the effort, while in the Yukon, team design was its strongest asset.

This represents a first step in filling the need for empirical research on how to design effective negotiating teams for environmental disputes. While many of the design criteria

listed are not new in themselves, this study has attempted to compile a more comprehensive list than was available previously. It has also proposed a new way of conceptualizing the criteria in terms of five basic, essential categories. It helps to explain what some of the principal options are in designing teams and what benefits and costs may be associated with each. It also demonstrates how important team design is in the outcome of negotiations and makes an important link to the management literature on team effectiveness.

This research discovered five cardinal concepts that can make the difference between success and failure. First, the team's task and level of authority over that task must be carefully considered. Teams are likely to be more effective when given greater authority, when their task is a complete and meaningful whole, and when the purpose is a noble one which *all* of the members view as important.

Second, teams in environmental disputes are more likely to work when the convening agency views its role as steward—and the public's role as that of owner—of the resource. Agencies can provide technical support, but it is the team's responsibility, in representing the larger public, to determine the social and ethical priorities.

Third, the most successful team was not a “who's who” of prominent organizations. On the contrary, it was a distinctly grass roots team of relatively unknown people who were not politically connected and were not under a media spotlight. Unlike some high-profile task forces, the members of this team were not grandstanding or keeping an eye on their own personal gain or loss. They became more like a sequestered jury brought together to weigh the evidence and make the tough judgment calls.

Fourth, to have lasting impact, teams must produce a written agreement which includes both a vision of where management should go and a clear road map for how to get there.

Fifth, politicians and agency administrators must develop a thorough understanding of what these processes involve, for they are fundamentally different from traditional advisory committees. If agencies have faith in the participants, they will rise to the occasion, juggle many different concerns (including those of the agency) and strive for a wise agreement. Most participants make a *total* commitment to the process: they take their job very seriously and their lives will be deeply affected by it. Respect this. Don't let the team members be the only ones to make a commitment. Agencies must also be prepared to commit to the process, take an active role in it, and uphold their end of the agreement.

The world's human population, currently estimated to be 5.5 billion, is increasing and with it the pressure on our resource base. Differences of opinion over how we manage

our natural resources are certain to intensify. Environmental dispute resolution has enormous potential to settle many of these disputes in an egalitarian and creative manner, at lower cost, and faster than the traditional approaches and litigation we have seen in the past decade.

If the above caveats are adhered to, an EDS team can achieve significant results—even in cases where “fundamental values” are involved—and the agency, the public, and the resource itself can benefit greatly.

# List of Interview and Survey Respondents

## British Columbia Wolf Working Group

<u>Name</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Date Interviewed and/or Surveyed</u>
1. Ralph Archibald .....	Former Carnivore Specialist .....	Interviewed June 18, 1993 Wildlife Branch, BCME
2. Vivian Banci .....	Former Carnivore Specialist .....	Interviewed June 15, 1993 Wildlife Branch, BCME
3. Don Caldwell .....	Group member, representative .....	Interviewed June 9, 1994 of Guide Outfitters Association of BC Survey Returned June 1994
4. Rosemary Fox .....	Group member, representative .....	Interviewed March 8, 1994 of Sierra Club Survey Returned June 1994
5. Mike Green .....	Group member, representative .....	Interviewed June 21, 1993 of BC Trappers Association Survey Returned June 1994
6. Alton Harestad .....	Former team member.....	Interviewed June 16, 1993 Professor of Biological Sciences Survey Returned June 1994 Simon Fraser University
7. Peter McPherson .....	Group Facilitator .....	Interviewed June 17, 1993
8. Barbara Meredith.....	Team member, representative of .....	Survey Returned June 1994 Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society
9. Bill Munro.....	Deputy Director.....	Interviewed March 9, 1994 Wildlife Branch BC Ministry of Environment, Lands, and Parks
10. Sherry Pettigrew....	Team member, former .....	Interviewed March 9, 1994 representative and founder Survey Returned June 1994 of Northwest Wildlife Preservation Society
11. Don Robinson .....	Group member, representative .....	Interviewed June 18, 1993 of BC Wildlife Federation Survey Returned June 1994
12. Michael Sather .....	Group member, representative .....	Interviewed June 29, 1993

of Federation of B. C. Naturalists



## Alaska Wolf Management Team

<u>Name</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Date Interviewed and/or Surveyed</u>
1. Bob Ahgook .....	Team member, Eskimo hunter .....	June 8, 1994
2. Dick Bishop .....	Former regional supervisor ADFG..... current lobbyist for Alaska Outdoor Council (AOC)	June 3, 1992
3. Valerie Brown.....	Team member..... Former Executive Director Alaska Wildlife Alliance	June 3, 1992 Survey Returned June 1994
4. Scott Bothwell.....	Team member..... Member of AOC	June 22, 1991 Survey Returned June 1994
5. Dick Burley.....	Chairman Board of Game .....	July 16, 1992
6. Bud Burris.....	Retired Wildlife Biologist..... Member AOC	July 10, 1992
7. David Cline .....	Team member..... Executive Director National Audubon Society, Alaska Region	July 6, 1992 Survey Returned June 1994
8. Ray Collins .....	Team Member .....	July 10, 1992
	Member, McGrath Advisory Committee	Survey Returned June 1994
9. Peggy Cowan .....	Team Member .....	Survey Returned June 1994
	Education specialist	
10. Dale Haggstrom .....	Wildlife Biologist, ADFG.....	June 4, 1992 October 16, 1992
11. Sam Harbo .....	Retired Wildlife Biologist..... Former Board of Game member	July 10, 1992
12. Cathie Harms.....	Wildlife Biologist, ADFG.....	June 4, 1992

13. John Hechtel ..... Wildlife Biologist, ADFG ..... June 22, 1992
14. Larry Holmes ..... Team member ..... July 1, 1992  
       Member of Alaska                      Survey Returned June 1994  
       Bowhunters Assoc.
15. Robert Heyano ..... Team member, Alaska Native ..... May 20, 1994  
    Survey Returned June 1994

## Alaska Wolf Management Team

- | <u>Name</u>                | <u>Role</u>  | <u>Date Interviewed<br/>and/or Surveyed</u> |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| 16. David Kelleyhouse..... | Director, Wildlife Conservation, ADFG .....  | July 21, 1993                               |
| 17. Connie Lewis.....      | Team Facilitator .....   | May 26, 1992                                |
| 18. Chuck McMahon .....    | Team Member, Big Game Guide .....  | January 25, 1994                            |
| 19. Doug Pope .....        | Former Chairman, Board of Game.....  | June 30, 1992                               |
| 20. Wayne Regelin.....     | Team member .....<br>Deputy Director, Wildlife Conservation,<br>ADFG   | June 29, 1992                               |
| 21 Katharine Richardson... | Member Fairbanks Advisory Committee .....  | May 26, 1992                                |
| 22. Anne Ruggles .....     | Team member .....<br>Wildlife Biologist                      Survey Returned June 1994<br>Currently on Board of Game | May 5, 1992                                 |
| 23. John Schoen.....       | Wildlife Biologist, ADFG .....   | July 9, 1992                                |
| 24. Chris Smith.....       | Regional Supervisor, Wildlife Conservation .....   | June 19, 1992                               |

Division for Fairbanks, ADFG

25. Bob Stephenson..... Wolf Biologist, ADFG..... June 18, 1992
26. Dave van den Berg ..... Northern Alaska ..... June 24, 1992  
Environmental Center
27. Skip Wallen..... Former Board of Game Member ..... July 6, 1992  
December 2, 1992
28. Dean Wilson..... Team member..... July 8, 1992  
Fur buyer, trapper Survey Returned June 1994

## Yukon Wolf Management Team

<u>Name</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Date Interviewed and/or Surveyed</u>
1. Jim Babala .....	Team Member, ..... Outfitter	March 8, 1994 Survey Returned June 1994
2. John Bailey .....	Team Facilitator .....	June 28, 1993 March 30, 1994
3. Bill Brewster.....	Minister of Renewable Resources.....	July 9, 1993
4. Patty Denison.....	Team member .....	June 23, 1993 Survey Returned June 1994
5. Larry DuGuay.....	Process Coordinator ..... Wildlife Branch, Yukon Renewable Resources	July 5, 1993
6. Scott Gilbert.....	Team Member..... Wildlife Biologist	Survey Returned June 1994
7. Bob Hayes .....	Wolf Biologist, ..... Yukon Renewable Resources	June 18, 1993
8. Bob Jickling.....	Team member ..... Professor of Environmental Ethics Yukon College, Whitehorse	June 24, 1993 Survey Returned June 1994
9. Dan McDiarmid.....	Team member ..... Trapper and fisherman	March 9, 1994 Survey Returned June 1994

10. Juanita Sydney ..... Team member and ..... June 4, 1994  
First Nations representative      Survey Returned June 1994
11. Frances Woolsey ..... Team member and ..... Survey Returned June 1994  
First Nations representative

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